Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Himanshu Sharma vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi (Mcd) on 17 April, 2026
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O.A. No.2922 of 2025
Orders reserved on :06.04.2026
Orders pronounced on : 17.04.2026
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Himanshu Sharma
S/o Sh. Jai Prakash Sharma
R/o BK-1/189, Shalimar Bagh,
Delhi - 110088
Presently -
R/o 6A, Ground Floor,
Janhit Apartments,
Sector-9, Rohini,
Delhi - 110085
(Aged 41 years approx.)
(Terminated Medical Officer (Ayurvedic))
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri Ajesh Luthra)
VERSUS
1. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
Through its Commissioner
Dr. S.P.M. Civic Centre,
JLN Marg, Minto Road,
New Delhi - 110002
2. Director (Ayush)
A-Block, 3rd Floor,
Dr. S.P.M. Civic Centre,
JLN Marg, Minto Road,
New Delhi - 110002
....Respondents
(By Advocate: Dr. L.C. Singhi)
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ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):
By filing the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:-
"(a) Quash and set aside impugned order dated 17.07.2025 (Annexure A/l), alongwith impugned show cause notice dated 29.05.2025 (Annexure A/2)
(b) Direct the respondents to forthwith reinstate the applicant in service
(c) Accord all consequential benefits including back wages/salary/pay etc.
(d) Award costs of the proceedings; and
(e) Pass any other order/direction which this Hon'ble Tribunal deems fit and proper in favour of the applicant and against the respondents in the facts and circumstances of the case.
FACTS OF THE CASE
2. Facts in brief as stated by the applicant are that pursuant to an open selection process, the applicant was selected and issued a Memorandum dated 14.12.2016 (Annexure A/3) for contractual engagement to the post of Medical Officer (Ayurvedic) on a monthly remuneration equivalent to the minimum of the pay in the pay band of Rs.15,600/- with Grade Pay of Rs.5,400/- along with admissible allowances, including Non-Practicing Allowance, HRA, DA and TA. The initial engagement was for a period of six months, the applicant has accepted the terms and conditions of such appointment. 2.1 In furtherance thereof, the respondents issued an order dated 31.01.2017 (Annexure A/4), pursuant to which the applicant joined duties on 01.02.2017, i.e., within the stipulated time.
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2.2 The contractual engagement of the applicant was extended
from time to time, and copies of certain extension orders have been placed on record as Annexure A/5 (Colly)and perusal of the said extension orders, it is evident that mandatory break has also been mentioned therein.
2.3 It is the case of the applicant that on 08.01.2025 (Annexure A/6), an FIR, being FIR No.12/2025,under Sections 498A, 420, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(n), 354-A, 506 and 34 IPC was registered at Police Station Hudkeshwar, Nagpur at the instance of Ms. Chetna, who is the estranged wife of the applicant's younger brother, namely Anupam Singh. The applicant contends that the said FIR arose out of matrimonial discord between the couple, who were married on 08.07.2019.
2.4 On the basis of the aforesaid FIR, the applicant was arrested by the Nagpur Police on 24.02.2025 while he was on duty. The applicant was subsequently released on bail on 23.05.2025 pursuant to bail order dated 20.05.2025 (Annexure A/7)passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-6, Nagpur.
2.5 Upon release, the applicant reported for duty by submitting a joining letter via email dated 24.05.2025 and a written representation dated 27.05.2025 (Annexures A/8 and A/9 respectively). 2.6 Instead of permitting the applicant to resume duties, the respondents issued a show cause notice dated 29.05.2025 (Annexure A/2), calling upon the applicant to explain the status of the criminal 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 4 OA No.2922/2025 proceedings and to show cause as to why disciplinary action, including termination of contract, should not be taken against him. 2.7 The show cause notice relied upon two clauses of the initial memorandum dated 14.12.2016, namely:
(i) that the contractual engagement is purely temporary and can be terminated at any time without assigning any reason; and
(ii) that the incumbent should not have been convicted by any court or booked under IPC/Cr.P.C.
2.8 The applicant submitted a detailed reply dated 02.06.2025 (Annexure A/10) denying the allegations and explaining his position.
2.9 However, without considering the said reply, the respondents passed an order dated 17.07.2025 (Annexure A/1), terminating the services of the applicant with retrospective effect from the date of his arrest, i.e., 24.02.2025, primarily,on account of his arrest, custody and pendency of the criminal case. Aggrieved by the termination of his services, the applicant has filed this OA seeking the reliefs as quoted above.
3. Upon issuance of notice, the respondents filed their short affidavit contesting the applicant's claim. The applicant thereafter filed a rejoinder to the said short affidavit.
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CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT
4.1 Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submits that the
criminal proceedings against the applicant are wholly false, fabricated and malicious. The complainant, being the wife of the applicant's younger brother, had been residing at her parental home at Nagpur since March 2022 of her own volition, as her husband was living abroad, and she was unwilling to reside in the matrimonial home in Delhi in his absence.
4.2 Learned counsel also submitted that she visited Delhi on 30.07.2023 and lodged false complaints alleging dowry demand and harassment against the applicant and his family members. A subsequent complaint dated 03.08.2023 before the SPUWAC Cell, Nanakpura also remained unsubstantiated, as the complainant never joined the enquiry proceedings, and no FIR was registered pursuant thereto, as confirmed through RTI reply dated 21.03.2025, as stated in sub para A. of para 4.13 of the OA.
4.3 Learned counsel further submitted that after an unexplained delay of nearly three years, a false FIR No.12/2025 was registered on 08.01.2025 at Police Station Hudkeshwar, Nagpur, invoking serious penal provisions as stated above. The inordinate delay in reporting itself renders the allegations doubtful and motivated. Further, the allegations pertain purely to a private family dispute between the applicant's younger brother and his wife, and bear no nexus whatsoever with the applicant's official duties. The implication of the 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 6 OA No.2922/2025 applicant is thus wholly unwarranted and actuated by mala fide intent to extort money.
4.4 Learned counsel further submits that the applicant was illegally taken into custody on 24.02.2025 while performing his official duties at Ayurvedic Hospital, Ballimaran, as certain persons in civil dress forcibly attempted to take the applicant without initially disclosing their identity or producing any lawful authority. Only upon intervention by hospital authorities did they claim to be police officials from Hudkeshwar Police Station, Nagpur. The said officials neither produced valid authorization nor obtained prior permission from competent authorities, nor coordinated with the local police station or departmental authorities before effecting custody. 4.5 Learned counsel also contended that the alleged offences pertain to incidents stated to have occurred in Delhi, and therefore, the Maharashtra Police lacked territorial jurisdiction. The entire exercise of taking the applicant into custody was thus illegal and in violation of established procedure.
4.6 Learned counsel further contended that the impugned termination is wholly arbitrary and punitive in nature, having been passed merely on the basis of unproven allegations. It is well settled that mere pendency of criminal proceedings, particularly arising out of matrimonial disputes, cannot form the basis for termination of service, especially when the allegations are yet to be established.
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4.7 Learned counsel thus argued that the impugned termination
order is stigmatic and punitive having been effected without establishing any misconduct and without affording due process. It is a settled proposition that even a contractual or temporary employee cannot be terminated by way of punishment without following due process of law. The action of the respondents, in effect, amounts to imposing a penalty without enquiry, which is impermissible and violative of principles of natural justice.
4.8 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant is a qualified Medical Officer who has been discharging his duties diligently and efficiently and there has never been any complaint or deficiency in his performance. The impugned action is thus wholly unrelated to his service record and has been taken solely on extraneous considerations. 4.9 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant has been rendered unemployed, causing severe financial hardship and mental agony to him and his family. Despite being ready and willing to discharge his duties, he has been unjustly prevented from doing so. 4.10. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that impugned termination order being illegal, arbitrary, punitive and unsustainable in law, is liable to be set aside and the applicant is thus entitled to reliefs as prayed for in the instant OA.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents by referring to the short affidavit submitted that the applicant was engaged as 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 8 OA No.2922/2025 Medical Officer on contract basis vide order dated 31.01.2017 initially for a period of 6 months, which was renewed for further six months with one day mandatory break based upon the performance of the applicant and requirement for renewal of the contract by the respondents. The applicant accepted the termsand conditions of the engagement contained in the Memorandum issued by the respondent dated 14.12.2016. The said terms and conditions are the conditions regulating the contractual engagement of the applicant and that the same are binding. The respondents further renewed the contractual engagement of the applicant by six months by orders dated 22.08.2017 & 19.02.2018. The engagement was further renewed by one year by orders dated 05.03.2019, 11.03.2020, 03.02.2021, 21.02.2022, 19.01.2023, 08.02.2024 and 05.03.2025 with one day mandatory break in between the two contractual renewals wherein the respondent categorically published the nature of the engagement being purely contractual and the terms and conditions of the engagement, being the same as mentioned in the initial memorandum dated 14.12.2016. 5.1 Learned counsel submitted that the applicant was arrested on duty from MCD Ayurvedic Hospital, Ballimaran Delhi-110006 on 24.02.2025 by a team of Nagpur Police in F.I.R dated 08.01.2025 registered u/s 498A/420/376(2)(f), 376(2)(n)/354-A/506/34 IPC. After obtaining the approval of the Competent Authority, contractual services of the applicant was terminated vide impugned orderdated 17.07.2025 in accordance with the terms and conditions of his contractual agreement.
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5.2 Learned counsel argued that applicant was a contractual
employee working in Ayush Department of Municipal Corporation of Delhi and due to his detention/arrest, the respondentswere compelled to terminate the contractual engagement of the applicant. Similarly, if the applicant would have been a regular employee of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, then his case would have been treated as per rules applicable to a regular employee and in that eventuality, the applicant could have been suspended only. Since the applicant was a contractual employee, therefore, the rule of suspension cannot be applied in this case. Hence, the respondents ordered termination of the contractual engagement of the applicant in accordance with the terms and conditions of his contract agreement.
5.3 Learned counsel also submitted that the contractual engagement of the applicant was liable to be terminated at any point of time even without assigning any reason thereof and without any notice as has been clearly stipulated in the terms and conditions of agreement that the contractual engagement can be terminated, if an incumbent has been booked under IPC & CrPC case and as the applicant was involved in a said criminal case, arrested and detained in connection with a said criminal case, the engagement of the applicant on contractual basis was rightly terminated by passing the impugned order with due approval of the competent authority.Thus, the said order of termination of the contractual engagement of the applicant is legal, just and proper and cannot be challenged on the grounds that his 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 10 OA No.2922/2025 arrest and detention wasn't justified or that he has been subsequently acquitted.
5.4 Learned counsel emphasised that the applicant's arrest constituted a breach of the terms and conditions of his contractual engagement, and therefore, the respondents were justified in terminating the contractual engagement in accordance with the said terms.The applicant cannot claim the rights of a regular employee and cannot insist on following the procedure, prescribed for regular employee, to be followed in his case.
5.5 Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the present OA is liable to be dismissed by this Tribunal.
6. In rebuttal to the aforesaid contentions of the respondents, the learned counsel for the applicant besides reiterating the submissions as noted above has submitted that the respondents have proceeded on a legally untenable assumption that mere registration of an FIR, arrest, custody, pendency of proceedings, or grant of bail can, by itself, be treated as proof of misconduct warranting severance of service. Such an assumption is impermissible in law.
6.1 Learned counsel reiterated that the said FIR in question arises out of a private matrimonial dispute between the applicant's younger brother and his estranged wife, Ms. Chetna. The applicant's implication is incidental to a family dispute, wherein the allegations are disputed and presently under judicial scrutiny. The respondents, being a State instrumentality, were duty-bound to appreciate the said 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 11 OA No.2922/2025 context before taking a decision affecting the applicant's livelihood. Instead, they treated mere accusation as an established fact and converted the status of criminal proceedings into a ground for immediate termination.The approach adopted by the respondents, if sustained, would lead to a dangerous precedent whereby any contractual employee could be rendered unemployed merely on account of implication in a criminal complaint, without any inquiry into truth, nexus with service, or proportionality. Such an approach is arbitrary, violative of rule of law, and inconsistent with the obligation of the State to act as a model employer.
6.2 Learned counsel emphasised that the applicant's service record itself negates any allegation of unsuitability. His work and conduct have consistently been recorded as satisfactory, and his integrity has been certified as beyond doubt. His engagement was extended repeatedly over several years, thereby demonstrating continued institutional confidence. A long-serving employee with an unblemished record cannot be terminated solely on account of disputed allegations arising from a private family matter. 6.3 The respondents have taken a plea that the termination was effected with the approval of the competent authority and in terms of the contract does not cure the inherent illegality. Administrative approval cannot legitimize an arbitrary exercise of power, nor can a contractual label immunize punitive action from judicial scrutiny.The impugned termination is stigmatic in nature and punitive in effect. The order itself refers to the applicant's involvement in criminal 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 12 OA No.2922/2025 proceedings and bail status, and treats the same as the basis for termination. Once such factors are relied upon, the action assumes a penal character, irrespective of the nomenclature used. 6.4 Learned counsel argued that where termination is founded upon allegations of misconduct, it is incumbent upon the employer to arrive at a finding of such misconduct through due process. In the present case, no departmental inquiry was conducted, no independent finding was recorded, and no nexus with service was established. The impugned action is thus punitive without adjudication and liable to be set aside.
6.5 Learned counsel for the applicant reiterated that the circumstances surrounding his arrest were themselves irregular and disputed. The applicant was taken into custody from his workplace without adherence to proper procedure, without prior coordination with local authorities, and under questionable circumstances. These facts were neither verified nor examined by the respondents, who mechanically relied upon the prosecution narrative, thereby demonstrating complete non-application of mind. Further, the alleged incidents pertain to earlier periods and were reported after considerable delay amidst ongoing familial discord. The truth of such allegations is subject to judicial determination, and the employer could not have pre-empted the same by imposing punitive consequences. 6.6 Learned counsel also submitted that the respondents themselves admit that had the applicant been a regular employee, he 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 13 OA No.2922/2025 would have been placed under suspension. The decision to terminate solely on the basis of his contractual status reveals arbitrariness and discrimination. Public law does not permit harsher consequences merely because an employee holds a weaker bargaining position. Further, learned counsel submitted that the applicant does not seek parity with all aspects of regular service jurisprudence; however, even in contractual employment, State action must be fair, reasonable, and non-arbitrary. The respondents were required to consider the applicant's service record, the nature of allegations, and available alternatives. No such exercise was undertaken before passing the impugned termination order. Further, there is no finding that the applicant's professional duties were deficient, that patient care was affected, or that any service-related misconduct was established. The decision to terminate was thus not based on service considerations but solely on the factum of applicant's arrest in the said alleged false criminal case.
6.7 Learned counsel submitted that the respondents' reliance on contractual clauses is misconceived and legally untenable, as they cannot simultaneously contend that the contract was terminable without assigning reasons and also justify the termination by relying upon allegations and criminal proceedings. Once reasons are assigned, and particularly, stigmatic reasons, the action cannot be treated as termination simpliciter.
6.8 Further, it is submitted that even in contractual matters, the State is bound by constitutional limitations under Articles 14 and 16 of 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 14 OA No.2922/2025 the Constitution. Clauses permitting termination without reason cannot be construed as conferring unfettered or arbitrary power. Learned counsel reiterated that the contractual terms relied upon by the respondents are unconscionable and hit by the principles underlying under Sections 16, 23 and 24 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In public employment, there exists inherent inequality of bargaining power, and one-sided clauses enabling deprivation of livelihood without due process are opposed to public policy and cannot be enforced.Further, the contractual engagement of the applicant was renewed repeatedly over a long period. The governing relationship at the time of termination was the subsisting extended engagement. The respondents cannot selectively rely upon initial terms to impose punitive consequences, ignoring the continuity and evolution of the contractual framework. The present case does not involve any suppression at the time of initial appointment. The allegations arose during service, are disputed, and are sub judice. No finding of misconduct has been recorded, nor has any nexus with official duties been established. The impugned termination is therefore arbitrary and unsustainable.
6.9 Learned counsel further submitted that the contention of the respondents that the termination cannot be challenged even if the arrest was unjustified further demonstrates arbitrariness. The issue before this Tribunal is not the determination of criminal guilt but the legality of administrative action. The impugned action fails to satisfy the requirements of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality.
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6.10 Learned counsel also submitted that the respondents have
failed to establish any lawful basis for the impugned action except reliance on the applicant's criminal-process status. There is no adjudicated misconduct, no inquiry, no independent application of mind, and no nexus with service. The impugned action has resulted in grave civil consequences, including loss of livelihood, reputational harm, and hardship to the applicant and his family, without any finding of guilt. The same is, therefore, arbitrary, punitive, and unsustainable in law and the claim of the applicant is covered by the aforesaid judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, Hon'ble High Court and of this Tribunal.
6.11 During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the parties sought and granted liberty to file judgments in support of their arguments.
7. Learned counsel for the applicant has filed the following judgments in support of his above submissions:-
(1) OA No.217/2023 in Amar Jeet Singh (Ex. Const Conductor) vs. DTC and others decided by this Tribunal vide Order/Judgment dated 05.05.2025 affirmed in WP (C) No.13234/2025 in DTC and others vs. Amar Jeet Singh EX Cont Conductor decided by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide Order/Judgment dated 29.08.2025 and further affirmed in SLP (C) No.36275/2025 in Delhi Transport 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 16 OA No.2922/2025 Corporation (DTC) and others vs. Amar Jeet Singh vide Judgment dated 06.02.2026;
(2) OA No.3648/2019 in Ms. Sudha Sharma vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others decided by this Tribunal vide Order/Judgment dated 30.04.2025;
(3) W.P (C) No.14126/2004 in Sanjay Kumar vs. UOI and others decided by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide Order/Judgment dated 23.04.2014;
(4) W.P. (C) No.6391/2016 in Himanshu Gupta vs. Engineers India Limited decided by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide Order/Judgment dated 22.03.2017;
(5) O.A. No.1210/2024 in Kavita vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others decided by this Tribunal vide Order/Judgment dated 27.11.2024; and (6) OA No.1537/2019 in R.S. Bisht vs. UOI and another decided by this Tribunal vide Order/Judgment dated 22.01.2020.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings as well as the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant.
9. From the pleadings on record and submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, we observe that the applicant was engaged as Medical Officer (Ayurvedic) on contractual basis 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 17 OA No.2922/2025 pursuant to Memorandum dated 14.12.2016 and joined duties on 01.02.2017. The contractual engagement of the applicant was extended from time to time, with intermittent mandatory break, and continued uninterrupted in substance till the year 2025, thereby indicating a long tenure of service. The terms and conditions governing the contractual engagement, including the clause permitting termination without assigning reasons and the stipulation regarding involvement in criminal cases, are not in dispute.
9.1 An FIR bearing No.12/2025 dated 08.01.2025 under various provisions of IPC was registered against the applicant at Police Station Hudkeshwar, Nagpur. The applicant was arrested on 24.02.2025 and remained in custody till his release on bail on 23.05.2025. Upon release, the applicant reported for duty and submitted representations seeking resumption of duties. The respondents issued a show cause notice dated 29.05.2025 and thereafter passed the impugned order dated 17.07.2025 terminating the contractual engagement of the applicant with retrospective effect from the date of his arrest. The impugned termination order is founded primarily on the factum of the applicant's arrest, custody and pendency of criminal proceedings. No departmental inquiry or fact-finding exercise was conducted by the respondents prior to passing the impugned order.
9.2 We also find that the applicant himself admitted that the said FIR Sections 498A, 420, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(n), 354-A, 506 and 34 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 18 OA No.2922/2025 IPC was registered on 08.01.2025 at Police Station Hudkeshwar, Nagpur at the instance of Ms. Chetna, who is stated to be the estranged wife of the applicant's younger brother, namely, Anupam Singh, and was arrested on 24.2.2025 and was released on bail on 23.05.2025. However, nowhere in his pleading, the applicant has stated that he had ever informed the respondents either about lodging of the said FIR against him on 08.01.2025, arrested on 24.2.2025 by the said Police and released on bail on 23.5.2025. In the meanwhile, vide Office Order dated 05.03.2025 issued by the respondents, the applicant along with other 60 employees was engaged again to the post of Medical Officer (Ayurveda) on contract basis for further period from 11.2.2025 to 05.01.2026. As per para 14 of the initial terms of engagement of the applicant on contract basis on the said post vide Memorandum dated 14.12.2016, which reads as under:-
"You should not have been convicted by any court and not booked under I.P.C./Cr.P.C."
In view of the above position, the applicant was duty bound to inform the respondents about registration of the said FIR and even about his arrest within the stipulated time which he failed to do so.
10. In terms of the aforesaid condition, the applicant was under a clear obligation to promptly inform the respondents about the occurrence of any such event as contemplated in para 14 above. However, it is evident from the record that the applicant failed to discharge this obligation. He neither informed the respondents 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 19 OA No.2922/2025 about the registration of the FIR against him, nor about his arrest by the police, nor even about the grant of bail to him on 23.05.2025. This omission on the part of the applicant assumes significance inasmuch as his contractual engagement was due for extension w.e.f. 11.02.2025, which is subsequent to the date of registration of the FIR and his arrest. Had the applicant disclosed these material facts to the respondents in a timely manner, the competent authority under the respondents would have been in a position to take an informed decision regarding the continuation or otherwise of his contractual engagement. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that such non-disclosure had a direct bearing on the decision-making process concerning extension of his contract. 10.1 Further, the deliberate suppression of material facts relating to criminal proceedings, which the applicant was duty-bound to disclose, disentitles him from seeking equitable relief. It is a settled principle of law that a person approaching a judicial forum must do so with clean hands and must disclose all relevant and material facts. The applicant simply stated in the OA that he reported for duty by way of joining letter sent to the respondents via email on 24.5.2025 and another letter dated 27.5.2025 wherein only he has stated the factum of registration of FIR, his arrest and release on bail (Annexure A/8 and Annexure A/9 respectively). In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the applicant has failed to approach this Tribunal with candour and has not come with clean hands.
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10.2 It is profitable to note the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P., reported in (2013) 2 SCC 398, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:
"32.1. Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure of facts and came to the courts with "unclean hands". Courts have held that such litigants are neither entitled to be heard on the merits of the case nor are entitled to any relief. *** 32.3. The obligation to approach the court with clean hands is an absolute obligation and has repeatedly been reiterated by this Court."
11. Since the core issue arising for adjudication in the present case is whether the impugned order dated 17.07.2015, though ostensibly passed in terms of the contractual conditions, is in substance a termination simpliciter or a stigmatic/punitive termination founded on allegations of misconduct, we consider it appropriate, in the interest of justice, to examine the legality and validity of the said impugned order dated 17.07.2015. For a proper appreciation of its true nature, scope, and effect, the said order is reproduced hereunder:
"No.Dir(Ayush)/MCD/2025-26/D-389 Dated: 17/07/2025 TERMINATION LETTER Dr. Himanshu Sharma engaged on contract basis as Medical Officer in Ayurveda Section of Ayush Department, MCD stand terminated subsequent to his arrest by Nagpur Maharashtra Police and legal Custody for approximately 03 months. Currently, he is facing legal proceedings and out on bail.
Accordingly, his contract agreement stand terminated w.e.f. date of his arrest i.e. 24.02.2025.
This issues with the approval of the Competent Authority i.e. Commissioner, MCD Sd/-
Director (Ayush) B.P. BHARDWAJ 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 21 OA No.2922/2025 Director (AYUSH) Municipal Corporation of Delhi
1. Dr. Himanshu Sharma S/o Sh. Jai Prakash Sharma (BMID-40001389), Medical Officer (Contractual) Through-RS, AVH Ballimaran"
12. In the present case, although the respondents seek to justify the impugned action as one taken strictly in terms of the contractual conditions stipulated in the applicant's initial contract, however, a careful perusal of the impugned order, as extracted hereinabove, clearly reveals that the termination is founded upon allegations relating to the applicant's arrest, detention, and alleged involvement in the said criminal case. Such recitals unmistakably indicate that the order is not a termination simpliciter, but is stigmatic in nature. By no stretch of imagination can the said action be construed as a mere termination simpliciter, inasmuch as it is predicated upon alleged misconduct and carries adverse civil consequences for the applicant.
13. Once an order attributes reasons which cast a shadow on the conduct or character of an employee, the same becomes stigmatic in nature. The respondents cannot simultaneously rely on a "no reason" clause and yet justify termination on specific allegations. The foundation of the impugned order is not the expiry or non- renewal of contract, but alleged misconduct inferred from the said criminal proceedings initiated against him. Hence, the action is clearly punitive in nature.
14. At this stage, it is profitable to refer the Order/Judgment of the coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in Amar Jeet Singh (supra) in 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 22 OA No.2922/2025 which the issue was also identical as involved in this case and the coordinate Bench has observed as under:-
13. Moreover, the order dated 14.12.2022 of the Appellate Authority is also not a speaking one and, therefore, in violation of principles of natural justice. In view of the aforesaid, the question that now arises for consideration is as to whether, simply for the reason that the applicant had been working as Conductor on contractual basis, can the respondents terminate his services on the ground of misconduct without conducting an inquiry and whether the same is sustainable in law. The issue is no more res integra in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Swati Priyadarshini (supra), paragraphs 4 to 9 and 34 to 37 of which read as under:-
4. On 15.10.2012, the sole appellant was appointed by the Respondent No. 4 to the post of Assistant Project Coordinator (hereinafter referred to as "APC") under the Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan (hereinafter referred to as "SSA") on contract basis, initially for one academic session (1 year), renewable in subsequent years for two years each "subject to evaluation of work in the first year."
5. It was contended by the appellant that she received some information about alleged misconduct and immoral activity going on in the CWSN (abbreviation for "Children with Special Needs") Girls' Hostel, Sehore (hereinafter referred to as the "hostel") run by one Bright Star Social Society, a non-governmental organization (hereinafter referred to as "Bright Star"). The State Level Committee raided the hostel on a complaint made by the appellant. The State Level Committee found the allegations, made by the appellant to be true eventually leading to termination of the Memorandum of Understanding with Bright Star to run the hostel with effect from 08.01.2013.
6. On 09.01.2013, the appellant was made in-charge of the hostel. An order was issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer and Magistrate, Sehore on 10.01.2013 to the District Coordinator, State Education Centre, Sehore to lodge a First Information Report against the warden under whose supervision the alleged crime(s) was/were being committed in the hostel.
7. By order dated 14.01.2013, charge of the hostel was withdrawn from the appellant after 5/6 days of assigning the charge. The appellant received a Show-
Cause Notice (hereinafter abbreviated to "SCN") issued by the Respondent No. 5 which reads as under1:
"The attendance register was perused by the District Project Coordinator District Education Centre, Sihore under the above subject. Absent was marked on 4th and 5th January, 2013 by me in the attendance rgister. (sic) 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 23 OA No.2922/2025 Signatures were made by you in the said dates in the attendance register and your coming in the office at 12 : 00 hours on 14.02.13 is a negligence on your part towards duties and is violation of orders of officer."
To the above, the appellant replied on 16.02.2013, stating that signatures have not been made by her on the attendance register. She stated that due to the arrival of her daughter from Bhopal on 14.02.2013, she was late on the said date. The appellant contended that whenever she comes late to work, she stays late in the office till evening 7-8 PM and completes all the work.
8. On 15.03.2013, another SCN was issued by the Respondent No. 4 to the appellant with the following charges:
"i. Marking of disabled boys/girls and verification of the specified list prepared by Social Justice was to be done by you for the execution of several activities through Arushi Institution but marking and verification was not done by you.
ii. The proceedings of appointing volunteers and MRC are prevalent in the Arushi Institution. You are also nominated therein as representative of District Education Centre but due to your in- cooperative, obstruction and negligent attitude, the appointment on the said posts could not be made and due to this reason, the other activities including education is adversely being affected. iii. No report was submitted when the monitoring of CWSN hostel was done and what improvements were made.
iv. Entry of unauthorized persons in the hostel is strictly prohibited and you being posted at a responsible post, it is your duty to ensure prohibition on the entrance of unwanted persons in the hostel but telling about this is very far and you yourself has tried to enter the hostel along with the crowd of outsiders. Further you put pressure on the senior officers to give entrance to the unauthorized persons in the hostel. The work done beyond your official duties, comes under the category of indiscipline.
v. Your head office is situated at Sihore, but you are not residing at the headquarter and come from Bhopal everyday vi. You do not come in the office at right time also and in spite of being late, you made signature on the attendance register. It is indiscipline on your part."
(sic) 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 24 OA No.2922/2025
9. The appellant vide representation dated 20.03.2013 stated that all tricks were being adopted for removing her from the post of APC. She stated that SCNs were being issued to her even for small things. She alleged non co-operation from other officers and that she was being harassed as she had complained about the hostel.
XXX XXX XXX XXX
34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5:
"28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows : Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420 : 1953 SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1954) 1 SCC 572 : (1955) 1 SCR 26]. In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India, [58 Bom LR 673 : AIR 1956 Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 25 OA No.2922/2025 for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant."
(emphasis supplied) 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 26 OA No.2922/2025
35. We would only be adding to verbosity by multiplying authorities. In view of the above dictum, it is clear that the Respondents did not comply with Clause 4 - either the first part or the second part thereof. The order dated 30.03.2013 does visit the appellant with evil consequences and would create hurdles for her re further employment.
36. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, the Impugned Judgment is quashed and set aside. The judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 20.06.2017 stands revived, however with a modification to the extent that the appellant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits including notional continuation in service at par with other similarly-situated employees, but with the back wages restricted to 50%. Further, in view of the long passage of time, we deny liberty to the respondents to proceed afresh against the appellant as was granted by the learned Single Judge. However, this will not preclude the respondents from taking action against the appellant in accordance with law in futuro apropos her official duties on the post in question, if the situation so arises. The exercise be completed within three months from the date of receipt of this judgment.
37. The appeal is allowed and disposed of on the above terms while leaving the parties to bear their own expenses."
14. In view of the aforesaid, O.A. is allowed with the following directions:-
(i) Impugned termination order dated 10.12.2021 (Annexure A-2) and order dated 14.12.2022 are set aside.
(ii)Applicant shall be reinstated in service from the date of his termination.
(iii) Applicant shall be entitled for consequential benefits including 50% back wages.
(iv) The aforesaid direction shall be complied with by the respondents, as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within 8 weeks of receipt of a copy of this order.
(v) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to proceed against the applicant, if they so decide, of course, in accordance with law."
14.1 The aforesaid Order/Judgment of this Tribunal was challenged by the DTC before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court by way of WP (C) No.13234/2025 titled DTC and others vs. Amar Jeet Singh EX Cont Conductor and the Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide Order/Judgment dated 29.08.2025 in the same case upheld the 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 27 OA No.2922/2025 aforesaid Order/Judgment of this Tribunal, the relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"4. To give a brief background of facts in which the present petition arises, the respondent was engaged by the petitioners on a contract basis as Conductor on 07.02.2014. His services were extended from time to time till 13.02.2022. It is the allegation of the petitioners that on 16.10.2021, while on duty, a challan was issued to the respondent on the allegation that he accepted the full fare from the passenger, however, he did not issue a ticket. A Show Cause Notice dated 20.11.2021 was accordingly issued to the respondent which proposed to award a punishment of termination of service. The respondent submitted his detailed reply to the Show Cause Notice denying the allegation levelled against him. However, by an order dated 10.12.2021, the respondent was terminated from service. The appeal filed by the respondent against the termination was also dismissed vide order dated 14.12.2022.
5. The learned Tribunal has set aside the order of termination as also the order dismissing the appeal of the respondent, on the ground that the same was stigmatic in nature, however, no departmental inquiry had been conducted by the petitioners.
6. We find no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Tribunal.
7. Accordingly, the present petition is, dismissed. Pending application is also dismissed as being infructuous."
14.2 Further, the aforesaid Order/Judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court was affirmed even on a challenge by the DTC before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.36275/2025, titled DTC (DTC) and others vs. Amar Jeet Singh vide Judgment dated 06.02.2026, the relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"3. Having considered the contentions made across the Bar, we do not find any reason to grant Special Leave to Appeal.
4. As such, the present Special Leave Petition is dismissed on merits."
14.3 Further, this Division Bench also vide Order/Judgment dated 30.04.2025 passed in OA No.3648/2019, titled Ms. Sadha Sharma vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others had an occasion to consider the similar issue and having regard to the judgments of 2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 28 OA No.2922/2025 the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and of this Tribunal observed as under:-
"25. It is well settled position of law that if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. In this case, the perusal of the proceedings and documents connected with the formal order of termination reveal the true nature of the termination. After going through the above mentioned order, we find that the order is afflicted with a punitive flavour in cause or consequence. To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the respondents are satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the applicant, is a dismissal, even if they had the right in law to terminate the applicant with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. In such a case whether the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order, does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the respondents abandon the enquiry and proceed to terminate. Therefore, we hold that given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service, the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non- injurious terminology is used.
26. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, The Original Application is allowed with the following directions: -
(a) the Impugned orders dated 4.12.2019 (Annex. A/1) and order dated 3.1.2019 (Annex. A/2) are quashed and set aside.
(b) The respondents are directed to reinstate the applicant in service with all consequential benefits, including arrears of back wages and continuity in service for all purposes including notional continuation in service but with the back wages restricted to 50%.
(c) In view of the long passage of time, we deny liberty to the respondents to proceed afresh against the applicant. This exercise be completed within three months from the date of receipt of this judgment."
14.4 Further, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide Order/Judgment dated 23.04.2014 passed in W.P (C) No.14126/2004 in Sanjay Kumar vs. UOI and others held as under:-
2026.04.18 RAVI KANOJIA17:20:46 +05'30' Item No.13/C-2 29 OA No.2922/2025 "7. In a case where a Government servant is arrested for an alleged wrongful act committed not in discharge of official duties, the department can never have evidence to sustain the charge of doing a criminal wrong which would be a misconduct. To wit : A Government servant is charged for the offence of murder. We cannot think of the said charge being a subject matter of a disciplinary proceeding. The charge has to be tested at a regular criminal trial. If the offending act is such that a Government servant should not be permitted to perform duties in public interest, the correct thing to do is to place him under suspension.
14.5 Thus, having regard to the above observations as quoted above, we are of the firm view that the impugned order is punitive and stigmatic.
14.6 We further observe that it is a settled principle of service jurisprudence that mere registration of FIR, arrest or pendency of criminal proceedings does not amount to proof of misconduct.
Criminal law operates on the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Administrative authorities cannot pre-empt judicial determination by treating accusations as established facts. In the present case, admittedly, no conviction has been recorded till date. Admittedly, the allegations arise out of a matrimonial dispute involving the applicant's family and are yet to be tested in a competent court of law. The respondents have not demonstrated any nexus between the alleged offences and the applicant's official duties. There is no material to show that his conduct in service was affected or that institutional functioning was impaired. Therefore, mere involvement in a criminal case, without adjudication and without nexus to service, cannot constitute a valid ground for termination.
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15. We also observe that the respondents themselves admit that had the applicant been a regular employee, he would have been placed under suspension. The decision to terminate solely due to contractual status results in disproportionate and discriminatory treatment. Public employment, even in contractual form, cannot be governed by unfettered discretion. The State is required to act as a model employer. However, the impugned action reflects: absence of independent application of mind, failure to consider service record, absence of nexus with official duties, disproportionate response to unproven allegations. Therefore, the same renders the action arbitrary and violative of constitutional guarantees.
16. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, especially in view the position explained in paras 9 and 10 above, we dispose of this OA with the following directions:-
(i) The impugned order dated 17.07.2025 and impugned show cause notice dated 29.05.2025 are quashed and set aside;
(ii) In view of the findings as recorded in para 10 hereinabove, the applicant shall not be entitled for wages as a result of quashing of impugned notice dated 29.05.2025 and impugned order dated 17.07.2025, however, the respondents are directed to issue a non-stigmatic order terminating the services of the applicant.
17. No order as to costs.
18. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/ravi/
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