Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mrs. Damyanti Bhalla And Anr. vs Pritpal Singla on 1 December, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1999)122PLR519
Author: V.S. Aggarwal
Bench: V.S. Aggarwal
JUDGMENT V.S. Aggarwal, J.
1. The present revision petition has been filed by Mrs. Damyanti Bhalla and another, hereinafter described as the petitioners, directed against the judgment of the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, dated 22.4.1998. By virtue of the impugned judgment, learned Appellate Authority had set aside the order of the learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh, dated 11.12.1996 and dismissed the petition for eviction.
2. The relevant facts are that the petitioners had filed an application under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short "the Act"). The respondent was stated to be a tenant in the property in question as proprietor of M/s Singla Provision Stores. It was claimed that he was in arrears of rent w.e.f. 1.12.1991 and that he has changed the user of the premises from residential to commercial without the consent of the petitioners and in addition to that unauthorised additions and alterations have been made. Lastly, it had been averred that the conduct of the respondent had caused nuisance to the occupiers of the buildings in the vicinity.
3. The petition as such was contested by the respondent. On the first date of hearing the respondent had tendered the arrears of rent with interest which was accepted under protest. The relationship of landlord and tenant had not been disputed but the respondent alleged that the building in dispute was exempt from the purview of the Act. Thus, the learned Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for eviction. Petitioner No. 1 was stated to be the allottee. As per terms of the allotment, ownership rights were still vested with the Chandigarh Housing Board. It was alleged that permission had not been taken from the Chandigarh Housing Board to let the property to the respondent. The grounds of eviction were also controverted.
4. Learned trial Court had framed the issues and thereupon held that the Rent Controller had the jurisdiction to entertain the petition for eviction. An order of ejectment was passed holding that certain grounds of eviction have been proved which is not relevant for the purpose of the present revision petition. Aggrieved by the same, appeal was filed before the learned Appellate Authority. The learned Appellate Authority had set aside the order of the learned Rent Controller and held that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition because the property in question was exempt from the provisions of the Act as applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. He had proceeded on the premise that the provisions of the Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971 specifically exempts such properties from the scope and ambit of the Act.
5. Before proceeding further some of the facts which are not in controversy can conveniently be relisted. The property in dispute is a dwelling unit in Sector 44-A, Chandigarh. The property in question had been built by Chandigarh Housing Board under the Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971. The dwelling unit of which the demised property is a part had been allotted to petitioner No. 1.
6. Strong reliance is being placed on behalf of the respondent on Section 4 of the Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971 which specifically prescribes that the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act shall not apply to the building belonging to the Board. During the course of arguments, it is not being disputed that till date no conveyance deed had been executed in favour of the petitioners.
7. In order to appreciate the relevant controversy, it would be in the fitness of things to refer to Section 4 of the Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971 which reads as under:-
"The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 shall not apply nor shall be deemed to have ever applied to any land, building belonging or vesting in the Board under or for the purpose of this Act, and as against the Board to any tenancy or other like relationship created by the Board in respect of such land or building but shall apply to any land or building let to the Board."
A perusal of above provision shows clearly that the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 are not to apply to the land or building belonging or vesting in the Board under or for the purpose of this Act. In other words, if the land belongs to the Board, the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 will not apply to it. The second part of Section 4 had no application in the facts of the present case.
8. On behalf of the petitioners, reliance was strongly being placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Swadesh Ranjan Sinha v. Haradeb Banerjee, 1991(2) Rent Control Reporter 531. This was a decision rendered under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The sole question before the Supreme Court was as to whether the plaintiff in that case was the owner of the suit premises for the purpose of instituting a suit for eviction. The dispute concerned a flat allotted to the plaintiff by a Housing Co-operative Society, Calcutta. This was one of the 16 flats held by the Society under a 99 years lease. This Society in turn allotted these flats for a term of 99 years. When the tenant did not vacate the property, the allottee had invoked the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Supreme Court explained the contempt of "ownership" and "possession" in paragraph 8 of the judgment which reads as under-
"Ownership denotes the relation between a person and an object forming the subject matter of his ownership. It consists in a complex of rights, all of which are rights in rem, being good against all the world and not merely against specific persons (Salmond on Jurisprudence. 12th ed., Ch.8, p.246 et. seq.). There are various rights or incidents of ownership all of which need not necessarily be present in every case. They may include a right to possess, use and enjoy the thing owned; and a right to consume, destroy or alienate it. Such a right may be indeterminate in duration and residuary in character. A person has a right to possess the thing which he owns, even when he is not in possession, but only retains a reversionary interest i.e., a right to repossess the thing on the termination of certain period or on the happening of a certain event."
The ratio decidenti of the decision, as is apparent from the facts, has no application to the present case. It was held therein only that keeping in view 99 years lease, the plaintiff in that case was owner for the purposes of the Act. That is not so in the present case. Therefore, the cited case, indeed, cannot be made applicable to the facts herein or would be of any help to the petitioner.
9. On the contrary, reference with advantage can be made to the decision of the Supreme court in the case of Messrs Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Limited v. D.C. Patel, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 16. In that case, on or about 15th April, 1908 the Board of Trustees for the improvement of the City of Bombay had put up to. auction certain plots. One Sitaram Luxman was the highest bidder. He deposited the money. There were certain conditions with respect to the agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, Sitaram Luxman erected a building. On the completion of the building, by an Indenture of lease made on 19th April, 1916 between the Trustees for the Improvement of the City of Bombay and one Rustomji Dhunjibhoy Sethna who was the receiver of Sitaram Luxman, an agreement had been executed. In 1925 all the properties of the Trustees for the Improvement of the City of Bombay vested in the Bombay Municipality. The property had been let to one respondent. A question arose as to whether the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 would apply to the sub-tenant therein or not? Section 4(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 reads as under:-
"4(1) This Act shall not apply to any premises belonging to the Government or a local authority or apply as against the Government to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Government in respect of premises taken on lease or requisitioned by the Government; but it shall apply in respect of premises let to the Government or a local authority."
Supreme Court considered the same in the light of the facts stated above and held as under:-
" ..... The purpose of the first two parts of Section 4(1) is to exempt two cases of relationship of landlord and tenant from the operation of the Act, namely, (1) where the Government or a local authority lets out premises belonging to it, and (2) where the Government lets out premises taken on lease or requisitioned by it. It will be observed that the second part of 4(1) quite clearly exempts "any tenancy of other like relationship" created by the Government but the first part makes no reference to any tenancy or other like relationship at all but exempts the premises belonging to the Government or a local authority. If the intent of the first part were as formulated in item (1), then the first part of Section 4(1), like the second part, would have run thus:
This Act shall not apply to any tenancy or other like relationship created by Government or legal authority in respect of premises belonging to it."
10. Therefore, it is elucidated further as under-
"Learned counsel for the respondent next contends that the immunity given by the first part should be held to be available only to the Government or a local authority to which the premises belong. If that were the intention then the Legislature would have used phraseology similar to what it did in the second part, namely, it would have expressly made the Act inapplicable "as against the Government or a local authority". This it did not do and the only inference that can be drawn from this circumstance is that this departure was made deliberately with a view to exempt the premises itself."
11. In other words, it was categorically held that once the building had been exempted, the Act would not apply as between the lessee of the said premises and his sub-tenant. Same is the position herein. Therefore, it was rightly held that the provisions of the Act did not apply to the suit premises.
12. Similar question arose before the Supreme court in the case of Magji Vallabhji & Co. v. Meghji Vijpar & Co. and Ors., A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court 1313. Once again Section 4(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 was under consideration. As referred to above, it provided that the provisions of the said Act are not applicable to the premises belonging to the Government or a local authority. The decision rendered earlier by the Supreme Court in Messrs. Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Limited's case (supra) was approved.
13. Same view prevailed with the Gujarat High Court in the case of Maharanidas Vallabhdas Shaj and Anr. v. Narender Jivram Shah, 1992(1) Rent Control Reporter 652. In that case, flats had been constructed by the Local Authority and allotted to a person on hire purchase basis. It was held that flat continues to belong to Local Authority so long as full consideration has not been paid. Rent Act would not apply to the building belonging to the Local Authority and only a civil suit was competent.
14. Keeping in view the said propositions which are very much applicable to the facts of the present case, it was obvious that the property in question as such was exempt from the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. There is no conveyance deed in favour of the petitioners and once the building is exempt from the provisions of the Act, it must follow necessarily that, keeping in view Section 4 of the Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971, the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 will not apply. There is no ground to interfere in the impugned order.
15. The revision petition being without merit must fail and is accordingly dismissed.