Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Ravi Gupta S/O Shri Kedar Mal Gupta vs Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur on 18 July, 2019
Bench: Mohammad Rafiq, Narendra Singh Dhaddha
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10022/2019
Arti Meena D/o Shri Dhanji Lal Meena, Aged About 27 Years, R/o
Quarter No. 143, Railway Colony, Sawaimadhopur Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Its Registrar.
----Respondent
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10100/2019
Sugandha Gupta W/o Shri Devkrishna Purohit, Aged About 30
Years, R/o 54-Type-3, Income Tax Colony, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur,
Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.The Honble High Court For Judicature Of Rajasthan, Through
Registrar General, Jodhpur.
2.The Honble High Court For Judicature Of Rajasthan, Through
Registrar (Examination) Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10217/2019
Kiran Meena D/o Late Shri Ram Swaroop Meena, Aged About 34
Years, R/o 47Ka-1, Jyoti Nagar, Housing Board Colony, Near
Vidhan Sabha, Jaipur 302005
----Petitioner
Versus
1.The Honble High Court For Judicature Of Rajasthan, Through
Registrar General Jodhpur.
2.The Honble High Court For Judicature Of Rajasthan, Through
Registrar (Examination) Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10570/2019
Jigyasa Arya D/o Shri Ramesh Kumar Arya, Aged About 23 Years,
Caste- Sain, R/o 33/115, Varun Path, Mansarovar, Jaipur (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Through Registrar General, Rajasthan
High Court, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur.
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10705/2019
Vishal Kataria S/o Shri S R Kataria, Aged About 25 Years, R/o 24,
Tagore Nagar, Dcm, Ajmer Road, Jaipur (Rajasthan) Roll No.
57008
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----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
2.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar
(Examination), Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10920/2019
Hemank Vaishnav Son Of Laxmikant Vaishnav, Aged About 24
Years, Resident Of Vaishnav Colony, Village And Post Ghatol,
District Banswara (Rajasthan) (Roll No. 32537)
----Petitioner
Versus
1.The Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
2.The Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar
(Examination), Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10921/2019
Shivangini Audichya Kaushik Daughter Of Govind Lal Audichya,
Aged About 38 Years, Resident Of Bada Bazar, Nathdwara, District
Rajsamand (Rajasthan) 313301 (Roll No. 21191)
----Petitioner
Versus
1.The Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
2.The Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar
(Examination), Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10922/2019
Yashwardhan Singh Rathore Son Of Peer Singh, Aged About 25
Years, Resident Of Santpur, Aburoad, District Sirohi (Rajasthan)
Pin 307026 (Roll No. 57516)
----Petitioner
Versus
1.The Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
2.The Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar
(Examination), Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10953/2019
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1.Vivek Pandey S/o Sh. Shiv Prasad Pandey, Aged About 27 Years,
R/o B-100, Ashok Nagar Colony, Pandeypur, Varanasi, Uttar
Pradesh-221003 (Roll No. 57277)
2.Kavita Meena D/o Sh. Ramcharan Lal Meena, Aged About 29
Years, R/o Flat No. 110/a-45, Jaipur, Rajasthan-302033, (Roll No.
18178)
----Petitioners
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11102/2019
Kritika Dev, Daughter Of Shri Jagdish Narayan Kohli, Aged About
26 Years, Resident Of Dev Kutir 44 Radhikapuram Jagatpura,
Jaipur (Rajasthan) 302017
----Petitioner
Versus
Rajasthan High Court, Through Its Registrar (Examination)
Jodhpur
----Respondent
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11134/2019
Ms. Kajal Singh D/o Shri Brij Pal Singh, Aged About 25 Years,
Resident Of House No. I/iv, C.i.r.b. Campus, Hisar, Haryana, Pin-
125001.
----Petitioner
Versus
The Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
----Respondent
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11161/2019
Nandini Sharma D/o Shri Naval Kishore Sharma, Aged About 22
Years, Resident Of 132 Kv Gss Colony, Karauli (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Through Registrar General, High
Court Building, Jodhpur (Raj.)
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11257/2019
1.Kamal Kishore Modi S/o Shri Raj Kumar, Aged About 25 Years,
By Caste Modi, Resident Of Bigga Bass, Ward No. 16, Shri
Doongargarh, Bikaner, Rajasthan.
2.Arjoo Tailor D/o Shri Gopal Tailor, Aged About 25 Years, Resident
Of 1-B-21, R.c. Vyas Colony, Bhilwara, Rajasthan.
----Petitioners
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Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Through Its Registrar General
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11317/2019
1.Vijay S/o Shri Girdhari Lal, Aged About 37 Years, B/c Brahmin,
R/o Fca-28, East Chawala Colony Both Abgarh, District Faridabad,
Haryana.
2.Nikhil Kaushik S/o Shri Amar Chand Kaushik, Aged About 24
Years, B/c Brahmin, R/o H.no. 276/12-A, Near Prakash Vatika,
Konsiwas Road, Vijay Nagar, Rewari, Haryana.
----Petitioners
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Its Registrar General
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11319/2019
1.Khanjan Sharma D/o Shri Pradyot Sharma, Aged About 25
Years, B/c Brahmin, R/o 59, Sonabadi, Gopalpura Byepass, Jaipur,
Rajasthan
2.Pankaj Soni S/o Late Shri Pradeep Kumar Soni, Aged About 30
Years, B/c Soni, R/o 84, Bajrang Nagar, Mr 9 Road, Indore,
Madhya Pradesh
3.Vasudha Goutam D/o Shri Sita Ram Sharma, Aged About 34
Years, B/c Brahmin, R/o Behind Bus Stand, Janta Colony, Deoli,
Tonk, Rajasthan
4.Sunita Kumari D/o Shri Jagdish Prasad, Aged About 36 Years,
B/c Meena, R/o Village And Post Bhatu Kalan, Tehsil Kathumar,
District Alwar, Rajasthan
----Petitioners
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Its Registrar General
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11356/2019
Ravi Gupta S/o Shri Kedar Mal Gupta, Aged About 27 Years, R/o
23, Soni Ka Bag, Behind Alka Theater, Sikar Road, Murlipura,
Jaipur - 302039, Rajathan
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Its Registrar General
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2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11357/2019
Arti Devi D/o Shri Padam Chand, Aged About 32 Years, R/o Jai
Bharat Traders Opposite Shubham Marriage Home, Kherli Road,
Nagar, Bharatpur, Rajasthan-321205
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Its Registrar General
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11358/2019
1.Payal Agarwal D/o Shri Girdhari Lal, Aged About 24 Years, B/c
Agarwal, R/o Plot No. 8, Moti Nagar, Near Jhotwara Circle,
Jhotwara, Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302012
2.Utkrsha Mittal D/o Shri Ashok Kumar Mittal, Aged About 29
Years, B/c Agarwal, R/o Radha Krishna, Colony, In-Front Of New
Collectred, Gulab Bag Road, Dholpur, Rajasthan- 328001
3.Diksha Sangwan D/o Azit Singh, Aged About 28 Years, B/c Jat,
R/o Village And Post Chandeni, Charkhi Dadri, Bhiwani, Haryana.
----Petitioners
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Its Registrar General
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11360/2019
Lalita Matai D/o Shri Narayan Das Matai, Aged About 31 Years, B/c
Sindhi, R/o D-3/11, Wonder Cement Ltd Colony, Nimbahera,
Chittorgarh, - 312601, Rajasthan
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Its Registrar General
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11361/2019
Chhitar Mal Jat S/o Shri Ram Sahai, R/o A-5, Shanti Niketan
Colony, Barkat Nagar, Tonk Phatak, Jaipur (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Its Registrar
----Respondent
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D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11394/2019
1.Mohit Rana S/o Pramod Rana, Aged About 25 Years, Resident Of
D1, Sanjay Enclave, Rajapuri Road, Uttam Nagar, New Delhi At
Present Residing At C-603, Hanging Garden, Jaisinghpura Road,
Bhakrota, Jaipur.
2.Paramvir Singh, S/o Satvir Singh, Aged About 26 Years,
Resident Of 174/27 Rohtak Road, Jind, Harayana At Present
Residing At C-603, Hanging Garden, Jaisinghpura Road, Bhakrota,
Jaipur.
3.Somya Singh, D/o Jitendra Singh Deshwal, Aged About 25
Years, Resident Of C3 (New) Isswc, Selaqui, Dehradun,
Uttrakhand At Present Residing At C-603, Hanging Garden,
Jaisinghpura Road, Bhakrota, Jaipur.
----Petitioners
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
2.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar
(Examination), Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11395/2019
Meghna Tanwar D/o Shri Bhawani Singh Tanwar, Aged About 25
Years, Resident Of C-324, Sector 8, Vidhyadhar Nagar, Jaipur-
302023, Raj.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Rajasthan High
Court Building, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11456/2019
Ankita Bafna Daughter Of Shri Kantilal Bafna, Aged About 28
Years, Resident Of Flat No. 406, Vidhi Vinayak Apartment, Khaine
Ka Kua, Jodhpur, Presently Resident Of C-45, B, 6D, Engineers
Colony, Mansarovar, Jaipur (Roll No. 25576)
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
2.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar
(Examination), Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11570/2019
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Gayatri Singh D/o Shri Sangram Singh, Aged About 24 Years, By
Caste Rajput, R/o Retd. Dgp Police Residence, Opposite Road No.
14, Vki Area, Near Jaipur Ajmer Bye Pass, Jaipur (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
2.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Through Registrar (Examination)
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9577/2019
Seema Roj D/o Shri Prahlad Sahay Roj, Aged About 22 Years, R/o
361, Tegore Nagar, Ajmer Road, Jaipur.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
2.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar
(Examination), Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9752/2019
Mohit S/o Shri Karam Chand, Aged About 25 Years, R/o 323, Near
Desu Road, Shalimar Village, New Delhi-110088
----Petitioner
Versus
Rajasthan High Court, Through Its Registrar (Examination),
Jodhpur.
----Respondent
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9697/2019
Vidhi Joshi D/o Shri Deep Chandra Joshi, Aged About 25 Years,
R/o Plot No.71, Lane 5, Bhrigu Nagar, Behind Elements Mall, Dcm,
Ajmer Road, Jaipur (Rajasthan) Roll No. 55981
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
2.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, Through Registrar
(Examination), Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9854/2019
Rakesh Sharma S/o Shri Jagdish Prasad Sharma, Aged About 33
Years, Resident Of Plot No. 25, Shri Ram Nagar, Near Avm School,
Jhotwara, Jaipur.
----Petitioner
Versus
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1.Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Its Registrar General
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9857/2019
Rupendra Kumar Sharma S/o Shri Gopal Krishan Sharma, Aged
About 35 Years, Resident Of 1525, Teli Mohalla, Near Sr. Sec.
School, Kalyan Ganj, Bassi Village Bassi District Jaipur.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Its Registrar General
2.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9906/2019
Archana Sharma D/o. Om Prakash Sharma, Aged About 36 Years,
Permanent Address- Ram Bhajo Kutir, Ward No.8, Doliyon Ka Bas,
Sikar. Present Address House No. 51/157, Shipra Path,
Mansarovar, Jaipur (Raj.) 302020
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Through Its Registrar
Administrative.
2.Rajathan High Court, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur Through Its Registrar
Administrative
3.Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9965/2019
1.Anugrah Singh S/o Shri Shailendra Singh, Aged About 25 Years,
Resident Of Flat No.101, Shivalaya Apartments, M-55, Janakpuri,
Marris Road, Aligarh-202001, Uttar Pradesh. (Roll No. 26000)
2.Priyanka Yadav D/o Shri Yadram Singh Yadav, Aged About 35
Years, Resident Of X-118, Street No.8, Brahmpuri, Delhi-110053.
(Roll No. 44633)
3.Vishaka Pundeer D/o Shri Shakti Singh, Aged About 26 Years,
Resident Of H.no.39, Kanwali, G.m.s. Road, Dehradun-248001,
Uttarakhand. (Roll No. 56961)
4.Amanpreet Kaur D/o Shri Amarjit Singh, Aged About 23 Years,
Resident Of H.no.77, U.p.o. Randhawa Masanda, Jalandhar-
144004., Punjab. (Roll No.24257).
5.Neelima Singh D/o Shri Manoj Kumar Tanwar, Aged About 24
Years, Resident Of H.no.3040, New Housing Board, Sector-13,
Bhiwani-127021, Haryana. (Roll No. 40244).
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6.Gaurav Saxena S/o Shri Ashok Saxena, Aged About 33 Years,
Resident Of Saxena Bhawan, Plot No.5, Near Chaturvedi Bhawan,
Behind Atta Mandir, Indira Colony, Alwar-301001, Rajasthan. (Roll
No.31437).
7.Vishal Godara S/o Shri L.r. Godara, Aged About 28 Years,
Resident Of C-252, Gokul Path, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur-302021.
(Roll No. 57000)
8.Aditi Nagayach D/o Shri Madan Mohan Nagayach, Aged About 30
Years, Resident Of 3-Mb-161, Indira Gandhi Nagar, Jagatpura,
Jaipur-302017. (Roll No. 23183).
9.Neha Rai D/o Shri Vashistha Rai, Aged About 23 Years, Resident
Of Pathakauli Kaloni, Harra Ki Chungi, Azamgarh-276001, U.p.
(Roll No. 40613).
10.Nishant Jain S/o Shri Bharat Bhushan Jain, Aged About 25
Years, Resident Of Near, Sbi Bank, Ward No.14, Tijara-301411,
Alwar, Rajasthan (Roll No. 41237).
11.Noopur Sharma D/o Shri Rajnikant Sharma, Aged About 28
Years, Resident Of Mandir Shri Madho Biharji, Opposite Reserve
Police Line, Station Road, Jaipur-302006 (Roll No. 41541).
12.Aditya S/o Shri Ram Niwas Sharma, Aged About 34 Years,
Resident Of 1399, Sector-I, Rohtak-124001, Haryana (Roll
No.23218).
13.Akshay Pandey S/o Shri Raj Kumar Pandey, Aged About 24
Years, Resident Of H.no.60, Ansal Pradhan Enclave, Bhopal-
462039 (Roll No.23967)
14.Bhavneet Arora D/o Shri Suresh Kumar, Aged About 25 Years,
Resident Of 777-A Jheel Khuranja, East Delhi-110051 (Roll
No.28333).
15.Akash Gosain S/o Shri Gopal Gosain, Aged About 24 Years,
Resident Of 111-A, R-23, Meenakshi Garden, Tilak Nagar, New
Delhi-110018. (Roll No.23778).
16.Sameer Gosain S/o Shri Gopal Gosain, Aged About 25 Years,
Resident Of 111-A, R-23, Meenakshi Garden, Tilak Nagar, New
Delhi-110018. (Roll No. 48776).
17.Mohammed Shadab S/o Shri Fariyad Mohammed, Aged About
26 Years, Resident Of S-63, Bapu Nagar, Bhilwara-311001,
Rajasthan. (Roll No. 38710).
18.Anirudh Singh Rathore S/o Shri Rajendra Singh Rathore, Aged
About 28 Years, Resident Of E-310, Shastri Nagar, Ajmer,
Rajasthan (Roll No.25068).
19.Shivangi Gupta D/o Shri Indra Bhooshan Gupta, Resident Of
Rajeev Colony, Deeg, Bharatpur, Rajasthan. (Roll No. 51416)
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----Petitioners
Versus
1.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Through Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
2.Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Through Registrar (Examination),
Rajasthan High Court Building, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11788/2019
Kriti Gour D/o Sh. Abhisheak Gour, Aged About 26 Years, R/o 45,
Priyanka, Scheme No.1 (Extension) Mehtab Singh Road, Alwar
(Raj.).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. High Gourt Of Judicature For Rajasthan, Jodhpur
Through Its Registrar General.
2. Registrar (Examination), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9768/2019
Shashi D/o Shri Bhagwat Singh, Aged About 28 Years, R/o 23,
Deen Dayal Nagar, Bharatpur, Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.Registrar General, High Court Of Judicature For Rajasthan,
Jodhpur.
2.Registrar Examination, High Court Of Judicature For Rajasthan,
Jodhpur.
----Respondents
Advocates who appeared in these matters:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. R.N. Mathur, Senior Advocate,
assisted by Mr. Shovit Jhajharia,
Mr. Biri Singh Sinsinwar, Senior
Advocate, assisted by Mr. Raghu
Nandan Sharma,
Mr. Rajesh Sharma, Mr. Dev Krishna
Purohit, Mr. Mithlesh Kumar,
Mr. Ashwini Jaiman, Mr. Mukesh
Kumar Meena, Mr. Kuldeep Singh
Meena, Mr. Kamal Kant Vyas, Mr.
Ashish Kumar, Mr. Anurag Sharma,
Mr. Giriraj Prasad Sharma, Mr. Dinesh
Pareek, Mr. Rakesh Chandel, Mr. Abhi
Goyal, Mr. Raj Kumar Garhwal, Mr.
Ved Prakash, Mr. Martand Pratap
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Singh, Mr. S.N. Kumawat, Mr. Govind
Gupta, Ms. Mahi Yadav, Mr. Punit
Singhvi, Mr. Asgar Khan, Mr. Rajeev
Sogarwal.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. A.K. Sharma, Senior Advocate,
assisted by Mr. V.K. Sharma &
Mr. Rachit Sharma
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD RAFIQ
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NARENDRA SINGH DHADDHA
Judgment
//Reportable//
Per Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohammad Rafiq:
18/07/2019
This batch of writ petitions seeks to challenge the
correctness of final answer key of the preliminary examination
issued by the respondent Rajasthan High Court dated 20.05.2019
for recruitment of 197 posts to Civil Judge Cadre, notified vide
advertisement dated 15.11.2018. Challenge has been made to
decision of the respondent-High Court establishment, deleting five
questions of the question paper of preliminary examination. In the
alternative, prayer has also been made for award of bonus marks
for the deleted five questions. Also challenged answers to twenty
other questions on different grounds.
It may be noted at the outset that as per the scheme of
examination, the competitive examination for recruitment was to
be conducted in two stages, i.e,. preliminary examination and
main examination. Marks obtained in the preliminary examination
by the candidates, who are declared qualified for main
examination, are not counted for determination of final merit. All
those candidates who secure same percentage of marks of the last
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cut off would be admitted to the main examination. Candidates
belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes category were
required to secure 35% minimum marks and candidates of all
other categories were required to secure 40% minimum marks in
the preliminary examination. It was also notified that number of
candidates to be permitted to appear in the main examination
would be 15 times the total number of vacancies categorywise. It
was also notified that number of candidates to be called for
interview shall be, as far as possible, three times the number of
vacancies categorywise, provided that a candidate in order to
qualify for interview shall have to secure minimum 35% marks in
each law paper and 40% marks aggregate in main examination.
However, the candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes would be deemed to be eligible for interview if
he/she has obtained minimum 30% marks in each of the law
paper and 35% marks aggregate in the main examination. It was
compulsory for every candidate to appear in each paper of written
test as also before the interview board for viva-voce failing which
he shall not be recommended for appointment. The preliminary
examination carried 100 marks on the basis of hundred objective
type questions, with one mark for each question. Each question
had four options with only one correct answer. The question
papers booklet distributed at the examination centers were in four
series, namely, A, B, C, D, where due to reshuffling serial number
of the questions would undergo a change in the paper, although
the question remains the same with the same multiple options in
the same order. Except the language papers, candidates were
provided question paper booklet in bi-lingual, i.e., both
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English and Hindi and the candidates were provided OMR sheets in
objective type where they have to simply darken the circle/bubble,
indicating the correct answer from black/blue ball point pen as per
the instruction no.6 provided on the top thereof. The answer-
books are evaluated with the help of the computer programme, as
per one of the four circles/bubbles so darkened. In fact, question
paper booklet contained 12 instructions. The instruction no.3 was
to the effect that only one answer is to be given for each question.
The instruction no.4 provided that if more than one answer is
marked, it would be treated as wrong answer. Instruction no.6
was to the effect that each question has four options marked
serially as 1,2,3,4 out of which only one is correct. Instruction
no.7 read that there is no Negative Marking. Instruction no.10
provided that if there is any sort of ambiguity/mistake either of
printing or factual nature then out of Hindi and English version of
the question, the English version will be treated as standard.
A total 42118 candidates applied in response to the
advertisement but only 27776 candidates appeared in the
preliminary examination. Of them, only 3290 candidates were
declared eligible for the main examination. The respondents
immediately after conducting the preliminary examination on
31.03.2019 published the model answer key of the question paper
on 01.04.2019, with noting that if any candidate has any objection
regarding correctness of any of the answer, he/she should upload
the same on the official website of the Rajasthan High Court
between 04.04.2019 and 13.04.2019 by entering his application ID
and date of birth. According to the respondent, a total number of
2910 objections against 86 model answers were received. 58 out of
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them pertained to the law papers of civil and criminal, whereas 30
and 15 were pertaining to the language papers of English
proficiency and Hindi proficiency, respectively. All the objections
were placed before the Examination Committee, which, in its
discretion, constituted a Committee comprising two Hon'ble
Judges of this Court with the subject experts of each subject,
namely, Law, English and Hindi subjects, having vast experience in
their respective fields, to consider the objections. The Expert
Committee after examining the matter meticulously, disposed of
all the objections in its meeting held on 03.05.2019. It submitted
three separate reports for Law, English and Hindi subjects,
thereby sustaining objections in regard to five questions and
rejecting other objections in respect of all other questions.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the material on record.
Contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that
deletion of five questions has diminished the chances of the
candidates, who diligently prepared for the examination and
marked the correct answers to the question. Even in a case where
there are multiple correct options, deletion of the questions would
only work to the advantage of those who have chosen wrong
answers, thereby putting the candidates who have attempted the
correct answer in a disadvantageous position. The appropriate
course, even in the case of multiple correct answers, would be to
award marks to each of those candidates, who selected any one of
correct answers, including with regard to Question No.A/50 where
the option (2) is correct answer in English language and option (1)
is correct answer in Hindi language. It is argued that the Expert
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Committee ought not to have given vague and unclear opinion. Its
opinion in respect of five deleted questions was that either
questions be deleted or any other appropriate decision, which is in
the interest of the examinees, may be taken. The best decision in
the interest of the examinees would have been to award marks to
all the candidates who chose any one of the correct answers. The
decision of the respondent to delete the questions is therefore
arbitrary, unreasonable and is liable to be set aside.
Learned counsel for the petitioners have also submitted that
in view of the discrepancies found in number of
questions/answers, this Court should appoint a fresh Expert
Committee as was done by the Supreme Court in Richal Vs.
Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Others - (2018) 8
SCC 81, in regard to recruitment to the post of School Lecturers.
In fact, a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal (Writ)
No.1092/2015 - Pankaj Oswal and Others Vs. Rahul Kumar
Mahrawal and Another, decided vide judgment dated
14.05.2018, while dealing with a case pertaining to recruitment to
the post of School Lecturers, followed the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Richal, supra, and directed a third Expert
Committee to be constituted and required the Vice Chancellor of
the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, to nominate three Professors
in his discretion to constitute such Committee. Reliance is also
placed on the judgment of this Court in Girraj Prasad Sharma
and Others Vs. Rajasthan High Court and Another - 2012
WLC (Raj.) UC 597, wherein the Division Bench of this Court
appointed a Senior Advocate of this Court as Amicus Curiae to
scrutinize the model answer key published by the Rajasthan Public
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Service Commission pertaining to recruitment of Civil Judge Cadre
in 2012, which agreed to his suggestions for deleting 6 questions,
changing answer key in respect of 8 questions, which were
wrongly deleted and correcting answer key in respect of other 6
questions.
Mr. Biri Singh Sinsinwar, learned senior counsel for some of
the petitioners, relying on Single Bench judgment of Madras High
Court dated 31.08.2010 in N. Sasi Kumar & Another Vs. The
Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu and Others -
2010 0 Supreme (Mad) 3800, argued that where two answers
are found to be correct the only rectification that could be done by
the respondents is to award marks to all candidates, who chose
either of the two correct options. The Allahabad High Court also in
Sunil Kumar Singh and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others -
2016 0 Supreme (All) 1568, refused to interfere with the
decision of the U.P.P.S.C. in awarding marks to candidates, who
chose either of the two correct answers to the questions.
Mr. Rajesh Sharma, learned counsel for petitioner Arti
Meena, submitted that the petitioner being a female candidate of
Scheduled Tribe category, the respondents were required to notify
a separate cut off for female candidates in each reserved category,
viz., Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes etc.
Mr. A.K. Sharma, learned senior counsel for respondent,
submitted that scope of judicial review of correctness of answer
key has been considered by the Supreme Court as well as this
Court time and again. The Courts have entertained such challenge
only on very limited grounds and have always given due
weightage to the opinion of the subject experts. Even if there are
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any conflicting views in text books or other study material, each
person should bow down to the opinion of experts. The court
should not at all reevaluate or scrutinize the answer sheets of a
candidate as it has no expertise, for academic matters are best
left to academicians. It has also been held that the courts should
presume the correctness of the key answers and proceed on that
assumption and in the event of a doubt, the benefit should go to
the examination authority rather than to the candidate. So far as
present matters are concerned, the petitioners have failed to
prove that the answers are palpably incorrect or demonstrably
wrong. It is submitted that the entire action of the respondents in
deleting 5 questions and turning down the objections with regard
to remaining questions is perfectly in accordance with law. The
Courts have always been slow to interfere with the opinion
expressed by the experts unless there are allegations of mala
fides against the experts. Reliance in support of this argument has
been placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Richal Vs.
Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Others - (2018) 8
SCC 81, Ranvijay Singh and Others Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others - (2018) 2 SCC 357, Uttar Pradesh
Public Service Commission and Another Vs. Rahul Singh
and Another - (2018) 7 SCC 254, Kanpur University Vs.
Samir Gupta - (1983) 4 SCC 309 and that of the Division Bench
of this Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.12277/2015
decided on 06.10.2015. It is submitted that in the present
matters, there being no allegations of bias or mala fides against
the Expert Committee, the present writ petitions deserve to be
dismissed.
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It is submitted that the Delhi High Court in the judgment in
Anjali Goswami and Others Vs. Registrar General, Delhi
High Court - Writ Petition (C) No.963/2019, on which
reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the
petitioners, has observed that the candidates who had marked
option (1) or (4) be awarded one mark. The said judgment is
distinguishable on the facts as well as law. The respondents in that
case proceeded to straightaway declare result of the preliminary
examination without first uploading answer key, inviting and
disposing of the objections. There was no dispute with regard to
deleting any question before the Division Bench of the Delhi High
Court. Therein the Delhi High Court followed its earlier judgment
dated 09.05.2016 in Samir Gupta Vs. Delhi High Court - Writ
Petitions (C) No.3453/2016 and 2104/2016, in which the
High Court observed that since two or more of the suggested
answers were correct, the model answer key and the question
would faultier as only one answer was to be marked. The High
Court therefore observed that the questions and suggested
answers fell foul to the test stipulated in Kanpur University's
case, supra, and should be deleted. Referring to judgment of the
Delhi High Court in Samir Gupta, supra, Mr. A.K. Sharma, learned
senior counsel, submitted that where more than one suggested
answers were correct, the Court has taken the view that such
questions should be deleted. It is submitted that the decision
regarding deletion of questions and preparing the result on the
basis of reduced 95 marks has been taken in the interest of all the
examinees and applied uniformly to all, which cannot be said to be
unfair or arbitrary or irrational in any manner.
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Replying to the argument raised on behalf of the petitioners
that a separate cut off ought to have been declared for the female
candidates of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Mr. A.K.
Sharma, learned senior counsel for the respondents, cited a
Division Bench judgment of this Court in Vikram Singh Chouhan
vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [D.B. Civil Writ Petition
No.3115/2014, decided on 16.05.2014], and submitted that this
being a horizontal reservation, a separate cut off for female
candidates of the reserved categories is not required to be
notified. In any case, there were already sufficient female
candidates available within the notified cut off, therefore, separate
cut off marks for females was not required to be notified.
We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions
and perused the material on record.
We may at the outset observe that contention that separate
cut off marks should be declared for female candidates of the
reserved categories, i.e., Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
is liable to be rejected for the simple reason that the respondents
in their reply to the writ petition filed in D.B. Civil Writ Petition
No.10022/2019 - Arti Meena Vs. Rajasthan High Court,
Jodhpur through its Registrar, have categorically stated that
separate cut off marks for women candidates of all categories
have not been issued, reason being that more than required
number of women have already found place in the main list of all
categories, having scured more marks than the cut off, and no
occasion had arisen to drag any less meritorious women candidate
to make up for deficiency of the required 15 times the number of
vacancies.
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Before proceeding to examine the submissions with regard to
alleged discrepancies in the options given under different
questions, we must observe that in this age of mass
unemployment, there is always a very stiff competition amongst
the candidates to secure a job. Difference of one wrong answer
taken as correct and vice versa may result in loss of fortune to
hundreds. But at the same time, it must also be kept in view that
the courts should be extremely loath in making interference in the
opinion of the experts unless the key answer is proved to be
palpably wrong, which no reasonable body of men would record as
correct. Such decision however should not be arrived at on the
basis of inferential process or process of rationalization. The
opinion of the academic experts is entitled to due weightage. The
writ court should not act like a court of appeal over the decision of
experts until it is proved on weighty material that such opinion is
wholly perverse and erroneous.
The earliest judgment available on the scope of interference
by this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review is in the
case of Kanpur University Vs. Samir Gupta, supra, wherein the
Supreme Court considered the issue pertaining to the scope of
judicial review of the correctness of key answer notified by the
examining body supplied by the paper setter with regard to
multiple choice of objective type test for admission to medical
course through combined pre medical test. The High Court in that
case upheld the challenge by the candidates to various key
answers of different questions in respect of some of the questions.
Repelling the challenge to the judgment of the High Court, the
Supreme Court in para 15 and 16 of the report, held as under:-
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"15. The findings of the High Court raise a question of
great importance to the student community. Normally,
one would be inclined to the view, especially if one has
been a paper setter and an examiner, that the key
answer furnished by the paper setter and accepted by
the University as correct, should not be allowed to be
challenged. One way of achieving it is not to publish the
key answer at all. If the University had not published the
key answer along with the result of the test, no
controversy would have arisen in this case. But that is
not a correct way of looking at these matters which
involve the future of hundreds of students who are
aspirants for admission to professional courses. If the
key answer were kept secret in this case, the remedy
would have been worse than the disease because, so
many students would have had to suffer the injustice in
silence. The publication of the key answer has
unravelled an unhappy state of affairs to which the
University and the State Government must find a
solution. Their sense of fairness in publishing the key
answer has given them an opportunity to have a closer
look at the system of examinations which they conduct.
What has failed is not the computer but the human
system.
16. Shri Kacker, who appears on behalf of the University,
contended that no challenge should be allowed to be
made to the correctness of a key answer unless, on the
face of it, it is wrong. We agree that the key-answer
should be assumed to be correct unless it is proved to
be wrong and that it should not be held to be wrong by
an inferential process of reasoning or by a process of
rationalisation. It must be clearly demonstrated to be
wrong, that is to say, it must be such as no reasonable
body of men well-versed in the particular subject would
regard as correct. The contention of the University is
falsified in this case by a large number of acknowledged
text-books, which are commonly read by students in
U.P. Those text-books leave no room for doubt that the
answer given by the students is correct and the key
answer is incorrect."
The Supreme Court in Manish Ujwal & Others Vs.
Maharishi Dayanand Saraswati University and Others -
(2005) 13 SCC 744, held that in the case of multiple choice in
objective type test, the authorities have to be very careful and
should always keep in view the interest of students as paramount
consideration. A wrong key answer may result in a merit being
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made a casualty. Disapproving the approach of the High Court,
the Supreme Court held that the student community cannot be
made to suffer on account of errors committed by the University.
The Supreme Court enunciated the same principle which was
propounded in Kanpur University, supra, as would be evident
from para 9 of the report in Manish Ujwal, supra, which reads
thus:
"9. In Kanpur University v. Samir Gupta, considering
similar problem, this Court held that there is an
assumption about the key answers being correct and in
case of doubt, the court would unquestionably prefer the
key answer. It as for this reason that we have not
referred to those key answers in respect whereof there
is a doubt as a result of difference of opinion between
experts. Regarding the key answers in respect whereof
the matter, is beyond the realm of doubt, this. Court has
held that it would be unfair to penalise the students for
not giving an answer which accords with the key answer,
that is to say, with an answer which is demonstrated to
be wrong. There is No dispute about the aforesaid six
key answers being demonstrably wrong and this fact has
rightly not been questioned by the learned counsel for
the University. In this view, students cannot be made to
suffer for the fault and negligence of the University."
The same approach was taken by the Supreme Court in
Guru Nanak Dev University Vs. Saumil Garg and Others,
supra, wherein the Supreme Court directed the University to
reevaluate answer of eight questions in reference to key answers
provided by the CBSE. The Supreme Court disapproved the course
adopted by the University in giving marks to all the students, who
had participated in the entrance test irrespective of whether any
of them had answered questions or not. It was held that when
correctness of the answer keys given by the paper setters is
examined by the experts, it should be assumed to be correct
unless they are shown to be palpably or demonstrably erroneous.
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Being, therefore, fully conscious of the limitations of its
jurisdiction, this Court has with the assistance of learned counsel
appearing on both the sides, evaluated the correctness of
questions primarily with a view to finding out whether there are
plural number of correct options given by the Examination
Committee against any question, though at the same time keeping
in mind the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Subhash
Chandra Verma, supra that candidates are required to tick mark
the answers which is most appropriate out of plurality of answers
and that even if the answers could be more than one, the
candidates will have to select the one, which is more correct than
the alternative answers.
We shall in the first instance deal with the arguments of the
petitioners challenging the deletion of aforementioned five
questions and in later part of the judgment, consider the
argument challenging the choice of the respondents as one of the
four options to be the correct answer in respect of the twenty
questions.
Question No.A/13, B/20, C/01, D/03, reads thus:-
Which of the following contracts can be enforced?
(1) A contract for the non-performance of which
compensation is an adequate relief.
(2) A contract which is in its nature determinable.
(3) A contract the performance whereof involves the
performance of a continuous duty.
(4) Purchase of a share of a partner in a firm
According to learned counsel appearing for the petitioners,
the respondents have in the model answer key wrongly treated
option (4) as the only correct answer, whereas according to the
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petitioners, option (1) is also a correct answer. Thus there were
two correct answers. Whoever has chosen either of these two as
the correct answer, should be awarded marks rather than deleting
the questions. According to the respondents, total 65 objections
were received about this question mainly on the ground that the
Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 notified on 01.08.2018 has
introduced certain amendments, amending various provisions of
the Specific Relief Act. The Committee was of the view that in the
light of the aforesaid amendment, options (1) and (4) would both
be correct answers and therefore sustained the objections and
proposed that either the question itself be deleted or any other
appropriate decision be taken in the interest of the examinees.
It may be significant to note that prior to amendment of
Section 14, its clause (a) had included a contract for non-
performance of which the compensation in money is an adequate
relief as one such contract, which could not be enforced but that
clause has since been deleted by the Amendment Act, which
substituted Section 14 with only four clauses, namely, (a) to (d),
wherein the aforesaid old clause (a) has not been retained. The
question is that which of the contracts referred to in four options
can be enforced. Option (1) refers to a contract for the non-
performance of which compensation is adequate relief. When read
in the light of the amendment, this would bring the same within
the purview of such contract which after amendment can be
specifically enforced. The option 4 includes the contract for
purchase of a share of the partnership in a firm which also by
virtue of Section 14(3)(b)(ii) can be enforced by specific
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performance and therefore options (1) and (2) were both rightly
taken as correct.
We are not inclined to accept the argument that the deletion
of the question by the respondent was not legally correct. We are
not inclined to uphold the argument that the respondent should
have awarded marks to all those candidates who chose either
option (1) or (4) as the answer. We shall deal with this aspect in
detail a little later.
Question No.A-50, B/47, C/66, D/41 reads as under:-
Kalu prosecutes Khema for stealing a car from him, Khema is
convicted. Kalu afterwards sues Ganesh for the car which Khema
had sold to him before his conviction. The Judgment of conviction
of Khema in the suit between Kalu and Ganesh is:
(1) Relevant
(2) Irrelevant
(3) Relevant only with prior permission of court
(4) None of the above.
According to the model answer key of the respondent, the
option no.2 was correct, whereas the argument of the petitioners
is that while option no.2 of the English version of the question is
correct but at the same time in Hindi version, the options no.1 and
2 got inter-changed and thus option no.1 became the correct
answer. There was thus one correct option in both English and
Hindi version.
There has been a conflict in the arguments made by different
learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in regard to this
question. Mr. R.N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the petitioners, submitted that the respondents in Instruction
no.10 on the question paper booklet provided that "if there is any
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sort of ambiguity/mistake either of printing or factual nature then
out of Hindi and English version of the question, the English
version will be treated as standard." Therefore, the respondents
have to treat only option no.2 given in the English version as the
correct answer. It is argued that principle of promissory estoppel
would apply in such a situation and the respondents would be
bound to adhere to instruction no.10. Learned Senior Counsel
argued that even if large number of candidates have answered
option (1) as correct in Hindi version, the English version shall
have to be preferred. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Allahabad High Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut Vs.
The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (III), U.P.,
Allahabad and Others - AIR 1962 Allahabad 240, judgment
of Orissa High Court in G. Sreenivasan and Others Vs.
Principal, Regional Engineering - AIR 2000 Ori 56, judgment
of the Supreme Court in Guru Nanak Dev University Vs.
Saumil Garg - (2005) 13 SCC 749 and judgment of the
Supreme Court dated 22.11.2018 in The Central Board of
Secondary Education and Another Vs. T.K. Rangarajan and
Others - Civil Appeal No.11232/2018 and Others.
Mr. R.N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel, relied on judgment
of the Supreme Court in the The Central Board of Secondary
Education and Another Vs. T.K. Rangarajan and Others -
Civil Appeal No.11232/2018 and Others. That was a case
where the students appeared in National Eligibility-cum-Entrance
Test - UG, 2018, which was in English, conducted by the Central
Board of Secondary Education. Therein bi-lingual questions were
set in English with an option of regional language Tamil. The High
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Court while allowing the writ petition held that 49 questions in
Tamil were ambiguous, especially in respect of the students who
had throughout studied in Tamil medium and had scant knowledge
of English. The instruction C (vi) in that case provided that in case
of any ambiguity in translation of any of the questions, its English
version shall be treated as final. The Supreme Court reversing the
judgment of the High Court, held that this clause was extremely
significant to ensure that the students have some basic knowledge
of English even if they are allowed the facility to write the
examination in their regional language because the entire
education for MBBS/BDS courses throughout the country is taught
in English.
On the other hand, Mr. A.K. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the respondent Rajasthan High Court, submitted
that the Expert Committee after analyzing the objections
objectively, was of the unanimous opinion that objections are to
be sustained and proposed that either the question itself be
deleted or any other appropriate decision be taken in the interest
of examinees. He submitted that the instruction no.6 of the very
same question paper booklet provided that "each question has
four options marked serially as 1,2,3,4 out of which only one is
correct." This being an objective type examination, the answer-
sheets were evaluated by a computer programme. The Expert
Committee, taking into consideration all the above factors and
also in the interest of examinees, decided to delete the question
as it was not possible to simultaneously treat option (2) in English
version as correct and option (1) in the Hindi version as correct
answer. The examining authority has no means of knowing or
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verifying as to which candidate has followed English or Hindi
version to answer the question. The sequence of answer of
Question No.A/50, B/47, C/66, D/41, in English and Hindi version
mismatched. If the answer key is prepared on the basis of correct
answer (2), i.e., "irrelevant" in English version than those
examinees, who might have followed the Hindi version to solve
the paper or to understand the questions, would stand penalized
for answering the questions correctly by opting for answer (1),
i.e., "folaxr" (visangat). And going by final answer key with option
(2) as correct, candidates who had given incorrect answer would
have been rewarded. Having considered this aspect, the
examining authority, acting on the recommendations of the Expert
Committee decided to delete the question to avoid arbitrary and
inequitable result.
Mr. A.K. Sharma, learned senior counsel for respondent,
further submitted that the instructions are not statutory in nature.
These are in the nature of guidelines to the candidates.
Instructions do not hold out any promise to the candidates making
it obligatory for the examining authority to award marks to those
candidates, who on their own volition, chose to follow English
version of the question. There is no case for invoking doctrine of
promissory estoppel. The English version in situation covered by
instruction no.10 was to be treated as standard and not final.
Reliance in support of this argument is placed by the learned
senior counsel on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Motilal
Padampath Sugar Mills Vs. State of U.P. - (1979) 2 SCC 409
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and Union of India Vs. Shri Hanuman Industries - (2015) 6
SCC 600.
In our view, deletion of this question has not prejudiced any
of the candidates as it affects all of them equally regardless of
whether they attempted the option in English or Hindi version. At
the stage of preliminary examination, the candidates are not
required to indicate their medium of instruction, which is why all
the hundred objective type questions in the question paper
booklet are printed in bi-lingual languages in English and Hindi.
The respondents in their counter affidavit have also clarified that
the candidates are required to indicate their medium of
instruction, either Hindi or English, only on the cover page of the
main examination.
Question No.A/58, B/38, C/42, D/63 reads thus:-
The right of private defence of the body does not extend to
voluntarily causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant,
if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right to be of
any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated:
(1) An assault with the intention of committing rape.
(2) An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting.
(3) An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a
person under circumstances which may reasonably cause
him to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.
(4) An assault of causing of grievous hurt on provocation.
Contention of the petitioners is that the option (4) was
rightly shown as the correct answer in the model answer key
published by the respondent and therefore the respondents have
unjustifiably deleted this question. According to the respondents,
a total of 360 objections were received on the model answer key
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of the question. The Expert Committee, after due deliberation,
came to the conclusion that option (3) is also correct. Since there
were two correct options, namely option (3) and option (4), the
Expert Committee while sustaining the objections proposed that
either the question should be deleted or any other appropriate
decision be taken in the interest of the examinees. The
Examination Committee therefore decided to delete the question.
The parties are not at variance with respect to the fact that
option (4) is the correct answer. They also do not dispute that
options (1) and (2) are not the correct answers. The respondents,
however, have found the option (3) also as a correct answer.
Section 100 of the IPC when read along with option (3) makes it
clear that while this option is worded substantially similar to its
clause sixthly, with the omission of the word "unable", which
means that the person was able to have recourse to the public
authorities for his release. Since this word has been omitted, the
right of private defence of the body does not extend to voluntary
causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant. The option
(4) was also correct, which would be evident by comparison of this
option with clause secondly of Section 100 of the IPC, with words
"on provocation" have been added thereto. While voluntarily
causing grievous hurt is punishable under Sections 325 and 326
IPC, voluntarily causing grievous hurt on provocation is punishable
under Section 335 IPC. The Examination Committee therefore
rightly deleted this question.
Question No.A/61, B/57, C/61, D/40, reads as under:-
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Which of the following irregularities vitiate the proceedings, if any
Magistrate, not being empowered by law in his behalf, does any of
the following things?
(1) Makes an order under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. as to a local
nuisance.
(2) Makes an order under Part C or Part D of Chapter X of
Cr.P.C.
(3) Holds an inquest under Section 176 of Cr.P.C.
(4) Makes an order for maintenance.
According to the model answer key, option (3) was the
correct answer. The respondents have received in total 468
objections to this option. The question is apparently based on
Section 461 of the Cr.P.C. Option (1) has been taken from
Clause (h), option (2) has been taken from clause (j) and option
(4) has been taken from clause (g) of Section 461. Had the
question been formed in negative to the effect as to which of the
irregularities indicated in the options does not vitiate the
proceedings, the option (3) in the model answer key published by
the respondent would have been correct. However, the omission of
the word "does not" has resulted into a situation where three
options, namely, options (1), (2) and (4) have been rendered
correct and therefore the Examination Committee, on
recommendation of the Expert Committee, has rightly decided to
delete the question.
Question No.A/83, B/72, C/77, D/74, reads thus:-
Complete the following sentence with correct subordinating
conjunction:
You must start at once ___________ you will be late.
(1) therefore
(2) although
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(3) otherwise
(4) because
As per the model answer key notified by the respondent,
option (3) was the correct answer. The objection to this option was
that "Otherwise" is not subordinating conjunction and it is a
conjunctive adverb. The Examination Committee concurring with
the view of the Expert Committee, decided to delete the question.
Learned counsel for the petitioners have vehemently argued that
the use of word "otherwise" in the blank space in the question
makes the sentence grammatically correct and therefore word
"otherwise" being the only possible correct option available to the
candidates, this question ought not to have been deleted. We are
however unable to countenance this submission as the blank
space indicated in the question is not the complete question but
the question becomes complete when read in entirety, which
require the examinees to complete the sentence with correct
subordinating conjunction and since "otherwise" instead of being
subordinating conjunction, has been opined to be conjunctive
adverb, this court would not be justified in substituting the opinion
of the language experts by that of its own.
Argument that deletion of the questions may cause prejudice
to those candidates who had attempted the correct answer and
give advantage to those, who had given wrong answer, cannot be
accepted as after deletion of the questions, the performance of the
candidates is evaluated on the remaining questions. The deletion
of the questions thus does not affect any one unevenly as all the
candidates are then uniformly subjected to examination on the
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remainder of the questions, with equal weightage to each of such
questions, for the entire examination. The Supreme Court in
Richal, supra, rejected similar contention in the following terms:
"25. One of the submissions raised by the appellants is
that marks of deleted question ought not to have been
redistributed in other questions. It is submitted that
either all the candidates should have been given equal
marks for all the deleted questions or marks ought to
have been given only to those candidates who
attempted those question.
26. The questions having been deleted from the
answers, the question paper has to be treated as
containing the question less the deleted questions.
Redistribution of marks with regard to deleted questions
cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational. The
Commission has adopted a uniform method to deal with
all the candidates looking to the number of the
candidates. We are of the view that all the candidates
have been benefited by the redistribution of marks in
accordance with the number of correct answers which
have been given by them. We, thus, do not find any
fault with redistribution of marks of the deleted marks
(sic questions). The High Court has rightly approved the
said methodology."
In a multiple-choice question paper, there can be only one
correct answer. The OMR sheets were got examined by a
computer programme. It was made clear in instruction no.6 that
each question had four options, out of which only one was correct.
As per instruction no.11 of the question paper booklet, candidates
were asked to darken only one circle or bubble indicating the
correct answer on the answer sheet. Instruction no.6 on the OMR
sheet also says that while marking answers the candidates were
required to darken the circle which is the correct best answer.
Decision to award marks to all who chose any one of two or three
correct answers would have been absurd and arbitrary by all
cannons of justice and equity. The examining body has to view
hardships to few individual vis-a-vis injustice to other, who will
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stand penalized for none of their fault, rather it would amount to
merit being a casualty. As there can be only on answer, therefore,
the questions which had multi options correct were ordered to be
deleted by the respondents. The decision taken by the
respondents therefore cannot be faulted.
This now brings us to the second segment of the controversy
in regard to the challenge by the petitioners in different writ
petitions to the model answer key and/or final answer key notified
by the respondents with regard to 20 more questions, which we
shall deal one by one.
Before venturing to examine challenge to correctness of the
answers to different questions, we want to make it clear that even
if it could be said that as per understanding of the candidates,
there could be more than one answer to a question, the
candidates are expected to select more correct option out of
alternative answers. We may for this proposition of law rely on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Subhash Chandra Verma
and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others - 1995 Supp (1)
SCC 325, in para 25 of the report, wherein their Lordships
observed as under:-
"25. We will now examine, whether these grounds had
been made out by those candidates who took the
objective test as well as the viva voce and yet could
qualify for selection.
(1) xxxxxxxxxx
2. xxxxxxxxxxx
3. Several controversial questions were set and in
relation to some questions, there could be more than
one answer: In an objective type of test, more than one
answer are given. The candidates are required to tick
mark the answer which is the most appropriate out of
the plurality of answers. The questions and answers
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were prescribed by the experts in the field with
reference to standard books. Therefore, it is incorrect to
say that a question will have more than one correct
answer. Even if the answers could be more than one,
the candidates will have to select the one which is more
correct out of the alternative answers. In any event,
this is a difficulty felt by all the candidates."
A reference at this juncture may also be made to a judgment
of the Supreme Court in Dr. J.P. Kulshreshtha and Others Vs.
Chancellor, Allahabad - 1980(3) SCC 418, which is a case
relating to recruitment based entirely on interview. The Supreme
Court speaking through Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.R. Krishna Ayer held
therein that while there is no absolute ban, it is a rule of prudence
that courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic
bodies. But University organs, for that matter, any authority in our
system, is bound by the rule of law and cannot be a law unto
itself. If the Chancellor or any other authority lesser in level
decides an academic matter or an educational question, the Court
keeps its hands off, but where a provision of law has to be read
and understood, it is not fair to keep the court out. (emphasis
supplied).
Question No.A/8, B/21, C/17, D/23 reads thus:
"Rule in Heydon's case is also known as:
(1) Purposive construction
(2) Casus omissus
(3) Literal construction
(4) Harmonious construction
As per respondents, option (4) was the correct answer to the
question. A total of 15 objections were received to the aforesaid
question and 11 of them suggested that all were wrong whereas
four objections suggested that in place of option (1), all other
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three options were correct. Opinion of the Expert Committee,
concurred with by the Examination Committee, in respect of this
question, is based on an excerpt from the celebrated book on
"Principles of Statutory Interpretation" 13th Edition by Justice G.P.
Singh, wherein Rule of Heydon's case has been described as
under:-
When the material words are capable of bearing two or
more constructions the most firmly established rule for
construction of such words "of all statutes in general (be
they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the
common law)" is the rule laid down in Heydon's case
which has now attained the status of a classic. The rule
which is also known as "purposive construction" or
"mischief rule", enables consideration of four matters in
construing an Act: (i) What was the law before the
making of the Act, (ii) What was the mischief or defect
for which the law did not provide, (iii) What is the
remedy that the Act has provided, and (v) What is the
reason of the remedy."
Objections of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the
option (1) taken as correct by the respondent is that while that
"Rule in Heydon's case" is mischief rule, which is not indicated in
any one of the four options, therefore, none of them is correct. In
the context of the question, the option (1) "Purposive
construction", as per afore-extracted excerpt, is the nearest
correct answer and therefore we do not find any fault with the
decision of the Examination Committee in rejecting the objection.
Question No.A/10, B/25, C/32, D/2, reads thus:
Who amongst the following cannot be appointed as Advocate
General:
(1) An Advocate of 66 years of age
(2) An Advocate who has not practiced in such State
(4) An Advocate having 07 years of practice at Bar
(4) All of above
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Mr. Kuldeep Singh Meena, learned counsel for the petitioners,
has argued that since Article 165 of the Constitution of India
provides that the Governor of the State shall appoint a person,
who is qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the High Court, to
be Advocate General of the State and since as per Article 217 of
the Constitution, a Judge of the High Court shall hold office until
he attains the age of 62 years. Therefore, not only option (3) as
per the model answer key notified by the respondent is correct,
but option (1) would also be correct. This issue is no more res
integra in view of the judgment of this Court in Dr. Chandra
Bhan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others - AIR 1983
Raj. 149, in which such contention was held as devoid of any
force because "all that the first clause of Article 165 lays down is
that a person, who is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a
High Court, can be appointed Advocate-General for the State. The
qualifications for the appointment of a Judge of a High Court are
prescribed under the second clause of Article 217 of the
Constitution. The provision about duration of tenure of the
appointment of a Judge of a High Court does not find place in
Clause (2) of Article 217 and so the attainment of the age of 62
years cannot be regarded as a disqualification for appointment of
a Judge of a High Court under Clause (2) of Article 217."
Question No.A/12, B/8, C/34, D/1, reads thus:-
For the purpose of Limitation Act, 1963, a suit in the case of a
pauper, is instituted;
(1) When the plaint is presented to the proper office
(2) When application for leve to sue as a pauper is made
(3) When the application seeking leave to sue as a pauper is
granted
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(4) None of the above
Objection to option (2) in the aforesaid question chosen by
the respondent as the correct answer is wholly without substance.
Answer to this question lies in Section 3(2)(a)(ii) of the Limitation
Act, which inter alia provides that for the purpose of the Act of
1963, a suit is instituted in the case of a pauper, when his
application for leave to sue as a pauper is made. Obviously, option
(2) being the correct answer, has rightly been chosen and the
objections thereto have rightly been turned down.
Question No.A/36, B/61, C/51, D/64, reads thus:-
Under which provision can a Court issue a warrant of arrest
against a person released on bail and require him to furnish
sufficient sureties?
(1) Section 440 of Cr.P.C.
(2) Section 446 of Cr.P.C.
(3) Section 441 of Cr.P.C.
(4) Section 443 of Cr.P.C.
The respondent in the model answer key indicated option
(4), i.e., Section 443 of Cr.P.C., as the correct answer. Section 443
Cr.P.C., inter alia, provides for the power to order sufficient
sureties, and that "if through mistake, fraud, or otherwise,
insufficient sureties have been accepted or if they afterwards
become insufficient, the Court may issue a warrant of arrest
directing that the person released on bail be brought before it and
may order him to find sufficient sureties, and on his failing so to
do, may commit him to jail." We do not find any fault with the
decision of the Examination Committee.
Question No.A/41, B/50, C/58, D/48 reads thus:
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In which of the following situations, the general principle of
presumption of innocence of a child in conflict with law shall not
be applicable?
(1) When the child is charged for the offence of murder
punishable under Section 302 IPC
(2) When the child is charged for the offence of gang rape
punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of IPC
(3) Where the Juvenile Justice Board has passed an order
under Section 15 read with Section 18(3) of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act that the child
should be tried as an adult.
(4) None of the above.
There were in all 64 objections received in respect of the
model answer key of this question, according to which option (4),
i.e., "None of the above.", answers given in options (1), (2) and
(3), was correct. The question is quite categorical as to in which of
the enumerated situations, the general principle of presumption of
innocence of a child in conflict with law shall not be applicable. The
Expert Committee as also the Examination Committee in rejecting
the said objection relied on Section 3(1) of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which, inter alia,
provides that while implementing the provisions of the Act of
2015, the Central Government, the State Government, the Board
and the other agencies shall be guided by the fundamental
principles enumerated in Section 3 of the Act of 2015. Clause (i)
thereof reads that "Any child shall be presumed to be an innocent
of any mala fide or criminal intent upto the age of fifteen years"
after the amendment in the Act. And since this was not given as
one of the options, option (4) was the only correct answer and
therefore the decision cannot be faulted.
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Here it may noted that the respondent in their counter
affidavit have inadvertently stated that the option (3) in the model
answer key is the only correct answer whereas in the model/final
answer key enclosed with the writ petition, option (4) was
indicated as the correct answer. The respondent have filed the
affidavit of the Registrar (Writs) of the Rajasthan High Court
Bench, Jaipur, stating that this was a bona-fide typographical error
which crept in the reply.
Question No.A/43, B/36, C/65, D/55 reads thus:
Under which provision of law, the Court while considering the case
of a person convicted for an offence not punishable with death or
imprisonment of life, is under an obligation to call for the report of
Probation Officer?
(1) Section 9 of Probation Offenders Act
(2) Section 7 of Probation Offenders Act
(3) Section 4 of Probation Offenders Act
(4) None of the above.
According to the model/final answer key published by the
respondent, option (3) was taken as the correct answer.
Some of the learned counsel have, however, argued that
Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act was the only correct
answer to the question and Section 6 having not been indicated in
any one of the four options, the correct answer would be option
(4) "None of the above." The question is that under which
provision of law, the Court while considering the case of a person
convicted for an offence not punishable with death or
imprisonment of life, is under an obligation to call for the report of
the Probation Officer. This question appears to have been inspired
by Section 4. Section 6(1) merely refers to an offence punishable
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with imprisonment and not with imprisonment for life. Besides,
Section 6(1) refers to any person who is under twenty-one years
of age and is found guilty of an offence punishable with only
imprisonment but not with imprisonment for life, but Section 4(1)
mentions about any person, not necessarily under twenty-one
years of age, found guilty of having committed an offence not
punishable with death or imprisonment, both of which find
mention in the question. Section 4 in our considered view has
rightly been accepted as the correct option by the respondent.
Thus, option (3) having indicating Section 4 of the Probation of
Offenders Act, is the correct answer.
Question No.A/45, B/43, C/36, D/39, reads thus:
In which celebrated judgment, did the Hon'ble Supreme Court
classified the witnesses into three categories (i) wholly reliable;
(ii) wholly unreliable; (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly
unreliable?
(1) AIR 1957 SC 614, Vadivelu Thevar Vs. State of Madras
(2) AIR 1974 SC 276, Guli Chand & Ors. Vs. State of
Rajasthan
(3) AIR 2012 SC 1357, Ramaresh & Ors. Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh
(4) (1994) 2 SCC 467, Bheru Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan
In respect to this question, none of objections was of any
worth. The respondents in model answer key have indicated
option (1) as the correct answer. Having gone through the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Vadivelu Thevar Vs. State of
Madras - AIR 1957 SC 614, in comparison to other judgments
referred to in remaining three options, we find option (1) to be the
correct answer.
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Question No.A/46, B/66, C/48, D/50, reads thus:-
When a child in conflict with law is in custody while undergoing
trial, is declared adult under Section 18(3) of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act upon crossing the age of 18
years during the course of trial, which of the following option is
available to the trial court in such a situation?
(1) To allow the child to go home after advise or admonition
(2) To drop the proceedings and release the child from
custody forthwith
(3) To direct the child to be released on probation of good
conduct
(4) Send the child to a place of safety.
The respondent in the model answer key, indicated option
(4) as the correct answer. According to some of the petitioners,
this is not the correct answer. The Expert Committee on conjoint
reading of Sections 15, 18 and 19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, found option (4) as the
correct answer. Section 18(3) provides that where the Board after
preliminary assessment under Section 15 pass an order that there
is a need for trial of the child above the age of sixteen years as an
adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to
the Children's Court having jurisdiction to try such offences.
Section 19(3) provides that the Children's Court shall ensure that
the child who is found to be in conflict with law is sent to a place
of safety till he attains the age of twenty-one years and thereafter,
the person shall be transferred to a jail. Obviously therefore a
child in conflict with law having crossed the age of sixteen years,
upon crossing the age of eighteen years, can be sent by the
Children's Court to a "place of safety" till he attains the age of
twenty-one years and thereafter shall be transferred to a jail.
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Option (4) has therefore rightly been accepted as the correct
answer.
Question No.A/53, B/67, C/53, D/36, reads thus:-
Under which provision of law, the Sessions Court can make a
reference to the High Court regarding the validity of any Act,
Ordinance or Regulation, the determination fo which is necessary
for the disposal of the case?
(1) Section 396 of Cr.P.C.
(2) Section 368 of Cr.P.C.
(3) Section 366 of Cr.P.C.
(4) Section 395 of Cr.P.C.
Even though none of the candidates, who have challenged
answer to this question in writ petitions, submitted objection to
the model answer key, therefore it is not open for any of the
petitioners to agitate this issue. Yet, mere reading of Section 395
of the Cr.P.C. makes it clear that where any Court is satisfied that
a case pending before it involves a question as to the validity of
any Act, Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in
an Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of which is
necessary for the disposal of the case, it can refer the same for
decision of the High Court. Option (4) has therefore been rightly
taken as the correct answer by the respondent.
Question No.A/59, B/59, C/41, D/69, reads thus:-
A trial court in State of Rajasthan delivers its judgment in English.
Under what provision of law, can the accused seek a translated
copy of the judgment in Hindi language?
(1) Section 353 of Cr.P.C.
(2) Section 362 of Cr.P.C.
(3) Section 364 of Cr.P.C.
(4) Section 363 of Cr.P.C.
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While according to the respondents, option (4) containing
Section 363 of the Cr.P.C. is the correct answer to the question,
but some of the petitioners contend that option (3) containing
Section 364 of the Cr.P.C. is the correct answer. The answer to this
question is to be found in the context of the fact that the
judgment is delivered in the State of Rajasthan by a trial court in
English language whereas the language of the court is Hindi. Sub-
section (2) of Section 363 of the Cr.P.C. provides that "on the
application of the accused, a certified copy of the judgment, or
when he so desires, a translation in his own language, if
practicable or in the language of the Court, shall be given to him
without delay." In contrast, Section 364 of the Cr.P.C. provides
that "the original judgment shall be filed with the record of the
proceedings and where the original is recorded in a language
different from that of the Court and the accused so requires, a
translation thereof into the language of the Court, shall be added
to such record." The distinction in the two provisions is that while
Section 363(2) refers to the demand of the accused of translated
copy of the judgment in his own language, and when it is not
practicable to provide him copy of the judgment in his own
language, provide him copy of the judgment in the language of
the court. But Section 364 essentially postulates the delivery of
the judgment by the Presiding Officer of the Court in a language
other than the language of the court and on being required by the
accused a translated copy thereof into the language of the court is
added to such record. As would be evident from the very
language of Section 364, this provision applies where the
judgment is passed in a language different than the language of
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the court and therefore the right is given to the accused to require
a translation thereof into the language of the court. The language
of the court in the State of Rajasthan being Hindi, and the
judgment referred to this question having been delivered in
English, a language different than that of the Court, if the accused
so requires, a translation thereof into the language of the court,
which is Hindi, shall be added to the record of the proceedings.
The question neither envisages accused applying for translated
certified copy of judgment in his own language or in the language
of the Court. Section 364 of the Cr.P.C. is indeed the nearest
correct answer. Word 'seek' in the question appears to have been
used in the same sense as the word 'requires' has been used in
Section 364. We see no reason to differ with the view of the
Expert Committee/Examination Committee as option (3) in the
nearest correct answer.
Question A/62, B/41, C/47, D/44, reads thus:-
The trial court while recording evidence in a case wherein the
accused is in custody, records the evidence of witnesses without
ensuring presence of the accused in the court, which of the
following statement would be correct?
(1) The judgment passed by trial court in such proceedings
would be vitiated by virtue of Section 273(1) of Cr.P.C.
(2) The judgment passed by trial court in such proceedings
would be saved by virtue of Section 460 of Cr.P.C.
(3) The judgment passed by the trial court in such
proceedings would be saved by virtue of Section 465 of
Cr.P.C.
(4) The judgment passed by trial court in such proceedings
would be saved by virtue of Section 317 of Cr.P.C.
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Mr. A.K. Sharma, learned senior counsel, submitted that the
very fact that none of the candidates has submitted any objection
in regard to mention of sub-section (1) along-with Section 273
Cr.P.C. goes to show that no one was misled by reason of Section
273 being indicated as Section 273(1), therefore the objection
raised for the first time before this Court should not be
entertained. Contention of the petitioners is that Section 273(1)
does not exist in the Cr.P.C., it is only Section 273. According to
the respondents, option (1), i.e., the judgment passed by trial
court in such proceedings would be vitiated by virtue of Section
273(1) of Cr.P.C. is the correct answer. Respondents have relied on
the judgment of this Court in State Vs. Atma Ram - D.B.
Criminal Death Reference No.2/2017 connected with D.B.
Criminal Appeal No.33/2018 - Atma Ram and Others Vs.
State of Rajasthan, wherein judgment of the trial court was set
aside in regard to absence of the accused. The aforesaid DB
judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal
No.656-657 of 2019 - Atma Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan.
We having gone through Sections 460, 465, 317 of the
Cr.P.C., find that none of them is attracted to the facts and
situation given in the question. The only provision attracted in this
situation is Section 273 Cr.P.C. Even if sub-section (1) added
thereto is superfluous, being non-existent, it has to be understood
as only Section 273 Cr.P.C. Therefore, whoever attempted this
question indicating the option (1) as the correct answer must be
held entitled to one mark., particularly when none raised objection
to model answer key.
Question A/66, B/62, C/55, D/66, reads thus:-
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Which of the following documents cannot be admitted in evidence
in a criminal trial without formal proof?
(1) Certified copy of public documents
(2) Report issued by a Government Scientist after
chemical/serological examination of samples forwarded to
him by the investigating agency.
(3) A report issued by the government handwriting expert
after comparison of the disputed signatures with an admitted
signature.
(4) A document which is admitted by the opposite party.
According to some of the petitioners, option (2) in view of
Section 293 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 54 of the Evidence Act, is
the appropriate answer, whereas the respondents have treated
option (1) as the correct answer. The respondents have relied on
Sections 293 and 294 of the Cr.P.C. and Sections 76, 77, 79 of the
Indian Evidence Act in support of their stand. Obviously, in view of
Section 293 of the Cr.P.C., the report given by a Government
Scientist after chemical/serological examination of samples
forwarded to him by the investigating agency, and the report
issued by the Government hand-writing expert after comparison of
the disputed signature with the admitted one, can be admitted in
evidence without formal proof. Moreover, the document which is
admitted by the opposite party need not be proved in a criminal
trial in view of sub-section (3) of Section 294 read with Section 58
of the Evidence Act, and where the genuineness of a document is
not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in a trial
without proof of signature of the person who signed it.
Mr. Abhi Goyal, learned counsel for some of the petitioners,
has however argued that certified copies of the public documents
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can be proved in evidence without formal proof, therefore option
(1) also cannot be said to be correct answer. In support of his
argument, learned counsel has relied on the judgments of the
Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh Vs. Gurdev Singh - (2012) 1
SCC 425, Madamanchi Ramappa and Another Vs. Muthalur
Bojjappa - AIR 1963 SC 1633 and judgment of this Court in
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Nand
Kishore and Others - 2002 ACJ 1564 and that of the Andhra
Prdesh High Court in Md. Akbar and Another Vs. State of A.P.
- 2002 Cri. L.J. 3167.
The Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh Vs. Gurdev Singh,
supra, held that certified copy of a public document prepared
under Section 76 of the Act, in terms of Section 74 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 is admissible in evidence under Section 77 of
the said Act, without being proved by calling witness. The
Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh Vs. Gurdev Singh, supra, in
para 9 of the report, held as under:-
"9) Now the other question which remains to be decided
is whether the compromise Ex. D3 is admissible in
evidence or not? The compromise dated 27.11.1972 has
become the basis of the decree dated 08.12.1972
passed by the Sub-Judge, Hoshiarpur. The perusal of Ex.
D4 i.e., judgment and decree were passed as per the
terms and conditions of compromise placed on file. As
rightly observed by the courts below, the compromise
has merged into a decree and has become part and
parcel of it. To put it clear, the compromise had become
a part of the decree which was passed by the court of
Sub-Judge Ist Class, Hoshiarpur. Hence, it is a public
document in terms of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 (in short `the Act') and certified copy of the
public document prepared under Section 76 of the Act is
admissible in evidence under Section 77 of the said Act.
A certified copy of a public document is admissible in
evidence without being proved by calling witness.
Inasmuch as the decree was passed and drafted in the
light of the compromise entered into between the
parties, viz., the plaintiff and the defendants, the
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(49 of 62) [CW-10022/2019]
certified copy of such document which was produced
before the Court, there is presumption as to the
genuineness of such certified copy under Section 78 of
the Act. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" (underline ours)
The Supreme Court in Madamanchi Ramappa and
Another Vs. Muthaluru Bojjappa, supra, held as under:
"Aggrieved by the decree passed in his appeal by the
District Court, the respondent moved the High Court
under section 100 C. P. C., and his appeal was heard by
Sanjeeva Rao Nayudu J. The learned judge emphasised
the fact that no sale deed had been produced by the
appellants to prove their title, and then examined the
documentary evidence on which they relied. He was
inclined to hold that Ext. A-8 had not been proved at all
and could not, therefore, be received in evidence. It has
been fairly conceded by Mr. Sastri for the respondent
before us that this was plainly erroneous in law. The document in question being a certified copy of a public document need not have been proved by calling a witness. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (underline ours)"
A Division Bench of M.P. High Court in Smt. Rekha Rana and Others Vs. Smt. Ratnashree Jain - AIR 2006 M.P. 107, speaking through Hon'ble the Chief Justice Mr. Justice R. Ravindran, as His Lordship then was, answering a reference on the question whether a certified copy of a public document can be received in evidence without any proof, held as under:-
"15. We have already held that a certified copy of a registered Instrument/document issued by the Registering Officer, by copying from Book 1, is a certified copy of a public document. It can therefore be produced in proof of the contents of the public document or part of public document of which it purports to be a copy. It can be produced as secondary evidence of the public document (entries in Book I), under Section 65(e) read with Section 77 of the Act without anything more. No foundation need be laid for production of certified copy of secondary evidence under Section 65(e) or (f). But then it will only prove the contents of the original (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM) (50 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] document, and not be proof of execution of the original document. (Vide Section 57 (5) of Registration Act read with Section 77 of Evidence Act). This is because registration of a document is proof that someone purporting to be 'X' the executant admitted execution, but is not proof that 'X' executed the document.... (underline ours)"
In the context of the question that which of the documents can be admitted in evidence in criminal trial without formal proof, definition of the evidence given in Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act may be noted, which says that all documents produced for inspection of the Court, are called documentary evidence. Section 64 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that the document must be proved by its primary evidence except in cases mentioned in the Act, where Section 65 dealing with the secondary evidence, comes into picture. Section 65(f) of the Indian Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence. Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act refers to public documents. Section 76 provides every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, and such copy shall be called certified copy. Section 77 provides that such certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies. It is in continuation of these provisions that Section (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM) (51 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] 79 provides that the Court shall presume to be genuine every document purporting to be a certificate, certified copy, or other document, which is by law declared to be admissible as evidence of any particular fact and which purports to be duly certified by any officer of the Central or of a State Government, who is duly authorized thereto by the Central Government.
In view of the above, none of the options (1), (2), (3), (4) would carry correct answer to the question. In our view, option (1) accepted as the correct answer by the respondents is palpably incorrect. Therefore this question, in our view, is liable to be deleted.
Question No.A/68, B/56, C/52, D/60, reads thus:-
Public servant "A" while discharging his official functions, issues a document with incorrect particulars knowing that by this action, he is likely to harm another public servant "B". The public servant "A" is responsible for which of the following offences, (1) Forgery (2) Creating of false document (3) Cheating (4) None of the above.
As per the respondent, the option (4) "None of the above", i.e., options (1), (2), (3), is correct. According to the respondent, this question is based on Section 167 IPC. The respondent contends that in the given problem the public servant is responsible for offence punishable under Section 167 IPC, which is not any one of the options and therefore "None of the above" as mentioned in option (4), is the correct answer. Whereas some of the petitioners relying on Section 464 of the IPC, have contended that option (2) "Creating of false document" is the correct answer. (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM)
(52 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] The question is based on Section 167 IPC, which, inter alia, provides that "whoever, being a public servant, and being, as such public servant, charged with the preparation or translation of any document or electronic record, frames, prepares or translates that document or electronic record in a manner which he knows or believes to be incorrect, intending thereby to cause or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby cause injury to any person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both." Section 167 IPC falls in Chapter IX, which enumerates offences by or relating to public servants, whereas Section 464 IPC is part of Chapter XVIII of the IPC pertaining to offences relating to documents and to property marks. Section 167 IPC describes the intended act to be done only framing, preparing or translating the document or electronic record only by a "public servant", which he knows or believes it to be incorrect. Section 464 IPC, on the other hand, envisages the making of false document or false electronic record by "any person". Section 167 IPC is thus a distinct offence attracted in the fact situation given in the question, which would not be covered by the general provision of forgery under Section 463 or making of false document under Section 464 IPC and cheating under Section 420 IPC, respectively, given in options (1), (2),(3). Therefore, we do not find any reason not to accept the option (4) "None of the above", as the only correct answer.
Question No.A/84, B/78, C/73, D/81, reads thus:-
Fill in the blanks with the most appropriate option ________ of my friends advised me to take ____ taxi home.
(1) No, the (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM) (53 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] (2) One, a (3) More, no article (4) These, some As per the respondent, option (2) would be the correct answer which would make the sentence complete as "One of my friends advised me to take a taxi home. Some of the petitioners have relied on a book titled "English for R.J.S. Preliminary Examination" 17th Edition published by CBC publications and authored by Prof. B.K. Rastogi. Under the caption use of "Zero Article" it is stated that no article would be used before the means of transport, such as, car, bus, plane, train, bicycle etc. The respondents however contended that "one of" indicating a particular number out of a set with multiple number was its correct use of the plural form "one of my friends". Uses of indefinite article "a" is correct before taxi. It is a general grammer that "means of transportation" are not used with article but when these means are used for specific purpose, the uses of appropriate article comes into play. We do not find any fault in the approach taken by the respondent because here the means of transportation, such as, car, bus, plane, train, bicycle etc., are not being used but rather used for which they are being put to is indicated. Even if we go by the "Zero Article Rule" relied by the petitioners, the means of transport having been used as taxi, use of article "a" in the above sentence cannot be said to be inappropriate.
Question No.A/87, B/93, C/92, D/91, is the question of Hindi subject, which reads thus:-
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(54 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] fdl fLFkfr esa vorj.k fpg~~u dk iz;ksx lkekU;r% ugha gksrk gSA ¼1½ fdlh ds egRoiw.kZ opu mn~~/k`r djus esaA ¼2½ vizpfyr vFkok fo'ks"k izpfyr 'kCnksa esaA ¼3½ O;fDr;ksa ds miukeksa esaA ¼4½ jpuk dk vuqokn djrs gq,A Inverted coma in Hindi is known as " vorj.k fpg~~u" (Avtaran chinha) and therefore the question is that in which of the given options the inverted comas are not used. As per the respondent, option (4), i.e., inverted comas are not used in the translation of a composition, is the correct answer. Whereas, according to some of the petitioners, option (2) and option (4) are both correct. Option (2) is "vizpfyr vFkok fo'ks"k izpfyr 'kCnksa esa " (Aprachalit Athwa Vishesh Prachalit Shabdo Me).
Reliance has been placed on page 127 of the book titled "uohu fgUnh O;kdj.k ,oa jpuk" (Naveen Hindi Vyakaran Evam Rachna) by the National Council of Educational Research and Training, New Delhi, (NCERT) for the Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Ajmer, published by 'Rajasthan Rajya Pathyapustak Mandal, Jaipur" where mention of " vorj.k fpg~~u@m)j.k fpg~~u@mifjfojke" (Avtaran Chinha/Uddhran Chinha/Upriviram) has been made. It is stated therein that there are two kinds of inverted comas, i.e., single and double. The question is that in which of the situations given in the options the inverted comas are generally not used and the option (2) which according to some of the petitioners is correct, refers to " vizpfyr"
(aprachalit), namely - unconventional, obsolete or outdated words or specially prevalent words. The Expert Committee has (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM) (55 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] unanimously rejected the objection. We have no reason to disagree with their decision because the question itself mentions that in which of the situations the inverted comas are generally not used. Conversely read, it would mean in which of the situations given in four options, the inverted comas are generally used. Looked at from either angle, the inverted comas are generally not used in the translation of a composition but the same cannot be said to be true of obsolete/outdated or specially prevalent words, in which inverted comas may be used, depending on the context in which such words are employed in the formation of a sentence.
Question No.A/89, B/91, C/86, D/98, reads thus:-
fuEu esa ls dkSulk] opu laca/kh =qfV okyk okD; gS\ 1 egkRek th dk n'kZu djds eSa /kU; gks x;kA 2 Jksrkvksa esa dbZ Jsf.k;ksa ds yksx FksA 3 fonzksfg;ksa dks dqRrksa dh rjg ?klhVk x;kA 4 gj ,d us Vksih igu j[kh FkhA The Expert Committee has found option (1) as the only answer having the mistake in its formation and we have no reason not to accept the opinion of the Expert Committee.
Question No.A/92, B/89, C/98, D/86, reads thus:-
^vius ?kj xk¡o ;k uxj esa fdlh dk vknj ugha gksrk* vfHkO;fDr gsrq fudVre yksdksfDr gSA ¼1½ ?kj dh [kkWM fdjfdjh] ckgj dk xqM+ ehBk ¼2½ ?kj ds ihjksa dks rsy dk eyhnk ¼3½ ?kj dh fcYyh ?kj esa gh f'kdkj ¼4½ ?kj vk;s ukx u iwft, ckeh iwtu tk;A A total of 48 objections have been received to the model answer key given to this question, in which the objectors have (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM) (56 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] described options (1) and (4) as the correct, whereas the Expert Committee has rejected all the objections, accepting the option (2) as the only correct answer. We do not find any reason not to accept the opinion of the Expert Committee on this question.
Question No.A/93, B/95, C/93, D/100, reads thus:-
^jksxh dks cgqr ?kcjkgV gks jgh Fkh*A okD; esa js[kkafdr 'kCn gS ¼1½ laKk ¼2½ fØ;k ¼3½ fØ;k fo'ks"k.k ¼4½ vO;;
A total of 51 objections were received to the model answer key to this question, according to which (1) laKk (sangya) (noun) is the correct answer. According to respondents, use of the word "?kcjkgV" (ghabrahat) (nervousness) in the formation of sentence is 'abstract noun, which is what has been opined by the Expert Committee. Therefore, option (1) has rightly been taken as the correct answer.
Question No.A/94, B/96, C/90, D/96, reads thus:-
^og vkneh vk jgk gS*] okD; esa ^og* dh O;kdjf.kd dksfV gS% 1 laKk 2 loZuke 3 fo'ks"k.k 4 vO;;
According to some of the petitioners, the Hindi word " og"
(vaha), the question translated into English means "that person is coming" and what is asked is that " og" (vaha) (that) would fall in which of the grammatical categories. As per the decision of the respondents, based on the opinion of the Expert Committee, the (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM) (57 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] use of word "og" (vaha) in the sentence has been made to denote the specialty of the person and therefore it is an adjective.
Ms. Mahi Yadav, learned counsel for one of the petitioners, has relied on the book "Vyavharik Samanya Hindi" (Seventh Edition) authored by Dr. Raghav Prakash and published by Pinkcity Publishers, to argue that "og" (vaha) (that person) in the sentence is a pronoun but in that very book, it is mentioned that sometimes pronoun can also be used as adjective. For example, " ;g yM+dk"
(yaha ladka), "og ckr" (vaha baat) etc. Question No.A/99, B/90, C/100, D/88, reads thus:-
fuEu esa ls dkSulk lgh foykse oxZ ugha gS ¼1½ fHkK&vufHkK ¼2½ fo/kok&l/kok ¼3½ okpky&ewd ¼4½ uSlfxZd&d`f+=e The question was as to which of the options are not the correct opposite words. A set of two words, has been given in all four options, asking as to which of them are not opposite words to each other. The Expert Committee rejected the objections and opined that option no.1 was the only correct answer.
As per the objections by some of the petitioners, the word "fHkK" (bhigya) is opposite word of " vufHkK" (anbhigya), whereas opinion of the experts was that there is no word like "fHkK" (bhigya) in Hindi. In fact the correct opposite word of " vufHkK"
(anbhigya), which means "an ignorant person, is "vfHkK"
(abhigya), which means "a knowledgeable person". (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM)
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The book titled "O;kogkfjd lkekU; fgUnh" (Vyavharik Samanya
Hindi) (Seventh Edition) authored by Dr. Raghav Prakash, which is published by Pink City Publishers, Jaipur, contains Chapter, namely, "foykse 'kCn" (Vilom Shabd) (Antonyms) at page 251, and the opposite word of "vfHkK" (Abhigya) is given "vufHkK" (Anbhigya).
A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Gunjan Sinha Jain Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Delhi, W.P. (C) No.449/2012 dealt with a similar dispute pertaining to the preliminary examination conducted for recruitment to Delhi Judicial Service. The High Court on examination of the disputed questions directed 12 questions to be removed from the purview of consideration for the purposes of re-evaluation. While rejecting the objection to the correctness of answer key of other 7 questions, the Delhi High Court directed that minimum qualifying mark would undergo a change as the minimum qualifying marks for general candidates was 120 (60% of 200) and for reserved candidates it was 110 (55% of 200) and because of the direction so issued that 12 questions be removed from the purview of consideration for the purposes of re-evaluation, the minimum qualifying marks would also change and the same would become 112.8 (60% of 188) for general candidates and 103.4 (55% of
188) for the reserved categories. In those facts, the High Court held as under:-
"80. We now come to the second condition which stipulates that the number of candidates to be admitted to the main examination (written) should not be more than ten times the total number of vacancies of each category advertised. Let us take the case of general (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM) (59 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] vacancies which were advertised as 23 in number. Ten times 23 would mean that up to 230 general candidates could qualify. But, as mentioned above, 235 general candidates have already been declared as qualified for taking the Main Examination (Written). We are, therefore, faced with a problem. If we strictly follow this condition then there is no scope for any other candidates (other than the 235 who have been declared qualified) to qualify. But, that would be unfair to them as the question paper itself, as we have seen above, was not free from faults. Hypothetically speaking, a candidate may have left the 12 questions, which are now to be removed, and, therefore, he would have scored a zero for those questions. What is worse, he may have answered all those 12 questions wrongly (in terms of the Answer Key) and, therefore, he would have received minus (-) 3 marks because of 25% negative marking. And, all this, for no fault on his part as the 12 questions ought not to have been there in the question paper. Therefore, it would be unfair to shut out such candidates on the basis of the second condition.
81. We must harmonize the requirement of the second condition with the requirement of not disturbing the candidates who have been declared as qualified as also with the requirement of justice, fairness and equity insofar as the other candidates are concerned. We feel that this would be possible:
(1) by re-evaluating the OMR answer sheets of all the general category candidates on the lines summarized in the table set out above;
(2) by selecting the top 230 candidates in order of merit subject to the minimum qualifying marks of 112.8; and (3) by adding the names of those candidates, if any, who were earlier declared as qualified but do not find a place in the top 230 candidates after re-evaluation.
In this manner, all persons who could legitimately claim to be in the top 230 would be included and all those who were earlier declared as having qualified would also retain their declared status. Although, the final number of qualified candidates may exceed the figure of 230, this is the only way, according to us, to harmonize the rules with the competing claims of the candidates in a just and fair manner. A similar exercise would also have to be conducted in respect of each of the reserved categories. The entire exercise be completed by the respondents within a period of two weeks. Consequently, the Main Examination (Written) would also have to be re-scheduled and, to give enough time for preparation, we feel that it should not be earlier than the 26.05.2012."
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(60 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] Aforesaid judgment of the Delhi High Court was subjected to challenge in Civil Appeal No.4794/2012 - Pallav Mongia Vs. Registrar General, Delhi High Court. The Supreme Court examined the question of fresh short-listing consequent to deletion of some questions or correction of the model answer key in respect of few. Taking note of the fact that the candidates in the first eligibility list had not been excluded from the list of eligible candidates for appearing in the mains examination, even if such candidates had come down in rank in view of deletion of some questions or change in the model answer key, it was directed that the other candidates, who upon re-evaluation pursuant to deletion of questions and modification of the model answer key had secured more mark than the last candidate allowed to appear in the main examination vide revised list, would also qualify and will be included in the eligibility list.
In Anjali Goswami and Others Vs. Registrar General, Delhi High Court, supra, the Delhi High Court was dealing with the challenge to correctness of the alleged errors in the questions/answer keys of the preliminary examination of Delhi Judicial Services, which according to the petitioners therein were demonstrably and palpably wrong. The High Court administration informed the Court about the decision of the Examination Committee to delete two questions and award one bonus mark to all the candidates who appeared in the examination and revise answer keys in respect of one of the questions. The Delhi High Court, while deciding the writ petition, found that there were two correct answers to a question, one of which was accepted as (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM) (61 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] correct by the Examination Committee. It therefore directed to award one mark to the candidates who had opted for the other option as the correct answer. The Delhi High Court however in the concluding part of the judgment directed that if, as a consequence of the aforesaid exercise, any of the petitioners meet the eligibility for being permitted to take the main examination and they also rank within the 10 times number of vacancies advertised, they should be permitted to do so.
A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in its judgment dated 09.05.2016 in a set of two writ petitions, leading being one Writ Petition (C) No.3453/2016 - Sumit Kumar Vs. High Court of Delhi and Another, was also dealing with challenge to some of the questions and answer-key in the Delhi Judicial (Preliminary) Examination held on 20.12.2015. The Delhi High Court directed deletion of four questions in the multiple choice question paper and re-computation of marks and consequently fresh preparation of the eligibility list in accordance with the ratio of the judgment in Gunjan Sinha Jain Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Delhi, supra, of Delhi High Court and that of the Supreme Court in Pallav Mongia Vs. Registrar General, Delhi High Court, supra.
In view of the discussion made above, present writ petitions deserve to partly succeed, only to the extent of Question A/66, B/62, C/55, D/66, with direction to the respondents to delete that question from the question-paper booklet and keeping in view the ratio of judgment of the Supreme Court in Pallav Mongia Vs. Registrar General, Delhi High Court, supra, recompute the marks so as to prepare fresh list of eligible candidates, by (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM) (62 of 62) [CW-10022/2019] including all such candidates therein, who secure more marks than the last candidate originally allowed to appear in the main examination and apart from originally allowed candidates, also permit the candidates newly included in the eligibility list, to appear in the main examination, for recruitment to Civil Judge Cadre. Ordered accordingly.
The writ petitions are accordingly partly allowed in the terms indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.
Office to place a copy of this judgment in each connected case file.
(NARENDRA SINGH DHADDHA),J (MOHAMMAD RAFIQ),J //Jaiman// (Downloaded on 01/09/2019 at 08:02:43 PM) Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)