Mrs. Ritu Khanna vs Delhi Gymkhana Club Limited on 8 April, 2025

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National Company Law Appellate Tribunal

Mrs. Ritu Khanna vs Delhi Gymkhana Club Limited on 8 April, 2025

This appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 10.09.2024 passed by the NCLT (National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi, Principal Bench), rejecting CA 90/PB/2024 filed by the appellant. The appellant has filed the application CA 90/PB/2024 for recall of the order dated 15.12.2023 passed by the NCLT, which application has been rejected.

2. It is necessary to notice background facts, giving rise to filing of CA No.90/PB/2024:

i. C.P. No.71/ND/2020 was an application filed by Union of India under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 (for short 'the Act') against the Delhi Gymkhana Club as Respondent No. 1.

Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025

2 of 17 ii. One Col. Ashish Khanna, the husband of the appellant was impleaded as Respondent No.18 as a secretary of Delhi Gymkhana Club in the petition filed under Sections 241 and 242 of the Act.

iii. NCLT proceeded to pass various order in the said company petition. iv. Col. Ashish Khanna has filed CA 440/PB/2022, praying for recall of the order dated 24.04.2020 and all order passed subsequent to 24.04.2020. The order dated 24.04.2020 was passed by single member judicial. The application CA440/2022 was dismissed by the NCLT vide order dated 15.12.2023 and cost of ₹50,000 was also imposed. v. Col. Ashish Khanna, the husband of the appellant has filed another application CA 49/2024, praying for recall of the order dated 15.12.2023 and to declare it per incuriam which also came to be dismissed on 14.03.2024.

vi. Col. Ashish Khanna filed Comp. App. (AT) No. 242/2024 in this Tribunal, challenging the order dated 15.12.2023, there being delay in filing of the appeal, I.A. No.5502/2024 was also filed praying for condonation of delay. The I.A. No.5502 of 2024 came to be considered by this Tribunal and this Tribunal vide order dated 21.10.2024, rejected the application, in consequence for dismissal of delay condonation application, memo of appeal was also rejected. The order dated 15.12.2023 became final.

vii. The CA No.90/PB/2024 was filed by the appellant, the wife of Col.

Ashish Khanna for recall of the order dated 15.12.2023, which application was filed on 03.04.2024 after the CA No.49/2024 was filed Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025 3 of 17 by her husband to recall the order dated 15.12.2023 and was rejected on 14.03.2024.

viii. The NCLT vide impugned order rejected the application, holding that applicant has no locus to raise the question of jurisdiction with respect to proceeding in CP 71/2020. NCLT holding that applicant has no locus to raise question of jurisdiction or any other question of law the applicant being not party, rejected the application as not maintainable. In paragraph 7 & 8 of the order following was observed:

"7. Thus in our view, the Applicant has no locus standi to raise a question of jurisdiction or any other question of law or fact with respect to the proceedings in CP/71/202 in which she is not a party. More precisely, Applicant is neither a necessary party nor a proper party.

8. For the aforesaid reasons, we opine that Applicant has no locus to move this application, hence not maintainable. We REJECT this application."

ix. Appellant aggrieved by the order dated 10.09.2024, has filed the appeal.

3. We have heard learned counsel Mr. Deepak Khosla appearing for the appellant.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant challenging the order submits that order dated 15.12.2023, being a nullity and having delivered per incuriam deserved to be recalled. It is contended that the said order 15.12.2023 did not take notice of judgment of this Tribunal in the matter of 'Suchi Paper Mills Ltd. & Ors.' Vs. 'Ashish Gupta Resolution Professional in the Matter of Anush Finlease and Construction Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.' in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) No. 830/2020, delivered on 16.10.2023. It is submitted that order imposing cost on Col. Ashish Khanna is also without jurisdiction. NCLT Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025 4 of 17 having no jurisdiction to impose fine/penalty. Learned counsel for the appellant in his submission relies on Section 44 of Evidence Act, 1872 and submits that appellant has right to question the order dated 15.12.2023, which is an order per incuriam and nullity. Learned Counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on provisions of Order 1 of Rule 8A of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short 'the CPC'). Learned counsel for the appellant submits that order dated 15.12.2023, deserves to be set aside and appeal be allowed.

5. We have considered the submissions of counsel for the appellant and perused the records.

6. The proceeding in which order dated 15.12.2023 was passed was proceeding under Sections 241 & 242 of the Act initiated on an application filed by Union of India against the Delhi Gymkhana Club and other defendants. Col. Ashish Khanna the husband of the appellant was Defendant No.1 in the proceeding under Sections 241 & 242 of the Act, he being existing secretary of the Gymkhana Club at the time when Section 241 & 242 petition was filed. In the petition under Section 241 & 242, various orders were passed by the NCLT from time to time. CA No.440/2022 was filed by Col. Ashish Khanna, the husband of the appellant praying for recall of the orders 22.04.2020 and other orders. In the impugned order dated 10.09.2024, NCLT has also referred to its earlier judgment dated 15.12.2023 and has extracted certain paragraph where following was observed:

"As observed earlier in para 55,56 of our order dated 15.12.2023 passed in CA 440/2022, the orders passed in this matter do not suffer from lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Para 55, 56 of our order dated 15.12.2023 passed in CA 440/2022 is extracted below:

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5 of 17 "55.Applicant in its application has categorically differentiated between the voidable order and void order. It is the further submission of the Applicant that one cannot "set aside" that which is nullity in law. The Applicant has also submitted that as per the judgment of Vithabhai (supra) 'no amount of waiver or consent can confer jurisdiction on a court which it inherently lacks..' This submission does not hold good as per our analysis above. Further, Applicant has relied upon the judgment of Kunhayammed (supra) and A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra) for the nonapplication of doctrine of merger. On perusal of both the judgments we find that they are with respect to a primary order obtained by the parties by fraud which is an exception to the doctrine of merger. The same is not the case here.

No ground of fraud is made out. We do not find any force in the contention of the Applicant who is stating those orders as 'null or void ab initio'. As regards the submission of the Applicant that Section 431 does not preserve any defect in the constitution of the Bench, we find this not germane to the issue at hand. We are not relying on Section 431. The Applicant has separately given number of judgments to substantiate his submissions that it is not the Applicant on whom the onus to prove the absence of jurisdiction in the case of a court of limited jurisdiction lies. We find that the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to hear the main matter under Companies Act has not been challenged by the Applicant. Apparently, he seeks to rely on this argument because of the impugned orders having been passed by a Single Member Bench which he alleges has not been validly constituted and therefore, without jurisdiction. We hold that the single Member bench constituted by Order dated 20.04.2020 is a valid order in the exercise of power under Rule16(f) of NCLT Rules, 2016 r/w Section 419(3) of the Companies Act, 2013. There is no such jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders dated 24.04.2020 and 26.06.2020. The allegation of bias on the part of the then Acting President is without substance. Hence, the contention of the Applicant that these orders are void, FAILS. As the impugned orders are neither void nor voidable.

56.We will now examine the third issue i.e. whether this Tribunal has the power to recall its own order? It is important to mention here that no such power of recalling its own order or reviewing its own order has been granted to this Tribunal under the Companies Act, 2013 or in the Rules made thereunder. Applicant submitted that what is presently sought by Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025 6 of 17 him is not so much of a review of the order or judgment (whose consequence may be recall or as may be deemed otherwise appropriate, such as modification etc.) as much as a 'recall' of the order, simpliciter. Applicant relied upon the judgement of Pramod Bagga vs State (2008 CrilLJ 792) in which Hon'ble Delhi High Court carved out a clear distinction between 'review' of an order, and 'recall' of an order that is a nullity i.e. recall simpliciter. Another judgement on which Applicant relies upon is the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan (1954) SC 340. Relevant part of the judgement is extracted below:

"6. The answer to these contentions must depend on what the position in law is when a Court entertain a suit or an appeal over which it has no jurisdiction and what the effect of Section 11 of the Suit Valuation Act is on that position. It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether, it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pose any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District, Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position."

The above judgment relied upon by the Applicant speaks about the order or judgment which are passed by a court not having jurisdiction. It is not the case here. As observed earlier, the orders passed in this matter do not suffer from lack of jurisdiction. The power of Tribunal is only to rectify any mistake apparent from the record as per Section 420(2) extracted below:

Section 420(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 :

Orders of Tribunal: The Tribunal may, at any time within two years from the date of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025

7 of 17 from the record, amend any order passed by it, and shall make such amendment, if the mistake is brought to its notice by the parties.

.."

7. The appellant was not party to the proceeding under Sections 241 & 242 of the Act, nor at any point of time, appellant was permitted to intervene in the proceeding. It was only when CA 440/2022 filed by her husband, Col. Ashish Khanna to recall of order dated 28.04.2020 and subsequent orders were rejected on 15.12.2023, the application to recall the said was filed by Col. Ashish Khanna also got rejected, CA No.90/PB/2024 was filed by the appellant.

8. Before proceeding, further, we may notice observations made by NCLT in the impugned order rejecting the application, filed by the appellant holding that she has no locus. Following was observed in paragraphs 6, 7 & 8:

"...By no stretch of imagination, one can interpret the abovementioned provision that a stranger to the proceeding may move to the court to declare an order or judgement as null or non-est. If one interprets section 44 of Indian evidence act in this manner, then the entire purpose of doctrine of locus standi will be frustrated. Courts and Tribunals will be flooded with applications moved by strangers to the proceedings on the grounds of alleged fraud and collusion. This can never be the intention of legislature while drafting Section 44. Section 44 gives a right to 'any party to the suit or other proceeding' to show the relevant judgements (Sec 40, 41, 42) was delivered by court not competent to deliver the judgement or that fraud or collusion has been played. The Applicant is admittedly not a party to the proceedings. The affected party Sh. Ashish Khanna has already made an attempt and failed. This attempt is by the spouse to reopen what has already been decided. We are not inclined to hear or accept the contention of a third party i.e., one who is not enlisted in array of parties to raise any issue be it Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025 8 of 17 question of law and the question of jurisdiction of this tribunal."

7. Thus in our view, the Applicant has no locus standi to raise a question of jurisdiction or any other question of law or fact with respect to the proceedings in CP/71/202 in which she is not a party. More precisely, Applicant is neither a necessary party nor a proper party.

8. For the aforesaid reasons, we opine that Applicant has no locus to move this application, hence not maintainable. We REJECT this application."

9. The NCLT has also noticed the background of the main case C.P.71/ND/2020 and filing of multiple applications by Col. Ashish Khanna, husband of the appellant, in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the order which are as follows:

"9. At this point, we may like to briefly mention the background of the main case (CP 71(ND/2020) which gave rise to filing of multiple Applications by Mr. Ashish Khanna (Husband of Applicant in this application). Initially CP 71/2020 was filed by Union of India through RD (North) under section 241 and 242 of the Companies Act in which Applicant was arrayed as Respondent no 18. Mr. Ashish Khanna was made a party as Respondent no. 18 as at the time of filing of main petition CP 71(ND)/2020. In the heading 'Details of the Petitioner & Respondents, in para 4 of the petition, it is averred by the Petitioner (UOI) that:

"That Respondent No. 18 is Col. Ashish Khanna (Retd.), Present Secretary/CEO of the Delhi Gymkhana Club (hereinafter referred to as 'DGC' or 'the club') and is one of the Key Managerial Persons of the Company under Section 2(51)(v) of the Companies Act, 2013, appointed on 12/04/2018 to the services of DGC. During his personal appearance for statement on oath before the inspector carrying out the supplementary inspection of Respondent No. 1 Company under the Companies Act, 2013, while answering a pertinent question regarding his brief profile, Col. Ashish Khanna gave a statement that he has never been a member of the DGC. However, the inspector has stated in the supplementary inspection report dated 03.03.2020 that on examination of the membership record provided by the Company(DGC), it was found that Col. Ashish Khanna was holding UCP membership no. U-3098 which is valid from 21/04/2018. The Inspector has also Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025 9 of 17 stated in the supplementary inspection report dated 03/03/2020 that Col. Ashish Khanna neither had any green card nor he was dependent to any permanent member. The supplementary inspection report dated 03/03/2020 under the Companies Act, 2013 has discussed and detailed in the subsequent paras of the instant application.

Mr. Ashish Khanna was earlier selected as Secretary of the DGC for a period of three years from 12 April 2018 to 11 April 2021. Basis the records maintained by the Club, it appears that the issue of the Mr. Khanna's suspension and eventual termination were discussed during the General Committee (GC) meeting dated 20 July 2020 and the Applicant was issued a show-cause notice dated 27 July 2020 by the then GC. Thereafter, the services of the Applicant were terminated on 4 August 2020 as decided in the GC minutes dated 04 August 2020.

10. In our previous order dated 15.12.2023 passed in CA 440/2022, we have elaborately discussed the history, background and the relevant judgements/orders passed in CP 71(ND)/2020 and various Company Applications filed by parties to the main case and more pertinently the various applications/ appeals filed by Mr. Khanna challenging the various orders passed in the main petition as well as in various connected applications by this Tribunal before various forums inter alia asking for the recall of the orders on various grounds of ultra vires jurisdiction, contravention of provisions of Companies Act, 2013, violation of principles of natural justice, etc. Time to time, Mr. Ashish Khanna has filed various applications before this Tribunal as well as appeals before Hon'ble NCLAT for expeditious hearing alleging that his applications are not being taken up, making many unpalatable and wild allegations against this Tribunal. The relevant paras of the order dated 15.12.2023 in CA 440/2022 are extracted below:-

".......

Order Delivered On: 15.12.2023 ORDER

1. The Present application has been filed by Mr. Ashish Khanna (Respondent 18 in the main petition) seeking liberty to invoke the duty of this Hon'ble Tribunal to act EX DEBITO JUSTITIAE and to recall the order dated 24.04.2020 with all consequential effects, having been passed CORAM NON JUDICE, in breach of the mandatory provisions of Section 419(3) of the Companies Act, 2013. Applicant has asked for the following reliefs: 1. Acting ex debito justitiae, recall (i.e. Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025

10 of 17 recall, simpliciter, and not 'review with ensuing recall) the originating order dated 24-04-2020 passed in this CP, it having been passed by a Ld. Single Member (Judicial) acting singly and not by a 'Bench, and thereby having been passed coram non judice by virtue of its being in breach of the mandatory provisions of Section 419(3) of the Companies Act (2013), and thereby being a nullity in law, which is void ab initio as if non est, and furthermore, by applying the principles of fondamento sublato cadit opus, apply the recall with all its consequential effects, including recall of all orders passed subsequent to 24-04-2020, declaring them all to be equally null and void ab initio as if non est

4.Applicant further submitted that the petitioner in front of him (Hon'ble Acting President) was the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the aforesaid Ministry being directly and intrinsically with something (presumably) very close to his heart i.e. continuing his tenure as (acting) President of NCLT, by the well-established standard of judicial propriety, perhaps it may have been more optimal if he had not heard the present petition at all, given that the petitioner was the Ministry of Corporate Affairs itself.

6. It is the contention of the Applicant that by virtue of the (Acting President's) own administrative order dated 03.03.2020, since the Principal Bench was prescribed by him to comprise himself along with Mr. Hemant Kumar Sarangi, Member, Technical and since he knew that this Bench so composed could not take up the matter because the Member, Technical was a member of the club who would be compelled to recuse himself, perhaps being unable to find a Member (Technical) to conveniently sit with him and pass orders in a matter that he, by virtue of the pendency of his proposal for extension with the petitioning Ministry, ought not to hear, instead, even more perversely, he made matters worse, by choosing to hear the matter while sitting singly. .. "

10. Relevant part of order dated 15.12.2023 has also been extracted in paragraph 10 of the order of the NCLT which needs no repetition.

11. Now we come to the submissions advanced by the counsel for the appellant on basis of Section 44 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and Order 1 Rule 8A of the CPC.

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12. Section 44 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is part of Sections 40 to 44, which are under the heading "judgments of Courts of justice when relevant". Section 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act, 1872 are as follows:

"40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial.

The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of a such suit, or to hold such trial.

41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction.

A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.

Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof - that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation; that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person; that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease; and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property.

42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in section

41. Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025 12 of 17 such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.

Illustration A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public right of way over the land, which A denies.

The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit by A against C for a trespass on the same land, in which C alleged the existence of the same right of way, is relevant, but it is not conclusive proof that the right of way exists.

43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to 42, when relevant.

Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue or is relevant under some other provisions of this Act.

Illustrations

(a) A and B separately sue C for a libel which reflects upon each of them. C in each case says that the matter alleged to be libellous is true, and the circumstances are such that it is probably true in each case, or in neither.A obtains a decree against C for damages on the ground that C failed to make out his justification. The fact is irrelevant as between B and C.

(b) A prosecutes B for adultery with C, A's wife.B denies that C is A's wife, but the Court convicts B of adultery.Afterwards, C is prosecuted for bigamy in marrying B during A's lifetime. C says that she never was A's wife.The judgment against B is irrelevant as against C.

(c) A prosecutes B for stealing a cow from him. B is convicted.A `afterwards' sues C for the cow, which B had sold to him before his conviction. As between A and C, the judgment against B is irrelevant.

(d) A had obtained a decree for the possession of land against B. C, B's son, murders A in consequence.The existence of the judgment is relevant, as showing motive for a crime.

[(e) A is charged with theft and with having been previously convicted of theft. The previous conviction is relevant as a fact in issue.

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(f)A is tried for the murder of B.The fact that B prosecuted A for libel and that A was convicted and sentenced is relevant under section 8 as showing the motive for the fact in issue.] [Inserted by Act 3 of 1891, Section 5.]

44. Fraud or collusion in obtaining judgment, or incompetency of Court, may be proved.

Any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree which is relevant under sections 40, 41 or 42 and which has been proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a court not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by fraud or collusion.

Opinions Of Third Persons, When Relevant"

13. The heading under which the above sections are placed itself indicates that the above provisions of Evidence Act, 1872 is on the aspect when judgment of Courts justice are relevant. When we look into Section 44 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the said provisions provides that any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree which is relevant under Sections 40, 41 & 42 and which has been proved by the adverse party was delivered by a Court, not competent to deliver it or was obtained by a fraud of the collusion. The purpose of the above provision is to give right to other party to prove that judgment of the Court which is relied as evidence was delivered by a Court nor competent to deliver it or was obtained by fraud of collusion. The above Rule is Rule of evidence and was enacted to give right to other party to prove that a judgment which has been proved by other party was not delivered by Court not competitive to deliver. The purpose is to impeach the relevancy of the judgment in the suit, Section 44 begins with the words "any party to a suit or other proceeding". Section 44 cannot be used or utilised by the appellant since appellant was never party to the proceeding under Sections 241 & 242 of the Act and the order dated Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025 14 of 17 15.12.2023 is not an order which was relied as evidence by any party in the proceeding under Sections 241 & 242, in fact the order dated 15.12.2023 is an order passed in the same very proceeding. The submission of the appellant that by virtue of Section 44 appellant can very well impeach the order dated 15.12.2023 on the ground that it was delivered by a Court, not competent to deliver it cannot be accepted.

14. We, thus are of the view that submission of the appellant on basis of Section 44 of the Evidence Act is misplaced and has no applicability to give any locus to the appellant to file an application to recall the order dated 15.12.2023 before the NCLT.

15. Now we come to the Order 1 Rule 8A of the CPC on which reliance has been placed by the appellant. Order 1 Rule 8A has been inserted in the CPC by Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1976. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 8A is as follows:

"Order 1 - Parties to suits.

8A. Power of Court to permit a person or body of persons to present opinion or to take part in the proceedings.

[Substituted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, Section 52, for the former Rule (w.e.f. 1.2.1977).]-

While trying a suit, the Court may, if satisfied that a person or body of persons is interested in any question of law which is directly and substantially in issue in the suit and that it is necessary in the public interest to allow that person or body of persons to present his or its opinion on that question of law, permit that person or body of persons to present such opinion and to take part in the proceedings of the suit as the Court may specify.]"

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16. The above provision empowers a Court while trying a suit to allow a person or body of person to present case or his opinion on the question of law and to take parts in proceedings of the suit. If the Court is satisfied that person or body or person is interested in any question of law which is directly and substantially issued in the suit. The provisions of Rule 8A is enabling power which empowers the Court to permit person or body person interested in any question of law to present such opinion and to take part. The above provision does not give any right to the appellant who was not party to the proceeding to file an application to recall an order passed by the NCLT in the proceeding under Sections 241 & 242 of the Act. The sequence of the facts clearly indicates that Col. Ashish Khanna, the husband of the appellant has unsuccessfully questioned the order dated 15.12.2023, which was passed by the NCLT on the application CA 440/2022 filed by him. Col. Ashish Khanna, who was Defendant No.18 in the proceeding as the then Secretary of the Club had file CA 440/2022, praying for recall of various order which was rejected by detailed order dated 15.12.2023. When Col. Ashish Khanna, who was party to the proceeding and has filed various application, including the application CA 40/2022, which was rejected on 15.12.2023, we are of the view that NCLT has not committed any error in holding that appellant the wife of Col. Ashish Khanna has no locus to file the application to recall order 15.12.2023.

17. We may also notice one more submission of appellant that cost imposed of 50,000 on Col. Ashish Khanna by order date 15.12.2023 need to be struck on. Since that effect, the appellant who is wife of Col. Ashish Khanna and they maintain a joint account and imposition of the cost 50,000 shall have Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025 16 of 17 effect on the appellant also. As noted above against the order dated 15.12.2023 Col. Ashish Khanna has filed Comp. App. (AT) No.242/2024, which was not entertained by this Tribunal, refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal by its order dated 21.10.2024. The order dated 15.12.2023, which was sought to be challenged by Col. Ashish Khanna which challenge having not been entertained the order 15.12.2023 and the cost imposed by the order dated 15.12.2023 could not be allowed to be challenged by the appellant. Cost was imposed on Col. Ashish Khanna for the reasons as was noticed in the said order dated 15.12.2023. Col. Ashish Khanna having unsuccessfully challenged the said order, Appellant has no locus to question the imposition of cost on Col. Ashish Khanna.

18. In view of the forgoing discussions and our conclusions, we are of the view that NCLT (Principal Bench, New Delhi) did not commit any error in holding that appellant/applicant has no locus to file CA 90/2024 praying for recall of the order dated 15.12.2023. We, thus do not find any good ground to interfere with the order dated 10.09.2024, rejecting the CA 90/2024.

The appeal is dismissed.

[Justice Ashok Bhushan] Chairperson [Arun Baroka] Member (Technical) NEW DELHI 08th April, 2025 himanshu Comp. App. (AT) No. 59 of 2025 17 of 17

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