Himachal Pradesh High Court
Moti Ram vs State Of H.P on 26 June, 2025
( 2025:HHC:20444 ) THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 77 of 2024 .
Reserved on: 06.05.2025 Date of Decision: 26.06.2025.
Moti Ram ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
Coram
r to ...Respondent
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. P.K. Verma, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State: Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 02.01.2024, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chamba, District Chamba (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 30.12.2022 and order of sentence dated 05.01.2023, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Tissa, District Chamba, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 2( 2025:HHC:20444 ) same manner in which they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) .
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 355 & 504 of the Indian Penal Code (in short "IPC"). It was asserted that the informant/victim, Kishni Devi (PW1), was returning to her home on 12.09.2013 at about 08:30 A.M. When she reached near Bada at about 09:00 A.M., the accused, Moti Ram, obstructed her and told her that she wanted more land, and he would give her more land. He started abusing the informant. The informant asked the accused not to abuse her. The accused became infuriated and started beating the informant with his fist and kicks. He pushed her to the ground and took out a pair of scissors from his jacket.
He cut her braid with the scissors. She sustained injuries to her head, arm and other parts of her body. She raised an alarm for help, but no one came to the spot. She narrated the incident to her husband, Roshan Lal (PW2). They visited the police station and reported the matter to the police, where an FIR (Ex-PW1/A) was registered. SI Jagdish Chand (PW5) conducted the ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 3 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) investigation. He filed an application (Ex-PW4/A) for conducting the medical examination of the victim. Dr. Chandan .
Verma (PW4) conducted the victim's medical examination and found injuries on her head and face. He issued the MLC (Ex.PW4/B). The victim, Kishni Devi, produced her braid, which was put in a cloth parcel. The parcel was sealed with three impressions of seal "H" and was seized vide memo (Ex-PW1/B).
Seal impression (Ex.PW5/A) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The accused produced the scissors used by him for cutting the victim's braid. It was put in a cloth parcel and the parcel was sealed with three impressions of seal "S". A seal impression (Ex-PW5/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the parcel was seized vide memo (Ex-PW1/C). The braid, sample hairs and scissors were sent to FSL. The result (Ex-PZ) was issued, in which it was mentioned that the braid produced by the victim and the sample hairs were human hair, which were similar to each other. The test cut pattern made with the scissors was comparable to the cut pattern found on the braid produced by the victim. The site plan (Ex-PW5/C) was prepared. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 4 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
.
3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 355 and 504 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. Kishni Devi (PW1) is the informant/victim. Roshan Lal (PW2) is her husband to whom the incident was narrated. Brij Lal (PW3) is the witness to recovery; however, he did not support the prosecution's case. Dr. Chandan Verma (PW4) conducted the victim's medical examination. SI Jagdish Chand (PW5) conducted the investigation. ASI Hakam Singh (PW6) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited.
Naresh Kumar (PW7) carried the case property to RFSL, Dharamshala.
5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.PC denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He claimed that he is innocent and was falsely implicated. No defence was sought to be adduced by the accused.
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6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimony of the victim was duly corroborated by her husband to whom the .
incident was narrated, the medical evidence and the report of RFSL. She had sustained injuries, and her testimony could not be doubted because of the land dispute between the parties. The incident had taken place at a lonely place and was not witnessed by any person. The sole testimony of the injured victim can be relied upon. The accused obstructed the victim when she was going to her home. He gave her beatings and cut her hair;
therefore, the offences punishable under Section 323, 341 and 355 of the IPC were duly proved. However, the actual words used by the accused were not mentioned, and the offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC was not proved. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: -
Offence Sentence awarded Section 355 of the Indian One-year rigorous imprisonment Penal Code and a fine of ₹5,000/-. In default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for one month.
Section 323 of the Indian Six months' rigorous imprisonment. Penal Code Section 341 of the Indian One month rigorous imprisonment. Penal Code ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 6 ( 2025:HHC:20444 )
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal which .
was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chamba (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the testimony of the victim was reliable. The incident had taken place at a lonely place and was not witnessed by any person;
therefore, the non-examination of any independent person is not material. The testimony of the victim was duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the report of the RFSL, Dharamshala. The enmity is a double-edged weapon and is not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. However, the learned Trial Court erred in imposing the rigorous imprisonment for the commission of the offence under Section 341 of the IPC, and only a simple imprisonment could have been imposed. Hence, the learned Appellate Court modified the sentence and changed the nature of the imprisonment from rigorous to simple.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below decided the ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 7 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) matter in a cursory manner. There was no evidence against the accused; therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be .
allowed, and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
9. I have heard Mr. P.K. Verma, learned counsel, for the petitioner and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
10. Mr. P. K. Verma, learned counsel, for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The testimony of the victim was not corroborated by any independent person.
Her version was inherently improbable because of material discrepancies in it. There was a land dispute between the victim and the accused, and her testimony should not have been accepted at its face value. Learned Courts below erred in relying upon the uncorroborated testimony of the victim. The judgments and order passed by learned Courts below are perverse, and this Court can interfere with them while deciding the revision. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 8 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) below be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gamini Bala Koteswar Rao & Anr. Vs. State of .
A.P. 2009 (10) SCC 636] in support of his submission.
11. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly appreciated the evidence. There is no perversity in the judgments and order passed by them. The testimony of the victim was duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the report of RFSL. The learned Courts below had rightly accepted the testimony of the victim. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact while deciding a revision; therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
13. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 9 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -
.
"10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed:
"13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 10 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460, where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under:
.
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 11
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15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC .
OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
"12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) "5. ... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 12 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ..."
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and .
relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) "14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."
14. In the above case, also conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 13 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its own view. This Court set aside the High Court's order holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its .
views, and that too without any legal basis.
16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
"16. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is therefore, in the negative."
17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
18. The victim, Kishni Devi (PW1), stated that she had gone to Adhwar Kothru at about 07:00 am and was returning to her home at about 08:30 am. She reached Bada at 09:00 am, where accused Moti Ram had concealed himself. He obstructed her path and told her that she was demanding more land. He ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 14 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) would give her more land. He abused the victim, and when the victim asked him not to abuse her, the accused gave her .
beatings. He pushed her and took out scissors concealed by him in his jacket and cut her braid. She sustained injuries. She shouted for help, and the accused ran away from the spot. She narrated the incident to her husband. Both of them went to the police station and reported the matter to the police.
19. She stated in her cross-examination that the distance between Adhwar Kothru to Bada was one meter. Bada was not a village, but a place where sheep and goat are tied. Her house was located at a distance of 02 meters from Kothru. The name of her village is Chachal. 20-25 families reside in the village of Chachal. No person was present at Bada. She admitted that people used to cross that place. She denied that the cries could be heard in the village Chachal. She admitted that she had a dispute with the accused over the land. This dispute was pending for about 04 years. The incident continued for 10-15 minutes. No villagers arrived at the spot after hearing her cries.
She did not narrate the incident to any person except her husband. She denied that the accused had not cut her braid.
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20. It was submitted that her testimony makes the prosecution's case doubtful. She stated that the distance .
between Adhwar Kothru and Bada was about one meter, and she took 30 minutes to cover this distance. She claimed her house is located at a distance of 2 meters from Kothru; however, no person had visited the spot after hearing her cries, which is highly improbable. This submission is not acceptable. She is an uneducated villager because she put her thumbprint on her statement. There is nothing on record to show that she knows the meaning of the term meter; therefore, her testimony regarding the distance cannot be accepted.
21. SI Jagdish Chand (PW-5) conducted the investigation. He prepared the site plan (Ex-PW5/C). He has shown the place of the incident at point A, which is located on a path going through the Jungle. He specifically stated in his cross-examination that there was no house on the place of the incident. He was not asked about the distance between Adhwar Kothru, the village Chachal and Bada. Hence, the prosecution's case could not have been rejected because of the distance given by the victim.
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22. It was submitted that the victim admitted in her cross-examination that a land dispute was pending between her .
and the accused, which shows the enmity between the parties.
No witness corroborated her testimony, and the learned Courts below erred in relying upon the victim's testimony. This submission cannot be accepted. Learned Courts below had rightly pointed out that the enmity is a double-edged weapon-
while it furnishes a motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of crime; therefore, the enmity by itself could not have been used to discard the victim's testimony.
This proposition was laid down in Orissa v. Madhusudan Sahu, 2006 SCC OnLine Ori 241: 2007 Cri LJ 440, wherein it was observed at page 443:
"15. While the accused persons propagate the plea that, because of this enmity, they have been falsely implicated, the prosecution has come up with the suggestion that the attack on P.W. 6 was carried out because of the enmity. Enmity between the parties is a double-edged weapon. The effect of enmity is to be considered in the case according to the circumstances and evidence available on record. What is settled is that once enmity exists between the parties, the evidence adduced by the parties is to be scrutinised with great care and caution, and every mitigating circumstance has to be given importance. (See (2004) 27 OCR 899 (SC). Biharinath Goswamy v. Shiv Kumar Singh, (2004) 27 OCR 462: (2004 Cri LJ
646), Bhargavan v. State of Kerala...."::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 17
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23. Dr. Chandan Verma (PW4) conducted the victim's .
medical examination. He found a cut lacerated wound at the parietal side of the scalp and a cut lacerated wound at the left nasal fold. The injuries sustained by the victim showed her presence on the spot. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Singh @ Harbhajan Singh & Ors. Versus State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 421, that the evidence of the stamped witness must be given due weightage as his presence on the spot cannot be doubted. It was observed: -
"36. The evidence of the stamped witness must be given due weightage as his presence at the place of occurrence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable, and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, and this lends support to his testimony that he was present at the time of occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. Such a witness comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness". Thus, the evidence of an injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. (Vide:
Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 259;::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 18
( 2025:HHC:20444 ) Kailas & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 793; Durbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 2 SCC 676; and State of U.P. v. Naresh & Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 324).
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24. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 13 that the testimony of the injured witness has to be accepted as correct unless there are compelling circumstances to doubt such statement. It was observed:
"22. The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable evidence in a criminal trial.
23. In Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra [Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 355], this Court summed up the principles which are to be kept in mind when appreciating the evidence of an injured eyewitness. This Court held as follows: (SCC para 26) "26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be appreciated, the under-noted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind:
26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition.
26.2. Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused.::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 19
( 2025:HHC:20444 ) 26.3. The evidence of the injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be .
discarded lightly.
26.4. The evidence of the injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions.
26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishment in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence.
26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution r version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with the passage of time should be discarded." (emphasis supplied)
25. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan and Others, (1996) 9 SCC 104, that while assessing the evidence of an eyewitness, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely whether, in the circumstances of the case, the eyewitness could be present and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable.
It was observed:-
"7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves scrutinised the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion is irresistible that their evidence on material particulars has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation without ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 20 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) even discussing the evidence, more particularly the evidence relating to the basic prosecution case. While assessing and evaluating the evidence of eyewitnesses, the .
Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eyewitness to be present at the scene and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. The High Court, in our opinion, has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and, in fact, has misappreciated the evidence, which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out how he has fared in cross-examination and what impression is created by his evidence, taken insofar as the context of the case, and not by entering into the realm of conjecture and speculation. On scrutinising the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3 we find they are consistent with one another so far as the place of occurrence, the manner of assault, the weapon of assault used by the accused persons, the fact of dragging of the dead body of the deceased from the place to the grove and nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to impeach their testimony. The aforesaid oral evidence fully corroborates the medical evidence. In that view of the matter, we unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to establish the charge against the accused persons and the High Court committed an error in acquitting the three respondents, namely Inder Dutt, Raghu Raj and Bikram." (emphasis supplied)
26. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Hari Singh 1974 (3) SCR 725 that a person speaking on oath should be presumed to be a truthful witness unless there is something inherently improbable in his testimony. It was observed:::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 21
( 2025:HHC:20444 ) "The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The .
High Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have assumed that witnesses are untruthful unless it is proved that they are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon a grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with a full sense of responsibility for the consequences of what they state. It may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to disbelieve them."
27. Dr. Chandan Verma (PW-4) admitted in his cross-
examination that the injuries noticed by him could have been caused by a fall on the rocky surface; however, it was merely an alternative hypothesis, and it was sufficient to discard the testimony of the victim.
28. Brij Lal (PW3) stated that the accused produced scissors and the victim produced braid, which were seized by the police. It was submitted that this witness had not supported the prosecution's case and was permitted to be cross-examined;
however, he was cross-examined regarding what was told to him by the victim in the presence of the police. The statement made by a witness in the presence of the police is hit by Section 162 of Cr.PC and could not have been proved in a Court of law;
therefore, the fact that he was permitted to be cross-examined ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 22 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) because he failed to depose about the inadmissible evidence will not make his testimony doubtful.
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29. Moreover, he was not cross-examined regarding the production of the braid by the victim or the scissors by the accused. Nothing was suggested to him in his cross-
examination that the accused had not produced the scissors or the victim had not produced her braid in his presence, therefore, this part of his testimony was accepted as correct by the defence and his testimony regarding the production of the scissors by the accused and braid by the victim cannot be discarded.
30. SI Jagdish Chand (PW5) stated that he seized the braid produced by the victim and the scissors produced by the accused. These were sent to RFSL, and as per the report, the cut hair matched the sample hair of the victim. The cut pattern of the hair matched the cut pattern produced by the scissors recovered from the accused. Thus, the report of RFSL duly corroborated the testimony of the victim that the accused had cut her braid with the scissors.
31. The victim narrated the incident to her husband, Roshan Lal, after reaching her home. Roshan Lal stated that the ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 23 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) victim told him that the accused obstructed her way and started abusing her. The accused pushed her and cut her braid when she .
asked the accused not to abuse her. He admitted in his cross-
examination that he was not present on the spot, and this fact was narrated to him by the victim. However, this will not make any difference. The statement was made by the victim immediately after the incident to her husband and would be admissible under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sukhar v. State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507: 2000 SCC (Cri) 419: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 1005 that the statement under section 6 can be admitted if the statement is contemporaneous with the transaction. It was observed at page 511:
"6. Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of Section 6, what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts, and there should not be an interval which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae, must have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The aforesaid rule, as it is stated in Wigmore's Evidence Act, reads thus:
"Under the present exception [to hearsay] and utterance is by hypothesis, offered as an assertion to evidence the fact asserted (for example that a car ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 24 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) brake was set or not set), and the only condition is that it shall have been made spontaneously, i.e. as the natural effusion of a state of excitement. Now, this .
state of excitement may well continue to exist after the exciting fact has ended. The declaration, therefore, may be admissible even though subsequent to the occurrence, provided it is near enough in time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence continued."
7. Sarkar on Evidence (15th Edn.) summarises the law relating to the applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act thus:
"1. The declarations (oral or written) must relate to the act which is in issue or relevant thereto; they are not admissible merely because they accompany an act. Moreover, the declarations must relate to and explain the fact they accompany, and not independent facts previous or subsequent thereto, unless such facts are part of a transaction which is continuous.
2. The declarations must be substantially contemporaneous with the facts and not merely the narrative of a past.
3. The declaration and the act may be by the same person, or they may be by different persons, e.g., the declarations of the victim, assailant and bystanders. In conspiracy, riot & c, the declarations of all concerned in the common object are admissible.
4. Though admissible to explain or corroborate, or to understand the significance of the act, declarations are not evidence of the truth of the matters stated."
8. This Court in Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of A.P. [(1996) 6 SCC 241: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1290], considering the law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act, held thus: (SCC pp. 246-47, para 15) ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 25 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) "15. The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine .
is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, that it becomes relevant by itself. This rule is, roughly speaking, an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statements or facts admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. But it is necessary that such a fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such a statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication, then the statement is not part of res gestae."
9. In another recent judgment of this Court in Rattan Singh v. State of H.P. [(1997) 4 SCC 161: 1997 SCC (Cri) 525] this Court examined the applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act to the statement of the deceased and held thus: (SCC p. 167, para 16) "[T]he aforesaid statement of Kanta Devi can be admitted under Section 6 of the Evidence Act on account of its proximity in time to the act of murder. Illustration 'A' to Section 6 makes it clear. It reads thus:
'(a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or the bystanders at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact.' (emphasis supplied) Here the act of the assailant intruding into the courtyard during the dead of the night, the victim's ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 26 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) identification of the assailant, her pronouncement that the appellant was standing with a gun and his firing the gun at her, are all circumstances so .
intertwined with each other by proximity of time and space that the statement of the deceased became part of the same transaction. Hence, it is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act."
32. This position was reiterated in State of Maharashtra v.
Kamal Ahmed Mohammed Vakil Ansari, (2013) 12 SCC 17: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 242: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 202: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 230 wherein it was observed at page 45:
41. We may first extract Section 6 of the Evidence Act hereunder:
"6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction.
--Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.
Illustrations
(a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him.
Whatever was said or done by A or B or the bystanders at the beating, or so shortly before or after is as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact.
(b) A is accused of waging war against the Government of India by taking part in an armed insurrection in which property is destroyed, troops are attacked, and gaols are broken open. The occurrence of these facts is relevant, as forming part of the general transaction, though A may not have been present at all of them.
(c) A sues B for a libel contained in a letter forming part of a correspondence. Letters between the parties relating to the subject out of which the libel arose, and forming part of the correspondence in which it is ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 27 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) contained, are relevant facts, though they do not contain the libel itself.
(d) The question is whether certain goods ordered .
from B were delivered to A. The goods were delivered to several intermediate persons successively. Each delivery is a relevant fact."
In our considered view, the test to determine admissibility under the rule of "res gestae" is embodied in the words "are so connected with a fact in issue as to form a part of the same transaction". It is therefore, that for describing the concept of "res gestae", one would need to examine whether the fact is such as can be described by use of words/phrases such as, "contemporaneously arising out of the occurrence", "actions having a live link to the fact", "acts perceived as a part of the occurrence", exclamations (of hurt, seeking help, of disbelief, of cautioning, and the like) arising out of the fact, spontaneous reactions to a fact, and the like. It is difficult for us to describe Illustration (a) under Section 6 of the Evidence Act, especially in conjunction with the words "are so connected with a fact in issue as to form a part of the same transaction", in a manner different from the approach characterised above.
33. In the present case, the victim narrated the incident immediately after reaching home to seek help from her husband, and this will fall within the purview of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. This statement corroborates the victim's testimony in material particulars.
34. It was submitted that no independent person was examined to corroborate the victim's testimony. Learned Courts below had rightly held that no witness had reached the spot.
::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 28( 2025:HHC:20444 ) Hence, in these circumstances, there was no eyewitness, and none could have been examined.
.
35. Therefore, it was duly proved on record by the testimony of the victim that the accused had obstructed her path, given her beatings and cut her braid. The accused had cut her braid with the intent to dishonour her; therefore, he was rightly held guilty of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 341 and 355 of the IPC. This was a reasonable view which could have been taken by the learned Courts below, and there was no perversity in the view taken by the learned Courts below. Hence, the cited judgment in Gamini Bala Koteswar Rao (supra) does not apply to the present case.
36. The learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 355 of the IPC. This cannot be said to be excessive, keeping in view the fact that the accused had cut the victim's braid to dishonour her in society.
The act was done by the accused because of the pendency of the land dispute and to teach a lesson to the victim; therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly taken a serious view in the ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 29 ( 2025:HHC:20444 ) matter, and no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court.
.
37. The learned Trial Court had also sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 323 of the IPC. Keeping in view the fact that a helpless woman was beaten at a lonely place, the sentence of six months is also not excessive.
38. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for one month for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 341 of IPC and learned Appellate Court had rightly changed the nature of punishment from rigorous imprisonment to simple, and no further interference is required with the sentence imposed by learned Appellate Court.
39. No other point was urged.
40. Thus, there is no infirmity in the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. Consequently, the present revision fails, and the same is dismissed.
::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS 30( 2025:HHC:20444 )
41. A copy of this judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending .
applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 26th June, 2025 (Shamsh Tabrez) ::: Downloaded on - 30/06/2025 21:16:55 :::CIS