Delhi District Court
Ravi Alias Sunny vs State on 18 March, 2026
DLND010015472026 Page 1 of 18
Criminal Revision No. 95/2026
Ravi @ Sunny
Vs.
State
IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-05
NEW DELHI DISTRICT : PATIALA HOUSE COURTS : NEW DELHI
Criminal Revision No. 95/2026
In the matter of :-
RAVI @ SUNNY
C/o Shinku Mahto,
R/o C-8/138, Dalit Ekta Camp,
Masudpur, Vasant Kunj (South-West),
New Delhi - 110070
.....Petitioner/Accused
(represented by Ld. Counsel Sh. Aditya Kumar, Sh.
Yash Kotak, Ms. Ila Nath and Sh. Ayush Dutt Tripathi)
Versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI
Through Station House Officer,
Police Station Vasant Kunj (North),
New Delhi
.....Respondent
(represented by Ld. Addl. PP for State Sh. Mukul Kumar)
CRIMINAL REVISION UNDER SECTION 397 CrPC/438 BNSS
Date of institution : 16.02.2026
Date when judgment reserved : 18.03.2026
Date of Judgment : 18.03.2026
JUDGMENT
1. INTRODUCTION A) Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. However, where the non-compliance with a procedural prescription, though procedural in form, goes to the very jurisdiction of DLND010015472026 Page 2 of 18 Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State the court and prejudices the doing of justice, "the rule is mandatory." It is precisely at this cusp -- between the tyranny of procedure and the tyranny of its neglect -- that the present revision petition is poised. B) The fundamental question that this revision calls upon this Court to answer is deceptively simple but juridically profound: can a Magistrate, take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC") -- a provision that has, from its earliest days, been surrounded by a statutory moat erected by the legislature -- upon the basis of a police report (chargesheet), without any reference whatsoever to the written complaint of the concerned public servant, which the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("CrPC") by its Section 195(1)(a)(i) declares to be the indispensable, exclusive, and non- negotiable foundation of such cognizance?
C) The petitioner, Ravi @ Sunny -- a young man of nineteen years, hailing from Dalit Ekta Camp, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi -- stands arraigned in consequence of an alleged incident on 02.11.2023, wherein he is said to have possessed firecrackers at or near his place of residence, purportedly in violation of a ban order promulgated by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sub-Division Vasant Kunj (South-West), NCT of Delhi. It is the order of the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, dated 02.03.2024, taking cognizance in CR Case No. 1948/2024 arising out of FIR No. 331/2023, PS Vasant Kunj (North), under Sections 188/286 IPC and Section 9B of the Explosives Act, 1884, that is impugned before this Court by way of the present revision petition.
DLND010015472026 Page 3 of 18Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State
2. THE IMPUGNED ORDER A) Before this Court embarks upon its analysis, it is imperative to reproduce the impugned Order dated 02.03.2024 passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC-02), New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, in CR Case No. 1948/2024 (State v. Ravi @ Sunny, FIR No. 331/2023, PS VK North), in its entirety, as the same is central to the adjudication of this revision:
"FIR: 331/2023 State Vs. Ravi@Sunny PS VK North 02.03.2024 Fresh Chargesheet filed. It will be checked and registered as per rules.
Present: Ld. APP for the State.
IO in person.
Perused. Heard.
On the basis of material on record, I hereby take cognizance of offence as mentioned in charge-sheet against the accused.
Issue summons to the accused kept in column no. 1, and notice to his surety for appearance through IO/SHO concerned, returnable on 25.04.2024."
(emphasis supplied) B) That is the order in its entirety. It speaks little, and what it speaks, it speaks inadequately. No offence is named. No section of law is cited. No reference is made to the complaint filed under Section 195 CrPC. No application of judicial mind is discernible from its lines. No consideration is given to whether the cognizance of the offence under Section 188 IPC could lawfully be taken on the basis of the chargesheet, and if so, under DLND010015472026 Page 4 of 18 Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State what provision of law. The order is judicial silence masquerading as a judicial pronouncement, the mechanical movement of a pen without the corresponding movement of the judicial mind.
3. BACKGROUND FACTS The relevant facts, as discernible from the record of the present revision petition, are set out hereinbelow:
A) On 26.10.2023, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sub-Division Vasant Kunj (South-West), NCT of Delhi, issued an Order bearing No. 2269-2299 enforcing a complete ban on the manufacture, storage, sale, and bursting of firecrackers in any public place within the jurisdiction of Sub-Division Vasant Kunj from 27.10.2023 to 25.12.2023 (the "ACP Order") under Section 144 CrPC.
B) On 02.11.2023, at about 09:30 PM, Head Constable Sundar Singh (No. 1168/SW), Special Staff, South-West District, acting upon secret information, is alleged to have intercepted the petitioner near Dalit Ekta Camp, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi, and to have recovered 35 boxes of firecrackers (approximately 21 kg 400 grams) from the petitioner's possession.
C) On the basis of the said alleged recovery, FIR No. 331/2023 was registered at Police Station Vasant Kunj (North), under Sections 188 and 286 IPC and Section 9B of the Explosives Act, 1884.
D) On 22.11.2023, the Investigating Officer purportedly completed the investigation and submitted the final report (chargesheet) recommending prosecution of the petitioner under Sections 188/286 IPC and Section 9B of the Explosives Act, 1884.
DLND010015472026 Page 5 of 18Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State E) Subsequently, Sh. Devendra Kumar Singh, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sub-Division Vasant Kunj (South-West), NCT of Delhi, filed a complaint under Section 195 CrPC, dated 07.12.2023, before the competent court. On 04.12.2023, the chargesheet was filed before the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, wherein the said matter was numbered as CR Case No. 1948/2024, and the Learned Magistrate, on 02.03.2024, passed the impugned cognizance order.
F) The petitioner, being aggrieved by the aforesaid proceedings, approached the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi by way of CRL.M.C. No. 7445/2025 titled Ravi Sunny v. State (NCT of Delhi). The Hon'ble High Court, vide Order dated 17.09.2025, was pleased to not adjudicate the contentions regarding the bar under Section 195 CrPC and the maintainability of the chargesheet at that stage, and granted liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum.
G) Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present Criminal Revision Petition before this Court.
4. APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY -- CONSIDERATION AND CONDONATION A) Accompanying the present revision petition is an application for condonation of delay. The impugned order was passed on 02.03.2024, and the present revision petition has been filed in February 2026, resulting in a delay of approximately 23 months beyond the period prescribed.
DLND010015472026 Page 6 of 18Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State B) The petitioner has set out the cause for the delay: he had, in the first instance, approached the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi by way of CRL.M.C., where the matter was pending until the Hon'ble High Court granted liberty to approach the appropriate forum vide Order dated 17.09.2025. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present revision petition. C) I have considered the application for condonation of delay and the cause shown. The cause shown is sufficient in itself. The petitioner, a young man of nineteen years at the time of the incident, cannot be faulted for pursuing the remedy before the superior court before descending to this Court in the revisional jurisdiction. The time spent in pursuing litigation in good faith before a court of competent jurisdiction is a recognized ground for condonation of delay.
D) However, beyond the cause shown, this Court is moved to condone the delay for a broader and more compelling reason -- a reason grounded in the interest of justice itself. The illegality complained of in this revision goes not to a peripheral aspect of the proceedings, but to the very core of the cognizance taken by the learned Trial Court. It strikes at the jurisdictional foundation of the proceedings. A patent error at the threshold of criminal proceedings, if left uncorrected by a court of revision at this stage, will accompany the matter like a shadow at every stage of the trial -- through charge, through evidence, through argument, through judgment. And when, at the final stage, the infirmity is exposed
-- as it must be, for no illegality remains buried forever -- the entire edifice of the proceedings shall crumble, and the years spent in DLND010015472026 Page 7 of 18 Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State prosecution shall be rendered futile. To permit such a scenario is to permit a gross injustice both to the accused and to the cause of justice. E) The object of the law is not to multiply proceedings and prolong suffering but to secure the just, fair and speedy resolution of disputes. Letting an illegality at the stage of cognizance perpetuate itself through the entire machinery of trial, only to be corrected at the last stage -- when witnesses have been examined, cross-examinations completed, and the precious years of parties consumed -- is not justice. In the interest of justice, equity, and good conscience, the delay is accordingly condoned.
5. GROUNDS OF REVISION The petitioner assails the impugned Order on the following grounds:
A) That the impugned order is a non-speaking order, disclosing no reasoning, no identification of the specific offences cognized, and no application of mind to the material before the learned Trial Court; B) That the learned Trial Court took cognizance of offences "as mentioned in charge-sheet" without making any reference whatsoever to the complaint dated 07.12.2023 filed by Sh. Devendra Kumar Singh, ACP, Sub-Division Vasant Kunj, under Section 195 CrPC, which alone, under the mandate of Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC, could form the jurisdictional foundation for taking cognizance of the offence under Section 188 IPC; C) That cognizance of an offence under Section 188 IPC on the basis of a police report (chargesheet) -- which is explicitly excluded from the definition of "complaint" under Section 2(d) CrPC -- is in direct contravention of the mandatory bar enacted in Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC;DLND010015472026 Page 8 of 18
Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State D) That the taking of cognizance in violation of Section 195 CrPC is not merely an irregularity but a jurisdictional nullity, rendering the proceedings void ab initio, in view of the settled law of the land; E) That the belated filing of the complaint under Section 195 CrPC, after the registration of the FIR, completion of investigation, and filing of the chargesheet, does not cure the jurisdictional defect.
6. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES A) Learned Counsel for the revisionist, submitted with force and clarity that the impugned order is vitiated by a patent jurisdictional error. He submitted that Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC erects an absolute bar against the taking of cognizance of any offence under Sections 172 to 188 IPC except upon a written complaint by the public servant whose lawful order is alleged to have been disobeyed, or by a public servant superior to him. He further submitted that a "complaint" as defined under Section 2(d) CrPC expressly excludes a "police report" within the meaning of Section 2(r) CrPC, and that these two categories of documents are distinct in their origins, their purposes, and their legal consequences. He submitted that the learned Trial Court, by taking cognizance "on the basis of material on record" and "of offences as mentioned in charge-sheet," without any reference to the complaint under Section 195 CrPC, had effectively taken cognizance on the basis of a police report for an offence for which such cognizance is statutorily barred.
B) He fairly submitted that at the highest, even if this Court were to decline to quash the FIR and all proceedings, the impugned cognizance order be set aside and the matter be remanded back to the Learned Trial Court for DLND010015472026 Page 9 of 18 Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State fresh consideration on the point of cognizance and summoning, taking into consideration both the chargesheet and the complaint under Section 195 CrPC already on record.
C) Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, submitted that the chargesheet having been filed together with the complaint under Section 195 CrPC of Sh. Devendra Kumar Singh, ACP, the said complaint was available on record, and the learned Trial Court was therefore justified in taking cognizance. He further submitted that Section 188 IPC being a cognizable offence, the police were entitled to register the FIR and conduct investigation. However, the Learned Addl. P.P. fairly and candidly conceded that the learned Trial Court had not made any reference to the complaint under Section 195 CrPC in the impugned cognizance order, and fairly submitted that the court may remand back the matter to learned Trial Court for fresh consideration on the point of cognizance and summoning.
7. FINDINGS OF THE COURT A) The Impugned Order -- A Non-Speaking Order i. This Court begins with the order itself. The entirety of the learned Magistrate's cognizance order, stripped of its heading and signature, reads as follows: "On the basis of material on record, I hereby take cognizance of offence as mentioned in charge-sheet against the accused." There is nothing else -- no offence named, no section cited, no material identified, no reasoning offered, no reference to the complaint that was placed before the Court.
DLND010015472026 Page 10 of 18Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State ii. A Magistrate's order taking cognizance is not a formality. It is a solemn judicial act by which the criminal justice machinery of the State is set in motion against a citizen. It is the point at which the law's protection of the individual meets the law's demand for accountability. The Magistrate, at the stage of cognizance, is required not merely to look at the material but to apply his mind to it -- to determine, among other things, whether a prima facie case is made out, whether the offences alleged are triable by his court, and crucially, whether the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence at all. These are not academic questions. They are the very substance of the judicial function at the threshold stage.
iii. The impugned order reveals none of this. It reveals no reasoning. It reveals no awareness of the jurisdictional bar that the statute places on the taking of cognizance of Section 188 IPC. It reveals no recognition of the complaint under Section 195 CrPC that was placed before the Court. A judge who does not speak through his order speaks a language the law cannot recognize. The absence of reasoning in a cognizance and summoning order is not a trivial omission. It is the absence of justice in action.
B) The Anatomy of Section 195 CrPC -- Mandatory Bar, Not a Directory Suggestion i. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC commands in terms that are unambiguous and incapable of latitude: "No Court shall take cognizance... of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive)... except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or DLND010015472026 Page 11 of 18 Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate."
ii. The legislature has employed the expression " no Court shall take cognizance... except." In the vocabulary of legislative command, these words constitute an absolute prohibition, subject to a single, narrow exception: the written complaint of the concerned public servant. There is no escape clause, no saving provision, no room for judicial creativity to fill. The legislature has spoken, and spoken clearly.
iii. The mandatory nature of Section 195 CrPC has been recognized and affirmed in an unbroken line of judicial precedents. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh (1994) 4 SCC 95, emphasized that a written complaint by the concerned public servant is a sine qua non for initiating prosecution under Section 188 IPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010) 9 SCC 567, summarized the position that Section 195(1)(a) CrPC is mandatory and non-compliance invalidates the trial ab initio.
iv. In Devendra Kumar Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. 2025 INSC 1009, Hon'ble Apex Court summarized the law on section 195 CrPC as under:
"59. We may summarize our final conclusion as under:
(i) Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 respectively of the I.P.C., unless there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned or his administrative superior, for voluntarily obstructing the public servant from discharge of his DLND010015472026 Page 12 of 18 Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State public functions. Without a complaint from the said persons, the court would lack competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein.
(ii) If in truth and substance, an offence falls in the category of Section 195(1)(a)(i), it is not open to the court to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for the other distinct offences disclosed in the same set of facts. However, it also cannot be laid down as a straitjacket formula that the Court, under all circumstances, cannot undertake the exercise of splitting up. It would depend upon the facts of each case, the nature of allegations and the materials on record.
(iii) Severance of distinct offences is not permissible when it would effectively circumvent the protection afforded by Section 195(1)(a)
(i) of the Cr.P.C., which requires a complaint by a public servant for certain offences against public justice. This means that if the core of the offence falls under the purview of Section 195(1)(a)(i), it cannot be prosecuted by simply filing a general complaint for a different, but related, offence. The focus should be on whether the facts, in substance, constitute an offence requiring a public servant's complaint.
(iv) In the aforesaid context, the courts must apply twin tests. First, the courts must ascertain having regard to the nature of the allegations made in the complaint/FIR and other materials on record whether the other distinct offences not covered by Section 195(1)(a)(i) have been invoked only with a view to evade the mandatory bar of Section 195 of the I.P.C. and secondly, whether the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence for which a complaint of the court or a public servant is required.
(v) Where an accused is alleged to have committed some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195, Section 195 will affect only the offences mentioned therein.
However, the courts should ascertain whether such offences form an integral part and are so intrinsically connected so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. This would all depend on the facts of each case.
(vi) Sections 195(1)(b)(i)(ii) & (iii) and 340 of the Cr.P.C. respectively do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate, under the Criminal Procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance. However, that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation, DLND010015472026 Page 13 of 18 Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is followed."
C) Complaint v. Police Report i. Section 2(d) CrPC defines "complaint" as "any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person... has committed an offence ." The proviso, in no uncertain terms, declares: "but it does not include a police report." Section 2(r) CrPC defines "police report" as a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under Section 173(2). These definitions are mutually exclusive. A police report is, by statutory definition, not a complaint. No amount of legal ingenuity can transform a police report into a complaint for the purposes of Section 195 CrPC.
ii. The distinction between a complaint and a police report is not a mere terminological nicety. It carries profound juridical consequences. When cognizance is taken on a complaint, the Magistrate proceeds under Chapter XV of the Code; when on a police report, under Chapter XVII. The rights of the accused, the procedural obligations of the court, and the very mode of trial differ. To allow a police report to substitute for a complaint in the context of Section 195 CrPC would be to rewrite the Code by judicial fiat -- an exercise this Court declines to undertake.
D) The Complaint Exists -- But Was It Considered? i. This Court must advert to a critical fact that distinguishes the present case from one where no complaint at all was filed: the complaint under DLND010015472026 Page 14 of 18 Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State Section 195 CrPC, dated 07.12.2023, filed by Sh. Devendra Kumar Singh, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sub-Division Vasant Kunj (South-West), is on record in CR Case No. 1948/2024 before the Learned Trial Court. It was placed before the Learned Magistrate along with the chargesheet. It forms part of the record. ii. This fact is not inconsequential. It means that the Learned Trial Court was not faced with a situation where no complaint existed -- it was faced with a situation where both a chargesheet and a complaint were placed before it. The Learned Magistrate was required, in this situation, to identify the appropriate legal basis for cognizance with respect to each of the offences. For the offence under Section 188 IPC, cognizance could only be taken on the complaint of the ACP, not on the chargesheet. For the other offences (Sections 286 IPC and Section 9B, Explosives Act, 1884), cognizance could potentially be taken on the basis of the chargesheet (subject to the satisfaction of the Magistrate that a prima facie case is made out). iii. But the impugned order does none of this. It takes cognizance uniformly of "offences as mentioned in charge-sheet" -- conflating all offences, making no distinction between Section 188 IPC (for which only a complaint can found cognizance) and the other offences. It makes no reference to the complaint. It does not acknowledge the complaint's existence. It does not apply its mind to the fundamental legal question that Section 195 CrPC mandates the Magistrate to address. This is the patent error in the impugned order -- an error not DLND010015472026 Page 15 of 18 Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State in the result but in the jurisdictional foundation and the reasoning (or the absence thereof) that leads to the result. E) The Non-Curable Character of the Defect -- And the Appropriate Relief i. The defect in the impugned order is not curable. A cognizance order that takes cognizance of Section 188 IPC on the basis of a chargesheet without reference to the complaint is without jurisdiction. ii. However, this Court is mindful that the complaint of Sh. Devendra Kumar Singh, ACP, is on record. The Learned Trial Court was not bereft of the necessary document to take cognizance of Section 188 IPC in accordance with law. It simply failed to advert to it. This, in the considered opinion of this Court, is a case not for quashing but for remand -- a direction to the Learned Trial Court to take up the matter afresh, to consider the chargesheet as well as the complaint before it, to apply its judicial mind to the question of cognizance and summoning with respect to each of the offences separately, and to pass a fresh, reasoned order in accordance with law. iii. The petitioner's learned Counsel has also, with commendable fairness, not pressed for outright quashing and has submitted that remand is the appropriate relief. The Learned Addl. P.P. for the State has also not opposed the remand. Both parties are, therefore, ad idem that the impugned order cannot stand and that the matter must be remanded.
8. CONCLUSION A) That the impugned Order dated 02.03.2024 is a non-speaking order that discloses no application of the judicial mind to the material before the Learned Trial Court, and is, on that ground alone, liable to be set aside.
DLND010015472026 Page 16 of 18Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State B) That the taking of cognizance "on the basis of material on record" and "of offences as mentioned in charge-sheet" without any reference to the complaint under Section 195 CrPC filed by Sh. Devendra Kumar Singh, ACP, is a patent error, inasmuch as for the offence under Section 188 IPC, cognizance could only be taken upon a complaint as required by Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC, and not upon a police report/chargesheet. C) That the mandatory bar enacted in Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC cannot be bypassed, diluted, or circumvented. Non-compliance with Section 195 CrPC renders the cognizance taken thereunder void as to the offence under Section 188 IPC.
D) That since the complaint under Section 195 CrPC filed by Sh. Devendra Kumar Singh, ACP, is on record before the Learned Trial Court, the appropriate relief is not outright setting aside the proceeding, but setting aside the impugned cognizance order and remanding the matter to the Learned Trial Court for fresh consideration on the point of cognizance and summoning.
E) That on remand, the petitioner/proposed accused shall be entitled to make submissions on the point of cognizance and summoning before the Learned Trial Court.
F) Section 195 CrPC is a statutory safeguard erected by a thoughtful legislature to ensure that the coercive might of the criminal law is not invoked in respect of certain offences -- including disobedience of public servant's orders -- except upon the considered decision of the public servant concerned, expressed through a written complaint to the DLND010015472026 Page 17 of 18 Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State Magistrate. This safeguard must be honoured. It cannot be overlooked. It cannot be submerged in the brevity of a three-line cognizance order.
9. ORDER For all the foregoing reasons, this Court passes the following order:
A) The present Criminal Revision Petition No. 95/2026 filed by the petitioner Ravi @ Sunny against the State of NCT of Delhi, challenging the Order dated 02.03.2024 passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC-02), New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, in CR Case No. 1948/2024 (arising out of FIR No. 331/2023, PS Vasant Kunj (North), under Sections 188/286 IPC and Section 9B of the Explosives Act, 1884), is hereby ALLOWED.
B) The application for condonation of delay is ALLOWED and the delay in filing the present revision petition is hereby condoned for the reasons set out hereinabove.
C) The impugned Order dated 02.03.2024 passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC-02), New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, in CR Case No. 1948/2024, taking cognizance of offences as mentioned in the chargesheet against the petitioner, is hereby SET ASIDE.
D) The matter is REMANDED to the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, for fresh consideration on the point of cognizance and summoning in CR Case No. 1948/2024, in accordance with law and the observations contained in this Order. E) The Learned Trial Court shall, while considering the matter afresh, take into consideration all material available on record.DLND010015472026 Page 18 of 18
Criminal Revision No. 95/2026 Ravi @ Sunny Vs. State F) The Learned Trial Court shall, on remand, pass a fresh, reasoned order on the point of cognizance and summoning, duly applying its mind to the question of cognizance with respect to each of the offences separately, in conformity with the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. G) The petitioner/proposed accused shall be at liberty to make such submissions as he may deem fit on the point of cognizance and summoning before the Learned Trial Court, and the Learned Trial Court shall consider such submissions before passing the fresh order.
10. Nothing contained in this Order shall be construed as an expression of any opinion on the merits of the case, the guilt or innocence of the petitioner, or the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence or material contained in the chargesheet or the complaint.
11. A certified copy of this Order be transmitted to the Learned Trial Court forthwith for compliance.
12. Revisionist to appear before the Ld. Trial Court on the date fixed there.
SAURABH Digitally signed by
Announced in the open Court PARTAP SAURABH PARTAP
SINGH LALER
on 18th of March 2026 SINGH
LALER
Date: 2026.03.18
17:31:53 +0530
(Saurabh Partap Singh Laler)
ASJ-05 New Delhi
Patiala House Courts
Delhi 18.03.2026