Madras High Court
United India Insurance Co.Ltd vs Seethammal on 23 December, 2014
Author: S.Vaidyanathan
Bench: S.Vaidyanathan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated : 23.12.2014
CORAM:
The Honourable Mr. Justice S.VAIDYANATHAN
C.M.A.Nos.1582 of 2013 & 2121 of 2014
RESERVED ON 31.10.2014
CMA No.1582 of 2013:
United India Insurance Co.Ltd.,
No.19, Andiappa Gramini Street,
Royapuram, Chennai-13 .. Appellant
Vs.
1. Seethammal
2. L.Venkitasamy
3. G.Kandasamy .. Respondents
For Appellant : Mr.K.Padmanabhan
For Respondents : Mr.U.M.Ravichandran for R1&R2
No appearance for R3
CMA No.2121 of 2014:
1. Tmt.Seethammal
2. L.Venkitasamy .. Appellants
Vs.
1. Mr.G.Kandasamy
2. United India Insurance Co.Ltd.,
No.19, Andiappa Gramini Street,
Royapuram, Chennai-13 .. Respondents
For Appellant : Mr. U.M.Ravichandran
For Respondents : Mr. K.Padmanabhan for R2
No appearance for R1
Prayer: These Civil Miscellaneous Appeal have been preferred against the order passed in made in W.C.No.80 of 2011 by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour II, Chennai, dated 31.08.2012.
COMMON JUDGMENT
These appeals arise out of the order made in W.C.No.80 of 2011 by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour II, Chennai, dated 31.08.2012 in his capacity as the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, in and by which, an award for a sum of Rs.8,66,120/- together with interest at 12% p.a. from the date of expiry of 30 days from the date of occurrence till the date of payment, has been ordered.
2. Questioning the quantum of compensation awarded by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, the United India Insurance Company Ltd., as appellant has come forward with CMA No.1582 of 2012, whereas, being not satisfied with the quantum of said compensation, the claimants, as appellants have come forward with CMA No.2121 of 2014, seeking for enhancement together with interest from the date of accident.
3. The deceased V.Krishnamurthy, was working as a Driver for a Trailer Lorry bearing Registration No.TN-2-BU-9321 belonged to one G.Kandasamy. On 12.12.2010, he loaded container in the trailer lorry at Ponneri and proceeded to Madras along with Cleaner Subburaj and when they reached at Madarasan Company, Vandalur, the lorry came to contact with an electric live wire, due to which, the driver Krishnamurthy died of electrocution. The legal representatives of the deceased, who are the parents of the deceased, filed a claim petition under Section 10(1) & 4-A of the Workmen Compensation Act, before the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation II, Chennai Labour Court, claiming compensation at Rs.10,00,000/- with interest at 12% p.a. from the date of accident.
4. On consideration of both oral and documentary evidence, while taking into account the earning of the deceased at 8000/- per month, the Commissioner has awarded a sum of Rs.8,66,120/- with interest at 12% p.a. from the date of expiry of 30 days from the date of occurrence till the date of payment.
5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the respondents. Perused the entire materials available on record.
6. At the outset, it is pertinent to mention that though initially, this Court granted interim stay on 5.6.2013 while entertaining the appeal filed by the Insurance Company. However, subsequently, by a detailed order, dated 26.9.2013, relevant portion of which extracted hereunder, this Court vacated the interim stay.
2. Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 provides that no appeal by an employer shall lie to High Court unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate issued by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. In this case, the appellant seems to have produced a copy of the letter enclosing a cheque dated 26.12.2012 for a sum of Rs.8,66,120/- addressed to the Commissioner containing an endorsement to the effect that such a cheque was received on 04.01.2013. The same has been produced in purported fulfillment of the condition provided in the above said proviso. An acknowledgment that a cheque was received for a particular amount cannot be equated with a certificate issued by the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation that the amount awarded as compensation has been deposited. In this case, the learned counsel for the petitioners has rightly pointed out the fact that even otherwise what was deposited by the appellant in the CMA was only the principal component awarded by the Commissioner and interest component has not been deposited. It is also pertinent to note that unless the cheque is encashed, the appellant cannot contend that the amount awarded as compensation as per the order has been deposited. The acknowledgment for the receipt of the cheque will not b e a substitute for the certificate that the amount has been deposited.
3. In view of the same, this Court comes to the conclusion that the petitioners in the present miscellaneous petition have made out a clear case for vacating the order of stay granted by this Court in M.P.No.1 of 2013. Accordingly, M.P.No.2 of 2013 is allowed and the interim stay granted by order dated 5.6.2013 made in M.P.No.1 of 2013 shall stand vacated.
7. Therefore, it is clear that the appellant/Insurance Company has not complied with the requirement of proviso 3 to Section 30(1) of the Employees Compensation Act since interest component has not been deposited. Section 30(1) of the Act and Proviso 3 of it, reads as under:
30. Appeals. (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely:-
(a) .
(e) .
. . Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.
8. A perusal of the above, it is clear that no appeal by the employer shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. As already observed above, in this case, the Insurance Company has not produced any such certificate which indicates that no substantial compliance of Section 30 of the Act has been made by the Insurance Company. However, an acknowledgement to the effect that a cheque was produced before the Commissioner for Rs.8,66,120/- has been produced. As already stated by this Court in the above order that the receipt of the cheque will not be a substitute for the certificate that the amount has been deposited unless it is encashed. Further, the said amount only pertains to the principal component awarded by the Commissioner and interest component was not deposited. The words mentioned in the proviso 3 to Section 30(1) of the Act specifically mention that amount payable under the order appealed against, which include not only the principal amount of compensation, but also interest as well. Therefore, it can be held that the appellant/Insurance Company has not complied with Section 30 (1) of the Act.
9. In this regard, it is worthwhile to refer the decision of this Court reported in 2012 (2) TN MAC 750 (Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd. versus R.Mahalingam), wherein, this Court has held as under:
19. In the present case, the award has been passed on 30.5.2003. Admittedly, the principal amount of Rs.2,99,491/- has been deposited by way of cheque dated 13.8.2003 bearing No.094174 drawn on State Bank of Travancore with a covering note dated 18.8.2003 which is acknowledged by the Labour Deputy Commissioner on 20.8.2003. Even according to the Insurance Company, they have received the order on 18.7.2003 and they ought to have deposited within a period of 30 days i.e. on 18.8.2003. It is not in dispute that only principal amount of Rs.2,99,491/- alone has been deposited by way of cheque and the said cover containing the cheque had been received only on 20.8.2003 as could be noticed from the endorsement found on the cover. That apart, the appeal is not accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the Appellant/ Insurance Company has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. Therefore, the Appellant has failed to deposit the interest that has been ordered by the Commissioner. I am in entire agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in 2011-2-TNMAC-48 (New India Assurance Co. Limited Vs. Biju) and 2008-ACJ-235 (V.K.Raghavan Vs. Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation) that the words 'amount payable under the order appealed against' in the third proviso will include not only the principal amount of compensation, but also interest as well.
20. Now the question is as to whether the deposit of cheque is sufficient compliance to third proviso referred to above. My opinion is that it is not sufficient compliance. I gain strength to my view from the decision rendered in J&K SFC Vs.. Ghulam Mohd. (1993-ACJ-736-J&K) wherein it has been held thus:-
"It has been laid down that a cheque, bank draft, cash in deposit or any other kind of security is no substitute for the deposit of the amount with the Commissioner under the Act and the memo of appeal accompanied by a certificate of the Commissioner to that effect. The court held that allowing any mode of deposit of award money other than one laid down under Section 30(1) third proviso would amount to rewriting law."
21. Appeal in hand is not accompanied by the requisite certificate and therefore, instead of certificate, a letter addressed to the Commissioner enclosing a cheque accompanying the memorandum of appeal cannot be termed to be the compliance to the requirement of third proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act, 1923. The Insurance Company/appellant having not deposited the interest accrued on its failure to deposit the amount within 30 days from the date of receipt of order and as the memorandum of appeal is not accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the Appellant Insurance Company has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against is not sufficient compliance of the requirement of third proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act, 1923 and as such I hold that the appeal filed by the Insurance Company is not maintainable.
10. In view of the above, since there was no substantial compliance of Section 30(1) of the Act, I am of the view that the appeal itself is a defective one and it would not lie and accordingly, the appeal filed by the Insurance Company deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable.
11. As regards the quantum of compensation awarded by the Deputy Commissioner, the learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company, would contend that the Commissioner has erroneously fixed the wages of the deceased at Rs.8000/- by invoking the amended provision of Section 4(i) Explanation II of Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 in the absence of any material evidence produced either by the employer/owner of the vehicle or the workman. The Commissioner ought not to have invoked the provisions of Minimum Wages Act for the purpose of fixing the wages.
12. On the other hand, Mr.UM.Ravichandran, learned counsel appearing for the claimants, would contend that Section 4(1) of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 provides compensation where death results from the injury, equal to fifty per cent of the monthly wages of the deceased (employee) multiplied by the relevant factor, however, Explanation II of Section 4 of the Act which restricts the monthly wages of the workman at four thousand only even if it exceeds more than four thousand, and such restriction contained in Explanation II of Section 4(1) of the Act has been subsequently removed by amendment Act 45 of 2009 with effect from 31.05.2010 and by Notification issued by the Ministry of Labour and Employment, published in the Gazette of India, dated 31.10.2010, the monthly wages have been prescribed at Rs.8000/-. The learned counsel would vehemently contend that when the statute prescribed the said wages now at Rs.8000/-, it should be construed and interpreted as minimum, it means not less than Rs.8000/-, however, as no restriction attached such as in previous clause, which restricted by stating that the monthly wages workman at four thousand only and the present ceiling fixing Rs.8000/- cannot be construed as maximum and hence, while interpreting the statute which is a beneficial legislation, this Court has to liberally consider the case of the claimants who are aged persons and lost their bread-winner, by taking into the account of Rs.12,000/- as monthly wages of the deceased for the purpose of arriving at just compensation. He pointed out that the deceased workman was a driver and earning Rs.12,000/- p.m. which has been established in the evidence of PW.2 and in order to refute the same, to show that the deceased was not earning Rs.12,000/- p.m., the Insurance Company has not adduced any evidence nor produced any records from the employer of the deceased.
13. In support of his contentions regarding the interpretation of statute which should be construed as beneficial to the aggrieved party, the learned counsel for the claimants relied upon the decision of the Honble Supreme Court reported in Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt.Ltd. & Othrs versus State of Orissa & others reported in (1987) 3 SCC 279, wherein, the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under:
9. A statute is best understood if we know the reason for it. The reason for a statute is the safest guide to its interpretation. The words of a statute take their colour from the reason for it. How do we discover the reason for a statute? There are external and internal aids. The external aids are Statement of Objects and Reasons when the Bill is presented to Parliament, the reports of committees which preceded the Bill and the reports of Parliamentary Committees. Occasional excursions into the debates of Parliament are permitted. Internal aids are the preamble, the scheme and the provisions of the Act. Having discovered the reason for the statute and so having set the sail to the wind, the interpreter may proceed ahead. No provision in the statute and no word of the statute may be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally before any provision or word is attempted to be construed. The setting and the pattern are important. It is again important to remember that Parliament does not waste its breath unnecessarily. Just as Parliament is not expected to use unnecessary expressions, Parliament is also not expected to express itself unnecessarily. Even as Parliament does not use any word without meaning something, Parliament does not legislate where no legislation is called for. Parliament cannot be assumed to legislate for the sake of legislation; nor can it be assumed to make pointless legislation. Parliament does not indulge in legislation merely to state what it is unnecessary to state or to do what is already validly done. Parliament may not be assumed to legislate unnecessarily. Again, while the words of an enactment are important, the context is no less important. For instance:
...the fact that general words are used in a statute is not in itself a conclusive reason why every case falling literally within them should be governed by that statute, and the context of an Act may well indicate that wide or general words should be given a restrictive meaning.
14. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Honble Supreme Court, in The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and another versus Ramjee reported in AIR 1977 SC 965, wherein, it has been held as under:
5. .. Law is meant to serve the living and does not beat its abstract wings in the jural void. Its functional fulfilment as social engineering depends on its sensitized response to situation, subject-matter and the complex of realities which require ordered control. A holistic understanding is simple justice to the meaning of all legislations. Fragmentary grasp of rules can misfire or even backfire, as in this case. It is a notorious fact that collieries Indian collieries, both before and after nationalisation are strategic sources of the nations fuel and, operationally, areas of tragic human hazards. We need coal, we want miners to bring it from the bowels of the earth. The dangerous technology is not yet so perfect in India as to ensure risk-free extraction. And, after many lives have been lost by the neglect of operatives or supervisors or supine bosses, follows the scenario of tears and torndown homes, a little monetary compensation, a flutter in Parliament, a long-drawn-out Commission, a routine report about lapses and recipes and the little mans life-or-death lot continuing to receive callous consideration at the hands of the law, law-maker, law-enforcer this sombre colliery disaster sequence must educate and inform the jurisprudence of high-risk operations. .
15. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, since the statute is a beneficial legislation, it has to be construed by interpreting liberally and in view of omission of explanation II and the notification issued by the Central Government (Ministry of Labour and Employment), dated 31.5.2010, though a sum Rs.8000/- has been mentioned as monthly wages, it should be construed as minimum and not as maximum and therefore, when evidence establishes that the workman was earning Rs.12,000/- p.m., the same has to be considered for arriving at just compensation.
16. From the narration of the facts, it is not in dispute that the workman died while he was in the employment. It is the specific contention of the claimants that the deceased workman was earning a sum of Rs.12,000/- per month as a Driver and a notice dated 03.02.2011 was issued to the employer on behalf of the claimants, claiming the compensation based on the income of the deceased workman at Rs.12,000/- The Deputy Commissioner of Labour II, for the purpose of calculating and arriving at compensation, has considered the wages at Rs.8,000/- based on the Notification, dated 31.5.2010.
17. Section 4(1) of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (old Act) reads as under:
4.(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall b e as follows, namely:-
a) Where death results an amount equal to fifty per cent from the injury of the monthly wages of the deceased workman multiplied by the relevant factor or an amount of eighty thousand rupees, whichever is more;
b) Where permanent total an amount equal to sixty per
disablement results cent of the monthly wages
from the injury of the injured workman
multiplied by the relevant factor
or
an amount of ninety thousand
rupees, whichever is more;
Explanation I.- For the purposes of clause (a) and clause (b) relevant factorin relation to a workman means the factor specified in the second column of the Schedule IV against the entry in the first column of that Schedule specifying the number of years which are the same as the completed years of the age of the workman on his last birthday immediately preceding the date on which the compensation fell due.
Explanation II.- Where the monthly wages of a workman exceed four thousand rupees, his monthly wages for the purposes of clause (a) and clause (b) shall be deemed to be four thousand rupees only;
18. A reading of the above, it is clear that the compensation for the death of the workman, is an amount equal to fifty per cent of the monthly wages of the deceased or an amount of eighty thousand rupees, whichever is more. However, Explanation II clearly specified and restricted that the monthly wages of a workman shall be deemed to be four thousand rupees only even if exceeds fourth thousand.
19. Subsequently, by Notification, dated 21.5.2010, by Act 45 of 2009, the above Section has been amended (w.e.f.18.1.2010) as follows:
a) Where death results an amount equal to fifty per cent from the injury of the monthly wages of the deceased employee multiplied by the relevant factor or an amount of one lakh and twenty thousand rupees, whichever is more;
b) Where permanent total an amount equal to sixty per
disablement results from the injury of the monthly
from the injury wages of the injured workman
multiplied by the relevant factor
or
amount of one lakh and forty thousand rupees, whichever is more;
Explanation I.- For the purposes of clause (a) and clause (b) relevant factor in relation to a employee means the factor specified in the second column of the Schedule IV against the entry in the first column of that Schedule specifying the number of years which are the same as the completed years of the age of the employee on his last birthday immediately preceding the date on which the compensation fell due.
**** *Explanation II omitted by Act 45 of 2009, S.7 (w.e.f.18.1.2010)
20. In continuation of the above, the Central Government (Ministry of Labour and Employment) has issued Notification published in the Gazette of India, dated 31.5.2010, which reads as under:
NOTIFICATION New Delihi, the 31st May, 2010 S.O.1258(E).- In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1B) of Section 4 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), the Central Government hereby specifies for the purpose of sub-section (1) of the said section, the following amount as monthly wages, with effect from the date of publication of this notification in the Official Gazette, namely:-
Eight thousand rupees
21. A perusal of the above, it is explicit that for the death of the employee, an amount equal to fifty per cent of his monthly wages multiplied by relevant factor or one lakh and twenty thousand whichever is more, has to be awarded towards compensation and for the purpose of computing such compensation, monthly wages at a sum of Rs.8,000/- has to be considered. It is pertinent to note that earlier before amendment, the said wages were fixed at a sum of Rs.4,000/- and Explanation II specifically restricted to Rs.4,000/- only even if it exceeds. However, by virtue of Act 45 of 2009, the said restriction came to be omitted and in its place, a sum of Rs.8,000/- has been substituted by way of Notification stated supra. It is to be noted that while amending the said clause, no restriction has been attached or specified that if the monthly wages of the deceased employee exceeds Rs.8,000/- whether it should be considered at Rs.8,000/- only. Therefore, in this context, the learned counsel appearing for the claimants would vehemently contend that since no restriction is imposed in case the monthly wages of the deceased employee exceeds Rs.8,000/- since the Act itself is a beneficial legislation, liberal interpretation has to be made which would be beneficial to the claimants.
22. Though the contention of the learned counsel for the claimants is logically sound and acceptable, but I am unable to countenance the same.
23. Before dealing with the above contention, it is appropriate to refer para 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons mentioned in the Bill for amending the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (22nd December, 2009), as follows:
Statement of Objects and Reasons:-
. .
4. The Central Government has decided to introduce the Workmens Compensation (Amendment) Bill, 2009, on the lines of the Workmens Compensation (Amendment) Bill, 2008 introduced in the 14th Lok Sabha incorporating therein certain recommendation of the Standing Committee proposing to amend the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 which inter alia, makes provision,-
(a) for amendment in long title and the provisions of the aforesaid Act so as to substitute Workman by the employee;
(b) for enhancement of the minimum rates of compensation payable to a worker from eighty thousand rupees to one lakh twenty thousand rupees for death and from ninety thousand rupees to one lakh forty thousand rupees for permanent disability and to empower the Central Government to enhance the minimum rates of the said compensation from time to time.
(c) to confer power upon the Central Government to specify the monthly wages in relation to an employee for the purpose of the aforesaid compensation;
. .. ..
24. Form the above, it is clear only in order to enhance the compensation payable to worker for death or for permanent disability, the amendment came into force while empowering the Central Government to enhance the minimum rates of the said compensation from time to time as well as to specify the monthly wages in relation to an employee for the purpose of the aforesaid compensation. Therefore, fixing the minimum wages by way of amendment at Rs.8000/- is only for the present purpose and it is likely to be enhanced from time to time. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel that as there is no ceiling limit is fixed at Rs.8000/-, it should be construed liberally only as minimum and not maximum and thereby, the wages of the deceased employee if established that it is more than 8000/-, it can be considered, cannot be accepted. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute. In my considered view, when the intent of the legislature is clear while amending the Act to enhance the minimum rates of the compensation from time to time as well as to specify the monthly wages in relation to an employee for the purpose of the said compensation, liberal interpretation beyond the prescription made in the Act, is not at all required. Further it is pertinent to note that while amending the Act, the legislature has consciously in its wisdom, omitted the Explanation II of Section 4-A of the Act only in order to enhance the minimum rates of compensation. In this regard, it is worthwhile to refer a decision of the Honble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 437, at page 443 wherein, it has been held as under in para 15.
15. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so. (See Frankfurter: Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes in Essays on Jurisprudence, Columbia Law Review, p. 51.)
25. In State v. Parmeshwaran Subramani, (2009) 9 SCC 729, at page 734 the Honble Apex Court has held as under in para 9:
9. In a plethora of cases, it has been stated that where the language is clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope of legislation or the intention of the legislature, when the language of the provision is plain. The court cannot rewrite the legislation for the reason that it had no power to legislate. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. The court cannot, on an assumption that there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, correct or make up assumed deficiency, when the words are clear and unambiguous. Courts have to decide what the law is and not what it should be. The courts adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but cannot set at naught legislative judgment because such course would be subversive of constitutional harmony (see Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal2).
26. Therefore, where the language is clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. What is to be borne in mind is as to what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said. Having regard to the above, I am unable to give accept the contention of the learned counsel for the claimants. Accordingly, I am of the view that the monthly wages specified by the statute by way of amendment at Rs.8000/- is appropriate for consideration for the purpose of computing the compensation and hence, the Deputy Commissioner has rightly calculated the compensation by considering the wages of the deceased workman at Rs.8000/-, which, in my opinion, requires no interference.
27. As regards the issue of payment of interest is concerned, the Honble Supreme Court in Prakash Garg v Premi Devi and Others reported in 1998 (1) ACJ 1, after examining the entire the entire scheme of the Workmen's Compensation Act, has held that:- I. Payment of interest and penalty are two distinct liabilities arising under the Workmen Compensation Act. II. Penalty is not a part and parcel of the legal liability of the employer to compensate his employee and since the insurer is under contractual obligation to indemnify the employer for his legal liability the insurer is not liable to pay the penalty. III. Liability to pay interest is part and parcel of legal liability of the employer to pay compensation upon default of payment of that amount within one month. Therefore, claim for compensation payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act along with interest thereon will have to be made good by the Insurance Company jointly with the insured employer. Therefore, the Insurance Company is liable to pay the interest.
28. Now the issue is whether the claimants are entitled to the interest at 12% p.a. on the amount of compensation from the date of adjudication of the claim petitioner or from one month after the date of accident. The learned Deputy Commissioner awarded the interest at 12% p.a. one month after the date of accident.
29. In this context, it is worthwhile to refer the decision of the Honble Supreme Court reported in Saberabibi Yakubbhai Shaikh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in (2014) 2 SCC 298 wherein, it has been held that the claimants therein are entitled to the interest at 12% p.a. from the date of accident. The relevant portion of the order is extracted as under:
8. We have perused the aforesaid judgment. We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. This Court considered the earlier judgment relied upon by the High Court and observed that the judgments in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed (2007) 2 SCC 349 and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir (2009) 6 SCC 280 were per incuriam having been rendered without considering the earlier decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata (1976) 1 SCC 289. In the aforesaid judgment, upon consideration of the entire matter, a four-Judge Bench of this Court had held that the compensation has to be paid from the date of the accident.
9. Following the aforesaid judgments, this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Siby George (2012) 12 SCC 540 reiterated the legal position and held as follows: (SCC pp. 545-46, paras 11-13) 11. The Court then referred to a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alavi (1998) 1 KLT 951, and approved it insofar as it followed the decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo.
12. The decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo was by a four-Judge Bench and in Valsala K (1999) 8 SCC 254 by a three-Judge Bench of this Court. Both the decisions were, thus, fully binding on the Court in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir, each of which was heard by two Judges. But the earlier decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo6 and Valsala K. were not brought to the notice of the Court in the two later decisions in Mubasir Ahmed4 and Mohd. Nasir5.
13. In the light of the decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Valsala K., it is not open to contend that the payment of compensation would fall due only after the Commissioners order or with reference to the date on which the claim application is made. The decisions in Mubasir Ahmed and Mohd. Nasir insofar as they took a contrary view to the earlier decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo6 and Valsala K. do not express the correct view and do not make binding precedents. 10. In view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order1 of the High Court are set aside. The appellants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% from the date of the accident. No costs.
30. Having regard to the above, I am of the view that the claimants are entitled to the interest on the above said determined amount of compensation at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date of accident.
31. In the result, the appeal preferred by the Insurance Company in C.M.A.No.1582 of 2013 is dismissed and the appeal preferred by the claimants in C.M.A.No.2121 of 2014 is partly allowed, holding that the claimants are entitled to the interest on the award amount at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date of accident. No costs.
32. The appellant/Insurance Company is directed to deposit the entire compensation amount now awarded together with interest at 12% p.a. thereon from the date of accident less the amount already deposited if any, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. On such deposit being made, the claimants are entitled to withdraw the same, on filing a proper application.
Suk 23.12.2014 S.VAIDYANATHAN, J. Suk PRE DELIVERY JUDGMENT IN CMA NOS.1582 OF 2013 AND 2121 OF 2014 23-12-2014