Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Shanthi Tarachand vs C.S. Narasimha Rao And Others on 12 July, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(4)ALD578, 2000(4)ALT426, 2000 A I H C 3950, (2000) 2 RENCJ 338, (2001) 1 RENTLR 83, (2000) 4 ANDHLD 578, (2000) 4 ANDH LT 426
Author: I. Venkatanarayana
Bench: I. Venkatanarayana
ORDER
1.The revison petitioner is Ihe tenant. Respondent No.l-landlord filed RC No.272 of 1988 on the file of the learned Additional Rent Controller, Secunderabad seeking eviction under Section 10(2)(iii) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereafter referred to as 'tlie Act') seeking eviction of the tenant from the schedule premises on the ground that the tenant has committed acts of waste which materially imparted the value and utility of the premises. The factual matrix of the case of the petitioner before the learned Rent Controller is set out as hereiindcr:
The petitioner-landlord is the owner of the premises bearing No. 108/6, Park Lane, Secunderabad which consists of ground floor and first floor. Late Sri Tarachand, husband of the tenant, has obtained premises on rent from the landlord's grandfather through a letter dated 3-11-1972 intimating the tenant about the execution of the lease deed and also the attornment of the premises in favour of the petitioner. Thus the petitioner became the landlord of the scheduled premises. The tenants-respondents before the learned Rent Controller are the legal representatives of late Tarachand and Premchand, It is the case of the landlord-petitioner lhat the tenant has made material alterations in the schedule property unauthorised ly and without consent of the petitioner which has impaired the utility of the building. The petition was resisted on the ground that the tenant has obtained prior permission to make alterations with a view to start a hotel business in the premises and that in fact the tenant has improved the schedule premises by investing amounts and that the value of the property increased. The learned Rent Controller on a detailed enquiry based on the oral and documentary evidence found that there was no oral consent obtained by the tenant and Exs.C! to C54 establishes that the tenant has made material alternations and committed acts of waste and thus impaired the utility of the building from the point of view of the landlord and ordered eviction. The tenant filed the appeal under Section 20 of the Act before the learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, who in turn confirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the learned Rent Controller and the appellate authority, the tenant has filed the present revison petition under Section 22 of the Act.
2. Ms. Anita Ahuja, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has assailed the order of the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Court and contended that they are unsustainable. It is her contention that the alterations tnade do not impair or diminish the value of the property but only enhance the real value of the suit schedule premises. It is her contention that mere alterations to the building to suit the convenience of the tenant for doing business cannot be said as material alterations. She placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Sana Optics v. Shyam Sunder Bhargava and others, 1997(I)ALD 628, for the proposition that mere want of consent of the landlord for the change or additions does not constitute as an act of waste. She also brought to my notice the judgment of the Punjab and Ilaryana High Court in Gobitid Ram v. Smt. Kaushalya Rani and others, 1983 (1) P&H 295. She also placed reliance on another judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Darshan Kumar v. Kaka Ram. 1991 (2) All India Rent Control Journal 155. The aforementioned judgments have dealt with each case adverting to the nature of the alternations and ultimately held that each case has to be analysed to decide whether the alterations made by the tenant have impaired the material value or utility of the demised building.
3. Sri M. Ramachattdra Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents contended that what was let out to the tenant was a house under Ex.PL Though Ex.Pl does not mention the purpose for which is was let out it does not disclose that the premises was let out for commercial purpose or non-residential purpose. It is his contention that the alterations made will not leave the property in the same condition as it was let out. He further submitted that the impairment or alteration has to be viewed from the point of view of the landlord and not from the point of view of the tenant. He placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in M.S. Reddi v. T.A.P.S. Raghavan, , for the proposition that any alteration or impairment of the building has to be viewed from the point of view of the landlord and that should constitute a valid ground for tenant's eviction. This legal proposition was affirmed by the Apex Court in Gurbachan Singh v. Shivalak Rubber Industries, . The Apex Court had an occassion to deal with the expressions "impaire materially" and "value". The Apex Court has also held that ultimately the impairment or deterioration of the building has to be judged from the point of view of the landlord and not from the point of view of the tenant or any one else. The Apex Court has held as follows:
"Section 13(2Xiii) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act contemplates that a tenant is liable to eviction who has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land. The meaning of the expression "to impair materially"
in common parlance would mean to diminish in quality, strength or value substantially. In other words to make a thing or substance worse and deteriorate.... The word 'impair' cannot be said to have a fixed meaning. It is a relative term affording different meaning in different context and situations. Here in the context the term "impair materially" has been used to mean, considerable decrease in quality which may be measured with reference to the antecedent state of tilings as it existed earlier in point of time as compared to a later stage after the alleged change is made or effected suggesting impairment. Further the use of the word 'value' means intrinsic worth of a thing. In other words utility of an object satisfying, directly or indirectly, the needs or desires of a person. Thus, the ground for eviction of a tenant would be available to a landlord against the tenant under Section 13(2Xiii) of the Act if it is established that the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to diminish the quality, strength or value of the building or rented land to such an extent that the intrinsic worth or fitness of the building or the rented land has considerably affected its use for some desirable practical purpose. The decrease or deterioration, in other words the impairment of the worth and usefulness or the value and utility of the building or rented land has to be judged and determined from the point of view of the landlord and not of the tenant or any one else' The learned Counsel for the respondents further contended that the tenant has set up the theory that there was an oral consent and both the Courts found that the oral consent was not proved and no document has been filed in their defence of oral consent. Having failed in the plea of oral consent, it is not for the tenant now to set up plea that the alterations does not deteriorate the value of the property.
4. The Appellate Court has conduced a detailed enquiry and relied upon clause (5) of the Rental Agreement which clearly states "tenant is specifically prohibited from sub-letting house or making alterations or pulling any fixtures without the consent in writing of the landlord". Based on this clause the Appellate Court has held that the tenant has violated the terms and conditions of the agreement and it is not open to the tenant to set up that there was an oral consent. Further, a reading of the Rental Agreement shows that the house was leased out for residential purpose and it not leased out for commercial premises. Once it is leased out for residential purpose, it should be kept like a house only and it cannot be converted into a non-residential premises or as a 'hotel'. At Ihe time of leaving the premises the tenant should be in a position to leave it as a house and not as a 'hotel' or as a 'commercial premises'. In this case, as rightly held by both the Courts below, putting up shutters necessarily results in the removal of the doorways and meddling with the material value of the building. Both the Courts have concurrently found that there was material alteration to the building and I do not find that it is a fit case warranting interference under Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. This Court as a revisional authority has to satisfy itself as to the legality, regularity or of propriety of such proceedings. The dominant idea conveyed under the Revisional Jurisdiction is one of essentially power of superintendence. This Court while exercising the powers under Section 22 of the Act cannot arrogate itself as an appellate authority and cannot go into the questions of fact already decided by both the Courts. The concurrent findings based on evidence that the tenant has made material alterations cannot be interfered with by this Court as a revisional authority. There is no merit in the revision and it is liable to be dismissed.
5. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The revision petitioner-tenant is given six months time to vacate the premises on the condition that the petitioner deposits the arrears and continue to deposit the future rents regularly.