Uttarakhand High Court
State Of Uttarakhand And Another ... vs Satya Singh Bhandari on 10 December, 2025
Author: Pankaj Purohit
Bench: Pankaj Purohit
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition Misc. Single No.1558 of 2013
State Of Uttarakhand and another --Petitioners
Versus
Satya Singh Bhandari --Respondent
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Presence:-
Mr. C.S. Rawat, learned C.S.C. with Mr. R.C. Joshi, learned
Brief Holder for the State of Uttarakhand/petitioners.
Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for the respondent-workman.
Hon'ble Pankaj Purohit, J. (Oral)
The present writ petition has been instituted by the State/petitioners challenging the impugned award dated 05.09.2011 (published on 09.01.2012) passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Haridwar in Adjudication Case No.370 of 2009 (Old Adjudication No.25 of 2002) Satya Singh Bhandari Vs. Executive Engineer, Manari Bhali Surang Nirman Khand, Shaktipuram, Chinyalisour, District Uttarkashi. By the impugned award, learned Labour Court has held the termination of respondent-workman, Shri Satya Singh Bhandari, to be illegal and unjustified, directing his reinstatement along with service-related benefits from the date of his termination.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent-workman Shri Satya Singh Bhandari, was engaged by the petitioners as a daily wager on the exigencies of work between 01.08.1987 and 30.06.1992. His engagement was casual and dependent upon the availability of work and he was never appointed through any regular process, nor issued any appointment letter or salary slip. According to the respondent-workman, although he worked continuously during the said period, he was allegedly refused work by the petitioners from 01.07.1992, and such refusal amounted to termination 1 without compliance of the mandatory provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), particularly Section 6-N of the Act. The State Government, invoking its powers under Section 4-K of the Act, referred the following dispute for adjudication -
"Whether the termination of the respondent-workman, Shri Satya Singh Bhandari, was legal and justified? If not, to what relief is he entitled?" The petitioners filed their written statement asserting that the respondent-workman was never retrenched, instead, he voluntarily stopped coming to work after 01.07.1992 without making any application for re-engagement. Learned Labour Court, vide award dated 05.09.2011, held the termination to be illegal and directed reinstatement with service-related benefits (excluding back wages). Aggrieved thereby, the present writ petition has been filed by the State/petitioners challenging the impugned award dated 05.09.2011.
3. Learned State Counsel contended that the "Irrigation Department", being entrusted with sovereign functions of the State, does not fall within the definition of "Industry" under the Act. He has placed reliance upon authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, particularly Executive Engineer (State of Karnataka) vs. B. Somaseetty, 1997 Lab I.C. 2651, wherein, it has been held that daily wagers appointed on project work under the State's sovereign functions do not acquire any right to the post, and Labour Courts cannot order reinstatement in such circumstances. Thus, the very reference under Section 4-K of the Act was incompetent, and the entire adjudication proceedings stand vitiated.
4. Learned State Counsel argued that the learned Labour Court has wrongly recorded a finding that the workman completed 240 days in the preceding 12 months. He further argued that petitioners have produced year-wise 2 muster rolls, demonstrating conclusively that the workman never worked 240 days in any calendar year. Learned Labour Court ignored these crucial public documents and relied solely on the unsubstantiated oral statement of respondent-workman, rendering the conclusion perverse and contrary to evidence. Learned State Counsel further submitted that it is the petitioners' categorical case that the respondent-workman was a casual labourer deputed on exigencies of work and no order of termination was ever issued. After 01.07.1992, the respondent-workman stopped reporting for duty on his own and did not make any application seeking re-engagement. Therefore, core requirement for the applicability of Section 6-N of the Act, i.e., retrenchment is absent. Learned Labour Court erred in treating it as a case of termination and imposing obligations that do not arise in the facts of this case.
5. The learned State Counsel also argued that the respondent-workman produced no appointment letter, no salary slip, and no documentary evidence whatsoever to prove a legal or contractual relationship of service. Learned Labour Court, while passing the impugned award, completely overlooked this fundamental deficiency. In the absence of any appointment order, the direction of reinstatement along with service-related benefits is legally untenable and contrary to settled judicial precedent. The learned State Counsel submitted that Rule 42 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957, applies only to cases of retrenchment. Since the petitioners' case is that the respondent-workman ceased to report to duty of his own accord, learned Labour Court's reliance on Rule 42 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957, is misconceived and demonstrates lack of proper application of mind. Learned State Counsel submitted that even assuming any procedural irregularity occurred, reinstatement with service 3 benefits is impermissible, in view of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Incharge Officer & Anr. vs. Shankar Shetty, (2010) 9 SCC 126 and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Mani Ram, (2012) 1 SCC 558. Both cases categorically hold that daily wagers do not acquire a right to reinstatement, especially where there is no sanctioned post, no appointment process, and no evidence of continuous service.
6. Learned counsel for respondent-workman submitted that the writ petition filed by the State- petitioners is wholly misconceived, misleading, and founded upon deliberate distortion of facts. Except for those statements specifically admitted, all averments contained in the writ petition are emphatically denied as they are based on misrepresentation and falsehood. Learned counsel for respondent asserts that the petitioners have attempted to construct a false narrative by suppressing material facts that directly expose the illegality of the termination. Learned counsel for the respondent disputed the petitioners' contention that the Irrigation Department is not an "industry" within the meaning of the Act. He submits that the petitioners constitute an industrial establishment and their activities fall squarely within the definition of "industry" as laid down in the authoritative judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, including the Constitutional Bench decision in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213. He further submits that the judgments relied upon by the learned State Counsel are outdated and overridden by subsequent, more authoritative pronouncements as shall not apply the facts of this case. Since the petitioners themselves failed to produce any material before the learned Labour Court to show that they discharge purely sovereign functions, they cannot now be 4 permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court or the legality of the reference.
7. Learned counsel for respondent further submits that the computation of working days relied upon by the petitioners is incorrect, manipulated, and contrary to record. He further states that Sundays and holidays cannot be excluded while computing continuous service under Section 2(g) of the Act. He also submits that the interruptions in service that are not attributable to any fault of the workman cannot break the continuity of service. If the correct legal principles are applied, it becomes evident that the respondent has worked for more than 240 days in the relevant period, thereby attracting the statutory protection of Section 6-N of the Act. The petitioners' contention that he failed to complete 240 days is thus wholly erroneous and contrary to law. It is further submitted by learned counsel for respondents that the petitioners engaged in unfair labour practice by retaining junior workmen while refusing work to the respondent without any justification. Such selective engagement is violative of Sections 6-P and 6-Q of the Act. The learned Labour Court rightly found that the respondent was illegally denied work and that his termination was in clear breach of statutory provisions.
8. Learned counsel for respondent further contends that the findings recorded by learned Labour Court are pure findings of fact, based on the evidence produced before it. These findings suffer from no infirmity, perversity, or error of law. In writ jurisdiction under Article 227, this Hon'ble Court does not act as an appellate authority to reassess evidence or re-examine factual determinations made by learned Labour Court. Since the award is just, proper, and consistent with established legal principles, learned counsel for respondent submits that the writ 5 petition deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs. Any interference with the impugned award would cause irreparable loss and injury to the respondent, who has already suffered due to the petitioners' arbitrary and unlawful actions.
9. In response to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent, the learned State Counsel categorically deny that the writ petition is based on twisted facts or misrepresentation. He submits that every assertion made in the writ petition is supported by documentary material, including muster rolls, official records, and the objections filed before learned Labour Court. The allegations of falsehood levelled by the respondent are vague, baseless, and unsupported by any evidence.
10. The learned State Counsel further reiterates that the Irrigation Department does not fall within the definition of "industry". The work performed by the department relates to core sovereign and statutory duties, and not commercial activities. The respondent's reliance on certain judgments is completely misplaced, and the correct legal position is enunciated in authoritative Supreme Court decisions, including Executive Engineer vs. Somaseetty (Supra), which hold that daily wage workers engaged in State infrastructure projects do not acquire the status of industrial workmen so as to claim reinstatement. Since the respondent has led no evidence to establish otherwise, the Labour Court acted without jurisdiction, and the award is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.
11. The learned State Counsel maintains that the respondent-workman never completed 240 days of work in any calendar year. He submits that the muster rolls annexed to the writ petition, and again produced with the rejoinder, demonstrate sporadic and casual engagement which falls far short of the statutory requirement. Learned 6 Labour Court erred gravely in ignoring these official records and in relying solely on the unsubstantiated oral version of the respondent. The respondent's attempt to include Sundays and holidays is legally unsustainable, for such days cannot be counted unless the workman was actually employed and paid for them. The finding of the Labour Court regarding completion of 240 days is therefore perverse and devoid of any evidentiary foundation.
12. The learned State Counsel submits that no order of termination was ever issued to the respondent. He voluntarily abandoned service after 1 July 1992 and did not seek re-engagement thereafter. Thus, the case is not one of retrenchment within the meaning of Section 6-N of the Act. Learned Labour Court erred in treating it as such and in applying Rule 42 of the Industrial Disputes Rules, which is wholly inapplicable. The respondent's allegations of unfair labour practice are equally baseless, as his engagement was purely on a casual basis and dependent on the exigencies of work. The learned counsel further contends that even if some procedural irregularity is assumed, the Labour Court had no authority to order reinstatement with service-related benefits. Such a direction is directly contrary to binding Hon'ble Supreme Court judgments including Incharge Officer vs. Shankar Shetty (Supra) and BSNL vs. Mani Ram (Supra), which hold that daily wagers have no right to reinstatement and that regularization or reinstatement cannot be ordered in the absence of a sanctioned post or regular recruitment process. The impugned award is therefore legally unsustainable. In these circumstances, the learned State Counsel submits that the reasons stated in the writ petition fully justify interference by this Hon'ble Court.
13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the entire material available on record, this 7 Court is of the considered opinion that although the State- petitioners has raised multiple grounds challenging the learned Labour Court's award, none of the findings recorded by learned Labour Court on jurisdiction, computation of service, or illegality of termination warrant interference. However, the relief granted requires modification in accordance with the principles evolved by Hon'ble Supreme Court in cases concerning long-lapsed engagements of daily-wage employees. Learned State Counsel's argument that the Irrigation Department does not constitute an "industry" is misconceived. The Constitution Bench in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) remains the authoritative law and holds that systematic activities carried out through employer-employee cooperation for production or distribution of goods or services constitute "industry", save functions that are strictly sovereign such as policing, legislation, or administration of justice. The works undertaken by the Maneri Bhali Tunnel Construction Division relate to construction and execution of irrigation infrastructure, a public utility activity squarely falling within the industrial fold. The petitioners have neither pleaded nor proved that the work in question was sovereign in nature. Reliance on Somaseetty (Supra) is therefore misplaced and cannot override the Constitution Bench decision. The reference under Section 4-K of the Act was thus valid and learned Labour Court had full jurisdiction.
14. This Court finds no infirmity in learned Labour Court's conclusion that the respondent completed more than 240 days of continuous service in the twelve months preceding cessation of employment. Learned Labour Court has recorded, upon detailed scrutiny of evidence, that the workman had worked 19 days in each calendar month of the preceding year. To this, learned Labour Court rightly 8 added 52 Sundays and 17 paid holidays, as required by law. These additions brought the total beyond the statutory benchmark of 240 days. The Labour Court also relied upon the judgment in Sri Balam Singh & Another v. State of Uttaranchal, 2004 SCC OnLine Utt 165, wherein it was held that Sundays and paid holidays must be included while determining continuous service.
15. The reasoning of learned Labour Court is further fortified by binding Hon'ble Supreme Court precedents. In this context, it is also necessary to advert to the settled principles laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court on the manner in which the burden of proving 240 days is to be discharged and evaluated by the adjudicating authority. Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.M. Yellatti v. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, while analysing an earlier line of authorities, has held as follows:
17. "Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon the facts of each case."
16. The above exposition squarely applies to the present case. The respondent-workman here duly entered the witness box and furnished specific and detailed oral testimony regarding his period of engagement, the number 9 of days worked, and the circumstances in which he was denied further work. He also relied on Sundays and paid holidays as part of continuous service, a contention supported by judicial authority. Significantly, as learned Labour Court has recorded, the employer failed to produce reliable muster rolls, wage registers, or any contemporaneous documentary material to rebut the workman's account. In the absence of such evidence, and in view of the employer's exclusive custody of relevant records, learned Labour Court was fully justified in accepting the workman's version and holding that he had completed more than 240 days of service. Applying the principles laid down in Yellatti (supra), this Court finds no perversity or infirmity in the Labour Court's factual determination so as to warrant interference in writ jurisdiction. Similarly, Workmen of American Express v. Management, (1985) 4 SCC 71, clarified that all days during which the employee could not work for no fault of his own must be counted. In Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, (2005) 7 SCC 754, the Court held that the burden of proving discontinuity rests entirely upon the employer. The Labour Court has specifically recorded that no reliable oral or documentary evidence was produced by the employer to rebut the workman's version, a finding that remains uncontroverted. In such circumstances, there was no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the workman.
17. Learned Labour Court was also correct in rejecting the plea of abandonment. Abandonment cannot be inferred merely from non-reporting for work, it requires clear, positive evidence of an intention to sever the relationship of employment. The State issued no show- cause notice, no direction to resume duty, and initiated no disciplinary action. In the absence of any such material, 10 learned Labour Court rightly concluded that cessation of work amounted to retrenchment, thereby attracting the mandatory requirements of Section 6-N of the Act. It is undisputed that the State did not serve one month's notice, did not pay retrenchment compensation, and did not notify the State Government. Learned Labour Court was therefore justified in holding the termination to be illegal. However, while the finding of illegality is upheld, the consequential relief of reinstatement cannot be the automatic fall out. More than thirty years have elapsed since the workman last worked in 1992 and given the time span, reinstatement now would neither be feasible nor equitable. Additionally, although the age of the respondent is not explicitly mentioned in the present writ record, the proceedings before learned Labour Court reflect that the respondent- workman was 36 years old in the year 2002. On that basis, his present age would be approximately 59 years, which is almost at the verge of the age of superannuation in government service. In such circumstances, reinstatement at this stage would be wholly impractical and devoid of any real operative benefit to the workman. Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that where the employee is nearing or has crossed the age of superannuation, and especially where the engagement was daily-wage or casual in nature, monetary compensation rather than reinstatement is the appropriate and equitable relief. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shankar Shetty (supra) and BSNL v. Maniram, (supra), has repeatedly held that reinstatement is not an automatic consequence in cases involving daily wagers, especially where the engagement was purely casual, there was no sanctioned post, and considerable time has elapsed. These principles squarely apply here.
1118. Accordingly, while affirming the finding that the termination was illegal, arbitrary and contrary to Section 6- N of the Act, this Court finds it appropriate to substitute reinstatement with a lump-sum compensation, which would meet the ends of justice in the circumstances of the case.
19. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. The impugned judgment and award dated 05.09.2011 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Haridwar, is hereby affirmed to the extent that termination was illegal and unjust. In the interest of justice, the respondent- workman shall be entitled to receive a lump-sum monetary compensation, which is quantified by this Court as the amount deposited by the petitioners-State before this Court pursuant to the order dated 09.07.2013. The respondent- workman shall be entitled to get Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh only) along with interest accrued thereon up to date. The same shall be released in favour of the respondent-workman forthwith.
20. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
21. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(Pankaj Purohit, J.) 10.12.2025 PN 12