Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Ajay Kumar vs Home Affairs on 31 October, 2025
1
Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH: NEW DELHI
O.A. No. 4696/2024
Reserved on: 14.10.2025
Pronounced on: 31.10.2025
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon'ble Dr. Anand S. Khati, Member (A)
Ajay Kumar
Aged about 26 years,
S/o Shri Manchand,
R/o Thana Gajrola,
District Bulandshahar,
Uttar Pradesh - 203398
Phone No.: +91 9354797610
...Applicant
(By Advocates: Mr. Setu Niket, Ms. Esha Mazumdar
Mazumdar)
Versus
1. Union of India
Through Secretary (Home),
Ministry of Home Affairs,
North Block,
ck,
New Delhi - 110001.
2. Delhi Police
Through Commissioner of Police,
Delhi Police Headquarters,
Behind Parliament Street Police Station,
New Delhi - 110001.
3. Addl. Commissioner of Police, HQ-II
HQ II (Recruitment)
Police Headquarters,
Jai Singh Road,
New Delhi - 110001.
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Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024
4. Staff Selection Commission
Through its Chairman,
Northern Region,
Block No. 12, CGO Complex,
Lodhi Road,
New Delhi - 110003.
...Respondents
(By Advocates: Mr. J.P. Tiwari)
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J) :
In the present Original Application, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:
"A. A. Call for the records of the case;
B. Quash and set aside the impugned order dated 04/11/2024;
C. Direct the Respondents to appoint the Applicant to the post of Constable (Exe.) with with all consequential benefits, including arrears, etc.;
D. Award the cost of the proceedings; and E. Pass any other order/relief/direction(s) as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice in favor of the Applicant."
2. Narrating the facts of the case, learned counsel for the Narrating applicant submitted that the applicant applied for the post of Constable (Executive) (Male) in Delhi Police under the SC category in response to the SSC notification dated 3 Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 01.09.2023. He successfully qualified qualified the Computer Computer-Based Examination held on 17.11.2023, the Physical Efficiency/Standard Test on 14.01.2024, and the medical examination on 20.01.2024, and was included in the final merit list. During the attestation process, he disclosed his prior involvement involvement in FIR No. 114/2020 registered at PS Narsena, Bulandshahr under Sections 147, 148, 452, 323, and 427 of IPC, in which he was later honourably acquitted on 02.08.2023, as the case arose from a false and fabricated dispute and no evidence was produced a against him.
2.1. Learned counsel argued that despite being meritorious, fit, and having disclosed all relevant facts, the respondents arbitrarily denied appointment to the applicant by issuing a show-cause cause notice on 21.03.2024 and subsequently cancelling his candidature on 04.11.2024 solely based on the prior FIR.
2.2. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that such denial of appointment to the applicant amounts to vicarious punishment, violates principles of 4 Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 natural justice, legitimate expectation, and Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution, and is arbitrary and discriminatory, as established precedents hold that an acquitted candidate cannot be denied public employment on the basis of a prior FIR.
2.3. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that in view of the above facts the applicant has approached this Tribunal seeking directions to quash the impugned order and secure his appointment to the post of Constable (Executive) with all consequential ben benefits.
3. Opposing the grant of relief, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the applicant applied for the post of Constable (Executive) (Male) in Delhi Police in response to the SSC notification dated 01.09.2023. His selection was provisional, provisional, subject to verification of character, antecedents, medical fitness, and final scrutiny of documents, in accordance with Rule 9 of the Delhi Police (Appointment & Recruitment) Rules, 1980 and Standing Order No. HRD/04/2022. During the attestation process process, the applicant disclosed his prior involvement in FIR No. 5 Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 114/2020 registered at PS Narsena, Bulandshahr under Sections 147, 148, 452, 323, and 427 IPC. Learned counsel submtited that the applicant was acquitted by the trial court because material witness witnesses, including the complainant, turned hostile.
3.1. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the case of the applicant was referred to the Screening Committee, which assessed the nature and gravity of the offences. In view of the serious nature of the charges and in accordance with Standing Order HRD/12/2022 of the Delhi Police and judicial precedents, the Committee concluded that the acquittal could not be treated as an "honourable acquittal" and that the applicant was not suitable for induction induction into the disciplined force of the Delhi Police. Accordingly, the applicant's candidature was cancelled on 04.11.2024 after issuance of a show show-cause notice and due consideration of his reply. 3.2. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the he Screening Committee observed that the acquittal of the applicant could not be treated as an "honorable acquittal" 6
Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 in view of the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India vs Methu Meda (Civil Appeal No. 6238 of 2021, arising out of Special Special Leave Petition (C) No. 23856 of 2014). The Committee noted that the nature and gravity of the offence were serious. Further, the applicant's reply to the Show Cause Notice was found to be unconvincing. 3.3 Concluding the arguments, learned counsel for th the respondents aruged that the cancellation of the candidature of the applicant was neither arbitrary nor mechanical; it was a lawful exercise of discretion to maintain the integrity, discipline, and probity of the police force and that the action of the re respondents is fully supported by statutory rules, administrative policy, and binding judicial precedents, and thus the OA is devoid of merit.
4. In rejoinder to the arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the respondents, learned counsel for the applicant strongly emphasized that the cancellation of his candidature is arbitrary despite his honourable acquittal. Learned counsel submitted that FIR No. 114/2020 was 7 Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 false and fabricated, arising out of rivalry between parties, and no compromise or settlement occurred. The prosecution failed to produce any evidence to substantiate the charges, including weapons, medical, or scientific evidence. The The applicant's acquittal should be considered "honourable" as the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charges after full trial, in line with judicial pronouncements, and the nature or gravity of the alleged offence cannot disqualify him. Once the appl applicant qualified all stages and scored above the cut cut-off, the principle of legitimate expectation arises, and he has a right to be considered for appointment. The Screening Committee acted mechanically and on a presumption of guilt, ignoring the acquittal and and misapplying Standing Order HRD/12/2022. Learned counsel also relied upon judicial precedents and Apex Court guidance on moral turpitude and "honourable acquittal" to submit that trivial brushes with law cannot indicate unfitness for public service.
5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the pleadings available on record. 8
Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 6. ANALYSIS : 6.1 In the aforesaid background, it is necessary to
examine the case of the applicant in light of the principles Court in Union of India vs laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court Methu Meda (supra).
6.2 It may be noted that the present case does not involve non-disclosure disclosure or concealment of material facts, where an acquittal could impede employment in a disciplined force. Undisputedly, during the attestation attestation process, the applicant disclosed his prior involvement in FIR No. 114/2020 registered at PS Narsena, Bulandshahr, under Sections 147, 148, 452, 323, and 427 IPC. The applicant was acquitted by the Trial Court, Court, not on the basis of full exoneration, but because because key witnesses, including the complainant, turned hostile.
6.3 The rejection of the candidature of the applicant on the basis of HRM/12/2022 in a mechanical manner cannot be accepted. Furthermore, the Screening Committee cannot supplement or substitute substitute its own opinion on the merits of the criminal trial. The Screening Committee has to arrive at 9 Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 a decision independent of the observations made by the Trial Court while acquitting the charged person and, as such, not to sit in appeal over the decision so arrived at. 6.4 We also draw a reference to decision rendered in Mohd Imran Vs State of Maharastra and ors ( AIR 2018 SC 4895) , wherein it was held :-
:
"7. That the expression "moral turpitude" is not capable of precise definition was considered in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and another, (1996) 4 SCC 17: (AIR 1996 SC 3300), opining: "12. "Moral turpitude" is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any c connection showing depravity."
10. In the present proceedings, on 23.03.2018, this Court had called for a confidential report of the character verification as also the antecedents of the appellant as on this date. The report received reveals that except for the criminal case under reference, in which he has been acquitted, the appellant has a clean record and there is no adverse material against him to deny him the fruits of his academic labour in a competitive selection for the post of a judicial officer. In In our opinion, no reasonable person on the basis of the materials placed before us can come to the conclusion that the antecedents and character of the appellant are such that he is unfit to be appointed as a judicial officer. An alleged single misadventure or misdemeanour of the present nature, if misadventure it can be considered to be so, cannot be sufficient to deny appointment to the appellant when he has on all other aspects and parameters been found to be fit for appointment. The Law is well-well-settled in this regard in Avtar Singh v. Union of India and others, (2016) 8 SCC 471: (AIR 2016 SC 3598). If empanelment creates no right to appointment, equally there can be no arbitrary denial of appointment after empanelment." 10
Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 6.5 In a recent decision arising out of W.P.(C W.P.(C) 15591/2025 & CM APPL. 63795/2025, CM APPL. 63796/2025, CM APPL. 63797/2025 -- Employees State Insurance Corporation & Ors. vs. Vinod Kumar Kumar, decided on 10.10.2025, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court observed as follows:
17. In Deputy Inspector General of Police and Anr. v.
"17.
S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598, the Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" and held that where the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution's evidence and wherein the prosecution has has miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can positively be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. We may quote from the judgment as under:
24. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal"
"24.
came up for consideration before this Court inRBIv.Bhopal Singh Panchal[(1994) 1 SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594 :
(1994) 26 ATC 619] . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted."
18. The above principle was followed by the Supreme Court in Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and Ors., (2015) 2 SCC 377; and by Division Bench of this Court in Manoj v. Union of India 11 Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 & Ors., Ors. 2016:DHC:4593-DB, DB, and Rajesh v. Directorate General Sashastra Seema Bal & Anr Anr., 2024:DHC:8366 2024:DHC:8366-DB.
19. In Jagdamba Singh (supra), while considering a case arising out of almost similar facts, a Division Bench of this Court emphasized that where the acquittal arises after a complete trial, the the use of the words, 'extension of benefit of doubt' cannot alone be determinative for denying the benefit of the intervening period from being treated as one spent on duty. We quote from the Judgment as under:
"13.
13. While passing the impugned order the Tr Tribunal has relied upon Union of India v. Jayaram Jayaram, reported at AIR 1960 Madras 325, wherein the Division Bench has held that the terms "honourable acquittal" or "fully exonerated"
are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in criminal jurisprudence. Relevant Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:
"There is no conception like "honourable acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the a accused is entitled to be acquitted. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of the departmental enquiry.
Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled to the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply."
14. The Tribunal has further relied upon in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab Through Secretary to Punjab Government Irrigation and Others, reported at AIR (54) 1967 Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.) Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:
"The Interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charcharge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide 12 Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused.
accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being given a benefit of doubt or for other reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Proced Procedure does not contemplate honourable acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted is the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the court the accused is acquitted."
15. The Tribunal has also relied upon Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parmanand Society v. The State of Gujarat and Another, Another, reported at 1971 SLR 473. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:
"7. ...... Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule Madras 152, with this difference, that instead of the words "fully exonerated" the words were "honourably acquitted. With respect we are in agreement with the reasons of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of honourable acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge leveled against h him and he may meet the charge - (a) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version and the prosecution version version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Court is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not satisfies established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since he is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of honourable acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that 13 Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. In Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad 325."
16. Further in the case of Bhag Singh v. Punjab and Sind Bank, Bank, reported at 2006 (1) SCT 125, the Tribunal has taken note of the observations made by a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:
"In both the cases, inspite of the clear observations that there was no evidence against the petitioner, the trial court observed that the accused are g given benefit of doubt and acquitted of the charges framed against them. Relying on the aforesaid observation, the respondents have denied the benefit of full pay and allowances to the petitioner. In our opinion, the mere use of the expression "benefit of doubt" or "not proved beyond reasonable doubt" by the doubt"
trial Court or the appellate court, cannot be permitted to convert an acquittal on the ground of no evidence, to something less than that. The concepts of "Honourable Acquittal", "fully exonerated" or "a "acquitted of blame" are all unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Therefore, the term "benefit of doubt" cannot detract from the Impact of the acquittal."
17. In the case of Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam Seshachalam, reported at 2004 (2) SLJ (SC) 254, it has been held that when criminal proceedings are launched after investigation by an outside agency and the employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension,
18. Further in the case of Commissioner of Police v. Om 18 Prakash and Others, Others, reported at 2004 (3) SLJ 272, it was held that if one is acquitted by the Court, the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes."
6.6 In W.P.(C) 12533/2024 & CM APPL. 52124/2024 -- Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. vs. Satyapal Singh Yadav, Yadav, decided on 28.01.2025, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held as under:
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Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024
17. It may not be necessary, for the purposes of the limited scope of this decision, to delve in detail into the degree of material which is required to be present in order for an inference, that a witness has been won over by the opposite party, to be drawn. What is clear in law, however, is that clause (b) of Rule 12 of the DPPAR requires a observation or a finding by the DCP, or the criminal court, that the acquittal of the charged police officer in the criminal proceeding was because he had won over the witness.
witness. A finding, or at least an observation, of such a positive misdemeanour having been committed by the police official, must figure in the opinion of the DCP.
18. A mere reference to witnesses having turned hostile does not, therefore, ipso facto or ipso jure lead to an inexorable inference that the witnesses had necessarily been won over by the charged police officer.
19. The DCP, in the present, has, therefore, obviously failed to appreciate the distinction between a finding that the witness had turned turned hostile and a finding that the witness had been won over.
20. We are in agreement with the finding of the learned Tribunal that, in fact, there is no observation by the DCP in his punishment order dated 9 March 2015 that the acquittal of the respondent in the criminal proceedings following FIR dated 3 June 2014 was because he had won over the witnesses who had earlier deposed against him.
21. While arriving at this finding, we have kept in mind the limited scope of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are not sitting in appeal over the judgment of the Tribunal. It is not permissible for us, therefore, to overturn the judgment of the Tribunal merely on the ground that another possible, or even more appropriate, inference can can be drawn, from the facts, than that drawn by the Tribunal. Our jurisdiction, over the Tribunal, is that of certiorari. The limits of certiorari jurisdiction stand classically delineated in the following passage, from Syed Yakoob v K.S. Radhakrishnan13 Radhakrishnan13:
"7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases 15 Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction.
jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard, to the party affected by the order, orr where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.
proceedings. An error of law which is appare apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately legitimately exercised.
8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even 16 Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of tthe record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or alway always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari certiorari. In our opinion, it neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleg alleged to have been misconducted or contravened."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. The acquittal of the respondent by the learned MM was not, therefore, an acquittal on "technical grounds"
within the meaning of clause (a) of Rule 12 of the DPPAR. As already noted, Ms Bandopadhyaya, too, did not labour this point.
26. In our view, therefore, neither clause (a) nor clause (b) of Rule 12 of the DPPAR applies in the present case. None of the other clauses, obviously, apply.
27. We, therefore, are in agreement with the jujudgment of the Tribunal, which set aside the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent ab initio and granted consequential relief to him.
28. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment which is upheld in its entirety. 17
Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024
29. The writ petition is dismissed in limine." 6.7 In the present case, there is nothing on record to suggest that the applicant has concealed his involvement in the alleged crime. Moreover, no other criminal antecedents against the applicant have been brought on record.
7. CONCLUSION :
7.1. In view of the foregoing discussions, the impugned action of the respondents, namely the office order dated 04.11.2024, is hereby quashed and set aside.
7.2. The respondents are directed to appoint the applicant to the postt of Constable, as he has been found meritorious and eligible for the post, within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
7.3. It is clarified that the applicant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits from the date date of actual appointment only.
7.4. The present Original Application is allowed to the above extent.18
Item No. 40 (C-4) O.A. No. 4696/2024 7.5. Pending M.A.s, if any, shall stand disposed of. No costs.
(Anand S. Khati) (Manish Garg) Member (A) Member (J) /as/