Central Administrative Tribunal - Madras
R Kumaresan vs M/O Railways on 27 October, 2025
1 MA/310/00780/2024
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CHENNAI BENCH
MA/310/00780/2024
OA/310/001387/2025
Dated this the 27th day of October, Two Thousand Twenty Five
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR M. SWAMINATHAN. MEMBER (J)
AND
HON'BLE MR. SISIR KUMAR RATHO, MEMBER(A)
R. Kumarasean,
S/o N. Ramakrishjna Nadar,
No.4/109, West Street,
Kilkadayas, Kadayam
Thenkasi District,
Tamil Nadu. .. Applicant
By Advocate M/s. K. Manickaraj
Vs.
1. Union of India
rep by The Chairman,
Railway Board,
Rail Bhavan, Raisina Road,
New Delhi.
2. The Principal Chief Personnel Officer,
Southern Railway,
Park Town, Chennai.
3. The Senior Divisional Personnel Officer,
Madurai Division, Southern Railway,
Madurai .. Respondents
By Advocate Ms. A. Lakshmi
2 MA/310/00780/2024
ORDER
(Pronounced by Hon'ble Mr. M. Swaminathan, Judicial Member) This MA has been filed by the applicant to condone the delay of 21 years, 6 months and 2 days in filing the Original Application.
2. The relief sought by the applicant in the OA is as follows:
"i) call for the records related to the Railway Board order in respect of Note 7 of Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Railway Services (Revised) Pay Rules, 1986, dated19.09.1986, the A-9 Notification on the subject of Pay Fixation on stepping up of pay on par with juniors pay and after adding due increment before fixing the pay in revised pay and the A-7 rejection order No. U/P.721/GA/TN/24/99 dated20.04.1999 not allowing the option for allowing the increment due on 01.01.1986 before fixing the pay in the revised scale and to set aside the same as the A-7 decision is contradicting pay commission fixation Rules Note 7 of 7 and 8 of the principle of natural justice and Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India;
ii) issue of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus or any other appropriate writ or orders or directions, in the nature of Writ direct the respondents to fix thepay of the applicants as per the option and the A-4 fixation proposal and to step up of the applicant's pay on par with the pay of the juniors whose pay had been fixed on the option;
iii) Pass such other orders that are deemed just, fair and necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case."
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3. The factual matrix of the case are as follows:
The applicant was initially engaged as a Project Casual Labourer on daily wages in June 1980 for special works on the Sakkottai-Punalur section.
He was granted Temporary Status on 01.01.1984, brought under the CPC pay scales, and posted as a CPC Gangman under the project. Subsequently, the Railway Board implemented the 4th Central Pay Commission (CPC), revising the pay structure. However, the 3rd respondent applied these revisions only to regular employees and not to casual labourers under CPC scales. As a result, an Original Application No. 835 of 1986 was filed before this Tribunal, which led to the implementation of the revised pay scale for project casual labourers as well. The applicant and his juniors were drawing the same basic pay and annual increments. He was regularized as a Gangman on 26.12.1989. The Railway Board issued an order allowing employees who were drawing annual increments as on 01.01.1986 in the pre-revised scale to opt for pay fixation under the revised pay scale. However, the applicant was unaware of this order dated 05.05.1995. Consequently, while his juniors received higher pay (Rs. 811), his pay remained at Rs. 799. Although the applicant had submitted his option in April 1988, he was never informed of the 05.05.1995 order. The 3rd respondent refused to process his pay fixation, stating that the option had not been submitted within the prescribed six-month period from the
4 MA/310/00780/2024 date of the order. This rejection was formally communicated to the applicant on 21.09.1998. The applicant made further representations, including one on 16.03.1999 during the Pension Adalat, but the 3rd respondent again rejected his request on 20.04.1999. He submitted another representation on 03.01.2003, seeking stepping up of his pay on par with his juniors as per Railway Service Rules, 1986. This representation remains undisposed to date. The applicant retired on superannuation on 28.02.2013. Despite his retirement, the pay anomaly during his service period was never rectified. Therefore, the applicant has now approached this Tribunal through a Miscellaneous Application seeking condonation of delay for a period of 21 years, 6 months, and 2 days in filing the Original Application.
4. In the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, it is stated that the subject matter of the Original Application pertains to the fixation of pay under the applicable option, as well as the stepping up of pay on par with junior employees. This has resulted in a loss in basic pay, which in turn has adversely affected the fixation of pension and other consequential monetary benefits. The reduced pension leads to a recurring financial loss every month, thereby giving rise to a continuing cause of action until the anomaly is rectified.
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5. It is further stated in the affidavit that the delay in filing this Original Application arose from 03.01.2003, being the date of the last representation made following the rejection dated 20.04.1999. The delay from 03.01.2003 to the date of filing the OA on 05.07.2024, a period of 21 years, 6 months, and 2 days may be condoned by this Tribunal, in view of the continuing cause of action as detailed above.
6. The respondents have filed a reply statement contesting the application for condonation of delay. By referring to the various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is stated in the reply that the instant application filed belatedly and without any explanation as to delay and latches, is not maintainable. According to them, the present matter pertains to an application filed after an inordinate and unexplained delay of 25 years, seeking relief on grounds that are vague and lacking any substantive proof to justify the delay. It is their case that the applicant has failed to provide any cogent and acceptable reasons that would satisfy the legal threshold of "sufficient cause" required for condonation of such an extraordinary delay.
7. The respondents have relied upon the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the point of delay, latches and and also on the 6 MA/310/00780/2024 ground that repeated representations will not give fresh cause of action:
1.K.V. Rajalakshmiah Vs. State of Mysore (AIR 1967 SC 993)
2.State of Orissa Vs. Sri Pyarimohan Samantaray (AIR 1976 SC 2617)
3.Union of India Vs. Chamant Rana (2018 (5) SCC 798)
4.Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. K.Thangappan and another (2006 (4) SCC 322
5.S.S. Rathore Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1990 10)
6.State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. S.M. Kotrayya & Ors (1996 (6) SCC 267)
7.Rup Diamonds Vs. UOI (1989 (2) SCC 356)
8.Union of India Vs. C. Girija in Civil Appeal No.1577 of 2019(13.02.2019)
9.UOI Vs. A.Durairaj (Dead) 2010 (14) SCC 389
10. Union of India Vs. M.K. Sarkar (2010 (2) SCC 58
11.Ex.Capt. Harish Uppal Vs. Union of India 1994 SCC Supl(2) 195
12.D.C.S. Negi Vs. UOI & Ors (2018 (16) SCC 721)
8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings and the materials placed on record. The decisions referred to by them have also been gone through by us.
9. With regard to the delay and laches, it would be appropriate to refer to the recent judgment, dated 18.04.2024, of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
7 MA/310/00780/2024 Civil Appeal No.5027 of 2024( MRINMOY MAITY VS.CHHANDA KOLEY AND OTHERS). The relevant portions of the judgment are extracted hereunder:
"9.Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
10.The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.
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11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and others., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:
"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ w will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume 9 MA/310/00780/2024 matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261] , Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 :
(1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v.
H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84] ).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.'
12.It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. and another v. K. Thangappan and another, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right 10 MA/310/00780/2024 is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7.What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes had stated: "Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect 11 MA/310/00780/2024 has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution- makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."
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13.Reiterating the aspect of delay and laches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held:
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant -- a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis."
10. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case reported in 2014 (4) SCC 108, when an aggrieved person approaches the court without adequate reason and at his own convenience, the court is obligated to examine whether the case should be entertained at such a belated stage. It is also important to recognize that delay can impede the pursuit of equity.
While delay and laches may not always be detrimental, in most cases, 13 MA/310/00780/2024 significant delay can severely impact the litigant seeking relief. Delay often indicates inactivity or inaction on the part of the litigant, who may have disregarded the principle that "procrastination is the greatest thief of time," and the legal expectation is that one cannot delay indefinitely. Such delay can cause harm to the claim of the present applicant who requested for refixation of pay under option and for stepping up of pay on par with juniors, after a lapse of 22 years.
11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the applicant has miserably failed to make out a case for condoning the inordinate delay of 21 years,6 months and 2 days as claimed by him in preferring an OA to redress his grievance.
12. c In the result, MA 780 of 2024 is liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the unnumbered OA also stands dismissed. Registry to number the OA for record purpose.
(SISIR KUMAR RATHO) (M.SWAMINATHAN)
MEMBER(A) MEMBER(J)
.10.2025
mas