The Statesman Ltd. And Ors. vs The Fact Finding Committee And Ors. on 22 April, 1974

[Cites 57, Cited by 11]

Calcutta High Court

The Statesman Ltd. And Ors. vs The Fact Finding Committee And Ors. on 22 April, 1974

Equivalent citations: AIR1975CAL14, AIR 1975 CALCUTTA 14

Bench: Murari Mohan Dutt

ORDER
 

 Murari Mohan Dutt, J.

1. In this Rule, the first petitioner is the Statesman Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Statesman) and the second petitioner is Cushrow Russy Irani, who is a shareholder and the Managing Director of the Statesman, Mr. Irani is the Chairman of the Press Trust of India and of the Audit Bureau of Circulation Limited. He is also one of the two Directors from India of the Press Foundation of Asia, Manila, Phillipines. He was at all material times the President of the Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society.

2. By a resolution No 19/3/72- Press, dated April 14, 1972. The Government of India decided to set up a Fact Finding Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) with the Respondent No. 2, Bhabatosh Datta as the Chairman and the third, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents as members of the said Committee. The resolution is in the following terms:--

"RESOLUTION In pursuance of the decision to inquire into the economics of the newspaper industry, the Government of India have decided to set up a Fact Finding Committee, consisting of non-officials and officials. The composition of the Committee is as follows:--

CHAIRMAN

1. DR. BHABATOSH DATTA, Retd. Professor of Economics, Presidency College, Calcutta.

MEMBERS

1. SHRI R. RAJAGOPALAN.

Chief Cost Accounts Officer, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi.

2. SHRI K.C. RAMAN, Retd. Production Manager, M/s. Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd., Bombay.

3. SHRI I.P. GUPTA, Officer on Special Duty, Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi.

4. SHRI G. GOVINDAN. (Member Secretary), Registrar of Newspapers for India, New Delhi.

2. The terms of reference of the Committee will be--

(i) to ascertain all the elements of the cost of production (including distribution to the reader) of the daily newspapers; and the relative magnitude of these elements in the different categories of newspapers;

(ii) to ascertain all the different elements of the total revenue earned by the newspapers; and the relative magnitude of these elements in the different categories of newspapers;

(iii) to study, under both the above items, the trends during the past few years and forecast, to the extent possible, the normal changes likely to occur in the next year or two;

(iv) to evolve norms for different elements of expenditure from the point of view of reasonableness combined with efficiency and examine the prevailing levels of expenditure with reference to such norms; and

(v) on the basis of the above studies to record its findings in regard to the effect of the restriction of news-print supplies to different categories oi newspapers and the fair prices to be charged by newspapers of different categories.

3. The Committee will consult newspaper managements and also working journalists, non-journalist workers and any other interested group that it may consider desirable to consult.

4. The Committee will meet as often as considered necessary. The Headquarters of the Committee will be at new Delhi but it may visit such place as considered necessary for a proper and comprehensive study of the various aspects of the newspaper industry.

5. The Committee will evolve its own procedure.

6. The Committee will report its findings as soon as possible but not later than six months from the date of its constitution.

Sd/- (R. C. DUTT) Secy, to the Govt. of India."

3. The Committee by its letter dated September 5. 1972 issued a questionnaire and required all newspapers including the Statesman to answer the same. The Statesman did not answer the questionnaire. Many other newspaper proprietors also did not answer the same. It is now admitted that out of 821 daily newspapers only 150 have sent their answers to the questionnaire.

4. By notification No. GSR/208 (F), dated April 26. 1973 published in 'the Gazette of India, the Government of India directed that all the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), other than the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 thereof, would apply to the Committee. The said notification is as follows:--

"NOTIFICATION G.S.R. 263 (F)-- Whereas a Fact Finding Committee has been set up under the Resolution of Government of India in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting No. 19/3/72-Press dated the 14th April, 1972 for the purpose of making an inquiry into a definite matter of public importance, namely, the economics of the newspaper industry;

AND WHEREAS the Fact Finding Committee had addressed a detailed questionnaire to all the daily newspapers in September, 1972 requesting information and data on matters pertaining 'to the terms of reference which, in the opinion of the Fact Finding Committee, may be useful or relevant to the subject-matter of inquiry;

AND WHEREAS only a small number of newspapers have furnished the requisite information and data:

AND WHEREAS the information and data supplied by some daily newspapers have been found to be insufficient Or inadequate;

AND WHEREAS a large number of daily newspapers have still not furnished any information or data;

AND WHEREAS haying regard to the nature of the inquiry and the circumstances of the case, the Central Government is of opinion that all the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (60 of 1952) other than the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 thereof should be made applicable to the said Fact Finding Committee;

NOW. THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 11 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby directs that all the provisions of the said Act other than the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 'thereof shall apply to the said Fact Finding Committee." , The Committee by its letter dated May 19, 1973, again required the Statesman to send its replies to the said Questionnaire without any further delay and to furnish the figures, estimates and accounts. By its letter dated February 21, 1974, the Committee intimated the Statesman that failure to furnish information required by 'the Committee within the stipulated period would constitute an offence within the meaning of Section 176 of the Indian Penal Code. This letter has been annexed to the affidavit-in-reply of the petitioners and marked as Annexure "D"

5. It is contended by the petitioners that the Committee has no real right or power or authority or jurisdiction under the Act or at all to require the Statesman to answer 'the said or any other questionnaire or to furnish the said or any figures or estimates or accounts. The reasons therefor as stated inter alia in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e) of paragraph 6 of the petition are-

The economics of newspaper industry is not a matter of public importance within the meaning of the Act. It is not a definite matter of public importance or a definite matter at all inasmuch as the expression "economics of the newspaper industry" is vague and indefinite and has no fixed or exact limits or bounds and is incapable of beine defined with precision. Each and all the terms of reference set out in the resolution dated April 14, 1972 are vague and indefinite and have no fixed or exact limits or bounds and none of them is a definite matter. In any event, and on the assumption that the notification dated April 26, 1973 is valid, inasmuch as the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act have not been made applicable to the Committee and no notification under the said sub-section (1) of Section 5 has been or can be issued In respect thereto, the Committee has not been invested with any powers under Subsection (2) or Sub-section (3) of the said section. Accordingly it is alleged that the Committee has no power or authority to require the Statesman to answer the said questionnaire or to furnish the said figures or estimates or accounts in terms of the said letter dated May 19, 1973.

. It is alleged that the Central Government has acted mala fide and in abuse of its powers in petting up the Committee and in directing that the provisions of the Act other than Sub-section (1) of Section 5 thereof, shall apply thereto and the aforesaid action of the Central Government and of the Committee are violative of the fundamental rights of the second petitioner, namely, Mr. Irani and the Editor, Assistant Editors, Correspondents and Readers of the Statesman -to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In naragraph 7 of the writ petition certain facts have been given from which, it is alleged the mala fides of the Central Government can be inferred. The said facts will be referred te later.

7. It is alleged that the Committee by virtue of its composition is likely to be prejudiced and biased against the Statesman and is unlikely to be impartial. The complaint in this regard relates to the inclusion of the respondent No. 4, K.C. Raman as one of the members of the Committee. The respondent No. 4 was appointed as a Government Director of the Indian National Press Limited (proprietors and/or publishers of the Free Press Group of Newspapers). The said appointment was for six months only from January 15, 1972, and he was a Government Director at the time when he was appointed as a member of the Committee. Even after his appointment as a member of the Committee the said K.C. Raman was. on October 15. 1972, appointed a Director of Associated Journals Limited, Lucknow, which is the proprietor and/or publisher of the National Herald and he is still a Director thereto. It is alleged that the aioresaid newspapers are competitors of the Statesman and they also hold and express views on public matters that are divergent from those of the petitioners and the petitioners cannot expect fair treatment from the Committee of which the fourth respondent is a member. On these ground's the constitution of the Committee has been challenged by the petitioners.

8. It is alleged that it is impossible to have any norms of expenditure in relation to newspapers, in particular in respect of travelling expenses or amounts paid in the Managing Directors or Editors or Foreign or other Correspondents or any employees of the higher levels inasmuch as the remuneration that is appropriate to and can be commanded by the such persons depends upon their individual quality and calibre and is a matter for 'the exercise of judgment on the part of the proprietors of newspapers by assessment of the worth of the individual concerned to the particular newspaper. Further, it is alleged that the expression "fair prices" is a meaningless expression in relation to newspapers. Unit cost of production of a COPY of a newspaper is always far in excess of any price at which it can be sold. Accordingly, the greater the circulation of the newspaper the larger the excess cost over the total sale prices and Ihe greater the loss of the newspaper proprietors in this respect. This loss or difference is however, made up by revenues from advertisements; the greater the circulation the greater the amount that commercial concerns are willing to spend on advertisements: moreover the lower the price the greater the circulation and also the greater the amount of interesting matter that a newspaper contains the greater its circulation. It is, therefore, again a matter for the exercise of judgment on the part of the newspaper proprietors to determine what price can be charged end what proportion of advertisements can be included in the newspaper without causing readership to decline and what amounts can be spent in securing interesting matter commensurate with the expected increase in circulation and increased advertisement revenue. Further, it is alleged that all these are matters in which no norms or uniformity are possible. Different daily newspapers ester to different tastes, have different characteristic features, and vary widely in matters, such as coverage of foreign and indigenous news, choice of articles from writers in India and abroad, nature and quality of editorials, auality of printing and so forth. It is the contention of the petitioners that any attempt to fix the so called fair prices on the basis of the so called norms which the Committee is required to evolve would infringe the fundamental rights of the Statesman and/ or Mr. Irani to freedom of speech and expression.

9. On the aforesaid allegations, the petitioners have prayed for a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from taking any steps or proceedings whatsoever pursuant to or under the resolution dated April 14. 1972 or the notification dated April 26, 1973 and from requiring the petitioners to answer the questionnaire issued under cover of the letter dated September 5, 1972 or to furnish any fi-

gures or estimates or accounts in terms of the letter dated May 19. 1973.

10. The respondents have entered appearance in this Rule and have opposed the same by filing affidavits-in-opposition, it has been specifically averred by the respondents that the Committee is a lawfully constituted body and the provisions of the Act were lawfully made applicable to it by the Central Government in exercise of powers under Section 11 of the Act. A memorandum dated July 7, 1972 from the Statesman, including some opinions and observations on the working of the paper under the signature of Mr. Irani was received by the Committee. The said memorandum fnrms part of Annexure F" to the writ petition. It is also point pri out that the Manager of the Delhi office of the Statesman by his letter dated October 18. 1972 asked for extension of time till October 31. 1972 for filing a reply to the questionnaire and such request was granted. In the said memorandum of the Statesman, the petitioners not only invited the Committee to study various aspects of the working of the newspapers including the Statesman but went so far as to say -- "the Committee are at liberty to visit the office of the Statesman and inspect any books that they choose to satisfy 'themselves that this state of affairs has come out for reasons which lie beyond the power of the Company to influence or correct." As the collection of the information about economics of newspapers was a difficult task the Committee sought co-operation in this matter of two Newspaper Associations, namely, the Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society. New Delhi and the Indian Language Newspaper Association, Bombay. Mr. Irani, as president pf 'he Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society made an appeal on June 10, 1972 to all members of the Society. In the appeal, it has been stated by him that it is to the interest of all members, and all newspapers as a whole, to co-operate as fully as possible, with the Committee. Further, it has been stated by him that the Society, too will be submitting its own memorandum to the Committee and that he trusts that members are arranging to return the complete questionnaire by June 15, 1972.

11. It has been denied that economics of newspaper industry is not a matter of public importance within the meaning of the Act or that it is not a definite matter of public importance or that the terms of reference incorporated in the Government resolution dated April 14, 1972 are vague or indefinite or have no fixed or exact limits or bounds or are not definite matters. It is alleged that the field which the committee has been asked by the Government to study, is economics of newspaper industry which is a very well defined area. Further, it is alleged that for all policy decisions of the Government with regard to this important medium of mass communication, a reliable body of information on the subject of newspaper economics is extremely useful and necessary. The Government wants the Committee to study the relative magnitude of the various elements of costs of production including dis-'tribution to the reader, total revenue earned by the newspapers and the effect of restricted supply of newsprint, as well as the question of fair price not with reference to different categories of newspapers as a whole clubbed together, but to study variations of all those factors with reference to different categories of newspapers, it being left to the Committee to determine scientifically, in the light of the facts collected and the expert knowledge of the members of the Committee what exactly the different categories should be. The contention of the petitioners that the reference of "fair price" without specifying to whom they are to be fair renders the reference indefinite and vague has been denied It has been alleged that the concept of fair price is very well-known, namely, that a fair price has to be fair to the producer including the distributor, as well as the consumer. They have denied that the Committee has not been invested with the powers under Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 5. It has been pointed out that the Committee has not so far invoked the provisions of Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3) either in the case of the Statesman or in any other case though those powers may have to be used bv the Committee as and when necessary

12. On behalf of the respondent No. 7. The Central Government, it has been alleged that the Central Government has acted bona fide in the exercise of its powers in setting up the Committee and in issuing the Gazette notification applving the provisions of the Act other than Sub-section (1) of Section 5 thereof, to the Committee. It has been denied that the action of the Central Government and the Committee are violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner No. 2 or of the Assistant Editors, Correspondence and readers of the Statesman in respect of freedom of speech and expression as conferred by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It has been denied that the Central Government has acted mala fide or that its mala fides can be inferred from the circumstances stated in paragraph 7 of the writ petition. It is contended that the writ petition is not maintainable in law and the same is absolutely speculative. The respondents have prayed that the writ petition should be dismissed.

13. At this stage, it is necessary to dispose of certain preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents by Mr. Banerjee. appearing on their behalf. My attention has been drawn by Mr. Banerjee to the prayer made by the petitioners. It has been already stated that the petitioners have prayed for a writ in the nature of mandamus. It is contended that unltss there is a demand for justice and a refusal thereto, the petitioners are not entitled to ask for a writ in the nature of mandamus nor can this Court issue that writ without being satisfied that there was such a demand and refusal. In paragraph 12 of the writ petition, it has been stated that by letters, copies of which are included in Annexure 'F' to the petition and in particular by the letter dated June 21, 1973, the petitioners demanded justice and justice had been denied to them. The letters which have been included in An-nexure 'F' have all been written bv the petitioners before the Committee came into existence, excepting the letter written by the petitioners to the respondent No. 2 Dr. Bhabatosh Datta. The Chairman of the Committee on June 21. 1973, that is. after the Committee was set up by the Government. Mr. Banerjee submits that the letters which were written before the setting up of the Committee cannot be relied on by the petitioners for the purpose of showing that they made a demand for justice and the same was refused. It is argued that before the Committee came into existence there was no scope for demanding justice, or in other words, no cause of action arose to the petitioners so as to demand performance of duties by the Government. Regarding the letter addressed to Dr. Bhabavosh Datta, the Chairman of the Committee the contention of Mr. Banerjee is twofold. Firstly, he submits that Bhabatosh Datta or the Committee is not the authority to grant any relief to the petitioners. The Committee was set up by a resolution of the Government and it was the Government alone which could withdraw, recall or cancel the resolution in favour of the petitioners. Secondly, it is contended that even in that letter no demand for justice has been made by the petitioners; on the contrary, it will reveal that the petitioners agreed to co-operate with the Committee.

14. It is now well settled that a party seeking for a writ in the nature of mandamus must prove 'that he demanded justice from the authority responsible for the performance of duties and that the demand was refused. On behalf of the respondents certain decisions have been cited in support of the said principle, but it is not necessary to refer to those decisions, for there is no doubt or dispute about the same. The petitioners have claimed that the demand was made by the letters which are included in An-nexure 'F' to the writ petition. of these letters, all excepting one were written before the setting up of the Committee. Mr. Banerjee has rightly painted out that there was no scope for demanding justice before the Committee came into existence. There has not been any serious attempt on behalf of the petitioners to rely on these letters written before the Committee was constituted. The petitioners have, however, placed reliance on the letter dated June 21, 1973 which was addressed by Mr. Irani to the Respondent No. 2, Dr. Bhabatosh Datta, the Chairman of the Committee. It is said on behalf of the respondents that Bhabatosh Datta is not the proper authority to whom any demand can be made. The Committee is only a creature of the Government and accordingly the proper authority to whom such a demand should have been made was the Government. It is argued that it was the Government which could comply with the demand of the petitioners by rescinding the resolution or order appointing the Committee. It is submitted that even assuming that the said letter dated June 21, 1973. is considered as a letter of demand, it not having been made to the proper authority, namely, the Government, there was no demand for justice. Certain passages from Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 11. Third Edition have been placed before me on behalf of the respondents of which. I may refer to Article 198 at page 106 which is relevant to the contention of the respondents. Under that Article it has been stated that as a general rule the order will not be granted unless the party complained of has known what it was he was required to do so that he had the means of considering whether or not he should comply Relying on this statement it is contended that the Committee or the respondent No, 2 was not in a position to comply with the demand made by the petitioners. Reliance has also been placed on behalf of the respondents on a decision of the Madras High Court in Gorbarandum Universal Ltd., Madras v. Union of India, . It has been laid down in that decision that when a power is entrusted by a statute to a named authority and the exercise of it is invoked by a person concerned and there is an improper refusal to exercise the power, a mandamus may well issue under Article 226 of the Constitution directing the authority to exercise that power. It is said on behalf of the respondents that in the instant case, the proper authority is the Government.

15. There can be no doubt that the demand must be made to the proper authority and not to an authority who is not in a position to perform its duty in the manner as demanded. It is no doubt true that the Committee had been set up by an order of the Government. After the conferment of powers on the Committee by the Government under Section 11 of the Act, the Committee will proceed to discharge its duties in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The claim of the petitioners is that the Committee should not act and they have prayed for a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from taking steps or proceedings whatsoever pursuant to or under the Resolution dated April 14, 1972, or the 'notification dated April 26, 1973, and from requiring the petitioners to answer the questionnaire issued by the Committee. The petitioners have not claimed the rescission, cancellation or withdrawal of the said resolution of the Government, but they want to restrain the Committee from proceeding any further with the inquiry and from requiring the petitioners to answer 'the questionnaire. The prayer which has been made by the petitioners is directly concerned with the actions of the Committeee. It was the Committee which could only consider whether the demand made by the petitioners should be complied with or given effect to The questionnaire has been issued by the Committee and not by the Government The prayers of the petitioners include a prayer for direction upon the Committee not to require the petitioners to answer the questionnaire. The Government has nothing to do with the questionnaire issued by the Committee. In these circumstances, I am unable to accept the contention of the respondents that the Government was the proper authority to whom a demand for justice should have been made. In my opinion the proper authority is the Committee and the petitioners have rightly made a demand for justice from the respondent No. 2. The Chairman of the Committee.

16. Now it has to be considered whether by the said letter dated June 21, 1973 any demand for justice has been made by the petitioners. It is argued on behalf of the respondents that by that letter the petitioners wanted to co-operate with the Committee, although they only expressed certain difficulties on matters of principle in dealing with the questionnaire. I may first of all refer to the last sentence of the said letter written by Mr. Irani which reads as "I could in conclusion like to express a hope that this matter will not be pressed further, for the reasons and arguments that I have ventured to place before you".

Throughout this letter Mr. Irani has, in a clear language but in a courteous manner, argued against the terms of reference. He has said that the difficulty in the matter is the language of the terms of reference and that it is not possible to de-link the questionnaire that has been issued from these terms of reference about which they have serious complaints. He has not accepted the propriety of an inquiry into any of the terms of reference. He has challenged the power of the Government to fix the fair prices to be charged by different newspapers of different categories. It is well settled that demand for justice is not a matter of form but it is a matter of substance. It is amply clear from the said letter of Mr. Irani that the arguments which he has put forward in the letter are all for the purpose of impressing upon the respondent No. 2 not to proceed with the inquiry and to require the petitioners to answer the questionnaire. I have already referred to the concluding sentence of his letter in which a request has been made to the respondent No. 2 not to press the matter any further. In my opinion, a proper and sufficient demand for justice has been made in this letter.

17. The next objection of the respondents is that the Committee is neither a Tribunal nor a Statutory body and as such no writ can be issued against the Committee. Mr. Banerjee has placed reliance on certain passages from Garner on Administrative Law, Second Edition. At page 168 of that book, the distinction between a 'tribunal' and an 'inquiry' has been discussed as follows:--

"Neither expression is denned in any statute, but it is submitted that for an investigating agency to be properly described as a "tribunal", it must be constituted under statutory authority, it must have a regular or permanent existence, and also a defined jurisdiction within which it is required to exercise its powers to hear and determine dispute * * * * * *. In ordinary language also a tribunal connotes something similar to or approaching a judicial body. An "inquiry", on the other hand is an investigating agency constituted specially (in this context under statutory authority, but not necessarily in pursuance of a statutory requirement) to inquire into a particular matter, and it may have few analogies with a court of law. In general, a tribunal will come to a conclusion and be responsible therefor, but an inquiry may or may not arrive at any conclusion, and will often be required only to make a report or recommendations to some other Government agency (for example, a Minister of the Crown) so as to enable that agency the better to come to a conclusion on the matter. In the case of a tribunal, an individual (often a "person aggrieved") will normally have a statutory right to request his complaint to be heard and determined by the tribunal. In the case of an inquiry the individual's statutory right will most frequently be a rifiht to appeal to a Minister, the statute 'then providing that the Minister shall convene an inquiry to hear the matter and report to him thereon so that he may make a decision.

This distinction between tribunals and inquiries is rather descriptive than precise. The only precise classification seems to be one based on legal status;

Then dealing directly with tribunals of inquiry it has been observed at page 171 as follows:--

"A tribunal of this kind is constituted in particular circumstances to inquire into a definite matter described in the Resolution as of 'urgent public importance' * * * * These tribunals give rise to special difficulties of their own. They have the powers of the High Court and usually consist of a small number of persons, presided over by a High Court Judge. Their procedure is investigatory and inquisitorial rather than in accordance with the mure normal accusatory pattern of tribunals in this country, in which the issues before the tribunal are to some extent defined and any person concerned knows the case he has to meet. * * * * Because of their quite exceptional nature, however these Tribunals of Inquiry cannot be fitted logically into any scheme of classification of tribunals and inquiries."

18. All that has been stated in the passages referred to above is that a tribunal of inquiry is not a tribunal exercising iudicial functions or deciding any disputes between two parties. Its procedure is investigatory and inquisitorial rather than iudicial.

19. Mr. Deb also concedes that the Committee is not a tribunal exercising any iudicial functions. He, however, submits that it is a statutory authority discharging certain statutory duties. According to Mr. Banerjee it is not a statutory authority and as such it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. It follows from the contention of Mr. Banerjee that unless an authority is a statutory body no writ can be issued against such an authority. In support of his contention that the Committee is not a statutory body and as such no writ lies against it, Mr. Banerjee has cited before me the decision of D. Pal, J., in Borjahan Khan v. 24 Parganas. Southern Co-operative Bank, (1973) 77 Cal WN 691, The question that has been considered in that case is whether a co-operative society is a statutory body. In repelling the contention that a co-operative society is a statutory body. Pal. J., has obsorvea that it is now wsli established in England that the bodies to which in modern time the remedies of the prerogative writ have been applied are all statutory bodies on whom Parliament has conferred statutory powers and duties, exercise of which may lead to 'the detriment of subject. On the basis of this observation it is argued on behalf of the respondents that as the Committee has not been set up by a statute enacted by Parliament but has been constituted by the Government in exercise of its powers under Section 11 of the Act, it is not a statutory body on which Parliament has conferred statutory powers and duties. This contention of Mr. Banerjee, does not find support from the observation of Pal, J., referred to above. It may be that the Committee has not been set up directly by the provisions of a statute and it has been set up by the Government in exercise of its powers under the Act, but in my opinion, it makes no difference. It is not disputed that the Committee has to discharge its duties in accordance with the provisions of the statute enacted by Parliament. The powers which are exercised by the Committee are powers conferred on it by the statute. Some of the powers which are exercised by a Civil Court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure can also be exercised by the Committee under the provisions of the Act. In my view, the true test for the application of the writs is whether a body, though set up by the Government in exercise of its powers under a statute, discharges statutory functions or not. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Praga Tools Corporation v. C. V. Imanual. that a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which 'the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal interest. Further, it has been observed that it is not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official or an official body. A mandamus can issue, for instance, to an official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statute under or by which the socieiy is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the statutes authorising their undertakings. It is, therefore, apparent from what has been laid down in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court that for the purpose of having the performance of statutory duties, a writ in the nature of mandamus will lie. This does not mean that no negative order can be passed directing an authority not to do something. A writ will lie not only for compelling an authority to perform the statutory duties, but also for restraining or prohibiting him from doing something which he is not entitled to do under the law. The contention of Mr. Banerjee that the writ will lie only when the authority is a statutory authority created directly by the provisions of a statute, seems to be too wide a proposition to accept. As has been stated already, the Committee has to perform statutory duties; in my opinion, a writ will lie against i't.

20. It is said that the Committee has not yet done anything which has infringed any right of the petitioners. It is true that the Committee has asked the Statesman to answer the questionnaire, but it has not yet enforced any coercive process under the Act to compel the Statesman to comply with the direction of the Committee to answer the questionnaire. On the other hand, the petitioners submit that there is a sufficient threat to the infringement of the legal and fundamental rights of the petitioners. Specific reference in this regard has been made on behalf of the petitioners to a letter written By the Joint Secretary of the Committee to the Statesman dated February 21, 1974. which is Annexure 'D' to the affidavit-in-reply. In this letter, it has been pointed out that the Committee has been conferred with powers of a Commission of Inquiry including those under Sections 5(2) and 5(4) of the Act. The Statesman has been once more requested to submit the information to the Committee's office within a fortnight from the date of receipt of the letter, by answering the questionnaire. Further, it is stated that failure to furnish the said information required by the Committee within the stipulated period would constitute an offence within the meaning of Section 176 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Deb submits that this is a sufficient threat which has given rise to a cause of action to the petitioners to move this Court. There can be no doubt that in this letter it has been firmly indicated that if the Statesman does not answer the questionnaire within the time allowed steps would be taken against it as having committed an offence under the provisions of Section 176 of the Indian Penal Code, In my opinion, there is a threat to use the coercive power of the Committee to compel the Statesman to answer the questionnaire. Whether the petitioners are bound to answer the questionnaire or not is a matter which will be considered later, but at this stage it cannot but be held fhat there is a threat. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai. , the Supreme Court has held that where there has been a threat only and the right has not been actually in-fringed an application under Article 226 would lie and the courts would give necessary relief by making an order in the nature of injunction. In order to maintain an application under Article 228. it is not necessary for the petitioner to show that he has already suffered an actual injury; apprehension of in.iury or threat of injury is enough (See Ram Krishna v. Union of India, ; Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, ; Kochuni v State of Madras, .) Therefore, it is not correct to say that so long the right is not actually infringed or a party does not actually suffer a writ petition will not be maintainable at his instance.

21. Counsel for the respondents argues that in any event the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay. The Committee was constituted on 14-4-1972 and the writ petition has been filed on July 19, 1973, that is, more than a year after the setting up of the Committee. It is accordingly, argued that there has been an inordinate delay by the petitioners in presenting the writ petition to this Court and, as such, on this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed. In answer to this contention of the respondents. Counsel for the petitioners submits that so long the Com-mittee was not conferred with the powers under the Act, or in other words, so long the Committee was not given the status of a Commission of Inquiry under Section 11 of the Act, the petitioners had no locus standi to move this Court. For the first time, on April 26. 1973. The Government by a notification under Section 11 of the Act directed that all the provisions of the Act excepting Section 5(1) thereof would apply to the Committee. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that since that date the petitioners felt aggrieved and on June 21, 1973, the second petitioner Mr. Irani by his said letter demanded .justice from the respondent No. 2, Dr. Bhabhatosh Datta, the Chairman of the Committee. On July 7-1973, there was an implied refusal by the respondent No. 2 to comply with the demand made by the petitioners and. as already stated, the writ petition was moved on July 19, 1973. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that there has been no delay. In my opinion, in considering the question of delay, the date on which the Committee was conferred with the powers of the Commission of Inquiry should be taken to be the starting point and not the date on which the Committee was appointed by the Government not under the provisions of the Act. and so considered, it does not appear that there has been any delay on the part of the petitioners in moving this Court. For these reasons. I am unable to accept the preliminary objections of the respondents as to the maintainability of the writ petition.

22. I may now consider the contentions of the petitioner on the merits of the case. The first point that has been urged on behalf of the petitioners relates to the terms of reference. It is contended that the economics of the newspaper industry is not a definite matter inasmuch as the expression economics of the newspaper industry' is vague and indefinite and has no fixed or exact limits or bounds and is incapable of being defined with precision. It has not been disputed that it is a matter of public importance. It is contended that Items (i), (ii) and (v) of the terms of reference refer to different categories of newspapers without specifying the manner of categorisation. Item (iii) refers to 'trends during the first few years', without specifying the period of years, and to forecasts and possibilities and likelihoods of future changes, none of which is a definite matter. Item (iv) refers to the alleged norms which do not exist but are to be evolved and are not definite matters and item (v.) refers to fair prices without specifying to whom they are to be fair.

23. In this connection. Counsel for the petitioners has made a reference to the memorandum dated July 7, 1972, which was submitted by Mr. Irani to the Committee. In this memorandum, Mr. Irani has questioned the propriety of the terms of reference and has sought to support his reasons by facts and figures. It is not necessary to state in details 'the reasons given by Mr. Irani in this memorandum, but I may refer to the concluding portion of this memorandum wherein it is stated that it is an absurdity to fix norms of expenditure, irrespective of what test is sought to be applied to categorise newspapers. It is a matter of highly individualist standards set by each newspaper. Expenditure on news coverage and on the calibre of journalists and managerial personnel must remain individual to each newspaper. Apart from the impossibility of laying down norms, no reason has been advanced why an attempt to set norms should even be made. Similarly, there can be no conclusion drawn as regards the fair prices to be charged by different newspapers. The concern for 'the consumer in so far as the selling prices of newspapers are concerned, is totally unwarranted. It is stated that the reference is incomplete and must remain incomplete until an opportunity is given to a representative of the Statesman to give oral evidence before the Committee.

24. The principal question in 'this regard is whether the matters which have been referred to the Committee are definite matters. It is not the contention of Mr. Deb that the economics of the newspaper industry has no public importance, but he has strenuously urged that the expression 'economics of the newspaper in-

dustry' is not at all a definite matter having limits or bounds. It is said that this term may be understood by different PPO-ple in different ways. Mr. Banerjee has, however, pointed out that in the memorandum submitted to the Committee by K. Narendra, President of the Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society, the term 'economics of newspaper industry' has been used. He submits that they have clearly understood the import of the term as they have themselves used the same without any complaint that it is a vague term and not a definite matter to be inquired into. It is submitted that the expression covers a study of capital investment, employment and association in industry, its inputs and outputs, its market structure and distribution, its cost, revenues and profits or loss and its social cost and social benefits. In paragraph 7 (b) of the affidavit-in-oppositiqn used on behalf of the Union of India, it is stated that 'there has been many studies of comparable nature like 'economics of transport' (M. R. Bonavia, Cambridge University Press, 1954) and 'Economics of Middle Eastern Oil' by Issawi and Y. Mohammed (New York, 1962) and 'Cent per Cent Swadeshi or economics of Village Industries' by Mahatma Gandhi, (Navajivan Trust, 1958). Mr. Deb. however, submits that although the petitioners have understood the term in their own way, still it is not at all a precise term having a limit. The Government has not understood the term in the same way as the Society in its said memorandum has understood. Particular reference has been made to page 33 of the memorandum where it has dealt with rehabilitation and modernisation. It has been stated there that with severe restrictions on import of up-to-date machinery and equipment and hardly any large scale latest indigenous manufacture of printing machinery and equipment in the country, most newspaper establishments in the country have of necessity to depend on antiquated machinery and equipment for the production of newspapers. There is a dire need for the installation of modern equipment and machinery in the production and distribution departments of newspapers. Modernisation apart, rehabilitation and replacement of existing printing machinery and equipment in the production departments of newspaper establishments itself poses a big financial problem for the newspaper industry. Referring to the questionnaire Mr. Deb points out that the rehabilitation and modernisation of machinery and replacement of antiquated machinery by the newspaper industry as stated in the said memorandum has not been included in the questionnaire. He submits that this is one of the most important aspects which should have been included within the questionnaire. Accordingly, it is con-

tended that the Committee has not understood the term in the way the Society or the newspaper proprietors have understood the same and. as such, the term cannot be said to have a limit or a definite matter.

25. The Committee has been set up by the Government for the purpose of inquiring into the economics of newspaper industry by the resolution dated April 14, 1972. The resolution has also specified certain terms of reference which have to be considered by the Committee. These terms relate to the economics of newspaper industry. It may be that the expression 'economics of newspaper industry' includes within it various factors and may be understood in different ways by different persons as contended on behalf of the petitioners, but the said expression should be read subject to the points of reference. If the resolution had simply directed the Committee to inquire into the economics of newspaper industry without specifying the points which should be considered under it there could be some scope for argument that it was not a definite matter. It can-net be denied that the different factors which are to be considered to be inquired into as specified in the terms of reference come under the subject 'economics of newspaper industry'. The main issue is 'economics of newspaper industry' and the points referred to are the sub-issues clarifying the main issue. The contention of the petitioners is that the terms of reference are also vague and idenfinite. This contention will be dealt with subsequently. On the assumption that the terms of reference as contained in paragraph 2 of the resolution are definite matters, it is difficult to accept the contention of the petitioners that the present inquiry into the economics of newspaper industry is not an inquiry on a definite matter. The resolution must be read as a whole and not piecemeal. The economics of newspaper industry may be a wide issue or a subject having a wide amplitude but if taken together with the terms of reference it narrows down to specific points which are definite in character. The terms of reference clearly indicate what 'the Committee has to do. The Committee has not to grope in dark to find out the matters which it would consider for the purpose of inquiry into the economics of newspaper industry. Because of the terms of reference there is no room for any ambiguity as to the matters that are required to be considered or inquired into by the Committee. It is true that in the questionnaire there is no query as to the rehabilitation and modernisation of printing machinery and equipment in the country. The questionnaire has been framed by the Committee and not by 'the Government. It Is for the Committee to decide what evidence it will take and what information it requires for the purpose of its inquiry into the points of reference. The Court cannot take any notice of any omission on the part of the Committee to include in the questionnaire any particular question. The only question which is relevant is whether the matter which has been referred to the Committee is a definite matter. If the matter to be inquired into is a definite matter of public importance, the Court cannot enter into a further inquiry into the propriety or otherwise of the questions framed by the Committee for the purpose of inquiry into the matter directed to be inquired into. I am. therefore, unable to accept the contention of the petitioners that the matter for which the Committee has been set up by the said resolution of the Government, namely, the economics of newspaper industry is not a definite matter.

26. The next question is whether the terms of reference are vague and indefinite. Item (i) of the terms relates to ascertainment of all the elements of the cost of production including distribution to the reader of the daily newspapers and the relative magnitude of these elements in the different categories of newspapers, and item (ii) relates to ascertainment of all the different elements of the total revenue earned by the newspapers and relative magnitude of these elements In the different categories of newspapers. Elements of the cost of production and distribution to the reader and elements of the total revenue earned by the newspapers are quite distinct and definite matters. The petitioners have not also contended that these are not definite matters. Under item (iii) the Committee is to study, under both the above items (i) and (ii), the trends during the past few years and to forecast, to the extent possible, the normal changes likely to occur in the next year or two. As regards item (iii), the complaint of the petitioners is that the number of years during which the trends are to be considered have not been specified, making this item of inquiry vague and indefinite. The Committee is to study the trends under items (i) and (ii) during the past few years. If the matters under items (i) and (ii) are definite matters then the 'trends' in regard to the said matters must necessarily be a definite matter. It is true that the number of years during which the trends are to be studied has not been specified but that does not make the matter, namely, study of trends under items (i), (ii) an indefinite matter. It is for the Committee to consider for how many years the trends are to be considered under item (iii) and the Committee is to forecast, to the extent possible, the normal changes likely to occur in the next year or two. It is said that to forecast is nothing but to speculate and as such it cannot be a definite matter for inquiry. Further, it is argued that there is no indication as to the starting point of 'the next year or two' and that if the same has to be understood with reference to the date of the resolution, namely, April 14, 1972. this item of inquiry has become infructuous in 1974. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that the 'next year or two' has reference to the date when the life of the Committee is extended. In my opinion, both the petitioners and the respondents have taken a very narrow and restricted view of this item. The Committee has to first of all consider Items (i) and (ii) and after they come to the findings on those two items, 'then, they have to forecast the normal changes likely to occur in the next year or two. The forecast will have to be made for the next year or two from the date when the Committee arrives at its findings on Items (i) and (ii). The necessity of making a forecast as to the normal changes will not arise until the Committee makes its findings under Items (i) and (ii) and this, in my opinion, is quite apparent from the terms of reference. I am also unable to accept the contention of the petitioners that the direction to forecast the normal changes is wholly speculative and far less a definite matter. It is not disputed that the Committee cannot only give its findings on the points referred -to it. but it can also make recommendations which involve as element of opinion of the Committee. By the use of the word 'forecast' in Item (iii), the Committee has been simply asked to give its opinion as to the normal changes likely to occur in the next year or two. This opinion will not be arbitrary but it will be the result of the investigation by the Committee on Items (i) and (ii). In my view, there can be no valid objection to the formation of such opinion by 'the Committee based on its findings on Items (ii and (ii). There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of the petitioners that it will be a mere speculation on the part of the Committee to forecast the normal changes like-lv to occur in the next year or two.

27. Much has been said on behalf of the petitioners on the expression 'different categories of newspapers' which occurs in Items (i). (ii) and M of the terms of reference. Counsel for the petitioners argues that these three items of inquiry are rendered vague and indefinite as the categories of newspapers have not been specified and the Committee is also not required to determine the categories. The reply to this contention of the petitioners has been given by the respondent No. 7 in paragraph 7 (d) of its affidavit-in-opposition. It has been stated that the Government's re-

solution only indicates that the Government wants the Committee to study the relative magnitude of the various elements of cost of production, including distribution to the reader, total revenue earned by the newspapers and the effect of restricted supply of newsprint as well as the question of fair price not with reference to different categories of newspapers as a whole clubbed together, but to study various of those factors with reference to different categories of newspapers, it being left to the Committee to determine scientifically in the light of the facts collected and the expert knowledge of the members of the Committee what exactly the different categories should be. Further, it is stated that it was not necessary for the Government without having expert knowledge in the field, to have exactly defined the categories which might later prove inadequate or unsuitable for the conduct of a purposeful study^ It is true that the categories have not been specified but. In my view, the contention of the Respondent No. 7 referred to above seems to be quite reasonable. If the categories are specified by the Government, in that case, the Committee might feel difficulty in the investigation of the matters referred to it. It is clear from the terms of reference that the Committee has to determine the different categories of newspapers. It is not correct to say that the Committee is not required to determine the categories of newspapers, but in my opinion, such determination by the Committee is implied in the terms of reference.

28. As to item (iv). The criticism on behalf of the petitioners is that the said item refers to 'norms' which do not exist but 'they are to be evolved and. as such, it is not a definite matter. I am unable to accept this contention. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, Second Edition, the word 'norm' means standard; pattern; type. For the purpose of evolving norms for different elements of expenditure a definite indication has been given as to the principle which should be the guiding factor of the Committee. It has to be evolved, namely, from the point of view of reasonableness combined with efficiency. Such norms will be evolved by the Committee on the basis of the facts and figures that may be available to it. The norms that will be evolved by the Committee will form part of its recommendation. I do not find any indefiniteness as to item (iv) of the terms of reference.

29. Item (v) includes fixation of fair prices to be charged by newspapers of different categories. Except the contention that the reference of this item without specifying the categories of newspapers and without requiring the Com-

mittee to determine the categories is vague, the petitioners have not challenged the other matters under item (v) as vague or indefinite. It has been found that it would not have been prudent on the part of the Government to specify the categories and that it is implied in the terms of reference that the Committee has to determine and specify the categories. Further, it has been held that the non-specification of the different categories of newspapers has not rendered the terms of reference vague and indefinite. For the reasons aforesaid. I reject the contention of the petitioners that the terms of reference are vague.

30. It has been strenuously urged that the Central Government has acted mala fide and in abuse of its powers in setting up the Committee and in directing that the provisions of the Act other than Sub-section (1) of Section 5 thereof shall apply thereto. It is alleged that the mala fides of the Central Government can be inferred from certain facts. It is said that the Central Government has at all times been hostile to the newspapers that fearlessly and independently express their views and has at all times resented criticism of its policies and exposure of its short-comings and/or failures and/or malpractices. In particular, it is alleged, the Central Government has been hostile to the Statesman and other proprietors of newspapers having a large circulation on a national scale among the educated and intellectual population of India, and has sought to denigrate them by describing them as 'monopolists' and as 'divorced from the people'. Pursuant to the said hostility, the Central Government has continuously sought to enforce a policy of controlling newspapers and curtailing their freedom of speech and expression and making them subservient to the Central Government by inter alia interfering with prices that they may charge, restricting their supplies and use of newsprint, prescribing the number of pages that they may publish, the number of supplements that they may issue, the proportion of space that they may devote to advertisements, and seeking to control the expenses that they may incur, and otherwise putting pressure on proprietors of newspapers that may occasionally be critical of the Central Government and, in particular, on the Statesman. An act of this hostility led to the enactment of the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956 and the making of the Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order 1960 under the said Act, the effect of which was to fix the minimum prices which it was permissible for the larger newspapers to charge. The said Act and the Order were held to be unconstitutional and invalid by the Supreme Court by its judgment delivered in the case of Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India on September 25, 1961, since . The Newsprint Control Order, 1962 passed under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 laying down an Import Control Policy for newsprint from time to time thereunder, has also been criticised as in further pursuance of the said hostile policy. It is alleged that taking advantage of the natural crisis then facing the country as a result of the situation in the then East Pakistan Mr. Rajbahadur, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Shipping and Transport with the assistance of the then Chief Secretary of the Government of West Bengal, supported an agitation started by hawkers against a small increase in the price of newspapers and successively put pressure on the newspaper proprietors in the eastern region, including the Statesman to rescind and cancel the said price increase, ostensibly in the national interest but really with the object of causing loss and detriment to the financial condition of the said newspaper proprietors.

31. It is alleged that the real motives oi the Central Government in setting up the Committee emerged in the course of several interviews and/or conversation between Mr. Irani and Mr. R.C. Dutt, who was then the Secretary to the Central Government in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Mr. Dutt was alleged to have stated that newspapers such as the Statesman were paying excessively high salaries to personnel such as Managing Directors and Editors and also that it was unnecessary for each such newspapers to have separate and independent correspondents in foreign countries and that they ought to share the services of a single correspondent and remunerate such correspondent less It. was suggested by him that such sharing would effect a considerable saving to newspapers and would enable newspapers to work within 10 page ceiling which the Central Government had then imposed.

32. On October 30, 1972. In the case of Bennett Coleman and Co Ltd. , the Supreme Court held that the Central Government's import policy for newsprint for 1972-73 was invalid and unconstitutional and violative of the citizens' right to freedom of speech and expression. As a further act of hostility and mala fide, it is alleged, that notwithstanding the said decision of the Supreme Court, the Central Government issued the said notification dated April 26, 1973. conferring powers on the Committee under the Act.

33. Instances of mala fides against the Statesman that have been alleged are, withholding of advertisements from the Statesman, roving inspections of its books of accounts for three weeks from July 23, 1971. under Section 209(4) of the Companies Act. 1956 and exercise of powers under Section 234(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 by the Registrar of Companies West Bengal with a view to preventing the Statesman from incurring expenditure on travelling expenses and thereby from efficiently gathering news and publishing news and views.

34. After referring to the above allegations made by the petitioners, Mr. Deb submits that there is an attempt to denigrate the newspapers and that it was started with various remarks about the press by persons in authority that they are controlled by monopolists and industrial houses. It is argued that this attempt is being made with the deliberate object of lowering the national press of India- He has referred to the various documents which are mostly correspondence annexed to the writ petition in support of his contention that the hostile attitude of the Government towards the newspapers is amply proved by those documents. He submits that this policy of the Government is there from the beginning, but it has been rejected by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases.

35. I have referred to the allegations of the petitioners in some details as those have been strongly relied on on behalf of the petitioners. The allegations of mala fides of the Central Government may be classified under two heads, namely, (1) mala fides against the newspapers generally and (2) mala fides against the Statesman. Most of the allegations referred to above relate to mala fides of the Central Government against the larger newspapers. The sheet anchor of thp petitioners in this regard is the two decisions of the Supreme Court, In Sakal Paper case the Supreme Court held that Section 3(1) of the Newspaper (Price and Page] Act. 1956 which was the pivotal provision, was unconstitutional, and therefore, the Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order. 1960 made thereunder was also unconstitutional. Section 3(1) was struck down as bad and accordingly nothing remained in the said Act. The effect of the said Act and the said Order was to regulate the number of pages according to price charged, to prescribe the number of supplements to be published and to prohibit the publication and sale of newspapers in contravention of any order made under Section 3 of the said Act. The said Act also provided for regulating by an order under Section 3, the size and area of advertising matter in relation to other matters contained in a newspaper. Penalties were also prescribed for contravention of all or any of the provisions of the said Act or order. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 3(1) infringed the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In Benett Colmen's case, the Newsprint Policy of 1972-73 was held to be violative of Articles 19(1)(a) and 14 of the Constitution. By the said Newsprint Policy restrictic is were sought to be put on the fundamental right of the Press by fixing lO page limit and by other restrictions. I shall have to refer to these decisions of the Supreme Court later in connection with the petitioner's contention of the infringement of their right to freedom of speech and expression. It is contended that the Central Government has been pursuing this policy for the purpose of curtailing the freedom of speech and expression of the newspapers and for making them subservient to the Central Government in spite of the Supreme Court having struck down the restrictions which were sought to be put on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression of the newspapers.

36. It is true that in those two cases, the Supreme Court held that the restrictions were unconstitutional and violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. But can it be said that the restrictions were sought to be put by the Central Government due to any hostility and mala fides against the newspaper industry ? The Government has to lav down its policy from time to time in the interest of and in course of the administration of the country. In order to give effect to the policies of the Government suitable legislations have to be passed by Parliament as also by the State legislatures. These legislations must stand the test of the Constitutional provisions. If any particular provision of a statute contravenes any provision of the Constitution, it will be struck down as void by the Courts. The policies of the Government which are expressed in the shape of legislations are to be considered by the members of Parliament and the State legislatures. Thereafter, the particular legislation or legislations are passed. If Parliament or the State legislatures do not consider any proposed statute or enactment to be in the national interest they may refuse to enact the same. A statute cannot be challenged on the ground that it is the result of a mala fide policy of the Government. I am not aware of any authority which has laid down that a provision of a statute can be struck down on the ground that the policy of the Government behind its enactment is mala fide or hostile. As has been stated already, a provision of a statute can be declared ms unconstitutional and void by Courts jf Law if it contravenes any of the provisions of the Constitution. There are many instances of such pronouncements by the Court? of Law. A particular action taken by the Government against an individual may be held to be mala fide but policy decision of the Government behind the enactment of a statute has nothing to do with the question of mala fides. Such policies cannot be implemented by the Government except through the medium of a statute. Simply because the Supreme Court has struck down the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956 and the Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order, 1960 passed thereunder and the Newsprint Import Policy of 1972-73. it will be unreasonable to infer that the policy of the Government was mala fide or hostile towards the newspaper industry.

37. Article 19(1)(a) confers on the citizens freedom of speech and expression. Article 19(2) provides for imposition of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by Article 19(1)(a). The Supreme Court in those two decisions has held that the restrictions sought to be put by the impugned Acts, and Orders referred to above were not reasonable restrictions. Restrictions which are reasonable may be put on other fundamental rights conferred bv Article 19(1). If in any particular case, the Government decides that reasonable restrictions should be put on the exercise of any fundamental right and thereafter an enactment is made in that regard, it will be too much to say that the decision of the Government or the policy of the Government in that regard is mala fide. The Government may fail in its attempt to put restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights on the ground that they are not reasonable restrictions as contemplated by Sub-clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19, but surely it cannot be said that the policy of the Government in seeking to put restrictions is mala fide or hostile. In my view, the Court will not be in a position to examine or probe into the question what induced the Government to lay down its policy resulting in a particular enactment. Therefore, the said two Supreme Court decisions do not at all help the petitioners in making out their case of mala fides of the Central Government against the newspapers.

38. It is said that the intention of the Government is to denigrate the newspaper proprietors by describing them as monopolists and as divorced from the people. Much reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioners on a letter dated November 17, 1971. of Mr. R.C. Dutt, the Union Secretary of the Ministry o'i Information and Broadcasting, addressed to Mr. Irani. This letter was written bv Mr R.C. Dutt in reply to the letter dated October 13, 1971 of Mr. Irani written to the Prime Minister of India. In this letter. Mr. Irani has complained that for about two years various statements have been made by persons in authority complaining that the Indian press does not reflect what lay in the minds of the people, that there was a monopoly in newspapers, and so forth. Further, a complaint has been made that in a meeting which was convened at Delhi only Mr. Syamlal, Editor, Times of India and Mr. Rangnekar of the Economic Times belonging to the same group and Mr. Ra2-havan of Blitz were invited, but editors of many important periodicals and magazines were not invited. It is alleged that at this meeting the Ministers present including Mrs. Nandini Satpathi, who was then the Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, a document marked 'secret' was discussed which purports not only to set out certain amendments to the Companies Act. but there is a separate note detailing amendment to these proposals, the effect of which would ensure that a free press no longer exists in the country. It is pointed out that Mrs. Satpathi has since said that the secret document was only a 'discussion paper'. In reply to this letter Mr. R.C. Dutt has in his said letter stated inter alia "Government are of opinion that in order to ensure real freedom of the press the dominance of industrial Houses should be ended and ownership of the press made more broad-based." This statement. Counsel for the petitioners submits, shows the attitude of the Government towards the press in India, It is not necessary to refer to the other documents and correspondence all included in Annexure 'F' to the writ petition which have been relied on to prove tha alleged hostility of the Government towards the press. According to the petitioners, the Central Government has been going on the with propaganda 'through persons in authority that tha newspapers are controlled by the monopolists and industrial houses with the deliberate object of lowering the national press of India. This attempt, it is said, is being made and this policy is being followed for the purpose of curbing the freedom, of press to grow in the fashion they like and to make them subservient to the Central Government.

39. Regarding the meeting which was convened in New Delhi in which tha Minister for Information and Broadcasting had participated, the grievance of tha petitioners is that the editors or representatives of principal newspapers were not invited to attend. The meeting, it seems, was an informal one. There is no obligation on the part of the Government to invite the representatives of the principal newspapers in such a meeting. I do not consider that the meeting was held pursuant to any hostile attitude of the Government to the press. The Minister concerned or the department of Informal tion and Broadcasting was entitled to discuss matters with persons according to their own choice. It is clear from the letter of Sri R.C. Dutt that in that meeting no decision had been taken, not even a tentative one about any proposed legislation, and the meeting was not held on a representative basis. It is a mere allegation that in the meeting a document marked 'secret' was discussed. In the letter of Mr. Irani dated October 13, 1971. It is also stated that the Minister concerned described the alleged secret document as only a 'discussion paper'. These allegations, in my opinion, do not support the case of the petitioners about the mala fides or hostility of the Government against the newspapers.

40. Much argument has been made on the statement of Mr. R.C. Dutt that in order to ensure real freedom of the press the dominance of industrial houses should be ended and ownership of the press made more broad-based. This statement relates to the policy of the Government. If the Government thinks that the dominance of the industrial houses should be ended and ownership of the press should be made more broad-based, I fail to understand what bearing has it with the question of mala fides. It appears from the statement of Mr. R.C. Dutt that the real motive of the Government is to ensure freedom of the press. The policy may be good, bad or indifferent but that does not mean that the Government is hostile to the newspapers. It is for Parliament to consider whether or not it should give effect to that policy of the Government. It is too much to say that a Government to whom the people have reposed confidence will try to do harm and injure a national industry, namely the newspaper industry as a whole I do not find any material in that regard. No inference can be drawn against the Government that it supported an agitation started by hawkers against the small increase in the price of newspapers. It is true that due to the intervention of the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Shipping and Transport with the assistance of the then Chief Secretary of West Bengal, the newspaper proprietors were pur-suaded to rescind or cancel the increase in the price of newspapers. There is no evidence before me to suggest that they put pressure upon the newspaper proprietors taking advantage of the national crisis then facing the country as a result of the situation then prevailing in the then East Pakistan.

41. It is argued that the real motive of the Government is to put restriction on expenditure in order to prevent the independent and competitive covering of news and views by the different newspapers and to compel them to depend on official press releases of Government and to lower the standard and quality of reporting and editorials and leading articles and thereby stifle criticism of the Central Government and its policy. Reference has been made on behalf of the petitioners to another statement alleged to have been made by Mr. R.C. Dutt to the effect that the newspaper proprietors should curtail their expenditure by evolving norms of expenditure. No such statement of Mr. R.C. Dutt has been produced before me but an allegation has been made in that regard in paragraph 7 (g) of the writ petition. As evidence thereof, my attention has been drawn to the letter dated June 21, 1973 of Mr. Irani addressed to Dr. Bhabatosh Datta. In this letter, Mr. Irani has inter alia stated as follows:--

"Mr. R.C. Dutt (who held the office of the Secretary at that time) made it clear to us that there were several ways in which newspapers should economise in the context of evolving norms of expenditure. His first suggestion was that senior personnel like Managing Directors and Editors were receiving far too much salary and considerable savings could be effected in this direction. Mr. Dutt was speaking in the context of the impossible situation created by the Government's then decision to restrict the number of pages of the Daily Newspaper to ten.

Mr. Dutt also suggested that it was wasteful for each of the five or six leading Indian newspapers to have their own full time correspondents in a place like London for example, and he wanted to know why it was not feasible to economise by 'these newspapers sharing the services of one correspondent." The respondent No. 7 in its affidavit-in-opposition has not admitted the petitioners' account of the alleged conversation between Mr. Irani and Mr. R.C. Dutt. It is stated that the alleged conversation does not form part of any official record and as such no admission can be made of the same. On behalf of the respondents. Mr. Banerjee submits that the alleged statement which has been recorded in the letter of Mr. Irani is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be taken any notice of. Mr. Deb, on the other hand, submits that Mr. R.C. Dutt not having denied the said allegation by an affidavit his statement as recorded in the letter of Mr. Irani should be taken to have been admitted by the respondents. Decisions have been cited on both sides on the question as to the admissibility of the said alleged statement of Mr. K.C. Dutt I do not think, however, that it is necessary to decide whether the statement is admissible as a piece of evidence or not I may proceed on the assumption that the statement alleged to have been made by Mr. R.C. Dutt is his statement. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the statement of Mr. R.C. Dutt relates to the policy of the Government. The alleged statement of Mr. R.C. Dutt is on the point of evolving norms of expenditure. The suggestion which, he is alleged to have made, is one of the several ways in which newspapers may economise in the context of evolving norms. It was, therefore, a mere suggestion made by Mr. R.C. Dutt which is clear from the letter of Mr. Irani. It also seems to me that it was his personal suggestion. There is nothing in the letter of Mr. Irani to show that Mr. R.C. Dutt told him that the Government also thinks on that line or that the Government has set up the Committee for the purpose as suggested by Mr. R.C. Dutt. It was a mere proposal made by Mr. R.C. Dutt in the context of evolving norms of expenditure. One of the points referred to the Committee is to evolve norms of expenditure. In the terms of reference, the points which have been referred to by the Government are general in character. It is for the Committee to evolve norms of expenditure and the Committee will do the same independent of the said suggestion of Mr. R.C. Dutt. Even assuming that it is also the views of the Government, the Committee is not bound by the same when it will have to decide independently and impartially on the evidence and materials that may be made available to it. In my opinion, nothing turns out on the said statement made by Mr. R.C. Dutt as recorded ir. The letter of Mr. Irani. This also does not prove any mala fide or hostility of the Government against the larger newspapers.

42. Dealing with the question of mala fides of the Government, it is necessary to refer, to certain facts which are significant. It has been stated already that the Statesman also submitted a memorandum to the Committee. Neither in the said memorandum or in the letter dated June 21, 1973 of Mr. Irani which has been relied on by the petitioners as a letter demanding justice, there is any allegation that the Government is hostile to the newspapers or that it is proceeding mala fide against them. For the first time in the writ petition, the hostility and mala fides of the Central Government have been alleged. In this connection, it may be stated also that many other newspapers have participated in the inquiry and there is no allegation that they also think that the Government has adopted a hostile policy towards them or has been proceeding mala fide against them by setting up the Committee. The petitioners have moved this Court after the Committee was conferred with the powers under the Act. If no such powers had been conferred on the Committee, in that case, the petitioners could not have made any complaint whatsoever. The Government could have, on the basis of the findings and recommendations of such a Committee not having powers under the Act, considered the introduction of a Bill in Parliament. Even with the help or assistance of the findings and recommendations of such a Committee, the Government could pass a legislation regarding the newspaper industry. In that case, the only consideration would be whether any particular provisions of the statute or the Statute as a whole is ultra vires the Constitution as interfering with the fundamental right of the press to freedom of speech and expression. There could be no scope for agitating hostility and mala fides on the part of the Government. I fail to understand what difference does it make between a Committee which is not conferred with the powers under the Act and a Committee which has been 50 conferred with such powers

43. Now I may consider the alletions of the petitioners as to the hostility and mala fides of the Government against the Statesman. I have already referred to the instances which, according to the petitioners, prove such hostility and mala fides of the Government. It may be mentioned here, that the Registrar of Companies in exercise of its power under the Companies Act, 1956 caused inspection of the books of accounts of the Statesman. He also inquired by his letter dated January 8, 1970. as to the expenses made in connection with its Managing Director's visit to New Delhi. It is argued that no such inquiry could be made by the Registrar of Companies under Section 234(1) of the Companies Act, 1956. Further, it is alleged that a discrimination has been made against the Statesman in the distribution of advertisements by the Directorate of Advertising and Visual Publicity. Government of India (hereinafter referred to as DAVP). Reference has been made on behalf of the petitioners to a letter dated September 24. 1971, of Mr. Irani to the Director. DAVP. It is stated in that letter that DAVP had consistently cut down its releases to the Statesman in the recent past. The letter also contains a list of DAVP advertisements which had appeared in other metropolitan English newspapers but not in the Statesman. It is also alleged that the Union Public Service Commission's advertisements had also been excluded in the previous two months from the Calcutta edition of the Statesman. From these facts, it is contended that the Government sought to put pressure on the Statesman in particular, pursuant to its hostile attitude to the larger newspapers. It is very difficult to accept such contention. There is no reason why Government will select the Statesman for the purpose of making it a victim of its alleged hostility against newspapers. The instances which have been given on behalf of the petitioners as referred to above, do not at all support the contention of the petitioners. The Registrar of Companies may not have acted in accordance with the provisions of the statute and the DAVP may not have acted in accordance with the Government's advertising policy, but these lapses cannot be construed as due to the hostile attitude of the Government to the Statesman in particular, for the purpose of curbing its freedom in the matter of publication of news and views. It has been denied on behalf of the respondent No. 7 that the DAVP had made any discriminatory treatment to the Statesman in the matter of publication of advertisements. I have given my best consideration to the allegations of the petitioners as to the hostility of the Government against larger newspapers and in particular to the Statesman, but I am unable to accept the said allegations. I hold that the Government had not acted mala fide in setting up the Committee nor is the policy of the Government in setting up the Committee is hostile towards the newspapers. The petitioners have utterly failed to prove the allegations in this regard.

44. Next it has been alleged that Mr. K.C. Raman one of the members of the Committee has a bias against the Statesman and as such the deliberations of the Committee will likely to prejudice the petitioners. K.C. Raman was the Government Director of Indian National Press Limited for a period of six months from January 15, 1972. He was, therefore, such a Director on the day the Committee was constituted. On November 15, 1972, while he continued as a member of the Committee, he was appointed a Director of Associated Journals Ltd., Lucknow, which is the proprietor and/or publisher of the National Herald. He is still a Director thereof. These facts are not denied by the respondents. The complaint of the petitioners is that the aforesaid newspapers are competitors of the Statesman and they hold and express views on public matters that are divergent from those of the petitioners, and as such the petitioners cannot expect a fair treatment from the Committee of which the said K.C. Raman is a member.

45. It is a cardinal principle of natural justice that a person must not be a judge in his own cause. In Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Sri Satyanarayana Transport (Private) Ltd., , the Supreme Court has held that it is an elementary rule of natural justice that a person who tries a case should be able to deal with the matter before him objectively, fairly and impartially; if he has a pecuniary interest (in the case) brought before him, or is hostile to a party whose case he is called upon to try, that would introduce the infirmity of bias and would disqualify him from trying the case. These principles of natural justice which are the essence of all judicial and quasi-judicial decisions, have been made applicable to administrative acts as well. Thus in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India. , the Supreme Court observes:

"Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should not be made applicable to administrative enquiries."

This view has been expressed in Re Per-gamon Press Ltd., (1970) 3 All ER 535. The facts of that case are in brief that in June, 1964, an American Corporation called 'Leasco' made a take-over bid for the shares of Pergamon Press Ltd. They bought many of the shares and made an offer to buy the rest, but on August 21, 1969. They withdrew the offer. The Board of Trade ordered an investigation under Section 165(b) of the Companies Act, 1948 and appointed two inspectors. It was contended that whenever the inspectors thought of deciding a conflict of evidence or of making adverse criticism of someone, they should draft the proposed passage of their report and put it before the party for his comments before including it. In repelling the said contention Lord Denning, M.R. observed:

"They must be masters of their own procedure. They should be subject to no rules save this: they must be fair." Again in that case. Sachs, L. J.. observed as follows:

"The nature of the proceeding, the purposes for which the reports may be used, the matter which may be found in them and the extent of the publication be respectively as described, it seems to me, * * * * very clear that in the conduct of the proceedings there must be displayed that measure of natural justice which Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin. (1964) AC 40 described as insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as fair procedure in particular circumstances'. To come to that conclusion it is, as recent decisions have shown, not necessary to label the proceedings 'judicial', 'quasi-judicial', 'administrative' or 'investiga-

tory'; it is the characteristics of 'the proceedings that matter, not the precise compartment or compartments into which they fall and one of the principal characteristics of the proceedings under consideration is to be found in the inspectors' duty, in their Statutory fact-finding capacity, to produce a report which may be made public and may thus cause severe injury to an individual by its findings."

46. Relying on the above decisions it is argued by Mr. Deb that it ma'tters very little whether the Committee is a judicial, quasi-judicial or an administrative body, but what matters is that it has to observe the rules of natural justice. He submits that if it is found that K.C. Raman entertains a bias against the Statesman, in that case, it cannot be expected that there will be a fair and impartial inquiry by the Committee of which K.C. Raman is a member,

47. There cannot be any doubt, and it seems to be the concensus of judicial opinion both in this country as well as England, that rules of 'fair play in action1 must be observed by all authorities, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. The question to be considered in this regard is whether K.C. Raman has a bias against the Statesman. K.C. Raman was for some time a Government Director of the Indian National Press Ltd. proprietors and/or publishers of the Free Press group of newspapers. He is a Director of Associated Journals Ltd., Lucknow, which is the proprietor and/or publisher of the National Herald. It is alleged by the petitioners that the aforesaid newspapers are competitors of the Statesman and they also hold and express views on public matters that are divergent from tho.se of the petitioners. In considering this question, it must not be lost sight of that the inquiry that will be made by the Committee is not with regard to any particular newspaper but it relates to the newspaper industry. Even assuming but not deciding that the newspapers with which K.C. Raman is connected hold and express views different from the Statesman, it does not necessarily follow that he has a bias against the Statesman. It is difficult to accept the contention of the petitioners that he will influence the other members of the Committee against all the newspapers including the newspapers with which he is himself concerned. Finding this difficulty, Mr. Deb submits that at least he will try to persuade the other members of the Committee to come to findings and to make recommendations on the points of inquiry which will be favourable to the newspapers with which he is concerned. This apprehension on the part of the petitioners is farfetched and there is no material or evidence which can be said to justify such an extreme contention. After the argu-

ment of Mr. Banerjee, Mr. Deb in his reply takes a completely new point and makes an extreme contention that in view of the fact that there has been a joint representation on behalf of the Committee and its members and the Central Government, it must be inferred that not only K.C. Raman but also the Committee itself is biased against the petitioners. He argues that the Committee and its members have identified themselves with the views and submissions of the Government which prove that it is not only the hostility of the Government towards the larger newspaper proprietors but also the Committee is equally hostile and biased against them and the Statesman.

48. It appears that the respondents have appeared in the Rule 'through the same Advocate. Two Vakalatnamas were filed, one on behalf of the respondents Nos. 3 to 6 and the other on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 7 by the same Advocate. Two separate affidavits-in-oppositions have been filed, one on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 to 6 and the other on behalf of the respondent No. 7, the Union of India. One set of argument has been made on behalf of the respondents by Mr. Banerjee. In my opinion, it would have been better for the Committee and its members who are respondents Nos. 1 to 6 to appear separately and not jointly with the respondent No. 7. But in my opinion, such joint appearance of the respondents Nos. 1 to 6 with the respondent No. 7 and also joint submissions on their behalf by one Counsel does not necessarily raise any presumption that the respondents Nos. 1 to 6 are also guilty of the alleged hostility and mala fides with which the respondent No. 7, the Central Government has been charged by the petitioners, nor can it be inferred that all the members of the Committee entertain a bias against the petitioners or the larger newspapers. The affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents Nos. 1 to 6 does not at all indicate that the respondents Nos. 1 to 6 have identified themselves with the respondent No. 7, the Central Government. Mr. Banerjee in his argument has not referred to this affidavit of the respondents Nos. 1 to 6. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Deb that because of the joint representation and joint submissions made on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 to 7, it should be presumed that the respondents Nos. 1 to 6 also are biased against the larger newspapers and particularly against the Statesman. Moreover, as I have held that the petitioners have failed 'to prove the alleged hostility and mala fides of the Central Government against the larger newspapers or against the Statesman, such joint representation and joint submissions have become irrelevant and immaterial.

49. While I am on this point of mala fides and bias. I may notice the contention of the respondents that the necessity of such an inauiry was felt by the members of Parliament and, as such, it will be incorrect to say that it was sponsored purely at the dictates or whims of the Government and its officers. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents on the debates which had taken place in Parliament on the Newspapers (Price Control Bill, 1971. which was subsequently enacted. It is not necessary for me to refer to these debates in connection- with the question of the alleged hostility and bias of the executives, but I may refer to one such debates subsequently in connection with the contention of the petitioners on the question as to the fixation of fair prices of newspapers.

50. The next point is somewhat important as it relates to the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression of the press. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Committee has been set up in the background of certain types of restrictions on newspapers including 10 page restriction in the matter of fixation of price referred to in the case of Benett Coleman and that this is the object will appear from Clause (13) of the first page of the printed questionnaire. This is also confirmed by the statement of Mr. R.C. Dutt which has been recorded in the said letter of Mr. Irani and also in paragraph 7 (g) of the writ petition. Counsel argues that the finding of the Committee as to fair prices will be futile because price of newspapers cannot be fixed by the Government; by such fixation it will be interfering with the freedom of speech and expression of the Press within the meaning of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It is said that as the cost charged to a reader includes no element of profit, the question of fair price to a reader cannot arise as the price can never be unfair. So far as the price to the newspapers is concerned, it is argued, the question as to the price being fair to the newspaper is wholly irrelevant as the price is fixed by the newspapers. In this connection, it is said, a question arises why such an irrelevant inquiry. It is contended that the only answer is that there is some indirect or oblique motive behind the setting up of the Committee. That motive, according to the petitioners is the rnala fide intention of the Government to curb the freedom of the press and bring it under the control of the Government and make it subservient.

51. As regards the contention that there is an oblique motive behind the setting up of the Committee, it is not neces-

sary for me to deal with the same over again in connection with this point relating to fixation of fair price of newspapers, for I have already discussed and dealt with the allegations and contentions of the petitioners in this regard and I have found that the Committee has not been set up by the Government with any mala fide intention or any hostility against the newspapers or against the Statesman.

52. In this connection, a fuither argument made on behalf of the petitioners may be noticed. It is contended that the only object of the Government is to fix the price of newspapers. A reference has been made on behalf of the petitioners to a statement made by Mrs. Nandini Satpathy in Parliament on April 3, 1972, in connection with the debate on the Newspapers (Price Controll Bill. 1971. It was inter alia stated by her as follows-

"After that also, we had discussions with the different newspaper editors and others and we tried to bring it to their notice that this sort of ad hoc increase in prices was not proper. That is why Government decided to set up a Committee which will go into the economics of newspapers so that the entire thing can be assessed and we can have a definite policy on this matter. So, we had our discussion with the newspaper people".

(See Raiva Sabha Debates. Vol. 79. pages 174-175) The plain meaning of the statement of Mrs. Nandini Satpathy referred to above, is that the Government did not approve of the ad hoc increase in the price of newspapers. The Government wants to decide its policy on the basis of the findings of the Committee on the economics of the newspapers. From this statement, it cannot be said that the object of the Government in setting up the Committee is only to fix the price of newspapers,

53. Now coming to the more important question as to whether by directing the Committee to record its findings in regard to the fair prices to be charged by newspapers of different categories, the Government has sought to infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioners to freedom of speech and expression. In Sakal Paper's case , the validity of Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956 and the Daily Newspaper (Price and Pagel Order, 1960 made thereunder, were challenged as ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It has been already stated, that the effect of the impugned Act and Order was to regulate the number of pages according to price charged, to prescribe the number of supplements to be published and to prohibit the publication and sale of newspapers in contravention of any order made under Section 3 of the Act. The Act also provided for regulating by an order under Section 3, the size and area of advertising matter in relation to other matters contained in a newspaper. Penalties were also prescribed for contravention of the provisions of the Act or Order. Mudhol-kar, J., who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court observed as follows:--

"A bare perusal of the Act and the order thus makes it abundantly clear that the right of a newspaper to publish news and views and to utilise as many pages as it likes for that purpose is made to depend upon the price charged to the readers. Prior to promulgation of the Order every newspaper was free to charge whatever price it cho.se. and thus had a light unhampered by State regulation to publish news and views. This liberty is obviously interfered with by the Order which provide for the maximum number of puses for the particular price charged. The question is whether this amounts to any abridgement of the right of a newspaper to freedom of expression. Our Constitution does not expressly provide for the freedom of press but it has been held by this Court that this freedom is included in "freedom of speech and expression" guaranteed by clause (1) fa) of Article 19. See Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi. . This freedom is not absolute for, clause (2) of Article 1!) permits restrictions being placed upon it in certain circumstances. That clause runs thus:

"Nothing in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) shall affect the opi.-ra1iun of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relation with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence."

"It is not claimed on behalf of the State that either the Act or the Order made thereunder can be justified by any of the circumstances set out in this clause. The right to propagate one's ideas is inherent in the conception of freedom of speech and expression. For the purpose of propagating his ideas every citizen has a right to publish them to disseminate them and to circulate them. He is entitled to do so either by word of mouth or by writing. The right guaranteed thus extends, subject to any law competent under Article 19(2), not merely to the matter which he is entitled to circulate, but also to the volume of circulation. In other words, the citizen is entitled to propagate his views and reach any class and number of readers as he chooses subject of course to the limitations permissible under a law competent under Article 19(2). It cannot be gainsaid that the impugned Order seeks to place a restraint on the latter aspect of the right by prescribing a price page schedule. We may add that the fixation of a minimum price in the number of pages which a newspaper is entitled to publish is obviously not for ensuring a reasonable price to the buyers of newspapers but for the expressly cutting down a volume of circulation of some newspapers by making the price so unattractively high for a class of its readers as is likely to deter it from purchasing such newspapers."

54. In Bennett Coleman's case referred to above, validity ot sub-clauses (3) and (3-A) of clause (3) of the Newsprint Control Order, 1962 and the provisions of the Newsprint Import Control Policy for 1972-73 were challenged. In the Newsprint Policy, the following provisions were made: --

(1) Fixation of basic entitlement for newspapers whose actual number of pages was more than 10 during 1970-71 or 1971-72 on the basis of-

(i) an average of 10 pages, and

(ii) either the average circulation in 1970-71 or admissible circulation in 1971-72 plus increases admissible under the Policy of 1971-72 whichever is more;

(2) (i) Reduction in increases from 5 per cent, to 3 per cent, for dailies with circulation of more than 1 lakh; and giving of 20 per cent, increase to daily newspapers in the number of pages within ceiling of 10 pages provided this increase is not utilised for the increase of circulation.

(ii) Prohibition to increase the number of pages, page-area and periodicity by reducing circulation within the authorised quota but they are permitted to reduce the number of pages, page area and periodicity for increasing circulation.

(3) (i) Prohibition to use the newsprint quota of one newspaper/periodical for the other news paper/periodical in the case of newspapers/periodicals belonging to the Common Ownership Unit

(ii) Prohibition to start a new newspaper/periodical by the Common Ownership Unit from their authorised quota.

(4) Denial of newsprint quota to:

(i) An existing newspaper belongs to Common Ownership Unit which had not been granted newsprint quota; and

(ii) additional newspapers sponsored or acquired by a Common Ownership Unit;

(5) Prohibition to use white printing paper by the newspapers which have been allotted newsprint.

These restrictions have been held by the majority in the Bennett Coleman's case as ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. On behalf of the petitioners, reliance has been placed on certain passages from the judgment of A.N. Ray, J. (as he then was), who delivered the majority judgment. In paragraph 43 of the Report it was observed as follows:--

"The various provisions of the newsprint import policy have been examined to indicate as to how the petitioners' fundamental rights have been infringed by the restrictions on page limit, prohibition against new newspapers and the new editions. The effect and consequence of the impugned policy upon the newspapers is directly controlling the growth and circulation of newspapers. The direct effect is the restriction upon circulation of newspapers. The direct effect is upon growth of newsprint through pages. The direct effect is that newsprint are deprived of their area of advertisement. The direct effect is that they are exposed to financial loss. The direct effect is that freedom of speech and expression is infringed."

In paragraph 81 of the Report it was observed:

"In the present case, it cannot be said that the newsprint policy is a reasonable restriction within the ambit of Article 19(2). The Newsprint policy abridges the fundamental rights of the petitioners in regard to freedom of speech and expression. The newspapers are not allowed their right of circulation. The newspapers are not allowed right of page growth. The common ownership, units of newspapers cannot bring out new papers or new editions. The newspapers operating above 10 page level and newspapers operating below 10 page level have been treated equally for assessing the needs and requirements of newspapers with newspapers which are not their equal. Once the quota is fixed and the direction to use the quota in accordance with the newsprint policy is made applicable the big newspapers are prevented anv increase in page number. Both page numbers and circulation are relevant for calculating the basic quota and allowance for increases. In the garb of distribution of newsprint the Government has tended to control the growth and circulation of newspapers. Freedom of the press is both qualitative and quantitative. Freedom lies both in circulation and in content. The newsprint policy which permits newspapers to increase circulation by reducing the number of pages, page area and periodicity, prohibits them to increase number of pages, page area and periodicity by reducing circulation. These restrictions constrict the newspapers in adjusting their page number and circulation."

Dealing with the contention made on behalf of the Government that there should be an uninhibited market place of idea in which truth will ultimately prevail and there should not be monopolization of that market whether it be by the Government itself or by a private licensee, A.N. Ray, J., observed as follows in paragraph 82 of the Report:---

"The press is not exposed to any mischief of monopolistic combination. The newsprint policy is not a measure to combat monopolies. The newsprint policy should allow the newspapers that amount of freedom of discussion and information which is needed or will appropriately enable the members of the society to preserve their political expression of comment not only upon public affairs but also upon the vast range of views and matters needed for free society."

55. It has been already stated, that the case of the petitioners is that the selling price of newspaper contains no element of profit whatsoever. The larger the sale of the newspaper, the larger the loss it has to bear. The only reason why newspapers of all kinds continue to seek additional circulation is the authority and prestige that widespread readership commanded. It is also a fact that increase in circulation alone will lead to an increase in the advertisement rates and advertisements are the only remunerative part of a newspaper company's operations. Any attempt 1o lay down sale prices of daily newspapers which are based on a fine balance between revenues derived from advertisements and their sales to meet the total production and distribution cost will have adverse effects on the finances of daily newspapers. It is contended that if the sale price is lowered, the newspapers will suffer further loss and in case the sale price is enhanced, in that case, also the newspapers will suffer loss inasmuch as the circulation will be greatly affected and there will be less advertisements. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that this attempt to fix the price of newspapers is an attempt to infringe the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

56. On behalf of the respondents Mr. Banerjee has strenuously urged that at this stage it is most unreasonable to say that the freedom of the press has been sought to be infringed by the setting up of the Committee. The Committee will make its findings and recommendations and thereafter the Government will consider the said findings and recommendations. If the Government approves of the same, it may give effect to the findings and the recommendations by passing a suitable legislation in that regard. It is argued that the Government may not accept the findings and recommendations of the Committee. According to Mr. Baneriee. The contentions of the petitioners are based on mere surmise, conjectures and speculations. He submits that it 13 the shape of the legislation which may ultimately be passed bv Parliament that will be a criterion for considering whether the petitioners' fundamental rights have been abridged. It is contended that the Committee is not the final authority and its findings and recommendations have no binding force whatsoever. In both the aforesaid Supreme Court cases what was challenged was the specific provisions of a statute or an Order passed under a statute. But in the present case, there is no enactment and it is not known whether any enactment will be passed in future on, 'the basis of the findings and recommendations of the Committee. It is said that the Committee has been appointed by the Central Government for the information of its own mind, as observed by the Privy Council in Maharaja Madhava Singh, v. Secy, of State, (1904) ILR 32 Cal 1 (PC) that "it is sufficient to say that the Commission in question was one appointed by the Viceroy himself for the information of his own mind, in order that he should not act in his political and sovereign character otherwise than in accordance with the dictates of justice and equity. ......"

The ob.iect for the appointment of the Committee is for "a more broad-based ownership of the press". It is urged that the first petitioner, namely, the Statesman which is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 cannot claim to have any fundamental right under the Constitution and as such there is no question of violation of the fundamental rights of the Statesman. In his argument Mr. Banerjee has sought to make out an alternative case on behalf of the respondents that even assuming that the inquiry into the question of fixation of fair price of newspapers seeks to abridge their fundamental rights, it is protected by Article 31-C of the Constitution.

57. I may, first of all, consider the alternative case of the respondents. Article 31-C of the Constitution provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14. Article 19 or Article 31; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy. Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 are as follows:--

'The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing-

(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common goods;

(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment." I am not impressed with the argument of Mr. Banerjee that Article 31-C applies to the facts and circumstances of the case. The object for the appointment of the Committee is not for an inquiry as to ownership and control of the material resources of the community nor does it relate to concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment as a result of the operation of the economic system. This Article, therefore, does not apply.

58. Now I may consider the contention of the respondents that the Statesman being a Company has no fundamental rights and as such the question of infringement of its fundamental rights does not arise. In paragraph 7 (e) of the writ petition it has been stated that the setting up of the Committee is in violation of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression of the second petitioner and the editor, assistant edidors, correspondents and readers of the Statesman. The second petitioner. Mr. Irani is the Managing Director of the Statesman. It is true that the Statesman being a Company has no fundamental rights, but Mr. Irani being a share-holder of the Company has undoubtedly, the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19(1) of the Constitution. A similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Bennett Coleman's case . It has been held by the Supreme Court that the fundamental rights of the share-holders as citizens are not lost when they associate to form a company. When their fundamental rights as share-holders are impaired by the State action their rights as share-holders are protected. The reason is that the share-holders rights are equally and necessarily affected if the rights of the Company are affected. Further, it has been held that the rights of share-holders with regard to Article 19(1)(a) are projected and manifested by the newspapers owned and controlled by the share-holders through the mdium of the corporation. The individual rights of freedom of speech and expression of editors, directors, and share-holders are all exercised through their newspapers through which they speak. The press reaches the public through the newspapers. The share-holders speak through their editors. The fact that the Compa-

nies are the petitioners does not prevent the Supreme Court from giving relief to the share-holders, editors and printers who have asked for protection of their fundamental rights by reason of the effect of the law and of the executive action upon their rights. These principles laid down by the Supreme Court also apply to the present case. The second petitioner, Mr. Irani, who is admittedly a share-holder of the Statesman can claim redress in this Court for the violation of his fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression and the presence of the 'Statesman will not be a bar.

59. In Sakal Paper's case. by the impugned Act and the Order, the number of pages according to the price charged was sought to be regulated, as a result of which there would have been diminution of advertisement revenue of newspapers. The right of a newspaper to publish news and views and to utilise as many pages as it likes for that purpose was made to depend upon the price charged to the readers. The newspapers were to charge a a particular price for a particular number of pages. This was considered as interfering with the right of a newspaper to propagate its news and views. If number of pages is restricted and made to depend upon the price to be charged in that case, the right of the newspapers to freedom of speech and expression is infringed. In the instant case, however, assuming that the only object of the Government for setting up the Committee is to fix the fair price of the newspapers, in my view, there is no question of interference with the fundamental rights of the newspapers. The Government has directed the Committee to make its recommendations as to fair price to be charged by newspapers according to their categories. In this connection, it may be stated that Clause (131 of the explanatory notes to the questionnaire requiring that the estimates for 1972-1973 and 1974 may be made with reference to 10 page restriction imposed by Government with effect from January 1, 1972 so as to bring out clearly the effect of such a policy on costs/revenues, has been deleted by the Chairman of the Committee after the delivery of the judgment by the Supreme Court in Bennett Coleman's case . In Sakal Paper's case, it was not merely that the sale price of the newspaper was fixed, but it was fixed with reference to the number of pages to be used; the restriction was to the number of pages. In Bennett Coleman's case also the principal restriction was as to the number of pastes., namely, the fixation of 10 page limit. In. The instant case, however, no such restriction is contemplated. There can be no doubt that the circulation of newspapers will greatly de-

pend upon the price charged for it. as contended on behalf of the petitioners. The Committee is only to make a finding as to the fair price. Fair price is a price which is fair to all, that is, to the newspapers as also to the readers. As soon as it is held that a price charged is a fair price, it cannot have any unfair or adverse effect on anybody. The newspaper proprietors cannot also claim that they are entitled to charge a price which is not fair, but unfair to the readers. If, however, the price is not considered to be fair, it may affect both the newspapers as also the readers. Whether the price which has to be fixed is fair or not is a matter to be considered after it is fixed.

60. There is much substance in the contention of Mr. Banerjee that notning has happened as yet which threatens the interference of the fundamental rights of the share-holders, editors, printers etc. of the Statesman. The complaint of the petitioners is that fixation of fair price of newspapers will affect their fundamental rights. I have already dealt with the question as to the fixation of fair price with reference to the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court. On the assumption that fixation of fair price of newspapers will affect the fundamental rights of the shareholders, editors, readers and printers of the Statesman, we are to consider whether the petitioners are in imminent danger of invasion of their fundamental rights. The petitioners proceed on the assumption that the Government is determined to fix the price of newspapers. Such assumption on the part of the petitioners is without any foundation. Fixation of price of newspapers will not be made by the Government, but it will be made by Parliament by enacting a legislation in that regard. After the findings and recommendations of the Committee are made, the Government will consider whether it will accept the game or not. If the Government does not accept the same there is an end of the matter. If, however, the Government thinks that some steps have to be taken on the basis of the findings and recommendations of the Committee, the Government will have to take steps for the purpose of having a legislation passed in that regard. After the legislation is passed then the stage will come for considering whether the legislation has any adverse effect on the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression of Citizens including the share-holders, editors, readers, printers etc. It is impossible to predict at this stage what would be the type of such a legislation. Mr. Banerjee has rightly contended that the question of fundamental rights will depend upon the shape of the legislation if passed. In my opinion, the apprehension of the petitioners as to invasion of their fundamental rights is without any basis whatsoever. There is no threat to the invasion of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression of the petitioners. The contentions of the petitioners in this regard are accordingly rejected.

61. It is the case of the petitioners that the Government is going on with the propaganda that the newspapers are being controlled by monopolists and industrial houses. The respondents have also alleged that the newspapers should be got rid of monopolistic combines and the influence of industrial houses and that the object for the setting up of the Committee is to make the ownership of the press more broad-based. It is not for this Court to consider the truth or otherwise of the allegations of these kinds. The measure which, if ultimately taken by the Government on the basis of the findings and recommendations of the Committee, will decide whether the same are directed to get rid of monopolies. Before such measures are actually taken in the shape of legislation, it is difficult to say at this stage whether that will be directed towards the curtailment of the freedom of speech and expression of the newspapers. One of the grounds for striking down the provisions of the Newsprint Import Policy for 1972-73 as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Ben-netl Coleman's case is that the newsprint policy is not a measure to combat monopolies, as argued by the Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the Government. Thus it will be quite premature to say with any amount of certitude that the fundamental rights of the petitioners are going to be abridged as the Committee has been asked to consider the fixation of fair price.

62. It is said on behalf of the petitioners that the object of the Government has not been specifically stated in their affidavit-in-opposition. It is contended that when the petitioners have challenged the setting up of the Committee as mala fide, it was incumbent upon the State to state the actual purpose for which it has been set up. The purpose which has been alleged in the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent No. 7, is that it has been set up for the policy decisions of the Government. This purpose, as stated in paragraph 7, is alleged by the petitioners to be vague and quite insufficient. Reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in P.V. Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa, , where it has been held that the purpose for which a Commission of Inquiry is appointed under the Act must be a lawful purpose, namely, for some future Government action or legislative policy. Further, it has been laid down that if a statutory authority exercises its powers for a purpose not authorised by the law the action of the statutory authority is ultra vires and without jurisdiction; in other words, it is a mala fide exercise of power in the eye of law, i.e.. an exercise of power bv a statutory authority for a purpose other than that which the legislature intended. But where the purpose includes both an authorised purpose and an unauthorised purpose the proper test to be applied is what is the dominant purpose for which the administrative power has been exercised. If the administrative authority pursues two or more purposes of which one is authorised and the other unauthorised, the legality of the administrative act should be determined by reference to the dominant purpose. The purpose which has been disclosed in the present case is to make policy decisions of the Government on the subject That this is the purpose will also appear from the statement of Mrs. Nandini Sat-pathy in Parliament which has been already referred to above. The purpose is, therefore, a lawful purpose or an authorised purpose and not an unauthorised purpose. I have already rejected the contention of the petitioners that the Committee has been set up mala fide and in pursuance of the hostile policy of the Government towards newspapers and also towards the petitioners. As the purpose is one and the same the question of finding out the dominant purpose does not arise.

63. On behalf of the petitioners, it is argued that the appointment of the Committee for the fixation of fair price is not permissible under the provisions of Section 5 of the Newspapers (Price Control) Act. 1972. The life of this Act will expire in May. 1974. It is not disputed that this Act has not been given effect to by the Government. Mr. Banerjee also states that the Government has no intention to give effect to this Act. Mr. Deb submits that whether the Government has given effect to this Act or not, the same being still alive it is to be considered whether the action of the Government in setting up the Committee is contrary to the provisions of this Act, It is true that this Act is still alive, but at the same time when it has not been enforced and when the policy of the Government is not to enforce the same before its expiry. I am of the view that this Act is, for all practical purposes, a dead Act. Before a contention that an executive action is contrary to and is violative of the provisions of a statute can be entertained it must be shown that the statute is operative. Accordingly, I reject this contention made on behalf of the petitioners.

64. Lastly, it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the powers under Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the Act have not been validly conferred on the Committee and, as such, the Committee has no authority to direct the Statesman to answer the questionnaire. By the notification dated April 26, 1973, the Central Government in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 11 of the Act directed that all the provisions of the Act other than the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 thereof shall apply to the Committee. Section 11 provides as follows:--

"Where any authority (by whatever name called), other than a Commission appointed under Section 3, has been or is, set up under any resolution or order of the appropriate Government for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and that Government is of opinion that all or any of the provisions of this Act should be made applicable to that authority, that Government may, subject to prohibition contained in the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 3. by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that the said provisions of this Act shall apply to that authority, and on the issue of such a notification that authority shall be deemed to be a Commission appointed under Section 3 for the purposes of this Act"

Section 5 runs as follows:--

"5 (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that, having regard to the nature of the inquiry to be made and other circumstances of the case, all or any of the provisions of Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3) or Sub-section (4) or Sub-section (5) should be made applicable to a Commission, the appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that all or such of the said provisions as may be specified in the notification shall apply to that Commission and on the issue of such a notification, the said provisions shall apply accordingly.

(2) The Commission shall have power to require any person, subject to any privilege which may be claimed by that person under any law for the time being in force, to furnish information on such points or matters as, in the opinion of the Commission, may be useful for, or relevant to, the subject-matter of the inquiry and any person so required shall be deemed to be legally bound to furnish such information within the meaning of Section 176 and Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code.

(3) The Commission or any officer, not below the rank of a gazetted officer, specially authorised in this behalf by the Commission may enter any building or place where the Commission has reason to believe that any books of account or other documents relating to the subject-matter of the inquiry may be found, and may seize any such books of account or documents or take extracts or copies therefrom, subject to the provisions of Section 102 and Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in so far as they may be applicable.

(4) The Commission shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and when any offence as is described in Section 175, Section 178, Section 179. Section 180 or Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code is committed in the view or presence of the Commission, the Commission may, after recording the facts, constituting the offence and the statement of the accused as provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, forward the case to a magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same and the magistrate to whom any such case is forwarded shall proceed to hear the complaint against the accused as if the case had been forwarded to him under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

(5) Any proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code."

65. The Committee was not set up under Section 3 of the Act. To start with, it was only a Fact Finding Committee without any powers under the Act. Section 11 authorises the Government to direct that all or any of the provisions of the Act will be made applicable to the authority set up under any resolution or order of the Government for the purpose of making any inquiry into any definite matter of public importance. The present Committee was set up for the purpose indicated in Section 11 and. as such, the Government was entitled to direct that all or any of the provisions of the Act would apply to the Committee. By the notification referred to above, it has been directed that all the provisions, excepting Section 5(1) of the Act will apply to the Committee. It is contei ded on behalf of the petitioners that as Sub-section (1) of Section 5 has not been made applicable to the Committee, Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) will not necessarily apply. It is said that before applying the provisions of these sub-sections, under Sub-section (1) the Government has to consider the nature of the inquiry to be made and oiher circumstances of the case. It is argued, as Sub-section (1) has been excluded by the said notification, the other sub-sections are automatically excluded. Further, it is contended that even where the Government directs under Section 11, the application of all the provisions of the Act in that case, there must be a notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 5 for the purpose of conferring the powers under Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Banerjee submits that the word 'provisions' in Section 11 means 'powers' and should be read as such, and accordingly, the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 11 conferred the powers under Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) on the Committee without any further notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 5 and without applying the provisions of Subsection (1) to the Committee. It is contended that Sub-section (1) will apply only in the case of a Commission of Inquiry set up under Section 3, but when an authority like the present Committee which has not been set up under Section 3, the Government can in the exercise of its powers under Section 11 confer on it. The powers under Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) without the application of the provisions of Sub-section (1) and a notificafication under that sub-section.

66. In my view, there is considerable force in the contentions made on behalf of the petitioners. It is manifestly clear from Section 11 that the Central Government has been invested with the powers under that section for the purpose of conferring on the authority set up for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance, the status of a Commission of Inquiry under Section 3. The Government may direct that all the provisions or any of the provisions of the Act will apply to that authority. Even if the Government directs that a single provision will apply to that authority still that authority by virtue of the deeming provisions contained in Section 11 will be deemed to be a Commission appointed under Section 3. The operation of the provisions of subsections (2) to (5) of Section 5 depends upon the provision of Sub-section (11, namely, on the issue of a notification by the Government under Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) prescribes the mode for bringing into operation the provisions of Sub-sections (2) to (5). These sub-sections will not have any existence apart from Sub-section (11. Even where a direction is made under Section 11 that all the provisions will apply, a further notification has to be issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 5 for the purpose of conferring the powers, under these sub-sections upon the authority to be deemed a Commission under Section 11. The respective considerations which are to be made by the Government under Sub-section (1) of Section 5 and those under Section 11 are different. Under Section 11 what is to be considered by the Government is whether jail or any of the provisions of the Act should be made applicable to the authority other than a Commission appointed under Section 3. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 5, the Government has to consider the nature of the inquiry to be made and also other circumstances of the case. The powers under Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) are additional powers which are not vested in the Commission of Inquiry after it is appointed under Section 3. After the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry under Section 3. The Government has to further consider whether it will confer on the Commission of Inquiry the additional powers under Sub-sections (21, (3) and (41 of Section 5. There is no indication in Section 11 that the Government can invest such an authority with the powers under Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) without a further notification under Sub-section (1). I am not impressed with the contention made on behalf of the respondents that the word 'provisions' in Section 11 means and should be read as 'powers'. In the instant case, Sub-section (1) has been excluded and, accordingly, it must be held that Sub-sections (2). (31 and (41 have not been and cannot be applied to the Committee. It is impossible to think that while in the case of a Commission of Inquiry appointed under Section 3 a notification under sub-sec. (1) of Section 5 is required to be made for the purpose of conferring on the Commission the powers under Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4), no notification under subsection (1) will be necessary for conferring such powers on the authority other than a Commission appointed under Section 3. The provisions of Sub-section (1) upon which the operation of the provisions of Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) depends, have been excluded. I am, therefore, of the view that the provisions of Sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) have not been legally and validly applied to the Committee and as such the Committee does not possess any powers under those sub-sections. It is not disputed that the petitioners have been asked to answer the questionnaire in the purported exercise of the alleged power of the Committee under Sub-section (2) of Section 5. In view of my finding that the Committee does not possess powers under Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) it cannot direct the petitioners to answer the questionnaire.

67. For the reasons aforesaid, I hold that while the Committee has been set up quite legally and validly for the purpose of making an inquiry into a definite matter of public importance and that the Government has not acted mala fide or in pursuance of any hostile policy either towards larger newspapers or towards the petitioners, as alleged, the provisions of Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 5 have not been validly applied to the Committee. The Government, however, will be at liberty to amend the said notification dated April 26, 1973, by excluding the words 'other than the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 thereof and may apply the provisions of subsections (2), (3) and (4) or any of them by a notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 5, if it so thinks. As at present the provisions of Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) do not apply to the Committee, the Rule succeeds in part. Subject to the liberty given to the Central Government, I direct that a writ in the nature of mandamus issue commanding the respondents not to require the petitioners to answer the questionnaire issued under cover of the letter of the Committee dated September 5, 1972, or to furnish any figures or estimates or accounts in terms of the letter of the Committee dated May 19, 1973. The Rule is made absolute in part to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.

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