Madhya Pradesh High Court
Balla @ Balram And Others vs State Of M.P. on 14 November, 2017
Author: S.K.Awasthi
Bench: S.K.Awasthi
-( 1 )- CRA No. 455/1999
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH AT GWALIOR
DIVISION BENCH
BEFORE: HON.SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY YADAV
AND
HON. SHRI JUSTICE S.K.AWASTHI
Criminal appeal No. 455/1999
Balla @ Balram and others
Versus
State of Madhya Pradesh
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Shri R.K.Sharma, learned senior counsel with Shri
H.K.Shukla and Shri V.K.Agrawal, counsel for the
appellants.
Shri J.M.Sahni, learned Panel Lawyer, for the
respondent/ State.
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JUDGMENT
(14/11/2017) Per S.K.Awasthi, J.:
The instant Criminal Appeal is preferred to challenge the judgment dated 29.07.1999 passed in Sessions Trial No. 219 of 1 997 and 260 of 1997 by Additional Sessions Judge, Gohad, District Bhind, whereby the Trial Court convicted the present appellant No.1-Balla @ Balram for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 and appellants No.2 and 3-Ramsiya and Ashok for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC with respect to all the appellants; however, appellants No. 2 and 3 have been additionally convicted for commission of offences punishable under Section 323 of IPC. The appellants have been sentenced to undergo rigorous Life Imprisonment with respect to offence under Section 302 of IPC and fine of Rs.500/- each for appellants No. 2 and 3 with respect to offence under Section 323 of IPC.-( 2 )- CRA No. 455/1999
2. The facts necessary to be stated for disposal of the instant appeal are that on 26.07.1997, during evening time, the son, Balveer (PW-5), of the deceased, Roop Singh, went to a well to fetch water when the mother of appellants No. 2 and 3 who is the wife of appellants No. 1 also visited the same tube-well for fetching water; however, the utensil of Balveer (PW-5) was placed near to a circular pitcher brought by the mother of appellants No. 2 and 3 and while lifting up the utensil of Balveer, the circular pitcher got nudged and broken.
3. According to the prosecution story, the mother of the appellants No. 2 and 3 informed this incident to her husband, appellant No. 1, who thereafter being anguished by the act of Balveer, son of deceased, visited the house of deceased Roop Singh, along with appellants No. 2 and 3. The appellant No. 1 was equipped with a Dhariya (sharp edged weapon) and the appellants No. 2 and 3 were equipped with Lathis respectively.
4. The appellants, in furtherance to a common intention, confronted the deceased Roop Singh and asked him as to why the utensil of the mother of appellants No. 2 and 3 was broken by Balveer, son of deceased. Consequently, the deceased apologized for the mistake and offered to bear the cost of the broken utensil. However, suddenly, the appellant No. 1 inflicted an injury by using Dharia on the head of the deceased Roop Singh, due to which blood started oozing out from his head. Thereafter, the appellant No. 3 inflicted the second injury on the right side of the head of the deceased which resulted in severe bleeding and the deceased, Roop Singh, collapsed on the ground. Subsequently, the appellants No. 3 inflicted another injury on the forehead of the deceased Roop Singh also -( 3 )- CRA No. 455/1999 resulting in bleeding. At this juncture, Balveer, son of the deceased, tried to intercept the fight; however, he was prevented by appellant No. 2 who inflicted an injury on Balveer using a Lathi. At the same time, the sister-in-law, Kesar Bai (PW-1) tried to save the deceased but again appellant No. 2 stopped her and gave her a beating with the Lathi. This incident was witnessed by Ram Kishan (PW-3), Balmukund (PW-11) and Madhav Ram (PW-4).
5. Thereafter, the deceased Roop Singh was taken to Police Station and the incident was reported to Police at around 9.30 PM whereas as per the First Information Report, the incident is alleged to have been occurred at 6.30 PM. The deceased Roop Singh was taken to the Hospital where his medical examination was conducted by Dr. J.P. Gupta (PW-9) and he was given primary treatment although upon noticing deterioration in his medical condition, the doctor referred the deceased to the District Hospital in Gwalior. However, on the next day, the deceased succumbed to the injuries and died at around 10.20 AM. Thereafter his body was sent for Post mortem which was conducted by Dr. Yogendra Singh Kushwaha (PW-15). According to the Post Mortem report (Ex P-21) the death was homicidal in nature and had occurred on account of fatal injuries inflicted on the head which caused fracture at the temporal area of the head.
6. Consequently the police proceeded to file the chargesheet under section 302 read with section 34 of IPC against the appellants and the learned Trial Court framed charges against appellant No. 1 for offence punishable under section 302 of IPC and against appellants No. 2 and 3 for offences punishable under section 302 read with section 34 and under section 323 -( 4 )- CRA No. 455/1999 of IPC.
7. The prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses to establish its story, whereas the defence also produced three witnesses to strengthen their version. However the Trial Court arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution has duly established its story and there is significant material available against the appellants which is sufficient to convict them for the offences charged against them. Consequently vide the impugned judgment the appellants were held guilty and were convicted with punishment to undergo Rigorous Life imprisonment, whereas the appellants No. 2 and 3 were additionally convicted for offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC. The appellants have preferred this common appeal against a common judgment passed with respect to two separate Session Trials bearing No. 219/1997 and 260/1997.
8. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that, the impugned judgment suffers from several errors which are sufficient to set aside the same. He submits that, the prosecution has not explained the delay in filling of FIR as the incidence occurred at 06.30 PM and the information to police station was given at 09.30 PM whereas the police station is merely 3 KM away from the alleged crime scene. The learned counsel further submits that the trial court was swayed away by the opinion recorded by the Doctor in the Post Mortem report (Ex P-21) which indicated the fracture on the top of the head, whereas there was no injury which was found on that area in the medical report (Ex P-13) which was prepared immediately after the incidence, which renders the post mortem report doubtful. It has been vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the -( 5 )- CRA No. 455/1999 appellants that, the present appellants have been falsely implicated in the present case because of the previous enmity between the appellants and the family of the deceased, which goes back to more than 25 years. The witnesses who were examined by the prosecution are interested witnesses and their testimony cannot be relied upon. He further submitted that, the prosecution witnesses No. 6 and 7, who had witnessed the recovery of the weapons used in the commission of the crime, were declared hostile, which renders the only circumstantial evidence irrelevant. The learned counsel for the appellants also referred to the statement of Kesharbai (PW-1), more particularly Para No. 4 of her statement, in which she had admitted to the fact that, at the time of incidence the darkness was setting in, from which it can be reasonably inferred that the witness could have committed mistake in identification of accused persons. Thereafter in Para 7 and 8 of her statement, the witness has supported the contention of the appellants that the Police Station was near to the place of incidence, and that she had reached the place of incidence at a time when the deceased had already fallen on the ground. Therefore her testimony deserves to be discarded. The learned counsel further submitted that, according to Balveer (PW-5), the weapon used by the appellants No.1 was "Dhariya" and not "Kulhadi", whereas according to the memorandum of appellant No.1 (Ex P-8), the police has recovered "Kulhadi" from the house of appellant No.1. Thus, in absence of the recovery of weapon used for commission of the crime the conviction of the appellants deserves to be set aside. Therefore the impugned judgment deserves to be interfered with, and that the defence evidence produced -( 6 )- CRA No. 455/1999 before the Court below be made the basis for understanding the actual sequence of events. Lastly, it has been argued that, the nature of injuries inflicted on the deceased are not sufficient in ordinary course to cause death, therefore the conviction made by the Trial Court under Section 302 of the IPC be converted into conviction under section 304 part II of the IPC.
9. To the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent supported reasoning of the learned Trial Court and submitted that, there is overwhelming evidence available against the present appellants, which is sufficient to uphold the conviction by the Trial Court.
10. We have duly examined the record and have considered the rival contention canvassed by both the parties.
11. Balveer Singh (PW-5) stated that 7-8 months ago, at about 6 pm he went to a tube-well to fetch the water where the mother of appellants No.2 and 3 also visited the same tube-well for fetching the water, however her utensil was placed near to a circular pitcher brought by the mother of appellants No.2 and 3 and while lifting up the utensil, the circular pitcher got nudged and broken. Thereafter, Balla @ Balram, Ramsiya and Ashok came to his house equipped with Dhariya and lathis and they confronted with his father Roop Singh and asked him as to why the utensil of the mother of appellants No.2 and 3 was broken by Balveer. Consequently, Roop Singh apologized for the mistake and offered the cost of the broken utensil. However, suddenly appellant No.1 inflicted blow of Dhariya on the head of Roop Singh, due to which blood started oozing then appellant No.3 Ashok caused second injury on the left side of the head and another injury on the on the right side of the head of -( 7 )- CRA No. 455/1999 Roop Singh by lathi, due to which Roop Singh fell down on the ground. He was taken to the Police Station Endori in a tractor and lodged the FIR Ex.P/3 and after lodging the report the deceased was sent to the hospital where he died. Kesharbai (PW-1) and Ramkishan (PW-3) supported the statement of Balveer Singh (PW-5).
12. Dr. Yogendra Singh Kushwaha (PW-15) conducted the post-mortem on the body of the deceased Roop Singh and found following injuries:
(i) One stitched wound 4-1/2 cm. with 5 stitches on the left side of forehead obliquely placed at upper part.
(ii) One stitched wound 3 cm. with 3 stitches on left forehead with deep abrasion 4-1/2 x 2 cm. just above left eyebrow.
(iii) One abrasion 2 x 2 cm. on lower part of sternum on chest.
(iv) One stitched wound 4-1/2 cm. with 4 stitches, middle and upper part of forehead with blackening of both eye lids around.
(v) Depressed fracture 9 x 5 cm. on middle parietal region slight shifted right side with tear in membrane & brain matter. Blood under scalp of an area of 10 x 12 cm.
The doctor opined that the injuries were fatal and sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
13. The first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is with respect to the delay in lodging of the FIR as the incidence occurred at 06.30 PM and the information to police station was given at 09.30 PM whereas the police station is merely 3 KM away from the alleged crime scene. We are not inclined to accept -( 8 )- CRA No. 455/1999 this contention raised by the appellants because, in the statement of Balveer (PW-5), who is the son of the deceased, an explanation has been given that, they were making efforts to arrange for tractor so that, the deceased may be taken to the Hospital. Apart from it, the delay of three hours is not significant to throw away the entire prosecution.
14. The next contention canvassed before us is that, there is apparent anomaly in the Post Mortem report (Ex P-21) and Medical Report (Ex P-13) as the medical report (Ex. P-13) only observes three injuries on the deceased which includes two lacerated wounds on the head and one contusion above the eyebrow of the deceased, which are not sufficient to cause death. Therefore, the trial court has committed grave error in believing on the post-mortem Report (Ex.P-21). The submission of the learned counsel cannot be accepted for the reason that, in Medical Report (Ex.P-13) the treating Doctor had advised for X-ray to understand the gravity of the injuries, thus, Ex.P-13 was not a conclusive report, whereas, the P.M. Report was prepared after thorough examination and the doctor preparing the same had noticed the fracture on the skull which was the primary reason for the death of Roop Singh. Further, the ocular witnesses have narrated the exact manner in which the injuries were inflicted by the appellants. In any case, with respect to the inconsistency between Ocular and Medical Evidence, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P., (2016) 4 SCC 357, has held in the following manner:
"26. We are of the view that the High Court, for acquitting the respondents, had mainly relied upon the medical evidence in a very inappropriate manner. When the doctor (PW -( 9 )- CRA No. 455/1999
7) in his examination-in-chief had categorically stated that the incident could have occurred at 8.00 a.m. which corroborated the case of the informant, there was no reason to disbelieve this fact to hold that the incident occurred between 2.00 to 4.00 a.m. merely basing on a vague statement made by the doctor in the cross-examination.
Also we believe that merely for the reason that no blunt injuries were present on the deceased, the whole evidence of PW 1 cannot be discarded as primacy has to be given to the ocular evidence, particularly in the case of minor discrepancies. This Court in Darbara Singh v. State of Punjab [Darbara Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 476 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 1037] , wherein this Court has held: (SCC pp. 480-81, para 10) "10. ... So far as the question of inconsistency between the medical evidence and the ocular evidence is concerned, the law is well settled that, unless the oral evidence available is totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, the oral evidence would have primacy. In the event of contradictions between medical and ocular evidence, the ocular testimony of a witness will have greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence and when medical evidence makes the oral testimony improbable, the same becomes a relevant factor in the process of evaluation of such evidence. It is only when the contradiction between the two is so extreme that the medical evidence completely rules out all possibilities of the ocular evidence being true at all, that the ocular evidence is liable to be disbelieved."
(emphasis supplied)"
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in another judgment in the case of Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 8 SCC 270, has laid down following proposition of law:
"11. It is to be noted that PWs 7 and 13 were the injured witnesses and PW 10 -( 10 )- CRA No. 455/1999 was another eyewitness and was the informant. Law is fairly well settled that even if acquittal is recorded in respect of the co-accused on the ground that there were exaggerations and embellishments, yet conviction can be recorded if the evidence is found cogent, credible and truthful in respect of another accused. The mere fact that the witnesses were related to the deceased cannot be a ground to discard their evidence.
12. In law, testimony of an injured witness is given importance. When the eyewitnesses are stated to be interested and inimically disposed towards the accused, it has to be noted that it would not be proper to conclude that they would shield the real culprit and rope in innocent persons. The truth or otherwise of the evidence has to be weighed pragmatically. The court would be required to analyse the evidence of related witnesses and those witnesses who are inimically disposed towards the accused. But if after careful analysis and scrutiny of their evidence, the version given by the witnesses appears to be clear, cogent and credible, there is no reason to discard the same. Conviction can be made on the basis of such evidence."
16. The perusal of the aforesaid leaves no scope for this court to accede to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant.
17. The next contention is with respect to the failure of prosecution in examining the so-called independent Witnesses. Thus, the learned counsel for the appellants submits that, the conviction cannot be recorded merely on the basis of the statements of the partisan witnesses.
18. This contention can be best answered by referring to the observations given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jayabalan v. UT of Pondicherry, (2010) 1 SCC 199, in the following manner:
"23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal -( 11 )- CRA No. 455/1999 with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court, while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim."
19. In another Judgment by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Seeman v. State, (2005) 11 SCC 142, following has been observed:
"4. It is now well settled that the evidence of witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is a related witness or the sole witness, or both, if otherwise the same is found credible. The witness could be a relative but that does not mean to reject his statement in totality. In such a case, it is the paramount duty of the court to be more careful in the matter of scrutiny of evidence of the interested witness, and if, on such scrutiny it is found that the evidence on record of such interested sole witness is worth credence, the same would not be discarded merely on the ground that the witness is an interested witness. Caution is to be applied by the court while scrutinising the evidence of the interested sole witness. The prosecution's non-production of one independent witness who has been named in the FIR by itself cannot be taken to be a circumstance to discredit the evidence of the interested witness and disbelieve the prosecution case. It is well settled that it is the quality of the evidence and not the quantity of the evidence which is required to be judged by the court to place credence on the statement."
20. In the context of these reproduced portions of the judgments, if the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is examined, then we have no hesitation -( 12 )- CRA No. 455/1999 in concluding that the statements of Kesharbai (PW-1) and Balveer (PW-5) are consistent and establish the prosecution version of the story. In fact, the statement of Balveer (PW-5) clearly narrates the events as they transpired on 26.07.1997 and the role played by the appellants, which finds support from the Medical Report i.e. Exhibit P-13, and Post-Mortem Report i.e. Exhibit P-21. Therefore, merely because the appellants are relatives of the deceased, the entire testimony of Kesharbai (PW-1) and Balveer (PW-5) cannot be discredited. Further, the statement of Ram Kishan (PW-
3) has also complemented the prosecution story and had described the role of each appellant.
21. The learned counsel further submitted that, according to Balveer (PW-5), the weapon used by the appellant No.1 was "Dhariya" and not "Kulhadi", whereas according to the memorandum of appellant No.1 (Ex P-8), the police has recovered "Kulhadi" from the house of appellant No.1. Thus, in absence of the recovery of weapon used for commission of the crime the conviction of the appellants deserves to be set aside.
22. With regard to the aforestated contention the Hon'ble Supreme Court has given observations in the case of Mritunjoy Biswas v. Pranab, (2013) 12 SCC 796, as under:-
"33. The learned counsel for the respondent has urged before us that there has been no recovery of weapon from the accused and hence, the prosecution case deserves to be thrown overboard and, therefore, the judgment of acquittal does not warrant interference.
34. In Lakshmi v. State of U.P. [(2002) 7 SCC 198 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1647] this Court has ruled that: (SCC p. 205, para 16) -( 13 )- CRA No. 455/1999 "16. Undoubtedly, the identification of the body, cause of death and recovery of weapon with which the injury may have been inflicted on the deceased are some of the important factors to be established by the prosecution in an ordinary given case to bring home the charge of offence under Section 302 IPC. This, however, is not an inflexible rule. It cannot be held as a general and broad proposition of law that where these aspects are not established, it would be fatal to the case of the prosecution and in all cases and eventualities, it ought to result in the acquittal of those who may be charged with the offence of murder."
35. In Lakhan Sao v. State of Bihar [(2000) 9 SCC 82 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1163] it has been opined that: (SCC p. 87, para 18) "18. The non-recovery of the pistol or spent cartridge does not detract from the case of the prosecution where the direct evidence is acceptable."
36. In State of Rajasthan v. Arjun Singh [(2011) 9 SCC 115 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 647] this Court has expressed that: (SCC p. 122, para 18) "18. ... mere non-recovery of pistol or cartridge does not detract the case of the prosecution where clinching and direct evidence is acceptable. Likewise, absence of evidence regarding recovery of used pellets, bloodstained clothes, etc. cannot be taken or construed as no such occurrence had taken place."
Thus, when there is ample unimpeachable ocular evidence and the same has been corroborated by the medical evidence, non- recovery of the weapon does not affect the prosecution case."
Thus, the contention that, the weapon used has not been recovered is inconsequential in light of the strong ocular evidence.
23. Kesharbai (PW-1) and Ramkishan (PW-3) admitted in their cross-examination that when they reached on the -( 14 )- CRA No. 455/1999 spot, they have found that Roop Singh was lying on their platform. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that from such admission it is clear that these witnesses were not present at the time of incident and they reached on the spot lateron but we are not convinced with this contention because both the witnesses admitted that at the time of incident they were in their house and from perusal of the spot map, Ex.P/23, it reveals that the house of Ramkishan is located infromt of the place of incident.
24. The next contention canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants is that, the recovery witnesses had turned hostile therefore, dealing major dent to the prosecution case. In the considered opinion of this Court, this Contention also deserves to be repelled because the witnesses Harivilas (PW-6) & Nathuram (PW-7) in their examination in chief have admitted their signatures on memos and have also denied the suggestions given by the learned counsel for the accused persons that, the recovery of articles did not take place in their presence.
25. This contention can be answered by placing reliance on the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646, wherein the following observations were made:
"45.3.Thirdly, even the version given by PW 13 and PW 23 partially supports the case of the prosecution, though in bits and pieces. For example, PW 23 has stated that the driver of the Maruti van was Manik Das and also that he had taken out the vehicle from the parking lot at about 9.30 p.m. on the day of the incident and had brought it back after midnight. He also stated that this car was being driven by Manik Das. Similarly, PW 13 also admitted that other rickshaws were standing at the stand. This was the place where PW 9 and PW 11 had seen the -( 15 )- CRA No. 455/1999 loading of the gunny bags into the Maruti van. In other words, even the statements of witnesses PW 13 and PW 23, who had turned hostile, have partially supported the case of the prosecution. It is a settled principle of law that statement of a hostile witness can also be relied upon by the court to the extent it supports the case of the prosecution. Reference in this regard can be made to Govindaraju v. State [(2012) 4 SCC 722 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 533]"
(emphasis supplied)
26. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Trial Court ought to have convicted the appellants under Section 304 Part-II of IPC in view of the fact that, as per the post mortem report there were three accused persons and they had cornered the victim. Thus, they had enough opportunity to inflict repeated injuries on the vital part of the body although only one injury on the top of the head of the deceased was observed, but we do not agree with the submission of learned counsel for the appellants. In our considered view, the appellants reached at the house of Roop Singh having deadly weapons and caused injuries on the vital parts of the body of the deceased Roop Singh. The deceased died instantaneously after receiving the injuries. In that event, intention to commit murder can definitely be attributed to the appellants.
27. In the case of Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"(12) To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under S. 300 "thirdly" ;
First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present ;
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.
-( 16 )- CRA No. 455/1999Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
(13) Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under S.300 , "thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was Do intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional."
28. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Mahesh Balmiki vs. State of MP, 2000 (1) Vidhi Bhasvar 1, has held as under:-
"9. Adverting to the contention of a single blow, it may be pointed out that there is no principle that in all cases of single blow -( 17 )- CRA No. 455/1999 Section 302 I.P.C. is not attracted. Single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction under Section 302 I.P.C., in some cases under Section 304 I.P.C and in some other cases under Section 326 I.P.C. The question with regard to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. The nature of the injury, whether it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body, the weapon used, the circumstances in which the injury is caused and the manner in which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the offender and the offence committed by him. In the instant case, the deceased was disabled from saving himself because he was held by the associates of the appellant who inflicted though a single yet a fatal blow of the description noted above. These facts clearly establish that the appellant had intention to kill the deceased. In any event, he can safely be attributed knowledge that the knife blow given by him is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death."
29. Taking this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court has not committed any error in convicting the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and additionally appellants No.2 and 3 under Section 323 of IPC. Therefore, this appeal is hereby dismissed by confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court.
30. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds are cancelled. They are directed to surrender before the trial Court without any delay so that they may be sent to jail for execution of remaining part of their jail sentence.
A copy of the judgment be sent to the trial Court along with the record for information and compliance.
(Sanjay Yadav) (S.K.Awasthi)
(Yog) Judge Judge
YOGESH
Digitally signed by YOGESH VERMA
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF M.P. BENCH
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