Kerala High Court
M.A.Shajan vs State Of Kerala on 7 January, 2025
Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :1
: 2025:KER:726
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. V. BALAKRISHNAN
TH
TUESDAY, THE 7
DAY OF JANUARY 2025 / 17TH POUSHA,
1946
CRL.A NO. 974 OF 2018
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 12.04.2018 IN S.C. NO.531 OF 2014 OF
III ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT, PALAKKAD
APPELLANT
/ACCUSED:
.A.SHAJAN
M
S/O.APPUKUTTAN, AGED 44, MANNATHURUTHEL,
KULINEER,CHITTARIKKAL, PALAVAYAL,KASARAGODE - 670511.
Y ADVS.
B
SRI.V.JOHN SEBASTIAN RALPH
SMT.P.V.DENCY
SRI.K.J.JOSEPH ERNAKULAM
SRI.V.JOHN THOMAS
RESPONDENT
/COMPALINANT:
TATE OF KERALA
S
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT
ERNAKULAM,COCHIN - 31.
SMT NEEMA T V, SR. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIS
T CRIMINAL
APPEAL
HAVING
COME
UP FINAL
HEARING
ON
20.12.2024, THE COURT ON 07.01.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :2
: 2025:KER:726
"CR"
J U D G M E N T
Raja Vijayaraghavan, J.
ThisappealispreferredbythesoleaccusedinS.C.No.531of2014onthe file of the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Palakkad, challenging the finding of guilt, conviction, and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 2. In the above appeal, the appellant was charged for having committed offence punishable under Sections 302, and201oftheIPC. Bythe impugned judgment dated 12.04.2018, he was found guilty under Section 302 oftheIPCandwassentencedtoundergoimprisonmentforlifeandtopayafine of Rs.50,000/- with a default clause. He was also convicted and sentencedto undergoRIforfiveyearsandtopayafineofRs.25,000/-fortheoffenceunder Section 201 of the IPC. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 3. The allegation against the appellant as per the charge are as under: The deceased Leena was married to one Thomas and she had two Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :3 : 2025:KER:726 childreninhermarriage. Leenadevelopedanaffairwiththeappellantwhileher husband was working overseas. In the year 2003, Leena left her husbandand childrenandelopedwiththeappellant. They went to Palakkad and started residing in a house owned by one Rema Devi on rent. Leena secured employment in an establishment by the name 'M.S.Traders' situated in Manjakulam at Palakkad. While they were residing together, their relationship became strained. The prosecution alleges that the appellant suspected the chastity of his live-in partner. On 26.07.2007, after a brief quarrel, Leena decided not to go to work. It is allegedthatatabout3.15p.m.on26.7.2007, theappellantbrutallymanhandledLeenaandthereafter,tiedaclotharoundher neckandstrangulatedher. Inordertocausethedisappearanceofevidence,the appellant is alleged to have dismembered the body of Leena and thereafter, packedpiecesofthebodypartsincardboardboxesanddisposedofthesamein various places in and around Palakkad and elsewhere. The registration of various crimes: 4. On 28.07.2007, a body part of a human being was sighted in an agricultural field at Chalady by one Janardhanan (PW21). He rushed to the police and lodged Ext.P18 FI Statement to the Police Officer based on which, Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :4 : 2025:KER:726 Ext.P18(a) FIR was registered as Crime No.117 of 2007 of the Kottayi Police Station under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. On the same dayitself,anotherbody part was sighted 1 km away from the earlierspot. Ext.P19inquestreportwas prepared in respect ofalowerlimbandExt.P20inquestreportwaspreparedin respect of a thigh of a human body. 4.1 On 29.07.2007, the trunk portion was found in a cardboard box placed on a stone in a canal near the house of Ramdas (PW1). Basedonthe information furnished by PW1, Crime No.236 of 2007 oftheTownSouthPolice StationwasregisteredunderSection174oftheCr.P.C.Ext.P4inquestreportwas prepared in respect of the trunk of a lady, withthelowerandupperlimbsand the head severed off. 4.2 On 31.07.2007, another portion of a human body was sighted at Kottayi-Kalikavu-Cherukulam Sathram within the jurisdiction of Kottayi Police Station. Ext.P22 inquest report waspreparedinrespectofthethighportionof the body found at the spot. 4.3 Later,on05.08.2007,anotherportionofthedeadbodywassighted at the banks of the KoranattuRiverwithinthejurisdictionofTownSouthPolice Station, Palakkad. Ext.P5 inquest report was prepared in respect of the feet Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :5 : 2025:KER:726 portion, found at the spot. 4.4 The identity of the person was not known to any person. 4.5 While so, Mohanan (PW2) appeared before theOttappalamPolice StationandlodgedacomplaintstatingthatoneLeena,apersonwithwhomshe was having acquaintance, hadbeenmissingforafewdays. Healsoexpressed an apprehension that the bodies that were found fromvariousplaceswerethe body parts of the aforesaid Leena. He disclosed that Leenahadbeenresiding with the accused in a rented house. Based onthesaidinformation,thepolice party went to Puthoor, Palakkad, where the accused had resided with Leena. However, the house was found locked. The inquiry revealed that Leena was missing from 27.07.2007. On 11.08.2007, on receipt of information that the appellanthadlandedinthehouse,thepolicereachedthespot.Onquestioning, thepolicecametothedefiniteconclusionthattheappellantwasinvolvedinthe disappearanceandmurderofLeena,andaccordingly,hewasarrestedat7a.m. on 11.8.2007 as per Ext.P36 arrest memo. Based on the informationfurnished bytheappellant,MO2andMO3kniveswereseizedasperExt.P3Mahazar. The policewenttothesceneofthecrimeandpreparedExt.P15scenemahazarand seized certain items after securing the presence of Forensic and Fingerprint Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :6 : 2025:KER:726 experts. The clothes allegedly worn by the accusedwereseizedasperExt.P15 mahazar. MO29 series clothes which were allegedly used by the accused for cleaningthefloorafterthecommissionoftheoffencewereseized. Inaddition, plastic ropes, perfumes, and a half-sleeved shirt whichwerefoundintheroom were seized by the Forensic expert as per Ext.P6 mahazar. Based on the informationfurnishedbytheaccusedthathehadcometoErnakulamtodispose of the head portion of the body and he had stayed at A.S Tourist Home near KSRTCbusstand,theaccusedwastakentotheTouristHome,andtheregisters were seized. The Tourist Home Manager is alleged to have identified the appellant. It also came out that the appellant hadtakentheroombygivinga false address and identity. 4.6 The accused had also disclosed that he had stayed at the Santhi Tourist Home in Thrissur. Based on this information, the accused was taken to thesaidTouristHome,andMO6registerwasseized.TheManageridentifiedthe accused as the person who had taken the room. He also identified the handwritingoftheaccusedfoundintheregisterandstatedthattheentrieswere made by the appellant. 4.7 The samples of blood taken by the Forensic Surgeon for the Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :7 : 2025:KER:726 purpose of DNA analysis and for forensic examination were seized as per Exts.P23 and P24 mahazar. The scalp hair of the accused was seized as per Ext.P17mahazar. Ext.P2rentdeedofthehouseinwhichtheappellanthadbeen residingwiththedeceasedwasseizedasperExt.P16mahazar. Afterconcluding the investigation, final reportwaslaidbeforetheJudicialMagistrateoftheFirst Class-III, Palakkad. 5. ThelearnedMagistratetookthecaseonfileandinitiatedcommittal proceedings. Aftercomplyingwiththelegalformalities,thecasewascommitted to the Court of Session for trial and disposal. 6. After consideringtheprosecutionrecordsandafterconductingthe preliminaryhearing,thelearnedAdditionalSessionsJudgeframedchargesunder Sections302and201oftheIPC. Whenthechargewasreadoverandexplained to the accused, he pleaded not guilty and claimed that he be tried. 7. Theprosecutionexamined36witnessesasPWs1to36. Exts.P1to P52 were exhibited and marked. MO1 to MO43 were produced and identified. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the incriminating materials arising out of the prosecution evidence were put to the accused underSection313of theCr.P.C.Hedeniedalltheincriminatingcircumstancesbroughtagainsthimand Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :8 : 2025:KER:726 maintained his innocence. On the side of the defence, DW1 was examined. 8. ThelearnedSessionsJudge,afterevaluatingtheevidence,cameto theconclusionthattheevidenceadducedbytheprosecutionestablishedthatthe deceasedwasearliermarriedtooneThomas,andduringthesubsistenceofthe said marriage, she had eloped with the appellant and that they started living together in the rented house belonging to PW4 (Rema Devi) bearing DoorNo. 5/144(1)atPuthur,Palakkad. RelyingontheevidenceofPWs2and3,thecourt concludedthatLeenawasemployedinashopbythename'M.S.Traders'runby Mohanan. ThecourtalsoconcludedthatLeenawaslastseeninthecompanyof Mohananon25.07.2007at5.30p.m. Afterevaluatingtheforensicevidence,the courtconcludedthatthebloodstainsfoundonthearticlesseizedfromtheroom in the building where the appellant had beenstayingwiththedeceasedclearly showedthattheactofdismemberingthebodyhadtakenplaceinthesaidroom. The fact that the DNA evidence established beyond doubt that the body parts foundinvariousplaceswerethatofLeenaandthatshehadfacedabrutaldeath was also found in favour of the prosecution. The recovery of MO2 and MO3 knivespursuanttotheinformationfurnishedbytheaccusedandtheevidenceof the Surgeonthattheaboveknivescouldbeusedfordismemberingthebodyof the deceased was taken as an additional circumstance against the appellant. Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :9 : 2025:KER:726 Thecourtconcludedthattheprosecutionwasabletoestablishthattheaccused hadstayedinA.S.TouristHomeintheearlyhourson29.7.2007byfurnishinga false address. The post-occurrence conduct of the accused was also taken to show his involvement in the murderofLeena. Thecourtfinallyconcludedthat the established circumstances coupled with the other evidence available on record unerringly pointed to the guilt of the accused and the samewastotally incompatible with his innocence. The court went on to hold that the circumstances established by the prosecution formed a complete chain which were sufficient to conclude that the accused had committed the murder of Leena, mutilated the dead body, and had thrown it away at various places to cause the disappearance of evidence. 9. Sri.JohnS.Ralph,thelearnedcounselappearingfortheappellant, submittedthattheprosecutionreliedoncircumstantialevidencetoproveitscase againsttheaccused. Oneofthecircumstancesisthatthedeceasedwasseenin the company oftheaccusedon25.07.2007asspokentobyPW2. Itispointed outbythelearnedcounselthatthisvitalfactwasstatedforthefirsttimebythe witnessonlywhenhewasexaminedbeforethecourtandthesamewasbrought out as an omission. Though the investigating officer attempted to explain that this was a routine practice for the past few years, the fact remains that no Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :1 0: 2025:KER:726 reliancecouldbeplacedontheevidencetenderedbythewitnesstoemploythe theory of "last seen" and link the accused with the murder. It is further submitted that the 2nd circumstance is the recovery of the alleged weapon whichwasseizedasperExt.P3Mahazar. Itispointedoutbythelearnedcounsel that whenPW5,thewitnesstotherecoveryofthekniveswasexaminedbefore court, he had stated that the recovery was effected at7.00a.m.However,this wasanearimpossibilityasExt.P3wouldrevealthattheaccusedwasarrestedat 7.00 a.m. and the recovery was effected from a place about10kmawayfrom theplaceofarrest. ItissubmittedthattheevidencetenderedbyPW5andthe investigating officer is discrepant inmaterialparticulars. Itisfurthersubmitted that the prosecution has not established that any fingerprints or blood were found on the murder weapon. It is further submitted that one of the major circumstances relied on by the learned Sessions Judge against the appellant is that he hadstayedatA.S.TouristHome,Ernakulam,andSanthaTouristHome, Thrissurunderafalseaddress. Itissubmittedthatthoughtheprosecutionhasa casethattheentriesinMO6AandMO14Awereenteredbytheappellanthimself, no attempt was made to send the document for analysis to an expert to establish that the entries were made by the appellant, and no one else. The failureoftheprosecutiontotracethemobilephoneandtrackthemovementsof Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :1 1: 2025:KER:726 theappellantonthedateoftheincidentisalsohighlightedasaseriousflawby the learned counsel. It is urged by the learned counsel that itisludicrousto believe that theappellantwouldcarrya3-day-olddecayingheadtoErnakulam, placeitinthereception,andforgetaboutitforhalfanhourasstatedbyPW17 in his evidence. It is further submitted that the learned Sessions Judgefound the appellant guilty on the premise that his version as to the absence of the deceasedwasinconsistent. Accordingtothelearnedcounsel,3-4daysafterthe alleged incident, PW3 is admitted to have called one Sasi as suggested bythe appellant to enquire into the whereabouts ofthedeceased. Sasihadstatedto the witness that the deceased was unwell and was bedridden. However, no attempt was made to trace out Sasi though PW3 had deposed that he had provided the number of Sasi to the investigating officer. The learned counsel would then urge that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused entertainedadefinitemotivetodoawaywithLeena. Nocredibleevidencewas adducedtosubstantiatethesame.Itisfurthersubmittedthatmuchreliancewas placedbythelearnedSessionsJudgeonthepresenceofbloodincertainclothes and from the scene. Placing reliance on the report from the Forensic Science Lab,itissubmittedthattheprosecutionthoroughlyfailedtoestablishtheorigin of the blood found in and around the scene of the crime. According to the Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :1 2: 2025:KER:726 learned counsel, in view of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. r/w. Article 20 of the Constitution of India, the accused has a constitutional and statutory right to remain silent. Given these constitutional andstatutoryguarantees,anaccused cannotbecompelledunderSection106oftheIndianEvidenceActtoprovidean explanation for the various circumstances found against him. The learned counselwouldrelyontheobservationsmadebytheApexCourtinSubramanya v.StateofKarnataka1 anditisurgedthatitisthedutyoftheprosecutionto establishandprovethecircumstancesfromwhichtheconclusionofguiltistobe drawn. Hewouldurgethattheprosecutionhasaboundendutytoprovealllinks in the chain of evidence so as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence oftheaccused. Inthecaseonhand, theprosecutionhasmiserablyfailedtoshowthatwithinallhumanprobabilities, the act must have been done by the accused and him alone. 10. Smt.Neema, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned Sessions Judge had delineated as many as 13 circumstances. After a detailed evaluation of the evidence, the court came to the conclusion that the prosecution had cogently succeeded in establishing the circumstances and the chain of evidence furnished by those circumstances was complete soasnotto 1 [(2023) 11 SCC 255] Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :1 3: 2025:KER:726 leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. The established circumstances also revealed without any semblanceofdoubtthatwithinallhumanprobability,theactwascommittedby theappellant. RelyingontheprincipleslaiddowninNaseemAhmedv.Delhi Administration2 and Gade Lakshmi Mangaraju @ Ramesh vs State Of Andhra Pradesh3, it is submitted that a mere absence ofalinkortwointhe chain of circumstances adduced by the prosecution evidence or defence evidence apparently inconsistent with guilt or apparently consistent with innocencemaynotbematerialiftheirapparenteffectissufficientlydispelledby theotherlinksinthechainofevidenceadducedbytheprosecution. Shewould submit that the appellant has not disputed the fact that he was in a live-in relationship with Leena and if that be the case, when her mutilated body was found from various places, he should have comeoutwithanexplanation. The failuretodosoisanadditionalincriminatingcircumstance. Bloodwasfoundon the floor, furniture, and other parts of the building wherein the appellant had beenresidingwithLeena. However,hehasnotfurnishedanyexplanationasto 2 [ 1974) 3 SCC 668] 3 AIR 2001 SC 2677 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :1 4: 2025:KER:726 the presence of blood. The recovery of the weapon used by the accused for dismembering Leena is another additional circumstance. The recovery at his instance is additionally another relevant fact under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. 11. We have carefully considered the submissions advancedandhave gone through the entire evidence. 12. The finding of guilt of the appellant is grounded entirely in circumstantial evidence. Before proceeding to analyze and assess the circumstancesthathaveinfluencedthedecisionsofthelearnedSessionsJudge, it would only be appropriate to refer to the precedents that may provide guidance on the handling and evaluation of cases based on circumstantial evidence. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra4, a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court has laid downfivegoldenprinciplesthat constitute the "panchsheel" in respect of a case based on circumstantial evidence. Referring to the decision inShivajiSahabraoBobadeandAnr.v. State of Maharashtra5, it was opined that it is a primary principle that the accused "must be" and not merely "may be" guilty before a court can convict 4 [(1984) 4 SCC 116] 5 [ (1973) 2 SCC 793] Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :1 5: 2025:KER:726 and the mental distance between "may be" and "must be" is long and divides vagueconjecturesfromsureconclusions.Thereafter,theBenchproceededtolay downthatthefactssoestablishedshouldbeconsistentonlywiththehypothesis oftheguiltoftheaccused,thatistosay,theyshouldnotbeexplainableonany otherhypothesisexceptthattheaccusedisguilty;thatthecircumstancesshould beofaconclusivenatureandtendency;thattheyshouldexcludeeverypossible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as nottoleaveanyreasonablegroundfortheconclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused andmustshowthatinallhuman probability the act must have been done by the accused. The very same principles were reiterated inPadala Veera Reddy v.State of A.P6. 13. We shall now endeavor to determine from the evidence whether thecircumstancesfromwhichtheconclusionofguilthasbeendrawnhavebeen fully and conclusively proved and whether thosecircumstancesaresufficientto connect the appellant to the crime. It is essential that the conscience of the Courtissatisfiedthatthevariouscircumstanceshighlightedbytheprosecutionin the chain of eventshavebeenclearlyestablished.Thischainmustbecomplete and unbroken, ruling out any reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the 6 19 89 Supp (2) SCC 706 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :1 6: 2025:KER:726 appellant. In conducting thisexercise,weshallensurenottoallowsuspicionto substituteforlegalproofandavoidbeinginfluencedbyemotionalconsiderations, however compelling they may be, in place of objective evidence. The live-in relationship: 14. We shall first consider whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the appellantwaslivinginalive-inrelationshipwithLeena.To establishthiscircumstance,theprosecutionhasexaminedcertainwitnesses,and we shall evaluate their evidence. 15. PW2 (Mohanan) testified that his brother-in-law, Suresh, is the owner of M.S. Traders in Palakkad, where he has been managing the shopfor thepasteightyears.Leenahadworkedinhisshopforaboutfouryears,during whichtimehealsobecameacquaintedwiththeappellant.AccordingtoPW2,the appellantusedtoregularlydropLeenaattheshopat9:30a.m.andpickherup at5:30p.m.Leenalastattendedworkon25-07-2007whentheappellantcame topickherupat5:30p.m.Thefollowingday,Leenadidnotreporttowork,and when PW2attemptedtocontactheronhermobilephone,hefounditswitched off. At around 12:30 p.m. on 26-07-2007, the appellant called PW2, informing him that he had a quarrel with Leena and requested PW2 to come to his Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :1 7: 2025:KER:726 residence to resolve the issue. PW2, accompanied by an employee named Ramkumar, went to Puthoor, where the appellant and Leena resided on the upper floor of a residential building. Upon reaching there, they found the appellant sitting on the stairs outside the house, wearing a shirt with snapped buttons. The appellant told PW2 that he had an argument with Leena, during which she damaged his mobile phone, CD player, and other items. He claimed thatLeenapushedhimoutofthehouseandlockedthedoor.Despiteknocking, Leenarefusedtoopenthedoor.PW2thenreturnedtotheshopwithRamkumar. On their way back, they saw a person named Sunil heading to the appellant's residence. PW2 later informed PW3 Manikandan about the incident and asked himtoinquirefurther.HestatedthatLeenadidnotreturntoworkafterthatday. WhenPW2contactedtheappellantagain,theappellantclaimedthatLeenawas pregnantandhadgonetoErnakulamtostaywithhissister.On31-07-2007,the appellant came to PW2'sshopandinformedhimthatLeenahadbeenadmitted tothehospitalduetoherpregnancyandwouldbeonleaveforfourmonths.The appellant further stated that Leena could not be reached by phone and asked PW2tocontacthimdirectlyifneeded.Duringcross-examination,itwasbrought out that PW2 had not explicitly mentioned to the police thattheappellanthad pickedupLeenaonhismotorbikeon25-07-2007.Healsostatedthatthepolice Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :1 8: 2025:KER:726 had questioned him aboutaweekafter26-07-2007.Whiledenyingthedefense suggestionthathehadnoacquaintancewiththeappellant,PW2maintainedthat theappellantoccasionallyvisitedtheshoptomeetLeena.Notably,theappellant did not contest the fact that Leena had beenemployedatM.S.Tradersorthat they were living together as husband and wife. 16. PW3 (Manikandan), a formeremployeeofM.S.Tradersfrom2002 to2006,corroboratedthatLeenaworkedasanaccountantattheshopandwas routinely dropped off and picked up by the appellant. PW3 stated that on 26-07-2007, after being informed by PW2 about the quarrel, he visited the appellant's residence at around 6:00 p.m. Upon reaching there, he saw the appellantpushinghisscooteroutofthenarrowlaneleadingoutofhishouseto goelsewhere.TheappellantsuggestedtheytalkelsewhereandtookPW3tothe highway, where he explained that he and Leena had resolved their differences afterafightearlierthatmorning.WhenPW3askedaboutLeena'swhereabouts, theappellantclaimedthatshehadgonetoabeautyparlorandwouldreturnlate after watching a movie. About 4-5 days later, the appellant informedPW3that LeenahadbeenadmittedtoLisieHospital,Ernakulam,duetoherpregnancyand required four months of bed rest. The appellant also requested PW3 to store some of his furniture, but when PW3 visited the appellant's house, hefoundit Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :1 9: 2025:KER:726 was not feasible. During his visit, he was introduced to Sunil, whom the appellant described as a friend. The appellant provided PW3 with the contact number of one Sasi, claiming he was Leena's brother. When PW3 called the number,SasiinformedhimthatLeenawasunwellandunabletospeak.Thenext day,PW3informedtheappellantabouthisconversationwithSasi.Aweeklater, PW3 disclosed these details to the Town South Police Station during questioning. 17. PW4 (Rema Devi), the landlord of the house rented by the appellant, testified that the appellant and Leena moved into the property on 20-03-2006underExt.P2leaseagreement.Thecouplecontinuedtoresidethere even after the lease expired, until early 2007. She stated that the appellant claimed to run a fruit shop and that Leena worked at a shop in Manjakulam. While both often visited her to pay the rent, in the last two months, only the appellant came to make payments. When Leena went missing,PW4attempted tocontactheratworkbutwasunsuccessful.Shealsorecalledthattheappellant informed her that Leena was pregnant and had been taken to Ernakulam for treatment. 18. PW7 (Rajan) gave evidence thatheisacquaintedwithPW4Rema Devi, the owner of the residential building where the appellant and Leena Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :2 0: 2025:KER:726 resided. He stated that he wasawitnesstoExt.P2leaseagreement,executed between PW4 and the appellant when the upper floor of the two-storeyed building was rented out to the appellant on 20-03-2006. Rajan confirmed that theappellantandLeenalivedtogetherontheupperfloorofthebuildingforover a year. He stated that although the lease period was for 11 months, the appellant and Leena continued to reside in the house evenaftertheleasehad expired.RajanalsoconfirmedseeingtheappellantandLeenatravelingtogether on a scooterseveraltimes.Duringcross-examination,hedeniedthesuggestion that the appellant and Leena had not resided in the house. 19. PW10(Simon),thebrotherofthedeceasedLeena,providedcrucial testimony to establish her identity and relationship with the appellant. Simon statedthatLeenawasinitiallymarriedtooneThomaskutty,withwhomshehad two children. After 10 years of marriage, when Thomaskutty went abroad for employment,Leenafellinlovewiththeappellantandelopedwithhim.Following this, a complaint was lodgedbyThomaskutty.SimonstatedthatLeenaandthe appellant stayed at the house of Sasi, the appellant's uncle, before moving to Palakkad.SimonstatedthatherememberedLeenahavingadistinctcircularscar on her leftknee,whichhehadseensinceherchildhood.Hefurtherstatedthat thepolicehadsummonedhimtoidentifythedismemberedbodypartsofLeena, Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :2 1: 2025:KER:726 andheprovidedbloodsamples,alongwithLeena'sson,forDNAanalysisatthe Rajiv Gandhi Centre for Biotechnology.Simon'stestimonyconfirmedthefamilial relationship between Leena, himself, and her son, which was scientifically corroborated through DNA evidence. 20. PW15 (Johny Joseph), a driver at Holy Trinity School, testified about his acquaintance withtheappellantandLeena.Johnystatedthathehad previouslyworkedwiththeappellantinarealestatebusinessandhadalsolent him a sum of ₹10,000, whichwaslaterrepaid.Herecountedaninstancewhen he visited M.S. Traders to meet Leena. During his visit, the appellant was informedthatLeenawasnotattendingwork.JohnyalsotestifiedthatLeenahad once confided in him about the appellant's relationships with other women, whichhadcausedsignificanttensionbetweenthem.Incross-examination,Johny denied the defense's suggestion that his testimony was motivated by business rivalry with the appellant. 21. PW16(Mohandasan)testifiedthatheknewboththeappellantand PW4(RemaDevi).Heconfirmedthattheappellanthadrentedtheupperfloorof PW4's residential building and lived there with Leena. Mohandasan also stated that he had seen the coupletogetheronseveraloccasionsandwasawarethat Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :2 2: 2025:KER:726 theyresidedinthesamehouse.HefurthertestifiedthathehadsignedtheExt. P15 Scene Mahazar prepared during the investigation of the crime scene. 22. PW31 (Prakasan), a resident of the ground floor of the building rentedbytheappellant,providedcorroborativeevidenceabouttheappellantand Leena'sresidence.HestatedthattheappellantandLeenahadbeenlivinginthe upstairs portion of the house when he moved into the ground floor. Prakasan confirmed seeing the appellant and Leena together on numerous occasions, including traveling on a scooter that was often parkednearthehouse.Healso testified that he had not observed any unusual activitypriortotheincident.In cross-examination, Prakasan denied suggestions from the defense that the appellant and Leena were not residing together or that his testimony was fabricated. 23. From an evaluation of the evidence of the above witnesses, it is clearthattheappellantandLeena,thesisterofPW10,hadresidedtogetherfor just over one year on the first floor of the residential building owned by PW4 Remadevi. The testimonies of PW2 (Leena's employer), PW3 (Leena's co-worker), PW4 (the landlord), PW7, PW16, and PW31 (nearby residents), PW15 (an associate of the appellant), and PW10 (Leena's brother) collectively Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :2 3: 2025:KER:726 establishthattheappellantandLeenawerelivingtogetherduringthisperiod.It was a regular practice for the appellant to drop Leena at her workplaceinthe morning and pick her up intheevening.Theappellanthasfailedtoundermine or discredit the consistent and corroborative evidence provided by these witnesses regarding their cohabitation. PW2 and PW3, though had come in searchofLeenaon26-07-2007,werenotpermittedtoseeher.Theappellanthas alsogivenanindicationtothewitnessesthatLeenawaspregnantandhadgone to Ernakulam to secure treatment. An overall assessment of the witnesses' testimoniesfurtherrevealsthatLeenawaslastseenon25-07-2007,andnoone has seen her alive thereafter. 24. The prosecution examined several witnesses to establish that various parts of a human body were discovered at different locations. It was based on the information provided by these witnesses, that crimes were registered, and the law was set in motion. 25. PW1 (Ramdas) came across the trunk portion of a body in a cardboardboxplacedonastoneinacanalnearhisresidenceon29-07-2007.He promptly reported the matter to the TownSouthPoliceStation,resultinginthe registration ofCrimeNo.236/2007underSection174Cr.PC.Thisdiscoverywas Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :2 4: 2025:KER:726 documentedinExt.P1FIStatementandExt.P4inquestoverthebodypartwas recorded. PW6 (Kailas), a resident of Kaduthuruthy-Thottupalam, corroborated PW1'stestimonyandstatedthathewitnessedthepolicerecoveringtheheadless body of a woman in a cardboard box, with the arms and legs severed. PW21 (Janardhanan)gaveevidencethathefoundaplasticcovercontainingbodyparts on the northern side of his paddy field at Chaladi on 28-07-2007. He reported the same to the Kottayi Police Station, leading to the registration ofCrimeNo. 117/2007 under Section 174 Cr.PC. Ext.P20 inquest of the body parts was conductedasperlaw.PW8,Krishnadas,gaveevidencethatheaccidentallycame acrosstheleftfootofahumanbodyintheKoranattupuzhaRiver.Heinformeda localwardmember,whosubsequentlyalertedthepolice.Theinquestoftheleft footwasdocumentedinExt.P5.PW28(P.Vahid),whoheldadditionalchargeas CircleInspectorofAlathuron28-07-2007,conductedaninquestofanotherbody portion found 1 km from the location of PW21's discovery. This inquest was recordedinExt.P19Inquest.On31-07-2007,heconductedanotherinquestfora body portion discovered at Kalikavu Sathram as documented in Ext. P22. Discovery and Identification of Body Parts: 26. The prosecution examined several witnesses to establish that Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :2 5: 2025:KER:726 various parts of ahumanbodywerediscoveredatdifferentlocations.Basedon the information provided by these witnesses, crimes were registered, and the investigative process was initiated. 27. As stated earlier, PW1 (Ramdas) had discovered thetrunkportion ofabodyinacardboardboxplacedonastoneinacanalnearhisresidenceon 29-07-2007. He immediately reported the matter to the Town South Police Station, leading to the registration of Crime No. 236/2007 under Section 174 Cr.PC.ThisdiscoverywasdocumentedinExt.P1(FIStatement),andtheinquest over the body part was recorded in Ext. P4. PW6 (Kailas), a resident of Kaduthuruthy-Thottupalam, corroborated the testimony of PW1. He stated that hewitnessedthepolicerecoveringtheheadlessbodyofawomaninacardboard box, with the arms and legs severed. 28. PW21 (Janardhanan) testified that on 28-07-2007, he found a plastic cover containing body parts on the northern side of his paddy field at Chaladi. He promptly reported thistotheKottayiPoliceStation,resultinginthe registration of Crime No. 117/2007 under Section 174 Cr.PC. The inquest of these body parts was conducted and documented in Ext. P20. 29. PW8 (Krishnadas) gave evidence that he accidentally discovered Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :2 6: 2025:KER:726 the left foot of a human bodyintheKoranattupuzhaRiver.Heinformedalocal ward member, who then alerted the police. The inquest of the left foot was recorded in Ext. P5. 30. PW28 (P.Vahid),whoheldadditionalchargeasCircleInspectorof Alathur on 28-07-2007, conducted an inquest of another body portion found 1 kmawayfromthelocationofPW21'sdiscovery.ThiswasdocumentedinExt.P19 (Inquest Report). On 31-07-2007, he conducted another inquest for a body portion discovered at Kalikavu Sathram, which was recorded in Ext.P22. The testimonies of these witnesses and the corresponding documentary evidence firmly establish the discovery of body parts in different locations, providing crucial leads in the investigation. Establishing the Identity of the body parts as that of Leena: 31. The next question tobeaddressediswhethertherecoveredbody parts belonged to Leena. The prosecution endeavored to establish this fact through the testimoniesofLeena'scloserelativesandscientificevidence.PW10 (Simon), Leena's brother, identified the headless trunk portion at the mortuary by recognizing a distinct scar mark on the left leg, which he stated had been present since Leena's childhood. The recovered body parts were sent for Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :2 7: 2025:KER:726 postmortemexaminationtotheDistrictHospital,Palakkad,wherePW12(Dr.P.B. Gujral), the District Police Surgeon, conducted the examination. Dr. Gujral confirmed that the body parts belonged to a single female, approximately 40 years of age, and opinedthatthecauseofdeathwashomicidal,resultingfrom manual strangulation. These findings remain undisputed. Blood samples were collected from the deceased, as well as fromPW10(Simon)andPW32(EbyK. Thomas), Leena's son. PW26 (Manikyan) corroborated the chain of custodyfor the DNA evidence, testifying that he witnessed the doctor handing over two packets, presumably containing biological samples from the body parts, to the police for DNA analysis.PW29(SanilGeorge),aScientistfromtheRajivGandhi Centre for Biotechnology, Trivandrum, conducted a DNA analysis on the body parts alongside the blood samples of PW10 and PW32. The findings were documented in the Ext.P14 DNA report, whichconclusivelyestablishedthatthe DNA profiles from the body parts, labeled as Exts. A1toA5,matchedthoseof PW10 (Simon) and PW32 (EbyK.Thomas),confirmingabiologicalrelationship. Through this combination of evidence--visual identification by her brother (PW10), the postmortem findings confirming the parts belonged to a single female, and the conclusive DNA analysis establishing a biological relationship with Leena'sbrotherandson--theprosecutioneffectivelyandfirmlyestablished Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :2 8: 2025:KER:726 that the deceased was Leena. 32. The next piece of evidence is the scientific evidence linking the appellantwiththecrime.ByexaminingPW4andtheneighbors,theprosecution has established that the appellant had been residing on the upper floor of the house of PW4.PW13(AnnammaJohn),SeniorInstructorofForensicScienceat the Kerala Police Academy, entered the box and gaveevidenceon11-08-2007, during an inspection of the house bearing Door No. V/144(1)), wherein the appellant had been residing with Leena, bloodstains were detected at various spotsintheroom.Ext.P52,thereportfromtheAssistantDirectorofSerologyat theForensicScienceLaboratory,Trivandrum,confirmedthepresenceofbloodon multiple items seized from the scene, which includeMO29:Cloth,MO30:Torn skirt,MO32:Bedsheet,MO35series:Elevenwhitepolythenecovers,MO13:Two white cotton gauzes. Two pieces of two-ply coir rope and jute thread found together andpiecesofbluesyntheticcords.WhiletheFSLreportconfirmedthe presence of blood, it did not conclusively establish whether the blood was of humanorigin.Itneedstoberememberedatthisjuncturethattheappellanthad enough time to clean up the premises and what remained was mere traces. Sri.Ralph, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant pointed outthatthe failuretodetecttheoriginofbloodwouldbefatalinthefactsandcircumstances. Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :2 9: 2025:KER:726 He would urge that the possibility of the blood found in the clothes being of animal origin cannot be ruled out. 33. We are unable toaccepttheargumentadvancedbeforeus.PW13 (Annamma John), the Scientific Assistant, inspected the building where the appellant and Leena resided on 11-08-2007, specifically examining the room identified by the prosecution as the scene of the alleged murder. During her inspection,shecollectedvariousitems,includingafloorswab,acombwithhair (MO11), a soap with hair (MO12), gloves (MO13), and samples of the bloodstainsfoundintheroom.Notably,thisexaminationwasconductedandthe swabs were takenonthe16thdayaftertheallegedcommissionoftheoffence. Despitethislapseintime,shedetectedthepresenceofbloodinmultipleareas, including the legs ofthecot,thehandlesofthealmirah,andotherpartsofthe room. The question that arises, therefore, is whether a contention questioning the validity of such findings canreasonablyberaised,especiallyaftereffortsto conceal the offence for over two weeks. 34. In State Of Rajasthan vs Teja Ram7, the Apex Court had occasion to observe as under in similar circumstances. 7 (1999) 3 SCC 507 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :3 0: 2025:KER:726 "25. Failure of the Serologist to detect the origin of the blood, due to disintegration of the serum in the meanwhile, does not mean that the blood stuck on the axe (in that case) would not have been human blood at all. Sometimes it happens, either because the stain is too insufficient or due to hematological changes and plasmatic coagulationthataSerologistmightfailto detect the origin of the blood butitdoesnotmeanthatthebloodmightbeof some other origin? Such aguessworkthatbloodontheotheraxewouldhave been animal blood is unrealistic and far-fetched in the broad spectrum of this case. The effort of the criminal court should not be to prowl for imaginative doubts and unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension which a judicially conscientiousmindentertainswithsomeobjectivitynobenefitcanbeclaimedby the accused." 35. In Gura Singh v. State Of Rajasthan8 relying on the observations in Prabhu Babaji Navle v. The State of Bombay9, Raghav Prapanna Tripathiv.StateofU.P10,ShankarlalGyarasilalDixitv.State ofMaharashtra11,KansaBeherav.StateofOrissa12,itwascontendedthat for the failure on the part of the prosecution to determine the origin of the blood,theaccusedtherewasentitledtobeacquitted.Repellingthecontentions and placing relianceonTejaRam(supra)theApexCourtobservedthatitwas due to the lapse of time that the classification of the blood could not be determined. It was held that nobonuscouldbeconferredupontheaccusedto 8 001 (2) SCC 205 2 9 AIR 1956 SC 51 10 AIR 1963 SC 74 11 (1981) 2 SCC 35 12 (1987) 3 SCC 480 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :3 1: 2025:KER:726 claim any benefit on the strength of such an argument. Hotel Stays after the incident: 36. The prosecution has let in evidence to show that Shajan rented rooms at tourist homes in Ernakulam and Thrissur, indicating that he has travelledtovariousplacestodisposeoftheheadportionofthebody.PW17,the managerofA.S.TouristHomeinErnakulam,testifiedthatShajancheckedintoa room at the lodge intheearlyhoursof29.7.2007at1:40a.m.,underthefalse name "Santhosh P. John." He arrived carrying a suitcase and a plastic cover. PW17 further stated that, after occupying the room, the accused immediately exited, carrying the plastic cover. On noticing beat police officers standing outside the tourist home, Shajan placed the plastic cover at the reception counter and returned to hisroom,claiminghehadforgottenhisphone.Shortly thereafter, the accused came back to the reception, retrieved theplasticcover, andleftthepremises.Hereturnedapproximately30to45minuteslaterwithout the plastic cover. Subsequently, the police brought Shajan to the tourist home and seized MO15,theroomallotmentregister.MO15(a),entrynumber2728on page9oftheregister,confirmedtheaccused'spresenceatthetouristhomeon July29,2007,at1:40a.m.Thoughanattemptwasmadetotraceoutthebody Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :3 2: 2025:KER:726 part dumped in a dumpster, the attempt was not fruitful. 37. PW18, the manager of Shanthi Tourist Home in Thrissur, gave evidence that the accused checked into a room on 29/7/2007, at 7:15 p.m., using the name "Santhosh." About 10 minutes after occupying the room, the accusedcomplainedofafoulodorandrequestedanairfreshener.PW18senta roomboytosprayanairfreshenerintheroom.Afterhisarrest,thepolicetook Shajan to the tourist home and seized MO6, the room register. MO6(a), the relevant entry, corroborated the accused's stay at the tourist home onJuly29, 2007. PW20,theroomboyatShanthiTouristHome,confirmedthatShajanhad stayed at the tourist home a few days before the police arrived with him. 38. Sri.JohnS.Ralph,thelearnedcounselappearingfortheappellant, submittedthatwithoutsubjectingthehandwritingforthereviewofanexpert,no reliance can be placed on the same. It is also submitted that the evidence tenderedbytheManagersoftherespectivetouristhomescannotbereliedupon. WefindthatPW18inhisevidencestatedinunequivocaltermsthattheentriesin the register were made by the appellant himself. A comparison of the handwritinginMO15(a)andMO6(a)wouldclearlyrevealthatthehandwritingin both registers displays consistent patterns in letter formation, spacing, Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :3 3: 2025:KER:726 alignment, and other individual characteristics. Both the witnesses have given specific reasons as to why they were able to remembertheappellantwhenhe was taken tothemexactlyamonthafterhehadtakenaroominthehotel.We find that the evidence of the witnesses are credible and there is no reason to disbelieve them. The fact that theappellantusedafalseidentityforhisstayat these places goes a long way in pointing the finger of suspicion towards him. Conduct of the appellant: 39. TheprosecutionhassuccessfullyestablishedthatLeena,thelive-in partneroftheappellant,wentmissingon25-07-2007,andafewdayslater,parts ofherbodywerediscoveredinvariouslocationsacrossthedistrict.Toprovethat Leenawasmurderedon26-07-2007,thelearnedSessionsJudgeprimarilyrelied on the evidence of PW2 to PW4 and PW12, the Doctor who conducted the postmortem examination. PW2 (Mohanan) testified that he last saw Leena on 25-07-2007, at 5:30 p.m., when the appellant picked her up from work. The learnedcounselfortheappellantarguedthatPW2hadnotexplicitlystatedinhis earlierstatementthattheappellantpickedupLeenaintheevening.However,a comprehensive reading of the evidence of PW2 and PW3 (Manikandan) demonstratesthattheybothtestifiedthatitwasusualpracticefortheappellant Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :3 4: 2025:KER:726 to pick upLeenaafterwork.Whilethereisnoexplicitmentionofthisoccurring on 26-07-2007, the overall evidence clearly indicates otherwise. Both PW2 and PW3 appearedtohaveacloserelationshipwithLeenaasanemployeeandhad genuine concern forherwelfare.TheirtestimoniesconfirmthatLeenaattended workon25-07-2007butdidnotreporttoworkthefollowingday.Herphonewas switched off thereafter. Despite their efforts to visit the appellant's residence where Leena was living, they were denied access to meet or speak with her. Ext.P11postmortemreport,preparedbyPW12,indicatesthatthetimeofdeath wasmorethantwodaysandlessthanfivedaysbeforethetrunkportionofthe body was placed in a freezer at 8:00 p.m. on 29-07-2007. This evidence is in tune with the prosecution's case that Leena was murdered by strangulation sometime on 26-07-2007 and her body was dismembered thereafter. If this timeline is accurate, the appellant's behavior raises critical questions. To PW2 Mohanan, Leena's employer, the appellant initially claimed that Leena was pregnant and had gone to Ernakulam with his sister. Later, he stated that she needed rest due to her pregnancy. To PW3 Manikandan, the appellant gave inconsistentaccounts,initiallystatingthatLeenahadquarreledwithhimandwas stayinginherroom.Helaterclaimedshehadgonetoabeautyparlorandwould returnlate.Subsequently,hesaidshewashospitalizedduetoherpregnancyand Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :3 5: 2025:KER:726 required four months of rest. He even provided PW3 with a phonenumberfor Sasi, claiming he was Leena's brother. However, evidence tendered by PW10 (Simon) and DW1, the brother of the appellant revealed thatSasiwas,infact, the appellant's maternal uncle. When questioned by PW3, Sasi also gave false information about Leena's whereabouts. Though the witnesseswantedtomeet Leena, theappellantsuccessfullymanagedtothwarttheirattempts.WhenPW4 Remadevi,thelandlord,enquiredaboutLeena,theappellantclaimedthatLeena was pregnant and had been taken to Ernakulam. Why would the appellant fabricate false accounts of Leena's whereabouts to individuals genuinely concerned about her and who would have seenherifshewerealive?IfLeena hadgonemissing,theappellant,asherlive-inpartner,wouldhavebeenthefirst personexpectedtomakeanattempttotraceherwhereaboutsortosetthelaw in motion. Instead, the appellant engaged in deliberate deception to mislead Leena's employer and colleagues. The appellant's inconsistent and fabricated statements regarding Leena's absence demonstrate a calculated and deliberate efforttoconcealthecrime.Thesefalsehoodsnotonlypointtohisconsciousness of guilt but also significantly strengthen the prosecution's case. 40. Sri. Ralph, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the right to silence of the accused is enshrined in various Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :3 6: 2025:KER:726 statutoryprovisions.HewouldrefertoSection313(2)and(3)oftheCr.P.C.and it was urged that the Code provide the accused with the dualrightstoremain silent or to make statements without being under oath. According to him, no adverse inference can be drawn from his refusal to testify. Hewouldurgethat given the constitutional and statutory guarantees, an accused cannot be compelledunderSection106oftheEvidenceActtoprovideexplanationsforthe circumstances against him. 41. Havingconsideredthefactsandcircumstancesoftheinstantcase, we areunabletoacceptthesubmissionsofthelearnedcounsel.Section106of the Evidence Act reads as follows: " 106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.-- When any fact is especiallywithintheknowledgeofanyperson,theburdenofprovingthatfactis upon him. Illustration (a) When a person does an act with someintentionotherthanthatwhich the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him. (b) Aischargedwithtravellingonarailwaywithoutaticket.Theburdenof proving that he had a ticket is on him." 42. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person,theburdenof Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :3 7: 2025:KER:726 proving that fact is upon him. The word "especially" means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. The ordinary rule that appliestocriminaltrialsthattheonusliesontheprosecution toprovetheguiltoftheaccusedisnotinanywaymodifiedbytheruleoffacts embodiedinSection106oftheEvidenceAct.Section106oftheEvidenceActis anexceptiontoSection101oftheEvidenceAct.Section101withitsillustration (a) lays down the generalrulethatinacriminalcasetheburdenofproofison the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty.Onthecontrary,itisdesignedtomeetcertainexceptionalcasesinwhichit would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecutiontoestablishthefactswhichare,"especiallywithintheknowledgeof the accused and which he can prove without difficultyorinconvenience".[See: Anees v The State Govt. of NCT13] 43. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra14, the Apex Court while elucidating the law under Sections 106 and 114 of the Indian Evidence Act observed as under: "23.Itissettledlawthatpresumptionoffactisaruleinlawofevidence that a fact otherwise doubtful maybeinferredfromcertainotherprovedfacts. 13 2024 INSC 368 14 ( 2012) 10 SCC 373 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :3 8: 2025:KER:726 When inferring theexistenceofafactfromothersetofprovedfacts,thecourt exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as themost probable position. TheabovepositionisstrengthenedinviewofSection114of theEvidenceAct,1872.Itempowersthecourttopresumetheexistenceofany fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in additiontothefactsofthecase.Inthesecircumstances,theprinciplesembodied inSection106oftheEvidenceActcanalsobeutilised.Wemakeitclearthatthis sectionisnotintendedtorelievetheprosecutionofitsburdentoprovetheguilt oftheaccusedbeyondreasonabledoubt,butitwouldapplytocaseswherethe prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference canbedrawnregardingtheexistenceofcertainotherfacts,unlesstheaccused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanationwhichmightdrivethecourttodrawadifferentinference.Itisuseful to quote the following observation in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar [(2000) 8 SCC 382 ]: "38.VivianBose,J.,hadobservedthatSection106oftheEvidenceAct is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambhu Nath Mehrav.TheStateofAjmer[AIR1956SC404:1956CriL J794]the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: '11. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case theburdenofproofisontheprosecutionandSection106is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :3 9: 2025:KER:726 accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word"especially"stressesthat.Itmeans facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.' 44. InTrimukhMarotiKirkanv.StateofMaharashtra15,theApex Court, in the facts of the said case had observed that where an accused is allegedtohavecommittedthemurderofhiswifeandtheprosecutionsucceeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place inthedwellinghomewherethe husband also normallyresided,ithasbeenconsistentlyheldthatiftheaccused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanationwhichisfoundtobefalse,itisastrongcircumstancewhichindicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. The following observations made therein would be relevant in the facts of the present case: 14.Ifanoffencetakesplaceinsidetheprivacyofahouseandinsuch circumstanceswheretheassailantshavealltheopportunitytoplanandcommit theoffenceatthetimeandincircumstancesoftheirchoice,itwillbeextremely difficultfortheprosecutiontoleadevidencetoestablishtheguiltoftheaccused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted uponbythecourts.Ajudgedoesnotpresideoveracriminaltrialmerelytosee that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty 15 (2006) 10 SCC 681 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :4 0: 2025:KER:726 mandoesnotescape.Botharepublicduties.(SeeStirlandv.DirectorofPublic Prosecutions [[1944] A.C. 315] --quotedwithapprovalbyArijitPasayat,J.in StateofPunjabv.KarnailSingh[(2003)11SCC271)Thelawdoesnotenjoina duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossibletobeledoratanyrateextremelydifficulttobeled.Thedutyonthe prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regardtothefactsandcircumstancesofthecase.Hereitisnecessarytokeep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especiallywithintheknowledgeofanyperson,theburdenofprovingthatfactis upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: "(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him." 15.Whereanoffencelikemurderiscommittedinsecrecyinsideahouse, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, butthenatureandamountofevidencetobeledbyittoestablish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a correspondingburdenontheinmatesofthehousetogiveacogentexplanation astohowthecrimewascommitted.Theinmatesofthehousecannotgetaway by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise thattheburdentoestablishitscaseliesentirelyupontheprosecutionandthere is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation." 45. After referring to all past precedents, the Apex Court in Anees (supra) had laid down the principles as under: Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :4 1: 2025:KER:726 "43. Thus, from theaforesaiddecisionsofthisCourt,itisevidentthat the court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. It cannotbesaidthatithasnoapplicationtocriminalcases. Theordinaryrulewhichappliestocriminaltrialsinthiscountrythattheonuslies on theprosecutiontoprovetheguiltoftheaccusedisnotinanywaymodified by the provisions contained in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 44. Section 106 of theEvidenceActcannotbeinvokedtomakeupthe inabilityoftheprosecutiontoproduceevidenceofcircumstancespointingtothe guiltoftheaccused.Thissectioncannotbeusedtosupportaconvictionunless the prosecution has discharged theonusbyprovingalltheelementsnecessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of provingthatacrimewascommittedeventhoughitisamatterspecificallywithin theknowledgeoftheaccusedanditdoesnotthrowtheburdenontheaccused to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence ofreasonableexplanationinacasewheretheothercircumstancesare notbythemselvesenoughtocallforhisexplanationistorelievetheprosecution of its legitimate burden. So, until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused. 45.Section106oftheEvidenceActobviouslyreferstocaseswherethe guiltoftheaccusedisestablishedontheevidenceproducedbytheprosecution unless the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his knowledge, which would render theevidenceoftheprosecutionnugatory.Ifin suchasituation,theaccusedoffersanexplanationwhichmaybereasonablytrue in the proved circumstances, the accused gets thebenefitofreasonabledoubt though he may not be able toprovebeyondreasonabledoubtthetruthofthe explanation.But,iftheaccusedinsuchacasedoesnotgiveanyexplanationat all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation,thisbyitselfisacircumstance which may well turn the scale against him.... xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :4 2: 2025:KER:726 54. Cases are frequently coming before thecourtswherethehusband, duetostrainedmaritalrelationsanddoubtasregardsthecharacter,hasgoneto the extentofkillinghiswife.Thesecrimesaregenerallycommittedincomplete secrecyinsidethehouseanditbecomesverydifficultfortheprosecutiontolead evidence. No member of the family, like in the case at hand, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. 55.Ifanoffencetakesplaceinsidethefourwallsofahouseandinsuch circumstanceswheretheaccusedhasalltheopportunitytoplanandcommitthe offence at a time and in the circumstances of his choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead direct evidence toestablishtheguiltofthe accused. It is to resolve such a situation that Section 106 oftheEvidenceAct exists in the statute book. In the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra), this CourtobservedthataJudgedoesnotpresideoveracriminaltrialmerelytosee thatnoinnocentmanispunished.TheCourtproceededtoobservethataJudge also presides to see that aguiltymandoesnotescape.Botharepublicduties. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character,whichisalmostimpossibletobeled,oratanyrate,extremelydifficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence, which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 46. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra16, it was held that false explanations by the accused are an incriminating circumstancethatstrengthensthechainofcircumstantialevidence. Itwasheld in Paragraph Nos. 159 and 160 of the judgment as under: 16 (1984) 4 SCC 116 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :4 3: 2025:KER:726 "159. It will be seen that this Court while taking into account the absence of explanation orafalseexplanationdidholdthatitwillamounttobe an additionallinktocompletethechainbuttheseobservationsmustbereadin the light of what this Court said earlier viz. before a false explanation can be used as additional link, the following essential conditions must be satisfied: (1) various linksinthechainofevidenceledbytheprosecutionhave been satisfactorily proved, (2) the said circumstance points to the guilt of the accused with reasonable definiteness, and (3) the circumstance is in proximity to the time and situation. 160. If these conditions are fulfilled only then a court can use a false explanation or a falsedefenceasanadditionallinktolendanassurancetothe court and not otherwise. 47. 1n Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra17, it was observed as under: "16. In acasebasedoncircumstantialevidencewherenoeye-witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation that is found to be untrue, then the samebecomesanadditional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. [See State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash 17 (2006) 10 SCC 681 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :4 4: 2025:KER:726 Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 (para 27); Ganesh Lal v. State ofRajasthan(2002)1SCC731(para 15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. (1995) 3 SCC 574 (para 4)]". 48. Thecontentionthathecanremainsilentdespitetheapplicabilityof Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act does not withstand scrutiny when assessed in light of the legal framework and precedents applicable to cases of this nature. While the accused indeed possesses the right to silence under statutoryandconstitutionalprotections,includingunderSection313oftheCode ofCriminalProcedureandArticle20(3)oftheConstitutionofIndia,theserights are not absolute and must be understood in the context of the facts and circumstances of each case.Section106oftheIndianEvidenceActoperatesin circumstances where the facts are specifically within the knowledge of the accused. When a crime such as murder is committed within the privacy of a house, and the accused is an occupant of that house, the law imposes a correspondingobligationontheaccusedtoprovideacogentexplanationofhow the crime occurred or, at the very least, account for the absence of the deceased.TheApexCourtunderscoredthatincaseswhereanoffenceoccursin secrecy inside a house, the prosecution's burden of proof islighter,andaduty shifts to the accused under Section 106 to explain circumstances peculiarly withintheirknowledge.Theaccusedcannotrelysolelyontherighttosilenceto Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :4 5: 2025:KER:726 evade this burden. The appellant's conduct, specifically his fabricated and inconsistent explanations regarding Leena's whereabouts, reflects a calculated efforttomisleadthosewhoinquiredabouther.Thesefalsestatementscannotbe reconciled with the claim of mere silence. Instead, they demonstrate consciousness of guilt and an attempt to evade accountability. Section 313(2) and(3)oftheCodeofCriminalProcedureprovidetheaccusedwiththerightto remain silent or make a statement without being under oath. However, these provisionsdonotgrantimmunityfromadverseinferencesinsituationswherethe facts of the case warrant such inferences. In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh18, the Court held that while the right to silence is constitutionally guaranteed, it does not preclude courts from drawing adverse inferences from the failure of the accused to explain facts within their special knowledge, particularly under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case where the crime occurredwithintherentedpremises,andwheretheaccusedhadtheopportunity and duty to explain the circumstances, complete reliance on silence would obstruct justice. The right to silencemustbebalancedwiththeprinciplethata guilty person should not escape accountability, as emphasized in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan(supra). 18 (2000) 1 SCC 471 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :4 6: 2025:KER:726 49. Inthecaseonhand,theprosecutionhassucceededinprovingthe following foundational facts to justify the trigger for the application of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. a. The appellant hadbeenlivingwiththedeceasedaspartners in the residential home taken on rent from PW4. b. Thedeceasedhadattendedworkon25.7.2007andhadgone back home as usual. She was never seen thereafter c. ThoughPW2andPW3attemptedtogetintouchandcontact the deceased, the appellant thwarted their efforts by providing false information and by practicing deception. d. Leena was found murdered and dismembered and presence ofbloodwasfoundinnumerousplacesinsidetheroomofthe house where they were staying together and in clothes. e. Forensic evidence revealed that thedeceasedwasmurdered by strangulation and she was dismembered thereafter. f. Recoveryofmurderweaponsattheinstanceoftheappellant andthepresenceofbloodthereinwhichconstitutearelevant Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :4 7: 2025:KER:726 fact. g. The appellant immediately after the murder travelled to Ernakulam and Thrissur and took rooms underproxynames for disposing off the body parts. h. There were strains in therelationshipbetweentheappellant and the deceased. Thoughfromthetrendofcrossexamination,theaccuseddoesnot disputethefactthathehadbeenresidingwithLeenainthehouseofPW4 andthatshewasemployedintheestablishmentmanagedbyPW2,inhis 313 statement he has pleaded ignorance of the entire facts. He even distancedhimselffromLeenaandstatedthathewasfalselyimplicatedby the police at the instance of his partner Johnny Joseph, with whom he hadcarriedoutrealestatebusiness.Thefailureoftheappellanttoexplain the circumstances especially within his knowledge demonstrate consciousness of guilt and an attempt to evade responsibility. The possibility of the crime being perpetrated in the manner claimed: 50. The contention raised by the defence counsel regarding the Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :4 8: 2025:KER:726 impossibility of the alleged incident occurring in the house, basedontheclaim that a fully grown woman beingdismemberedwouldresultinasignificantflow of blood of approximately four litres and noticeable signs such as stench of blood,cannotbeaccepted.Theheartistheprimarydriverofactivebloodflowin the body, and after death, once the heart stops pumping, there is no active circulation of blood. Post-mortem injuries do not resultinsignificantbloodflow because the vascular system loses pressure. Any blood flow observed in such injuries is due to passive leakage from severed vessels, as thebloodbeginsto settleduetogravitybyaprocessknownaslivormortis.Incontrast,antemortem injuriesresultinactiveandprofusebleeding,providedtheheartisstillpumping. This is dependent on the location and severity of the wounds. In the case on hand, the accused had murdered the deceased by ligature strangulation which the prosecution estimates was at about 3 pm, and it was much later that the body was sliced into pieces. The antemortem injuries noticed are only some contusions on the chest. Any blood present at the scene would be limited to residual blood in the tissues and vessels near the injury site. Ante-mortem injuries exhibit signs of inflammation, blood clotting, or other tissue reactions, indicating the bodywasaliveatthetimeofinjury.Post-morteminjuries,onthe other hand, lack these reactions and result in minimal blood loss. Thedefence Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :4 9: 2025:KER:726 contention of significant blood loss, therefore, cannot be sustained in the absence of cut injuries ante-mortem. 51. Acontentionwasraisedthatthedismembermentofahumanbody couldnothavebeencarriedoutbyasingleindividualusingtheknivesthatwere produced as MO2 and MO3. It was further argued that only a person with substantial knowledge of human anatomy could execute such dismemberment. However, the doctor refuted this contention, stating that the head, right upper limb, and both lower limbs were removed using a "cut-dislocate-cut" method. Thistechniqueinvolvescuttingthroughthesofttissues,dislocatingthejoint,and then completing the cut through the remaining tissues and bone. 52. As per the post-mortem report, the dismemberment of various organs was carried out in the following manner: A.Head: An oblique incision was usedtodecapitatethehead,withawoundmeasuring14x11 cm.Itwaslocated6cmabovethesternalnotchinthefrontand3cmabovetheroot of the neck at the back. Fromthefront,thewoundslicedthroughthesubcutaneous tissues and muscles on the front and sides of the neck. The thyroid cartilage was severed justbelowitsprominenceinthemidline,cuttingthelarynxobliquelythrough the vocal cords. From the back, the wound sliced through the subcutaneous tissues andmusclesatthebackoftheneck.Thecervicalspinalcolumnwasseveredbetween the4thand5thcervicalvertebrae,withthecutpassingthroughtheintervertebraldisc Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :5 0: 2025:KER:726 from back to front. The esophagus was cut frombacktofront,andtheseveredend extended beyond the lower half of the intervertebral disc between the 5th and 6th cervical vertebrae by approximately 0.5 cm. B.Right Upper Limb: Anobliqueincisionremovedtherightupperlimbalongwithpartoftheshoulder.The wound measured 14x13 cm and sliced through subcutaneoustissuesandmusclesto the joint capsule ofthehumeruswiththescapula.Theskinandsofttissuesoverthe acromioclavicular joint and bones remained inside the amputation wound. This was achieved through an 8x5.5 cm oval incision around the acromion and the acromioclavicular joint. The joint capsule and cartilage were severed in a circular manner, and the limb was detached using the cut-dislocate-cut method. C.Right Lower Limb: Anobliqueincisionremovedtherightlowerlimbandpartofthebuttockfromthehip. The wound, measuring 23x22 cm, cut through subcutaneous tissues and musclesto the joint capsule of the femur with the right pelvic bone. The joint capsule and cartilage were severed in a circular manner, and the limb was removed using the cut-dislocate-cut method. D.Left Lower Limb: An oblique incision removed theleftlowerlimbandpartofthebuttockfromthehip. Thewoundmeasured24x21cmandslicedthroughsubcutaneoustissuesandmuscles to the joint capsule of the femur with the left pelvic bone. The joint capsule and cartilage were severed in a circular manner, and the limb was removed using the cut-dislocate-cut method. The report concluded that all thesecutswerepostmortem,astherewas no evidence of bleeding into the body cavities. Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :5 1: 2025:KER:726 53. A specific query was posed to the Doctor, suggesting that the patternofdismembermentobservedcouldonlyhavebeenexecutedbyaperson experienced in cutting the body parts of living animals. The doctor disagreed, statingthatthepatternofdismembermentnotedsuggestedotherwise.Hegave reasons to a pointed question about whether MO2 and MO3 could have been used for such dismemberment, the Doctor affirmed that theycould.Hefurther elaborated that the person responsible for the dismemberment had sliced out chunks of soft tissue around the joints and severedthejointcapsuleusingthe cut-dislocate-cut method. After having carefully considered the evidence of the ForensicSurgeon,wefindnoreasontorejecttheconclusionsthathehasarrived at. Recovery of the weapons: 54. BasedonExt.P3(a)disclosurestatementfurnishedbytheaccused, PW34, recovered MO2 and MO3 knives, from a bushy area beneath the Narakampully bridge at 7:15 am on 11.8.2007. PW5 Ibrahim, an attesting witnesstotheseizure,gaveevidencethathewaspresentwhenthepoliceseized theknivesandthattheaccusedwasalsopresent.SriRalph,thelearnedcounsel submitted that no reliance can be placed on the same since there is a serious Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :5 2: 2025:KER:726 discrepancyintheevidenceletinbytheprosecution.WefindthatinExhibitP3 mahazar, the accused is seen to have been arrested at 7 am at Puthoor. PW5 had also stated that he witnessed the recovery at 7 am.However,ithascome out inevidencethattherecoverywaseffectedfromaplaceabout10kmaway. Furthermore, in Ext.P3 mahazar, it is stated that thetimeofpreparationofthe Mahazaris14.00hours.Weagreewiththelearnedcounsel,thatinviewofthis discrepancy,wewillnotbejustifiedingivingfullcredencetotherecoveryofthe knife. We however find that the knives were sent for analysis and blood was found on the same. However, theanalysthasreportedthatthebloodfoundon the knives was insufficient to determine its origin. 55. However,thatisnottheendofthematter.InA.N.Venkateshv. State of Karnataka19,theApexCourthasheldthatevenwhilediscardingthe evidenceintheformofdiscoverypanchnama,theconductoftheaccusedwould be relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. It was observed as under: "9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or isinfluencedbyany factinissueorrelevantfact.Theevidenceofthecircumstance,simpliciter,that theaccusedpointedouttothepoliceofficer,theplacewherethedeadbodyof thekidnappedboywasfoundandontheirpointingoutthebodywasexhumed, wouldbeadmissibleasconductunderSection8irrespectiveofthefactwhether 19 (2005) 7 SCC 714 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :5 3: 2025:KER:726 the statement made bytheaccusedcontemporaneouslywithorantecedentto suchconductfallswithinthepurviewofSection27ornotasheldbythisCourt inPrakashChandv.State(DelhiAdmn.)[(1979)3SCC90].Evenifweholdthat thedisclosurestatementmadebytheaccused-appellants(Ex.P-15andP-16)is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevantunder Section 8." 56. In the State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru20, Sections 8 and 27 of the Evidence Act were elucidated in detail with reference to thecaselawonthesubjectandwithreferencetoSection8ofthe Evidence Act it was observed as under: "206. We have already noticed the distinction highlighted in Prakash Chand case (supra) between the conduct of an accused which is admissible underSection8andthestatementmadetoapoliceofficerinthecourseofan investigation which is hit by Section 162 Cr. P.C. The evidence of the circumstance,simpliciter,thattheaccusedpointedouttothepoliceofficer,the place where stolen articles or weaponsusedinthecommissionoftheoffence were hidden,wouldbeadmissibleas"conduct"underSection8irrespectiveof the fact whether the statementmadebytheaccusedcontemporaneouslywith orantecedenttosuchconduct,fallswithinthepurviewofSection27,aspointed outinPrakashChandcase.InPrakashChandv.State(DelhiAdmn.)[(1979)3 SCC 90 this Court held that "Even apart from the admissibility of the information under Section 27,theevidenceoftheinvestigatingofficerandthe panchasthattheaccusedhadtakenthemtoPW11(fromwhomhepurchased theweapon)andpointedhimoutandascorroboratedbyPW11himselfwould be admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as conduct of the accused." 20 (2005) 11 SCC 600 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :5 4: 2025:KER:726 However, in Anees (supra), the Apex Court has sounded a caution that thoughtheconductofanaccusedmaybearelevantfactunderSection8ofthe EvidenceAct,yetthesame,byitself,cannotbeagroundtoconvicthimorhold himguiltyandthattoo,foraseriousoffencelikemurder.Likeanyotherpieceof evidence,theconductofanaccusedisalsooneofthecircumstanceswhichthe courtmaytakeintoconsiderationalongwiththeotherevidenceonrecord,direct or indirect. Motive: 57. The prosecution examined several witnesses who testified about frequent arguments between Leena and Shajan, stating that Leena harbored suspicions about Shajan's faithfulness. PW2 (Mohanan), Leena's employer, testified that Shajan informed him about a quarrel withLeena,afterwhichshe lockedherselfintheirroom.PW3(Manikandan)statedthatPW2hadaskedhim to inquire about the argument, and during their conversation, Shajanadmitted that Leena had accused him of having affairs with otherwomen.PW15(Johny Joseph) testified that Shajan had told him about frequent quarrels with Leena concerninghisallegedrelationshipswithotherwomen.PW15furthermentioned that Leena had personally confided in him about these suspicions and the Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :5 5: 2025:KER:726 resulting arguments. The defence highlighted that some of these statements were presented in court for the first time. However, itremainsundisputedthat the deceased was a married woman who had left her husbandandchildrento live with the appellant. What transpired within the four walls of their home cannot be known to any outsider. In a case of this nature, it is inherently difficult,ifnotimpossible,fortheprosecutiontoestablishadefinitiveandstrong motive for the murder. Conclusion 58. As stated earlier, it is a well-settled proposition oflawthatwhen the case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) thosecircumstancesshouldbeofadefinitetendencyunerringlypointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) thecircumstances,takencumulatively,shouldformachainsocomplete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :5 6: 2025:KER:726 probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be completeandincapableofexplanationofanyotherhypothesisthanthat of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with theguiltoftheaccusedbutshouldbeinconsistentwith hisinnocence. [See:StateOfU.Pv.Satish21,PadalaVeeraReddy v. State of A.P (supra), Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (supra), Gambhir v. State Of Maharashtra22 and Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State Of M.P23] 59. Wehavealreadydelineatedthefoundationalfactspresentedbythe prosecution to convincingly establish that the offence was committed by the appellant. We have no doubt in our mind the proven facts unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused and in all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else. 60. In view of the discussion above, we are of the view that the judgmentrenderedbythelearnedSessionsJudge,inS.C.No.531of2014onthe 21 (2005) 3 SCC 114 22 ( 1982) 2 SCC 351 23 AIR 1952 SC 343 Crl.A. No. 974 of 2018 :5 7: 2025:KER:726 fileoftheAdditionalSessionsJudge-III,Palakkad,findingtheappellant/accused guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC,does not warrant any interference. This appeal will stand dismissed, confirming the conviction and sentence. sd/- RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V, JUDGE sd/- P.V. BALAKRISHNAN, JUDGE PS/2 4/12/24