Jharkhand High Court
State Of Jharkhand Through Department ... vs Nirmal Singh on 20 May, 2004
Equivalent citations: [2005(1)JCR220(JHR)], (2005)IILLJ345JHAR
Author: P.K. Balasubramanyan
Bench: P.K. Balasubramanyan, Amareshwar Sahay
JUDGMENT P.K. Balasubramanyan, C.J.
1. The respondents in WP (C) No. 3309 of 2002 on the file of this Court are the appellants in this appeal. They challenge the decision of the learned Single Judge holding that the authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 had no jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 20(2) of the Act and direct the payment of the difference in the wages paid and the minimum wages fixed. The proceeding under the Act was launched on a complaint by the Inspector under, the Act stating that the employer had paid to the employees wages below the minimum wages fixed under the statue. The learned Single Judge held that the question of jurisdiction or the lack of it on the authority under the Minimum Wages Act stood concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, AIR 1969 SC 1335, and the subsequent decision following it, in Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. Chandi Lal Saha, AIR 1991 SC 520. The learned Single Judge hence quashed the proceedings including the final order passed by the authority under the Act on the ground that the authority under the Act, the Subdivisional Officer lacked jurisdiction to pass the order impugned.
2. Learned Government counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the learned Single Judge has misunderstood the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to by him and that on a close reading of the decision in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, AIR 1969 SC 1335, it will be seen that the complaint in this case was perfectly maintainable before the authority under the Minimum Wages Act. He also submitted that, if the view of the learned Single Judge were held to be correct, it would mean that Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act itself would be rendered redundant since it could not be applied to any claim or complaint that the minimum wages fixed by the Government has not been paid by the employer. Counsel for the writ petitioner, the respondent herein, on the other hand, submitted that the learned Judge has rightly held that the order of the authority under the Act was one without jurisdiction and the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court has been properly understood by the learned Single Judge. He, therefore, submitted that there was no reason to interfere with the decision.
3. The learned Central Government Standing Counsel, who intervened on behalf of the Central Government, submitted that the very object with which Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act was enacted, would be frustrated if the view of the learned Single Judge is upheld and the decision of the learned Single Judge called for interference in appeal.
4. The respondent in the appeal had engaged certain workers for the construction of a building. The Labour Enforcement Officer-cum-Inspector under the Minimum Wages Act, conducted an inspection of the building site and came to understand from the workmen employed, that they were not being paid the minimum wages fixed by the Government for such workmen. The Inspector issued a notice to the employer asking it to produce the relevant documents for inspection and informed the employer that during the inspection, 29 labourers were found working on wages less than the minimum wages fixed. He called upon the employer, the writ petitioner, to pay the difference in wages to the workmen without delay. The writ petitioner, according to him, produced the relevant documents before the labour enforcement officer, but the officer concerned, without making a proper inspection of the documents, filed a petition before the authority under the Act, namely, the Sub-divisional Officer, by way of a claim under Section 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act. The authority numbered the complaint as MW Case No. 1 of 2002. After giving the writ petitioner adequate opportunities to object to the claim or the complaint, the authority ultimately passed the order on 30.6.2002 calling upon the employer to pay the difference in the wages paid and the minimum wages fixed, along with a penalty at 10 times the deficient amount paid. The writ petitioner originally approached the Court even before filing his objection before the authority under the Act, seeking the quashing of the notice issued to him on the ground that the authority under the Act had no jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint. Since the order was passed by the authority meanwhile, the writ petitioner sought an amendment of the writ petition to include an additional prayer seeking to quash the order of the authority under the Act, marked Annexure-16 to the writ petition. It may be noticed that the said order is appealable under the Act. The argument raised on behalf of the writ petitioner was that the workmen who had the complaint that minimum wages had not been paid or something less than the minimum wages had been paid, have to approach the concerned authority under the Payment of Wages Act or under Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and they could not maintain a complaint before the authority under the Minimum Wages Act under Section 20(2) thereof and that the authority had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on such a complaint.
5. The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 was enacted to provide for fixing minimum rated of wages in certain employments. The intention behind the legislation was to ensure that every employer pays the minimum wages to the employees, if in respect of such employees, the minimum wage has been fixed under the Act. The object of the Act could be achieved only if the Act also provided a machinery for ensuring that the minimum wages was paid by the employer to the employee. In furtherance of that object, authorities were created by including an Inspector confer- ring powers on him as contemplated by Section 19 of the Act. The Act then provided for the appointment of an authority before whom certain claims, including the claim that minimum wages in not being paid, could be raised by an employee or based on a report by the inspector. Since what is involved is the interpretation of Section 20 of the Act, we think it appropriate to set down that section hereunder to the extent it is necessary for our immediate purpose :-
"20. Claims.-(1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the official Gazette appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience as a Judge of a civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be an authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages or in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause {c} of sub-section (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under Section 14 to employees employed or paid in that area.
(2) Where an employee has any claim of the nature referred to in subsection (1), the employee himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorized in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector, or any person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under sub-section (1), may apply to such authority for a direction under sub-section (3) :
Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages or other amount became payable :
Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period :
(3) When any application under sub-section (2) is entertained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer, or give them an opportunity of being heard, and after such further inquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer may be liable under this Act, direct-
(i) in the case of a claim arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages, the payment to the employee of the amount by which the minimum wages payable to him exceed the amount actually paid, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount of such excess;
(ii) in any other case, the payment of the amount due to the employee, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten rupees, and the authority may direct payment of such compensation in cases where the excess of the amount due is paid by the employer to the employee before the disposal of the application."
6. On a plain reading of Section 20(1), it is clear that the authority appointed thereunder is to hear and decide any claim arising out of payment of less than minimum wage by an employer to his employee within the area of operation of the authority. Sub-section (2) on its plain terms provides that every employee himself or any person authorized in that behalf by that provision or any Inspector, could apply to the authority for the issue of a direction to the employer to pay the minimum wage. In the case on hand, the Inspector, according to him, found that the employer was not paying the minimum wages fixed to his 29 employees. Therefore, after giving an opportunity to the employer to show his books of accounts and being satisfied that the minimum wages have not been paid, the Inspector reported to the authority that minimum wages were not being paid, with a prayer that it may be directed to be paid. It appears to us on the language of the section and the object sought to be achieved by the Minimum Wages Act, namely, the fixation of minimum wages and ensuring that it is paid by the employer to the employee; that such a claim could be entertained by the authority and appropriate direction issued to the employer. Under sub-section (3) of Section 20, the authority is entitled to direct the employer in claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages, the payment to the employee of the amount by which the minimum wages payable to him exceeding the amount actually paid, together with compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding 10 times the amount of such excess. Thus, in this case, on the report of the Inspector, the case was initiated by the authority, who gave an opportunity to the employer to contest the claim that minimum wages were not being paid, though fixed under the Act, and found deficiency in the wages paid by the employer and proceeded to direct the payment of the difference and ordered payment of compensation at 10 times the deficient amount paid. If Section 20 does not apply to a situation as the one obtaining here, we find it difficult to understand to what situation Section 20 of the Act would apply.
7. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner, the employer, argued that the object of the Minimum Wages Act was only to fix minimum wages and if an employer does not pay the employee the minimum wages, the employee has to make a grievance of it either by invoking Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or by approaching the authority under the Payment of Wages Act and the employee is not in a position to invoke the jurisdiction of the authority under Section 20 of the Act. Bereft of authorities, we find it difficult to accept this submission. While interpreting a beneficent legislation like the Minimum Wages Act, it is the duty of the Court to interpret it meaningfully, keeping in mind the object sought to be achieved by the Act and that when such an approach is made, the Court has necessarily to make the statute a live one and it can be given life only if the provision for enforcement of the obligation to pay minimum wage enshrined in the very Act, is given full effect to. The language of Section 20 is plain and unambiguous and it provides for compelling an employer to pay his employee the minimum wage on a complaint by the employee or someone on his behalf, including the Inspector, that the minimum wage is not being paid by the employer. An adjudication is also contemplated as provided in the section so as to ensure that the rules of natural justice are observed. In this situation, prima facie, we are inclined to the view that the authority under Section 20 of the Act has acted well within its jurisdiction in initially issuing the notice to the employer to appear before him and subsequently in passing the order directing payment of the difference in wages between the prescribed minimum wage and the wage actually paid and in imposing penalty, though the question whether the imposition of penalty was not arbitrary will have to be considered in a different context.
8. The learned Single Judge has held that the position was covered by the decision in Athani Municipality (supra) and has quoted the following passage from para 6 of that judgment :-
"We have mentioned these provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, because the language used at all stages in that Act leads to the clear inference that Act is primarily concerned with fixing of rates-rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rate of payment for work on a day of rest-and is not really intended to be an Act for enforcement of payment of wages for which provision is made in other laws, such as the Payment of Wages Act No. 4 of 1936, and the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947. In Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act also, provision is made for seeking remedy in respect of claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages or in respect of payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under Section 14. This language used in Section 20(1) shows that the authority appointed under that provisions of law is to exercise jurisdiction for deciding claims which relate to rates of wages, rates for payment of work done on days of rest and overtime rates. If there be no dispute as to rates between the employer and the employee, Section 20(1) would not attracted. The purpose of Section 20 seems to be to ensure that the rates prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act are complied with by the employer in making payments and, if any attempt is made to make payments at lower rates, the workmen are given the right to invoke the aid of the authority appointed under Section 20(1). In cases where there is no dispute as to rates of wages and the only question is. whether a particular payment at the agreed rate in respect of minimum wages, overtime or work on off days is due to a workman or not, the appropriate remedy is provided in the Payment of Wages Act."
In Athani Municipality, the claims related to payment for overtime work, washing allowance, cost of uniform and work on weekly off-days. Even in the passage quoted by the learned Judge, the Supreme Court has stated that in Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act also, provision is made for seeking remedy in respect of claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages or in respect of payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clauses (b) or (c) in sub-section (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under Section 14. This language used in Section 20(1) shows that the authority appointed under that provision of law is to exercise jurisdiction for deciding claims which relate to the rates of wages, rates for payment for work done on days of rest and over time rates. It there be any dispute as to rates between the employer and the employee, Section 20(1) would be attracted. The purpose of Section 20(1) must be to ensure that the rates prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act are complied with by the employer in making payments and if any attempt is made to make payments at lower rates, the workers are given the right to invoke the aid of the authority appointed under Section 20(1). This, in our view, clearly shows that the authority under Section 20 of the Act has a right to entertain. a complaint that even though minimum wage under the Act has been fixed, the employer is not paying that wage, but something less and after the inquiry contemplated, to-direct the employer on being satisfied that minimum wage is not being paid, to pay the minimum wage to the employee.
9. The further passage in the same paragraph reads :-
"It is true that, under Section 20(3), power is given to the authority dealing with an application under Section 20(1) to direct payment of the actual amount found due; but this, it appears to us, is only an incidental power granted to that authority, so that the directions made by the authority under Section 20(1) may be effectively carried out and there may not be unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings. The power to make orders for payment of actual amount due to an employee under Section 20(3) cannot, therefore, be interpreted as indicating that the jurisdiction to the authority under Section 20(1) has been given for the purpose of enforcement of payment of amounts and not for the purpose of ensuring compliance by the employer with the various rates fixed under this Act".
A reading of the passage clarifies that the power of the authority under Section 20(1) of the Act is to ensure that minimum wages are paid and in the context of Section 20(3) of the Act, the power is confined to directing the payment of minimum wages in case minimum wages are not being paid. In the case on hand, we have already indicated the factual position and the complaint was that the employer was not paying the minimum wages to his employees and what has been done by the authority is only to direct him to pay minimum wages and the difference between the minimum wages and the wages actually paid. The decision in the Manganese Ore (India) Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 520, related to the question whether the monetary value of the grain supplied at confessional rates and the amount paid as attendance bonus can be calculated and counted into the minimum wage payable to the employees under the notification issued under the Minimum Wages Act. In that context, their Lordships made the observation quoted by the learned Single Judge in his judgment. Their lordships relied upon the decision in Athani Municipality (supra). If our understanding of the ratio of Athani Municipality is correct, it is clear that in view of the question posed in paragraph 2 of the above decision, the question was held to be outside the remedy available under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act.
10. At this stage we think it appropriate to refer to some of the other decisions brought to our notice. In Bahadur Singh v. State of Bihar, 1980 PLJR 264, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held as follows :-
"From the scheme of the Act, it is manifest that where an appropriate Government has fixed the rates of wages etc. in respect of a scheduled employment, payment at these rates had to be made by the employer. There is no substance in the contention that the claim made by respondent No. 3 in the instance cases before the Labour Court is not maintainable under Section 20(2) of the Act and the remedy of respondent was by way of an application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, when the rates have been fixed under the Minimum Wages Act by the appropriate Government. It is manifest that the jurisdiction of the authority under Section 20(2) of the Act in respect of cases coming within the purview of the Minimum Wages Act is not ousted in view of Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, which relates to a different situation. In all the five writ applications the employees in their applications under Section 20of the Act, have specifically asserted that they were being paid at rates lesser than those prescribed under the Act and the land owners have refused to pay at those rates. The applications of the all the employees (respondent No. 3 in the writ applications) were, therefore, maintainable under Section 20(1) of the Act."
11. Their Lordships referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Athani Municipality, and also referred to the High Court's decision from which that appeal arose. After referring to the High Court's decision and dealing with the decision of the Supreme Court, their Lordships of the Patna High Court stated as follows :-
"The same question was agitated before the Supreme Court it may be mentioned that it was conceded by the parties that this question would not arise in one of the, cases, where the claim was with regard to cost of uniform and washing charges, which are items not governed by the Act at all. The question of law, therefore, remained confined to the remaining three appeals before the Supreme Court, as to whether the claim of the workmen under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was entertainable by the Labour Court, if an application for the same relief could be entertainable by the Labour Court under Section 20(1) of the Act. It was in this context that the Supreme Court observed that the Minimum Wages Act is primarily concerned with fixation of rates of minimum wages, rates for payment for word doe on days of rest and overtime rates, and under Section 20(2) of the Act provision is made for seeking remedy in respect of claims arising out of payment of wages at rates lower than the rates fixed under the Minimum Wages Act. While considering this question, the Supreme Court held that if there was no dispute as to rates between the employer and the employees, Section 20(1) would not be attracted, such as in cases, where there is no dispute as to rates of wages and the only question is whether a particular payment is at the rate agreed in respect of Payment of Wages, etc. the Supreme Court, after examining the pleadings of the parties, found that there was no dispute as to the rates between the parties. The relevant portion of the judgment may be quoted :-
"It does appear that, in one case, there was a pleading on behalf of the appellant that no rates at all had been prescribed by the Mysore Government. The pleading did not mean that it became a dispute as to the rates at which the payments were to be made by the appellant. The only question that arose was whether there were any rates at all fixed under the Minimum Wages Act for overtime and of payment for work done on days of rest. Such a question does not relate to a dispute as to the rates enforceable between the parties, so that the remedy under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act could not have been sought by the applicants in any of these applications. No question can, therefore, arise of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain these applications under Section 33C(2) of the Act being barred because of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act."
In all the five writ applications with which we are concerned, the employees in paragraph No. 3 of their applications under Section 20(2) of the Act, have specifically asserted that they were being paid at rates lesser than those prescribed under the Act and the land owners have refused to pay at those rates."
12. Before proceeding to consider the other decisions, we may also notice Form VI, the form of application to be made by an employee under Section 20(2) of the Act. Therein, the prayer to be made is as follows :- 'The applicant(s) pray(s) that a direction may be issued under sub-section (3) of Section 20 for :--
(a) payment of the difference between the wages due according to the minimum rates of wages fixed by the Government and the wages actually paid, and
(b) compensation amounting to Rs... The applicant(s) beg leave to amend or add to or made alteration in the application if any and when necessary."
The remedy in this case is absolutely consistent with the prayer (a) of the form prescribed. No doubt, the form prescribed under the rule cannot be the governing factor in the interpretation of a section or the jurisdiction of the authority or the Tribunal. But it does suggest that the interpretation we have attempted is not unreasonable in the circumstances of the case. In fact, the aspect sought to be achieved by the form prescribed was the subject matter of discussion by the Supreme Court in Pali Devi v. Chairman, Managing Committee, 1996 (3) SCC 296. Therein, the Supreme Court was considering whether an ex-employee, as distinguished from an employee, could make an application under Section 20(2) of the Act. Their Lordships held :-
'The statutory language employed in Form VI, prescribed by the Minimum Wages (Control) Rules, 1950, wherein particulars to be mentioned in the application for seeking relief under Section 20(2) are provided, is a good hind to discern the true scope of Section 20(2) to determine whether a past employee can invoke the provisions of the Act or not. The language of the form, covering the cases of the past and existing employees, was in accord with the views of a larger number of High Courts compared to the number of the High Courts taking the contrary view. Thus on account of the preponderance of authority, Section 20(2) and 2(i) have to be read along with the rules and Form VI to lean in favour of the view that both past and present employees were entitled to move in the matter. Such would be a purposive approach, which would carry out the necessary intendment of the statute, for which the rules and the form lend a hand to carry out the objectives of the Act. The language employed therein, even though executive voiced, is more often than not, demonstrative of the legislative purpose. So viewed, the intendment of the statute is furthered if an ex-employee too is held entitled to seek relied under Section 20(2) of the Act."
The above decision, in our view, also supports the purposive interpretation of Section 20(2) of the Act to make it effective and to make it is legitimate tool in the hands of an employee who has not been paid the minimum wage in spite of the minimum wage being fixed.
13. In Ram Kewal Chaudhary v. Kashi Nath Ram, 1989 PLJR 422, S.B. Sinha, J. (as the Lordship then was) after referring to the decisions in Bahadur Singh and Athani Municipality stated that in terms of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, an aggrieved person may file a claim arising out of payment lesser than the minimum rates. of wages or in respect of the payment of the remuneration for days of rest of for work done on such date under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under Section 14 against the employer and in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the said Act, an application under sub-section (2) thereof is maintainable and the authority may without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer may be liable under the Act, direct for payment contemplated by the Act.
14. A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Anand Oil Industries v. Labour Court Hyderabad, AIR 1979 AP 182, after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Athani Municipality, understood the position in law thus :-
'This decision of the Supreme Court makes one thing clear that where there is a dispute as to the rate at which minimum wage is payable under the Act, the matter would fall under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, It also declares that Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act does not cover all claims in respect of minimum wages; it covers only the cases where there is a dispute as to the rate at which the minimum wages are payable. That decision also lays down that the power given to the authority under Section 20(3) to direct payment of actual amount found due while dealing with an application under Section 20(1) is only incidental power granted to that authority."
15. The object of the Act was explained by their Lordships in Airfreight Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 1999 (6) SCC 567, wherein it was stated :-
"What the Act purports to achieve is to prevent exploitation of labour and for the purpose authorises the appropriate Government to take steps to prescribe minimum rates of wages in the schedule industries. In an under developed country which faces the problem of unemployment on a very large scale it is not unlikely that labour may offer to work even on starvation wages. The policy of the Act is to prevent the employment of such sweated labour in the interest of general public and so in prescribing the minimum wage rates the capacity of the employer need not be considered. What is being-prescribed is minimum wage rates which a welfare State assumes every employer must pay before he employs labour."
16. The Act contemplates that minimum wage rates should be fixed in the scheduled industries with a dual object of providing sustenance and maintenance of the worker and his family and preserving his efficiency as a worker. If these are the objects sought to be achieved by the Act and a machinery is provided in Section 20 of the Act for entertaining complaints that in spite of the fixation of minimum wages, the same was not being paid by an employer and to ensure that the employer is compelled to pay the minimum wage, it would not be proper to understand the provision as conferring he jurisdiction in the authority under that section to entertain a claim, like the one in the present case, and to direct payment of the dues under the Minimum Wages fixed by the notification for the industry concerned and the amount actually paid by the employer which, on the complaint, was below the minimum wage fixed.
17. One of the main arguments on the side of the writ petitioner was that the claim involved in this proceeding could be agitated under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. Section 15 of that Act provides for claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and the penalty for malicious or vexatious claims. The scope of Section 15 of that Act feel for consideration before the Supreme Court in Shri Ambica Mills Co. v. S.B. Bhatt, AIR 1961 SC 970. Their Lordships held :-
'The scheme of the Act is clear. The Act was intended to regulate the payment of wages to certain classes of persons employed in industry, and its object is to provide for a speedy and effective remedy to the employees in respect of their claims arising out of illegal deductions or unjustified delay made in paying wages to them. With that object Section 2(vi) of the Act has defined wages. Section 4 fixes the wage period. Section 5 prescribes the time of payment of wages; and Section 7 allows certain specified deductions to be made. Section 15 covers jurisdiction on the authority appointed under the said section to hear and decide for any specified area claims arising out of deduction from wages, or delay in payment of wages, of persons employed or paid in that area. It is thus clear that the only claims which can be entertained by the authority are claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment wages. The jurisdiction thus conferred on the authority to deal with these two categories of claims, is exclusive, for Section 22 of the Act provides that matters which lie within the jurisdiction of the authority are excluded from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil Courts. Thus in one sense the jurisdiction conferred on the authority is limited by Section 15, and in another sense it is exclusive as prescribed by Section 22."
18. In the light of the proposition thus enunciated by the Supreme Court, we are of the view that the claim that minimum wages, though fixed, had not been paid with a prayer for direction to the employer to pay the difference would not come within the purview of the authority under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. Of course, the above decision of the Supreme Court is also an authority for the position that the authority under that Act could have jurisdiction to consider the question incidental to the matters provided for therein, It cannot be said that the dispute present in this case is a matter which is incidental to claims arising out of deductions made in payment of wages or delay in making payment of wages. Here, the wages have been paid; there is no complaint of deduction and there is no complaint of any delay in payment and the complaint is only that though minimum wages under the Minimum Wages Act have been fixed, the same was not paid by the employer.
19. Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the other provision relied on by counsel for the writ petitioner, is a provision conferring jurisdiction to deal with a dispute relating to a claim for recovery of money due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award, or under the provisions of Chapter VA and Chapter VB of the Industrial Dispute Act, Chapter VA deals with lay off and retrenchment and Chapter VB makes special provisions relating to law of retrenchment and closure in certain establishments. Prima facie, it cannot be said that the claim herein comes under the purview of Chapter VA or VB of the Industrial Disputes Act. This was not a claim based on settlement or award. Even granting that the claim could have been agitated under Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, so long as there is no exclusion of jurisdiction of the authority under the Minimum Wages Act from entertaining a claim which might also come within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act or Payment of Wages Act, it cannot be held that the authority under the Minimum Wages Act has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim, if going by the relevant provision, Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, the Court finds that the claim is entertainable by the authority under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act. We are, therefore, satisfied that the argument in that, behalf by learned counsel for the writ petitioner deserves to be overruled.
20. We are therefore of the view that the learned Single Judge was not justified in coming to the conclusion that in view of the nature of the complaint made in this case, the authority under Section 20 of Minimum Wages Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the Inspector and, therefore, consequently, we set aside the impugned order of the learned Single Judge.
21. In the light of our conclusion as above, what remains is the question whether the final order passed by the authority calls for interference in the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
22. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that the employer had an alternate remedy by way of an appeal under Section 20(6) of the Act, as amended in the State of Bihar and now applicable in the State of Jharkhand, and in that view, the employer should be left to agitate his claim before the appropriate authority. In this case, we may also notice one defect in the writ petition filed by the employer. Even though, the complaint before the authority was made by the Inspector, the order passed by the authority clearly enured to the benefit of the workers involved and none of the workers was impleaded in the writ petition as a respondent. The result was that the order which benefited the employees has been set aside by the learned Single Judge without giving the employees, the beneficiaries of the order, an opportunity of being heard. Obviously, this would be against the fundamental principles of natural justice. Even in the appeal, the employees, either individually or in a representative capacity, are not before us. Therefore, there is some difficulty in deciding the question of the correctness of the order impugned in this appeal. We find that the employer had rushed to this Court with a writ petition merely on receipt of a notice from the authority under Section 20 of the Act and had not even filed a written statement before the authority under the Act putting forward his stand as against the complaint that the minimum wages fixed were not being paid. It is clear that the employer was given adequate opportunities by the authority concerned, but the employer tried to get an interim order from this Court staying the proceedings before the authority, But once the employer found that he did not .succeed in getting an interim order staying the proceedings before the authority, he should have filed an objection before the authority concerned, since at the hearing, counsel for the employer submitted before us that the employer was willing to pay the minimum wages fixed, if it was found that he had not paid the minimum wages fixed under the Act. We also find that even though the authority may have power to award compensation at ten times the difference in wages between the minimum wages fixed and the wages actually paid, such fixation was not automatic and it dependent on the circumstances available in a given case. The statute only fixes the upper limit of compensation to be made payable. There is no discussion by the authority nor reasons given in support of fixing the compensation at ten times the difference in the wages paid.
23. Taking note of the circumstances as a whole, we think that the proper course to adopt is to set aside the order, Annexure-17 to the writ petition and direct the authority to give an opportunity to the employer to file his objection to the complaint and to substantiate his claim regarding the wages paid to the workers and to pass a fresh order thereon including the compensation, if any that may be ordered to be paid by the employer after application of mind and giving reasons in support thereof. But was think that the employer should be given an opportunity to establish his defence only by providing some protection to the workers in the matter of recovery of the difference in wages that may be due to them. We are, therefore, satisfied that it would be in the interests of justice to direct the employer, the respondent in this appeal, to deposit a sum of Rs. 2,36,958/-, (the alleged dues in wages) before the authority under the Act within a period of six week from today. On the said sum being deposited, the authority will give an opportunity to the employer to file his objection to the complaint and a further opportunity to establish his defence as well as an opportunity to the workmen or the complainant to lead any evidence they or he may want. The amount, it deposited by the employer, will be kept in deposit in a Nationalized Bank so that it can earn interest and its dispersal would depend upon the final adjudication by the authority after hearing both the parties. In case the employer, the respondent herein, fails to make the deposit of Rs. 2,36,958/- within the time fixed as above, the order An- nexure-17 will stand affirmed and the writ petition filed by the employer before this Court as CWJC No. 3309 of 2002 will stand dismissed.
24. In the result, the appeal is al- lowed, as indicated above. We make no order as to costs.