Allahabad High Court
Dr Hemika Agarwal And Another vs State Of U.P. And Another on 19 July, 2024
Author: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
Bench: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:114885 Reserved on : 15.07.2024 Delivered on : 19.07.2024 Court No. - 74 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 9131 of 2024 Applicant :- Dr Hemika Agarwal And Another Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Ashok Kumar Singh,Pratibha Singh,Satish Kumar Tyagi Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Harish Chandra,Vivek Kumar Singh Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.
1. Heard Sri Satish Kumar Tyagi, learned counsel for applicants, Sri Vivek Kumar Singh, learned counsel for opposite party No.2/complainant and Sri Mithilesh Kumar, learned A.G.A. for State.
2. Applicants are aggrieved by an order dated 28.02.2024 passed under Section 204 Cr.P.C., whereby they have been summoned for offence under Sections 384, 504, 506 I.P.C. in Complaint Case No.6204 of 2024 (Anju Garg Vs. Dr. Hemika Agarwal and others), Police Station- Kavi Nagar, District - Ghaziabad by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of applicants has referred contents of complaint, statement of complainant recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. as well as statement of witnesses recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C. that even they are considered to be true in their entirety, still ingredients of offences under Sections 384, 504, 506 I.P.C. are not made out.
4. Learned counsel further submits that son of opposite party No.2 (complainant) was married with applicant No.1, whereas applicant No.2 is her father. Present proceedings were initiated to put pressure on applicant side as they have lodged an FIR against complainant and other, for offence of demand of dowry and other offences. For reference, statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. as well as impugned order are reproduced hereinafter :-
"बयान अन्तर्गत धारा 200 दं. प्र. सं.
आज दिनांक 2-2-2024 को अंजू गर्ग पत्नी श्री प्रदीप कुमार गर्ग निवासी ए-65, सेक्टर-33 नोएडा, थाना सेक्टर-24, नोएडा, गौतमबुद्धनगर ने सशपथ बयान किया कि मेरे पुत्र डा. प्रखर गर्ग का विवाह दिनांक 15- 7-2021 को विपक्षी डा. हेमिका अग्रवाल से हुआ था। मेरी पुत्रवधु ने मेरे तथा परिवार के अन्य लोगों के खिलाफ दहेज मांगने का झूठा मुकदमा दर्ज करा दिया था, जिसके फैसले की एवज में विपक्षीगण ने हमसे डेढ करोड़ रूपये की मांग की तथा कहा कि उक्त धनराशि दे दोगे तो फैसला कर लेंगे। इसकी शिकायत करने मै दिनांक 26-1-2024 को शाम करीब 5-00 बजे थाना कविनगर पर अपने पुत्र तथा पति के साथ गयी, जहां पर थानाध्यक्ष नहीं मिले। इसके बाद जब हम वापस जा रहे थे तो थाने के बाहर रास्तें पर मेरी पुत्रवधु डा. हेमिका अग्रवाल अपने पिता डा राकेश चन्द्र अग्रवाल तथा मां दिव्या अग्रवाल के साथ गाडी संख्या यू. पी. 14 डी. एस. 2581 से आयी तथा थाने के बाहर सर्विस लेन में आगे चलकर जब हम अपनी गाडी यू. पी. 16 डी. के. 2917 में बैठने जा रहे थे, तब रोककर तीनों ने हमे धमकी दी तथा गाली गलौच की तथा दहेज के केस को निपटाने के बदले डेढ करोड़ रुपये की अवैध मांग दोहरायी तथा कहा कि उनकी जान पहचान बदमाशों से है अगर पुलिस में शिकायत की तो जान से मरवा देंगे। हमने तुरन्त थाने पर वापस जाकर इस सम्बन्ध में लिखित रिपोर्ट दी परन्तु थाने वालों ने रिपोर्ट दर्ज नहीं की तथा कोर्ट से कार्यवाही करने को कहा। इस पुलिस तहरीर की स्वहस्ताक्षरित छायाप्रति नै आज दाखिल कर रही हूं।
PW2 202 सी.आर.पी.सी.
09.02.2024 नाम-प्रदीप कुमार गर्ग पुत्र श्याम सुन्दर गर्ग आयु 64 वर्ष पेशा रिटायर नि० A-65 10-33 नोएडा, थाना सै०-24 नौएडा जिला गौतमबुद्धनगर ने सशपथ बयान किया कि मेरी पुत्रवधू हेमिका ने मेरे व मेरे पुत्र व पत्नी के खिलाफ दहेज मांगने आदि का एक झूठा मुकदमा कराकर फैसले में डेढ करोड की मांग की थी, इसी मामले में अपनी बात कहते दिनाक 26.01.24 की शाम लगभग पांच वजे मैं अपने पुत्र प्रखर व पत्नी श्रीमती अंजू गर्ग के साथ थाना कविनगर आया। हमने अपनी कार थाना सर्विस लेन में आगे कट पर खड़ी कर दी थी, क्योंकि हमे दूसरे पक्ष से डर था कि कहीं वो थाने में आकर हमसे बदतमीजी न करे, थाने से वापस पैदल आकर जब कार में बैठने लगे तो डा० हेमिका अपने पिता राकेश, राकेश व माता दिव्या के साथ I-10 कार रजि० नं० U.P. 14 D.S-2581 में आयी और हमे गाडी में बैठने से रोक कर इन तीनो ने हमे गन्दी-2 गालिया दी और हमसे दहेज के इस केस को निपटाने के बदले में डेढ करोड रूपये की अवैध मांग की, उन्होने यह भी धमकी दी कि हमारी जान पहचान बदमाशो से है. अगर इसकी शिकायत पुलिस में की तो तुम्हें जान से मारवा देगे। हमने तुरन्त जाकर थाने में लिखित तहरीर दी, लेकिन थाने वालों ने रिपोर्ट दर्ज नहीं की और कोर्ट से कार्यवाही करने के लिए बोला। हमे पुलिस पर भरोसा न होने की वजह से मेरी पत्नी अन्जू ने ये परिवाद कोर्ट में पेश की है। पुलिस को दी शिकायत की कापी भी मेरी पत्नी ने अपने हस्ताक्षर में प्रमाणित करके अपने बयानो के साथ कोर्ट में दी है। कृपया हमे न्याय देने की कृपा करे। यही मेरा बयान है।
28-02-2024 पत्रावली पेश हुई। विगत तिथि पर परिवादी के विद्वान अधिवक्ता को तलबी के बिन्दु पर विस्तार पूर्वक सुना जा चुका है। पत्रावली का सम्यक अवलोकन किया।
संक्षेप में परिवाद कथानक इस प्रकार है कि परिवादनी श्रीमति अंजु गर्ग की पुत्रवधु डा० हेमिका अग्रवाल पुत्री डा० राकेश चन्द्र अग्रवाल निवासी आर 13/76, राजनगर, गाजियाबाद ने परिवादिनी उसके परिवार के खिलाफ दहेज मांगने आदि का झूठा मुकदमा कराकर फैसले में डेढ करोड की माँग की थी। इसी मामले में दिनांक 26.01.2024 को शाम लगभग 5 बजे वह अपने पति प्रदीप कुमार गर्ग व बेटे प्रखर गर्ग के साथ थाना कविनगर आयी तो डा० हैमिका अपने पिता राकेश व माता दिव्या के साथ आई-टेन कार रजि० नं० यू०पी० 14 डी0 एस0-2581 में आयी और थाने वाली सर्विस लेन में आगे चलकर कट पर उनकी गाड़ी से रोककर इन तीनों ने उन्हें गन्दी गन्दी गालियों दी और उनसे दहेज के इस केस को निपटाने के बदले में डेढ करोड रूपये की अवैध माँग की। इन्होने यह भी धमकी दी कि उनकी जान पहचान बदमाशों से है अगर इसकी पुलिस में शिकायत की तो जान से मरवा देगे। हमने तुरन्त जाकर थाने में लिखित रिपोर्ट दी लेकिन थाने वालों ने रिपोर्ट दर्ज नहीं की और कोर्ट से कार्यवाही करने को कहा। पुलिस पर भरोसा न होने की वजह से यह परिवाद कोर्ट में पेश किया है।
परिवाद के समर्थन में मौखिक साक्ष्य के रूप में धारा-200 दं०प्र०सं० के तहत परिवादिनी ने स्वयं को परीक्षित कराया तथा 202 दं०प्र०सं० के तहत साक्षीगण प्रखर गर्ग व प्रदीप कुमार गर्ग को परीक्षित कराया गया है तथा संलग्न सूची में वर्णित सम्बन्धित प्रपत्र दाखिल किये गये हैं।
परिवादी द्वारा अपने बयान अंतर्गत धारा-2०० दं०प्र०सं० में कथन किया है कि "मेरे पुत्र डा. प्रखर गर्ग का विवाह दिनांक 15-7-2021 को विपक्षी डा. हेमिका अग्रवाल से हुआ था। मेरी पुत्रवधु ने मेरे तथा परिवार के अन्य लोगों के खिलाफ दहेज मांगने का झूठा मुकदमा दर्ज करा दिया था, जिसके फैसले की एवज में विपक्षीगण ने हमसे डेढ करोड रूपये की मांग की तथा कहा कि उक्त धनराशि दे दोगे तो फैसला कर लेंगे। इसकी शिकायत करने मै दिनांक 26.01.2024 को शाम करीब 5.00 बजे थाना कविनगर पर अपने पुत्र तथा पति के साथ गयी, जहां पर थानाध्यक्ष नही मिले। इसके बाद जब हम वापस जा रहे थे तो थाने के बाहर रास्ते पर मेरी पुत्रवधू डा. हेमिका अग्रवाल अपने पिता डा. राकेश चन्द्र अग्राल तथा मां दिव्या अग्रवाल के साथ गाडी संख्या यू.पी. 14 डी.एस. 2581 से आयी तथा थाने के बाहर सर्विस लेन में आगे चलकर जब हम अपनी गाडी यू.पी. 16 डी.के. 2917 में बैठने जा रहे थे, तब रोककर तीनों ने हमे धमकी दी तथा गाली गलौच की तथा दहेज के केस को निपटाने के बदले डेढ करोड रूपये की अवैध मांग दोहरायी तथा कहा कि उनकी जान पहचान बदमाशों से है अगर पुलिस में शिकायत की तो जान से मरवा देंगे। हमने तुरन्त थाने पर वापस जाकर इस सम्बन्ध में लिखित रिपोर्ट दी परन्तु थाने वालों ने रिपोर्ट दर्ज नहीं की तथा कोर्ट से कार्यवाही करने को कहा। इस पुलिस तहरीर की स्वहस्ताक्षरित छायाप्रति मेै आज दाखिल कर रही हूँ।
परिवादी की ओर से धारा-202 दं०प्र०सं० के तहत परीक्षित कराये गये साक्षीगण ने परिवादी के उपरोक्त बयानों का समर्थन किया है।
प्रस्तुत प्रकरण में परिवाद कथानक में वर्णित विपक्षीगण द्वारा परिवादिनी व उसके पति व पुत्र को गालीगलौच कर साशय अपमानित करने, उद्यापन कारित करने व जान से मारने की धमकी देने के तथ्य का समर्थन परिवादी साक्ष्य अंतर्गत धारा-200 व 202 दं०प्र०स० से होता है। मामले के तथ्यों परिस्थितियों व उपलब्ध साक्ष्य के दृष्टिगत विपक्षीगण 1 ता 3 तो को धारा-504, 506, 384 भा०दं०सं० के अपराध में विचारण हेतु तलब किये जाने हा आधार पर्याप्त है।
आदेश विपक्षीगण डा० हैमिका अग्रवाल, डा० राकेश चन्द अग्रवाल व श्रीमती दिव्या अग्रवाल को धारा-504, 506, 384 भा०दं०सं० के अपराध में विचारण हेतु जरिये सम्मन तलब किया जाता है। परिवादी द्वारा पैरवी किये जाने के उपरान्त कार्यालय नियमानुसार आदेशिकाएं दिनांक 28-03-2024 के लिए जारी करे।"
5. Learned counsel for opposite party No.2 has also referred above quoted statements that there are prima facie case against accused persons. The learned Trial Court has assigned requisite reason that there are sufficient grounds to proceed.
6. In order to appreciate rival submission and to scrutinize whether prima facie ingredients of offence of Extortion is made out or not, the Court takes note of following paragraphs of Dhananjay @ Dhandnjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of Bihar and others, (2007) 14 SCC 768 and Salib @ Shalu @ Salim Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2023 INSC 687, as referred in a judgment passed by this Court in Sanjay Gupta @ Sanju Mohan Vs. State of U.P. and another, 2024:AHC:105492 :-
"10. In order to appreciate, whether contents of Section 387 IPC are made out or not, it would be appropriate to reproduce relevant part of judgments passed by Supreme Court in Dhananjay @ Dhandnjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of Bihar and others, (2007)14 SCC 768 and Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of U.P. and others, 2023 INSC 687:
Dhananjay @ Dhandnjay Kumar Singh (Supra) "5.Section 384 provides for punishment for extortion. What would be an extortion is provided under Section 383 of the Penal Code in the following terms:
"383.Extortion.--Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits ''extortion'."
6.A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would demonstrate that the following ingredients would constitute the offence:
1. The accused must put any person in fear of injury to that person or any other person.
2. The putting of a person in such fear must be intentional.
3. The accused must thereby induce the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security.
4. Such inducement must be done dishonestly.
7. A First Information Report as is well known, must be read in its entirety. It is not in dispute that the parties entered into transactions relating to supply of bags. The fact that some amount was due to the appellant from the First Informant, is not in dispute. The First Information Report itself disclosed that accounts were settled a year prior to the date of incident and the appellant owed a sum of about Rs.400-500 from (sic) Gautam Dubey (sic).
8. According to the said Gautam Dubey, however, a sum of Rs.1500/- only was due to him.
9. It is in the aforementioned premise the allegations that Gautam Dubey and the appellant slapped the first informant and took out Rs.1580/- from his upper pocket must be viewed.
10. No allegation was made that the money was paid by the informant having been put in fear of injury or putting him in such fear by the appellant was intentional.
11. The first informant, admittedly, has also not delivered any property or valuable security to the appellant.
12. A distinction between theft and extortion is well known. Whereas offence of extortion is carried out by overpowering the will of the owner; in commission of an offence of theft the offender's intention is always to take without that person's consent.
13. We, therefore, are of the opinion that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, no case under Section 384 of the Penal Code was made out in the first information report."
Salib @ Shalu @ Salim (supra) "21. "Extortion" has been defined in Section 383 of the IPC as follows:--
"Section 383. Extortion.--Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits 'extortion.
Illustrations
(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless Z gives him money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.
(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z's child in wrongful confinement, unless Z will sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay certain monies to A. Z sings and delivers the note. A has committed extortion.
(c) A threatens to send club-men to plough up Z's field unless Z will sign and deliver to B a bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign and deliver the bond. A has committed extortion.
(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z sings and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the paper so signed may be converted into a valuable security. A has committed extortion."
22. So from the aforesaid, it is clear that one of the necessary ingredients of the offence of extortion is that the victim must be induced to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, etc. That is to say, the delivery of the property must be with consent which has been obtained by putting the person in fear of any injury. In contrast to theft, in extortion there is an element of consent, of course, obtained by putting the victim in fear of injury. In extortion, the will of the victim has to be overpowered by putting him or her in fear of injury. Forcibly taking any property will not come under this definition. It has to be shown that the person was induced to part with the property by putting him in fear of injury. The illustrations to the Section given in the IPC make this perfectly clear.
23. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to the following observations made by a Division Bench of the High Court of Patna in Ramyad Singh v. Emperor Criminal Revision No. 125 of 1931 (Pat):-
"If the facts had been that the complainant's thumb had been forcibly seized by one of the petitioners and had been applied to the piece of paper notwithstanding his struggles and protests, then I would agree that there is good ground for saying that the offence committed whatever it may be, was not the offence of extortion because the complainant would not have been induced by the fear of injury but would have simply been the subject of actual physical compulsion."
It was held:-
"It is clear that this definition makes it necessary for the prosecution to prove that the victims Narain and Sheonandan were put in fear of injury to themselves or to others, and further, were thereby dishonestly induced to deliver papers containing their thumb impressions. The prosecution story in the present case goes no further than that thumb impressions were 'forcibly taken' from them. The details of the forcible taking were apparently not put in evidence. The trial Court speaks of the wrists of the victims being caught and of their thumb impressions being then 'taken' ....... The lower Courts only speak of the forcible taking of the victim's thumb impression; and as this does not necessarily involve inducing the victim to deliver papers with his thumb impressions (papers which could no doubt be converted into valuable securities), I must hold that the offence of extortion is not established."
24. Thus, it is relevant to note that nowhere the first informant has stated that out of fear, she paid Rs. 10 Lakh to the accused persons. To put it in other words, there is nothing to indicate that there was actual delivery of possession of property (money) by the person put in fear. In the absence of anything to even remotely suggest that the first informant parted with a particular amount after being put to fear of any injury, no offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out."
(Emphasis supplied) "
7. In the above factual and legal background, the Court takes note of statement of complainant as well as of witnesses as referred above, that it is not their case that any amount allegedly demanded was delivered to applicants, therefore, in view of above Dhananjay @ Dhandnjay Kumar Singh (supra) Salib @ Shalu @ Salim (supra), essential ingredient of offence of 'extortion' is not made out.
8. The Court also takes note of a judgment passed by Supreme Court in case of Mohammad Wajid and Another Vs. State of U.P. And Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951, that whether ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 I.P.C. are made out or not. The relevant parts of Mohammad Wajid and Another (supra) are reproduced hereinafter :-
"SECTIONS 503, 504 AND 506 OF THE IPC
24. Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:--
"Section 503. Criminal intimidation. --Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.--A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.
Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation."
25. Section 504 reads thus:--
"Section 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.--Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
26. Section 506 reads thus:--
"Section 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. --Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.--And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."
27. An offence under Section 503 has following essentials:--
1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i) to his person, reputation or property; or
(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested.
2) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised selfcontrol or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.
29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:--
"To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
31. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 of the IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present."
9. In above background, the Court further considered the statement of complainant recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. as well as of witnesses recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C. however, there is nothing that applicants have put the complainant on alarm or provoked him to commit any act which could breach the peace. The words used for alleged insult are also not specific except that "गाली गलौच की" or "गन्दी गन्दी गालियाँ दी". Accordingly, in view of Mohammad Wajid and another (supra), even ingredients of offences under Sections 504 and 506 I.P.C. are also made as well as the Court is of view that present proceedings were initiated by opposite party only in order to wrecking vengeance as they were facing criminal proceedings on a complaint of applicant No.1 for committing offences related to a woman.
10. The outcome of above discussion is that facts of present case are squarely falls within the parameters as referred in a judgment passed by Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426, where inherent power could be invoked to quash criminal proceedings, and for reference para 102(7) of Bhajan Lal (supra) is reproduced hereinafter:
"(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
11. Accordingly, impugned order dated 28.02.2024 is set aside and consequently criminal proceedings arising out of complaint Case No.6204 of 2024 under Sections 504, 506, 384 I.P.C. (Anju Garg Vs. Dr. Hemika Agarwal and others) are also quashed.
12. Accordingly, application is Allowed.
13. Registrar Compliance to take steps.
Order Date : 19.07.2024 Pushpendra Pandey