Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Allam Ramu And Anr. vs Yelakacherla Narasimhulu on 26 October, 2007
Equivalent citations: 2008(3)ALD28
ORDER A. Gopal Reddy, J.
1. Petitioner/plaintiff invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution in assailing the correctness of the docket order passed by the Junior civil Judge, Chittoor in O.S. (SR) No.2717 of 2007 dated 03-08-2007, wherein the suit filed by the plaintiffs for injunction has been returned directing them to present the suit in the proper court while fixing the notional value based on the market value of the properties.
2. The facts giving rise to filing this revision as stated in the plaint are as under:
The 1st plaintiff entered into possessory sale agreement with the defendant on 26-08-2006 for an amount of Rs.6,50,00,000/- and paid an advance of Rs.9,00,000/- under two cheques dated 26-08-2006 for Rs.3,50,000/- each and Rs.2,00,000/- cash. On receipt of the said amount the defendant delivered the vacant possession of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. The defendant previously sold item No. 2 of plaint schedule property to one Merugu Rajeswara Rao on 26-08-2006 for an amount of Rs.50,00,000/- by receiving an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- towards advance sale consideration and executed possessory sale agreement in his favour and delivered possession. Subsequently the said Merugu Rajeswara Rao approached the 2nd plaintiff and offered to sell the said property for an amount of Rs.50,01,000/- for which the 2nd plaintiff agreed to enter into possessory agreement on 02-12-2006 with him with the consent and knowledge of the defendant and paid an amount of Rs.1,01,000/- towards advance sale consideration and entered into possession of the said property. Subsequently the 2nd plaintiff made payment of Rs.5,00,000/- on 30-12-2006 and Rs.5,00,000/- on 28-01-2006 which has been endorsed by the defendant. When the Sub-Registrar of Chittoor refused to register the plaint schedule property, the defendant filed W.P.No.10233 of 2003, which is pending. Thereafter, the plaintiff approached the Sub-Registrar to get the sale deeds registered against the same property; when he refused to do so, the plaintiff approached the High Court by filing W.P.No.2954 of 2007 and 6758 of 2007 and obtained directions. After obtaining the directions from the High Court when the plaintiffs approached the Sub-Registrar to register the regular sale deeds in their favour and applied for valuation certificate for preparation of sale deeds, the Sub- Registrar, Chittoor again refused to so and issued valuation certification by mentioning the market value of the plaint schedule property as Rs.0/- dated 26- 05-2007. Meanwhile, when the defendant by suppressing the fact of above said two possessory sale agreements trying to alienate the plaint schedule property, the plaintiffs got issued legal notices through their counsel on 21-05-2007 with the demands not to alienate the plaint schedule property to third parties and calling upon the defendant to register the regular sale deeds in their favour. The said notices were returned with an endorsement "continuously absent". Upon which the plaintiffs got published a public notice in Eenadu daily bringing the above facts. Hence, they filed the above suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his agents and heirs from alienating the plaint schedule properties to the third parties by way of sale, gift etc. and valued the suit for computation of court-fees and jurisdiction under Section 50(1) of the A.P. Court-fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1956 (for short "the Act"). On office raising objections the lower court passed the aforementioned order, which is impugned in the present revision.
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs contends that under Section 26 (c) of the Act the plaintiffs are at liberty to value the suit notionally and can pay the court-fees accordingly and the trial court failed to consider the judgments of this Court in N.A. Siddiqui v. State ; Viraj Constructions v. P. Pandu ; Valluri Sri Vasudeva Siva Prasad v. Alluri Kurminaidu ; M.A. Jabbar v. State of A.P. 1969 (1) An.W.R.411; J. Rameshwar Rao v. Narsing Rao . Since the suit itself is for mere injunction, it is the prerogative of the plaintiffs to value the relief; but the same cannot be returned at this stage unless the defendant appears and raises an objection for which an issue has to be framed by the lower court.
4. In order to appreciate the above submissions, it is necessary to set about the relevant provisions of the Act under which the suit has to be valued. Section 26(c) of the Act is the relevant clause, which reads as under:
26 (c) in any other case, whether the subject matter of the suit has a market value or not, fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or at which such relief is valued by the Court, whichever is higher.
5. A Division Bench of this Court in A.P.S. Elec. Board v. K.R. Reddy dealing with the court-fees payable on the pliant with regard to relief sought by way of declaration/injunction after considering the provisions of Section 24(d) and 26(c) of the Act held that the test to be applied by the court in valuing the relief either under Section 24(d) or Section 26 (c) is to find out the advantage which is sought to be gained by the plaintiff or the loss sought to be avoided. The advantage which the plaintiff seeks to gain or the loss which he seeks to avoid must be decided with reference to the allegations in the plaint. After considering the pliant allegations alone it is clear that the plaintiff is seeking to avoid the demand of Rs.10,954-95 and the same has to be taken for the purpose of valuing the court-fees.
6. In N.A.Siddiqui's case (1 supra) the petitioner/plaintiff along with the deceased-Syed Abdul Majed executed an unregistered surety bond for grant of scholarship in favour of Dr.Mir Ahmed Ali, an employee working in the Medical Department in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad to qualify himself as M.R.C.P. within a period of three years and the scholarship committee without plaintiff's consent or that of other surety permitted the scholar to prolong his stay in the United Kingdom beyond the stipulated period of three years at his own expenses for obtaining the said qualification of M.R.C.P. The plaintiff did not agree to the extension of the period of deputation. The plaintiff for not informing how much amount was spent and when the scholar was actually declared as a defaulter sought to enforce the surety bond for the amounts due under the bond filed the suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from initiating the any proceeding. This Court after referring the judgments of this Court in M.A.Jabbar's case (4 supra); Sunkani Neelakantam v. The State of Andhra Pradesh (1960) 1 An.W.R.106 : 1960 ALT 53 and Pisupati Ramachandraiah v. Pisupati Lakshmidevamma (1965) An.W.R. 138 : (1965) 1 ALT 50 held that that these are the decisions decided on the basis of the language employed in Section 24 of the Court-fees Act but not under Section 26 with which the issue relates is distinguishable and after following the judgment of the Supreme Court in V.P. Sugar Works v. C.I. of Stamps held that the court-fee paid by the plaintiff for relief of injunction under Section 26 (c) of the Act and paying the court- fee of Rs.500/- is proper and correct and the court below erred in requiring the petitioner to assume that the relief sought for by way of injunction is only a consequential one.
7. In Viraj Construction's case (2 supra) in respect of Ac.3.27 gts. of land the plaintiff valued the relief claimed under Section 26(c) of the Andhra Pradesh Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 at Rs.10,000/- and payment of court-fees was returned observing that the relief has to be valued more than Rs.1 lakh so, present before the proper court. On revision being filed this Court after considering the judgments in Jabbar's case (4 supra); K.R.Reddy's case 6 supra and K.Ramamurthy v. E.O., Panchayat Raj held that in a suit for mere injunction market value of the suit land as such is not the criterion for valuing the relief, as the relief has to be valued on the basis of the advantage which is sought to be derived or the loss which is sought to be averted. That apart, the lower court has not arrived at any particular amount at which the relief has to be valued. It merely observed that the court valued the relief at more than rupees one lakh and so returned the plaint. In the absence of payment lower court came to that conclusion. The order was set aside and the matter is remitted to the lower court for properly valuing the relief in accordance with law.
8. In the case of VALLURI SRI VASUDEVA SIVA PRASAD (3 supra) this Court held that under Section 26 (c) of the Act discretion is vested in the plaintiff to value the relief of perpetual injunction and pay the Court-fee accordingly. It is another thing that the Court also has power to value the relief. But the said provision does not indicate that the value should be actual value or market value, and set aside the order passed by the lower court as it was passed during the midst of the trial instead of doing so at the conclusion of the trial or in the judgment to be rendered in the suit; on issues being framed and the relief of perpetual injunction can be valued notionally by the plaintiff and directed the lower court to proceed with the suit.
9. In the case of M.A.JABBAR (4 supra) it was held that the provisions of Section 24(d) of the Act are very clear and empower the court to value the relief claimed by the plaintiff and the relief sought by the plaintiff has to be valued on the basis of the advantage he would gain or the injury or loss he would avoid.
10. This Court in Pratap Rao v. Pochaiah 1983 (1) ALT 147 while considering the suit valued for injunction under Section 26(c) of the Act, where the plaintiffs sought for an injunction restraining the defendants from felling gulmohwa trees standing on their patta lands assailing their rights to trees and defendants have no manner of right whatsoever to cut the same; valued the same for the purpose of injunction at Rs.500/- and the court-fee paid thereon is correct or not, held that the plaint averments clearly goes to show that the plaintiffs have got right to the trees and that Rani Chinnamma-the original Jagirdar has no right to alienate the trees belonging to the plaintiffs; that the sale is not valid and binding on them and, therefore, the contract entered into between the predecessors in title of the petitioners and Rani Chinnamma is not binding on the plaintiffs. If the said contentions are accepted, the plaintiffs would be entitled to the advantage of the decree. The result would be, they are entitled to retain the trees standing on their patta lands. This advantage the respondents are to gain by an injunction that may be issued in their favour. After following the Division Bench judgment of this Court in A.P.S.E.B. v. K.R. Reddy (6 supra) where this Court exhaustively considered the scope of the provisions of Section 26 (c) of the Act and held that the advantage which the plaintiffs seek to gain or the loss which they seek to avoid, must be decided with reference to the allegations in the plaint. In view of the same, it was held that the proper valuation of the plaint is to be based on the value of the total number of trees in respect of which injunction is sought for and court-fee has to be paid thereon.
11. In the light of the principles laid down in the above judgments and the plaint allegations, as referred to above, it is clear that the plaintiff wants to restrain the defendants, his agents from alienating the plaint schedule properties to third parties by way of sale, gift etc. In other words, if the relief is not granted the loss caused to the plaintiff will be that the property for which he entered into agreement of sale will be alienating to the third parties, the same will be loss caused to the defendant from receiving the sale consideration on the property.
12. The proper court fee payable is on the value of the property, which he wants to keep in tact from alienation. Section 24(d) and Section 26 (c) which are similar in nature applies to cases whether the subject matter of the suit is capable of valuation or not or has market value or not. In either case the court-fee has to be paid on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or at which such relief is valued by the court, whichever is higher. It follows that if the court is not satisfied with the value placed on the relief by the plaintiff, it is entitled to value the relief itself and if such value exceeds the value adopted by the plaintiff, the court-fee has to be paid on the value arrived at by the court.
13. In view of the same, prima-facie, valuation as shown by the plaintiff for the purpose of jurisdiction will not reflect the value of the relief or value of the advantage which the plaintiff will gain or loss will be suffered if the defendant allowed to sell property. The plaint allegations go to show which is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Junior Civil Judge before whom the suit was laid by notionally valuing at Rs.20,000/-. Therefore, the lower court has rightly returned the plaint to properly value it and to be presented before the appropriate court, which will have the jurisdiction to try the suit.
14. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed.