Allahabad High Court
Samaidin vs D.M. on 28 March, 2018
Author: Siddharth
Bench: Siddharth
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R Court No. - 28 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 5868 of 1991 Petitioner :- Samaidin Respondent :- D.M. Counsel for Petitioner :- R.N. Ojha,P.K. Ganguli Counsel for Respondent :- S.C. Hon'ble Siddharth,J.
Heard Sri P. K. Ganguli, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents.
The petitioner has filed this writ petition, praying for quashing for order dated 10.12.1990, passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Basti and the order dated 12.12.1990, passed by Prabhari Naib Tehsildar, Tehsil Sadar, District Basti. Further prayer has been made for a direction to the respondents from not interfering in the functioning of the petitioner as Collection Amin, Tehsil Basti, District Basti.
The brief facts of the petition are that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Seasonal Collection Amin in the year 1976 in Tehsil Harraiya, District Basti. The post of Seasonal Collection Amin is transferable and therefore the petitioner was transferred from one place to the other within District Basti. On 28.10.1988, the petitioner made a representation before the District Magistrate, Basti, praying for substantive appointment on the post of Collection Amin on the post falling vacant on account of death of one Ram Adhar, Collection Amin, who was a schedule caste employee like the petitioner. A junior employee, Raja Ram, was being appointed on the substantive post aforesaid and therefore, the petitioner objected and thereafter the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Harraiya, Basti prepared a seniority list and the name of petitioner was recommended by him for appointment on the substantive post in the order of seniority. By the order dated 08.05.1989, the District Magistrate appointed him on the substantive post of Collection Amin. The petitioner was medically examined by the Chief Medical Officer on the direction of the Sub Divisional Magistrate. On 17.02.1990, the petitioner sought transfer from Tehsil Harraiya to Tehsil Basti Sadar and the District Magistrate by his order dated 20.03.1990 permitted his transfer as per his prayer and transfer order dated 26.02.1990 was issued to him by the Additional District Magistrate, Basti. The petitioner joined his duties at Tehsil Basti Sadar on 01.03.1990.
By the order dated 10.12.1990, the Sub Divisional Magistrate directed the Naib Tehsildar, Prabhari and Tehsildar Basti Sadar to relieve the petitioner from the post of Collection Amin. By the order dated 12.12.1990, the Prabhari Naib Tehsildar Collection, directed the petitioner to submit all his papers in the Collection Office and be relieved from duty. Against these orders, the petitioner has approached this Court and by the interim order dated 06.03.1991, the operation of the order dated 10.12.1990 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate Basti was stayed.
A Counter Affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondents stating that the petitioner was appointed by the Pargana Adhikari Harraiya, District Basti on 08.05.1989, on temporary basis for one year which came to an end on 07.05.1990. The petitioner got himself transferred from Harraiya to Tehsil Sadar Basti by misrepresentation of fact and in collusion with employees that he is a permanent employee. No appointment letter was issued to the petitioner. The services of the petitioner were not terminated by the order dated 12.12.1990 but he was only directed to contact the Additional District Magistrate (Finance & Revenue). In subsequent paragraph it has been stated that the petitioner has been relieved from his job and since he was not depositing the papers, the Station House Officer was informed.
The petitioner has filed his Rejoinder Affidavit stating that he was initially appointed as Seasonal Collection Amin by the District Magistrate Basti on 16.08.1976 and the Service Book of the petitioner was prepared, wherein, his date of appointment is mentioned. On 09.07.1976, a list of Collection Amins was prepared. 28 persons were listed as Collection Amin and the name of the petitioner found place at Sl.No.20 as Schedule Caste Candidate. Ram Shankar, Budh Ram & Om Prakash were promoted as Naib Tehsildar, when they were junior to the petitioner, the petitioner was appointed on substantive vacancy and there was no question of termination of his services after one year. The District Magistrate has power to transfer Collection Amin from one Tehsil to the other under Rule-29(1). The writ petition was dismissed on 18.12.1997 on account of appointment of Sri R.N.Ojha, Advocate as Standing Counsel of the State of U.P., who was the Counsel for the petitioner. On the Recall Application of the petitioner, the order dated 18.12.1997 was recalled on 05.04.2013. The petitioner was reinstated in his service, thereafter on the post of Collection Amin, but was paid fixed salary of Rs.12,000/- per month without any increment and other service benefits.
The petitioner has filed a Supplementary Affidavit dated 12.03.2018, bringing on record the photocopy of his service book which records his date of appointment as 16.08.1976. It is mentioned in the Service Book that as per the Government Order dated 03.06.1989, his pay is fixed in pay scale of Rs.950-20-1150-EB-25-1500 by the order dated 11.02.1990 of Parganadhikari and his pay was fixed at Rs.970/- w.e.f., 01.06.1989. His transfer from Tehsil Harraiya to Tehsil Basti has also been mentioned in the Service Book. It has been averred that the petitioner has retired on 30.03.2017, working on the post of Collection Amin.
The learned Standing Counsel was granted time on 12.03.2018 to obtain instructions on the averments made in the Supplementary Affidavit, regarding the Service Book of the petitioner filed therewith and 19.03.2018 was fixed. On 19.03.2018, on the request of learned Standing Counsel, case was posted on 21.03.2018 and then on 28.03.2018 when a Supplementary Counter Affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondents, wherein they have not replied to the averments regarding the Service Book of the petitioner and the mentioning of his date of appointment as Seasonal Collection Amin on 16.08.1976. The Supplementary Counter Affidavit only states that the petitioner is an adhoc employee and was appointed just for one year and his adhoc appointment came to an end on 09.05.1989.
Since there is no denial of the fact that the petitioner was not appointed in 1976 and the copy of the Service Book filed by the petitioner along with his Supplementary Affidavit dated 12.03.2018 has also not been disputed, therefore the learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the order dated 10.12.1990 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate Basti and the order dated 12.12.1990 passed by the Prabhari Naib Tehsildar, Tehsil Basti are arbitrary and illegal. The petitioner was appointed as permanent collection Amin by the District Magistrate on 20.02.1990 and therefore the order dated 10.12.1990 and 12.12.1990 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate and Prabhari Naib Tehsildar are illegal. They have no authority to pass the impugned orders. The petitioner was appointed on the substantive vacancy on the post reserved for Schedule Caste as per Government Order dated 18.02.1964 which provided that in the vacancy arising out of removal or retirement of a Schedule Caste employee only schedule caste candidates should be appointed. The State Government issued a notification dated 22.09.1978 subsequently directing the authorities to comply the earlier Government Order strictly in the matter of appointment of scheduled caste employees. The petitioner was appointed on the substantive post and the respondents have passed illegal orders dispensing with his services.
The learned Standing Counsel has argued that the petitioner was only an adhoc appointee and has no right to challenge the impugned orders which were passed after his term of appointment came to an end. He was never regularized in service and can not claim any right to the post. He got appointment by practicing fraud and in collusion with the Teshil employees.
Heard Counsel for the parties.
A perusal of the order dated 08.05.1989, passed by the Parganadhikari, Harraiya, District Basti, Annexure No.3 to the writ petition, states that in pursuance of the order dated 04.05.1989 passed by the District Magistrate, the petitioner is appointed on the post of Collection Amin on temporary and adhoc basis. In the letter dated 09.05.1985 of the Tehsildar, Harraiya addressed to the Chief Medical Officer, Basti, Annexure No.5 to the writ petition, the petitioner has been mentioned as temporary/ adhoc Collection Amin.
The services of the petitioner as temporary/adhoc employee could not have been terminated without following the procedure of giving one months pay and notice by the respondents. Further it has come in the Counter Affidavit filed by the respondents that the petitioner who was working in Tehsil Harraiya and he was appointed on the post of Collection Amin on temporary basis for one year, which was to come to an end on 07.05.1990. The petitioner by misrepresentation of fact got his transfer to Tehsil Sadar Basti and in collusion with the employees of the office got his appointment mentioned as permanent. He states that his appointing authority is District Magistrate, when the appointment letter which he claims to be the basis of permanent appointment has been issued by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Harraiya, Basti.
Therefore, it is clear that the services of the petitioner were not terminated as termination simpliciter, but by way of stigma of misrepresentation of fact and mentioning his status of employment wrongly in collusion with the other employees. It is settled law that where the services of temporary Government Servant is terminated without casting any stigma, then the employee has no case of assailing such an order.
It is settled principle of law that even a temporary government servant charged for mis-conduct is entitled to face regular enquiry. Regular enquiry means after service of charge-sheet and receipt of reply to the charge-sheet, oral evidence should be recorded with opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Thereafter, the delinquent employee has a right to lead evidence in defence and opportunity of personal hearing should be given by the enquiry officer vide 1990 LCD 486 Jagdish Prasad Singh versus State of U.P., 1998 LCD 199 Avatar Singh versus State of U.P., 1979 Vl. I SCC 60 Town Area Committee, Jalalabad versus Jagdish Prasad, 1980 Vol. 3 SCC 459 Managing Director, U.P. Welfare Housing Corporation versus Vijay Narain Bajpai, 1998(6) SCC 651 State of U.P. versus Shatrughan Lal, 1998 SC 117 Chandrama Tewari versus Union of India and others and 1985 SC 1121 Anil Kumar versus Presiding Officer and others.
Simpliciter order of termination under 1975 Rules may be passed in case the Government does not require the services of the employee for reasonable cause or a decision is taken keeping in view the service rendered by the temporary government servant for dis-continuance of service. Thus, in the matter of temporary government servant, if the motive for termination of service is innocuous and based on requirement and it can not be faulted. However, in case the foundation of the order of termination even if it is simplicitor, is mis-conduct or punitive in nature, then the employees shall be entitled for the protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. Special Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court (Seven Hon'ble Judges) in the case reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192 Shamsher Singh versus State of Punjab and another, had distinguished the motive and foundation. Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "only the form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment. Even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the facts and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision of Art. 311. In such a case the simplicity of the form of the order will not give any sanctity".
In the case of Samsher Singh, Justice Krishna Iyer as a member of the Bench observed that the "Constitution is a declaration of Articles of faith and not compilation of law and there should not be any confusion for the constitutional rights and privilege". While relying upon the legal proposition as settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gopi Kishore, AIR 1960 SC 689, His Lordship ruled that "where the State holds an enquiry on the basis of complaints of mis-conduct against a probationer or temporary servant, the employer must be presumed to have abandoned his right to terminate simpliciter and to have undertaken disciplinary proceedings bringing in its wake the protective operation of Article 311. At first flush, the distinguishing mark would therefore appear to be the holding of an inquiry into the complaints of misconduct" (para 157, page 2231).
His Lordship again proceeded to observe that "real motive behind the removal is irrelevant and the holding of an enquiry leaving an indelible stain as a consequence alone attracts Article 311(2). What is decisive means whether the order is by way of punishment, in the light of the tests laid down in Purshottam Lal Dhingra's case AIR 1958 SC 36". (para 158).
Samsher Singh's case was again reiterated and explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1980 SC 1896 Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited, etc. etc. versus Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and others. While considering distinction between motive and foundation, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "'master and servant' cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal."
In a case reported in (1991) 3 SCC 291 Om Prakash Goel versus Himanchal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Limited, Shimla and another, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in a case of an order of termination even that of a temporary employee the court has to see whether the order was made on the ground of mis-conduct. If such a complaint was made and in that process the court would examine the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation of the order complained of and if the court is satisfied that the termination of services is not so innocuous as claimed to be and if the circumstances further disclose that it is only a camouflage with a view to avoid an enquiry as warranted by Article 311(2) of the Constitution, then such a termination is liable to be quashed. (para 4) In the case of Om Prakash Goel (supra), regular charge-sheet was served along with documents and the delinquent employee has replied to the charge-sheet. Thereafter, the order of termination was passed without referring the charge-sheet. Hon'ble Supreme Court treated it as an order of dismissal and quashed the termination order.
In a case, reported in (1999)2 SCC 21 Radhey Shyam Gupta versus U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Limited and another, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
"27. In other words, it will be a case of motive if the master, after gathering some prima facie facts, does not really wish to go into their truth but decides merely not to continue a dubious employee. The master does not want to decide or direct a decision about the truth of the allegations. But if he conducts an enquiry only for the purpose of proving the misconduct and the employee is not heard, it is a case where the enquiry is the foundation and the termination will be bad.
The principle enunciated by aforesaid judgment (supra) has been reiterated in the case, reported in (1999)3 SCC 60 Dipti Prakash Banerjee versus Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others.
In the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "Material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in termination order of a probationer but might be contained in documents referred to in the termination order or in its annexures."
In the case reported in (2000)5 SCC 152 Chandra Prakash Shahi versus State of U.P. and others, Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the previous judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid principle and observed that in case after scrutiny it is found that the order of termination is passed on mis-conduct, then such order shall amount to dismissal from service.
In the case reported in (2000)3 SCC 588 Nar Singh Pal versus Union of India and others, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where during pendency of the criminal trial, an order of termination is passed on account of involvement in criminal case, it shall not amount to simpliciter order of retrenchment and shall be punitive amounting to dismissal.
In another case reported in (2001)10 SCC 83 A.P. State Federation of Coop. Spinning Mills Limited and another versus P.V. Swaminathan while considering a question as to whether the order of termination is simpliciter or punitive, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even if an order of termination is simpliciter, the Court is not debarred from looking at the attendant circumstance, namely the circumstances prior to the issuance of order of termination to find out whether the alleged inefficiency really was the motive for the order of termination or formed the foundation for the same. (paras 3 and 4) Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle in the cases reported in (2001)9 SCC 318 Bank of India versus Indu Rajagopalan and others, (2002)10 SCC 394 Shailaja Shivajirao Patil versus President, Hon'ble Khasdar UGS Sanstha and others, (2003)2 SCC 386 Dhananjay versus Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Jalna , (2003)3 SCC 263 Mathew P. Thomas versus Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Limited and others and (2004)11 SCC 743 State of Punjab and others versus Balbir Singh.
In the case of Balbir Singh(supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in order to determine whether the mis-conduct is motive or foundation of order of termination, the test to be applied is to ask the question as to what was the "object of the enquiry". If an enquiry or an assessment is done with the object of finding out any misconduct on the part of the employee and for that reason his services are terminated, then it would be punitive in nature. On the other hand, if such an enquiry or an assessment is aimed at determining the suitability of an employee for a particular job, such termination would be termination simpliciter and not punitive in nature. The nature of enquiry is another factor to ascertain the punitiveness of the order of termination.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Balbir Singh (supra) further held that when the termination is preceded by a full-scale formal enquiry into allegations involving misconduct which culminated in the finding of guilt, then such order may be punitive (paras 7 and 11).
Again Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle in the cases reported in (2005)13 SCC 652 State of U.P. and others versus Ashok Kumar, (2005)6 SCC 135 State of U.P. and others versus Vijay Shanker Tripathi, (2006)9 SCC 167 Hari Ram Maurya versus Union of India and others, (2008)2 SCC 479 Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan versus Mehbub Alam Laskar and (2008)3 SCC 386 Union of India and others versus Rajesh Vyas.
In a recent judgment reported in (2007)10 SCC 71 Jaswant singh Pratap singh Jadeja versus Rajkot Municipal Corporation, Hon'ble Supreme Court held in para 9 as under :
"The tests governing termination of probation is no longer res integra. When a disciplinary enquiry is initiated on the premise that there are serious allegations of misconduct on the part of the delinquent officer; his explanation thereupon had been rejected pursuant whereto a full-scale formal enquiry has been initiated culminating in a finding of guilt, the order terminating the service would be held to be stigmatic. There may also be cases where the allegations involved moral turpitude on the part of the delinquent officer. The language used in the order of termination of service may ex facie be stigmatic. The language used therein may also show that there was something over and above the assertion that the officer was found unsuitable for the job. The aforementioned tests, however, are not exhaustive."
In view of the legal position, in case the respondents wanted to dispense with the services of the petitioner, they were required to give him notice and after conducting enquiry against the alleged misconduct of the petitioner, they could have passed the order of major punishment of doing away with the services of the petitioner. It is also notable that the respondents have not stated the correct facts in their Counter Affidavit. The petitioner is proved to have been working since 1976 by the own document of the respondents i.e., the Service Book of the petitioner, which has not been disputed. Therefore, the case of the petitioner has been disputed on the basis of false averments.
The petitioner has performed temporary/ adhoc service from 1976 to 1989 on the post of Seasonal Collection Amin and thereafter on the post of Collection Amin since 01.03.1990 and has retired as such on 30.03.2017. In the State of U.P. even the continuous temporary service of 10 years entitles a Government Servant to get pension.
In the case of Yashwant Hari Katakkar Vs. Union of India and others, (1996)7 SCC 113, wherein it has been held in paragraph no.3, " Dr.Anand Prakash, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Union of India, has contented that on 7.3.1980 when the appellant was prematurely retired he had put in 18 ½ years of quasi-permanent service. According to him, to earn pension it was necessary to have a minimum of 10 years of permanent service. It is contented that since the total service of the appellant was in quasi permanent capacity he was not entitled to the pensionary benefit. There is nothing on the record to show as to why the appellant was not made permanent even when he had served the Government for 18 ½ years. It would be travesty of justice if the appellant is denied the pensionary benefits simply on the ground that he was not a permanent employee of the Government. The appellant having served the Government for almost two decades it would be unfair to treat him as temporary /quasi-permanent . Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case we hold that the appellant shall be deemed to have become permanent after he served the Government for such a long period. The services of the appellant shall be treated to be in permanent capacity and he shall be entitled to the pensionary benefits. We allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Tribunal and direct the respondents to treat the appellant as having been retired from service on 7.3.1980 after serving the Government for 18 ½ years (more than 10 years of permanent service) and as such his case for grant of pension be finalized within six months from the receipt of this order. The appellant shall be entitled to all the arrears of pension from the date of retirement. No costs."
In the case of Kedar Ram Vs. State of U.P. and others, C.M.W.P. No.26668 of 2002, wherein regarding Fundamental Rules 56 (e) it has been held:-
"56(e). A retiring pension shall be payable and other retirement benefits, if any, shall be available in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the relevant rules to every Government servant who retires or is retired or allowed to retire under this rule.
Provided that where a Government servant who voluntarily retires or is allowed voluntarily to retire under this rule the appointing authority may allow him, for the purposes of person and gratuity, if any, the benefit of additional service of five years or of such period as he would have served if he had continued till the ordinary date of his superannuation, whichever be less."
As per Government Order dated 1st July, 1989 (Annexure ''7' to the writ petition), the State Government has clarified that a government employee, who has put in 10 years of regular service, would qualify to receive pension. Qualifying service has been defined under Regulation 361 of Section 1 of Chapter XVI of the Civil Service Regulation, which provides that the service of an officer does not qualify for person unless it conforms to the following three conditions.
" First - The service must be under Government.
Second- The employment must be substantive and permanent.
Third- The service must be paid by Government Admittedly, the 1st and 3rd conditions are met. The petitioner was in the service of the Government and was also paid the salary by the Government. The question is whether the employment of the petitioner was substantive and permanent? This question has been answered by a Division Bench of this Court in Board of Revenue and others Vs. Prasidh Narain Upadhyaya, (2006) 1 ESC 611, wherein the Court held that in view of the provisions of Rule 56 (c) of the U.P. Fundamental Rules even a temporary employee is entitled to receive pension. The Court held that a person, who had worked for 37 years, would be entitled for pension, and the same can not be brushed aside on the ground that his service remained temporary.
Similar view was also held in the case of Dr. HariShankar Asopa Vs. Sate of U.P. and Ors. 1989 ACJ 337 in Writ Petition No.49080 of 2000 (Bhikhari Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.), decided on 06.08.2007, wherein the claim of the employee for pension, who had retired as a temporary seasonal collection peon, was allowed and it was held that the said temporary employee was entitled for pension and other retirement benefits. The said judgment is squarely applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case.
In view of the aforesaid, the petitioner has made out a case for issuance of a writ of mandamus. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and a mandamus is issued to the respndents to grant pension and other retirement benefits to the petitioner. The said calculation shall be made and the amount disbursed by the authorities within three months from the date of furnishing a certified copy of this order.
In the case of Ram Pratap Shukla vs. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (3) AWC 2909 wherein this Court has decided the meaning of ''10 years of regular service' for the purposes of pension has follows:-
"16. The standing counsel has submitted and laid much emphasis on the word " Dus Varsh Ki Niyamit Seva" as used in Government order dated 1.7.1989. The submission of the learned standing counsel is that the petitioner was a work charge employee and has not completed 10 years of regular service, as such, he is not entitled for pensionary benefits. The words "regular service' has not been defined in the Government order. From the repelling of the aforesaid Government order, it is clear that words "ten years regular service" has ben referred to the service rendered and not to the status of employee, an employee substantively appointed and permanent automatically entitled for pension. If he has rendered a considerable period of service. The Government order dated 1.7.1989 does not contemplate the ten years substantive service. The emphasis is that the service should be regular and the Apex Court in the Judgement in AIR 1980 SC 1464 (supra) has observed as follows:
To begin with the word regular is derived from the word ''regular' which means '' rule' and its first the legitimate signification, according to Webster, is conformable to a rule or agreeable to an established rule, law, or principle to a prescribed mode . In words and Phrases (Vol. 36A. P 241) the word regular has been defined as steady or uniform in course practice or occurrence etc., and implies conformity to a rule standard or pattern. It is further stated in the said Book that ''regular' means steady or uniform in course, practice or occurrence not subject to unexplained or irrational variation. The word ''regular' means in a regular manner, methodically, in due under. Similarly, Webster's New World Dictionary defines ''regular' as ''consistent or habitual in action not changing uniform. Conforming to a standard or to a generally accepted rule or mode of conduct.
The petitioner was never considered for regularization in service as per the Rule-5, of the U.P. Collection Amins' Service Rules, 1974. The averment of the respondents that the post of Seasonal Amin is non transferable is falsified from the Rule-29 of the aforesaid Rules which provides that the Collection Amins can be transferred from one Tehsil to the other, normally within the District.
Therefore in view of the above consideration and the irresponsible and false objections raised on behalf of the respondents, against settled law and correct facts, the impugned orders dated 10.12.1990, passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Basti and the order dated 12.12.1990, passed by Prabhari Naib Tehsildar, Tehsil Sadar, District Basti are hereby quashed. The petitioner is held entitled to the arrears of difference of salary w.e.f., 05.04.2013 and all other benefits of continuity of service till the date of his superannuation on 30.03.2017. Since the date of his superannuation, the petitioner is held entitled to get post retiral benefits in accordance with law and also arrears of pension with 7% simple interest within a period of 2 months from the date of production of the certified copy of this order before the respondent no.1, District Magistrate, Basti. The period of break in service on account of dismissal of writ petition in default shall not entitle the petitioner to claim any salary, however, this period shall not be treated as break in service of the petitioner for computing his post retiral dues.
The writ petition is allowed to the extent stated above.
No order as to costs.
Order Date :- 28.3.2018 SS