Central Administrative Tribunal - Gauhati
Sri Ravinder Daravath vs Directorate Of Forensic Science ... on 4 February, 2026
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O.A No.040/00371/2023
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
GUWAHATI BENCH
Original Application No.040/00371/2023
Wednesday, this the 4th day of February, 2026.
CORAM:
HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS, JUDICIAL MEMBER
HON'BLE Mr. SANJIV KUMAR, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER
Ravinder Daravath, aged about 37 years, S/o Late Hatchya Daravath,
Permanent resident of House No.6-117, Chapla Thanda,
P.O. Uyyalawada, Dornakal, Mahabubabad,
Pincode - 506 381, Telangana State,
Resident of C/o Manju Das, Third Floor, Near Swahid Bhawan,
Mirza, Pincode - 781 125, Kamrup (Rural) District, Assam.
Correspondence Address : P.No. 29, Balaji Enclave,
Behind CAL Public School, Kapra, P.O., ECIL,
Hyderabad - 500 062, Telangana. -Applicant
[By Advocate: Ms. N. Borah]
Versus
1. Union of India
Represented by the Additional/ Joint Secretary,
WS Divison, Room No-172C, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India, North Block, Central Secretariat,
New Delhi - 110 001.
2. Directorate of Forensic Science Services,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Block-09, 8th Floor, CGO Complex,
Lodhi Road, New Delhi - 110 003.
3. The Director-cum-Chief Forensic Scientist & First Appellate
Authority, Directorate of Forensic Science Services HQS,
Block-09, 8th Floor, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road,
New Delhi - 110 003.
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4. Central Forensic Science Laboratory,
Directorate of Forensic Science Services, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Village-Urput, Urput Kumeria Road, P.O.-Maniari Tiniali,
P.S.-Palashbari, Kamrup (Rural) District, Pincode - 781 1125, Assam.
5. The Director & Scientist (E) & Disciplinary Authority,
Central Forensic Science Laboratory,
Directorate of Forensic Science Services, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Village-Urput, Urput Kumeria Road, P.O.-Maniari Tiniali,
P.S.-Palashbari, Kamrup (Rural) District, Pincode - 781 125, Assam.
6. The Inquiry Officer & Deputy Director,
Central Forensic Science Laboratory,
Directorate of Forensic Science Services, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Village-Urput, Urput Kumeria Road, P.O.-Maniari Tiniali,
P.S.-Palashbari, Kamrup (Rural) District, Pincode - 781 125, Assam.
-Respondents
[By Advocate : Mr. V.K. Batra, SCGSC]
The Original Application having been heard on 11.11.2025, the
Tribunal on 04.02.2026 delivered the following:
O R D E R :-
Per: Justice Sunil Thomas, Judicial Member The applicant challenges Annexure A-2 order, by which appeal filed by him challenging Annexure A-1 order of removal from service issued to the 5th respondent, with effect from 07.12.2020, invoking Rule 11 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, was dismissed.
2. The facts leading to removal of applicant from service can be detailed briefly. He was offered appointment as an Assistant Central Intelligence 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 3 O.A No.040/00371/2023 Officer Grade-I at Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL), Hyderabad on temporary basis on 11.09.2015 by Annexure A-3. He joined at Hyderabad on 16.02.2016 by Annexure A-5 order. In May, 2016, a complaint was lodged against him by a lady colleague alleging harassment. A committee was constituted under the "Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013". By Annexure A-6, the committee, after recording the statement of both sides, noted a conciliation between the parties. It recommended that 1) the applicant may be transferred to any other office. 2) His probation may be extended. 3) Any other action as deemed fit and appropriate by the competent authority. Accordingly, by Annexure A-7 dated 10.08.2016, the applicant was transferred to Guwahati, where he joined on 25.08.2016.
3. While so, applicant sought for No Objection Certificate (NOC), by Annexure A-8 application dated 06.07.2017, for applying for Passport under Tatkal. By Annexure A-9 office note dated 07.07.2017, he was informed by CFSL that he had booked/purchased air tickets before sanctioning the leave and without permission. It was also informed that on earlier occasion also similar incident had happened. It seems that no action was taken thereon. However, subsequently, by Annexure A-10 dated 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 4 O.A No.040/00371/2023 01.08.2017, a fresh application was submitted to the Coordinator, CFSL, Guwahati for granting NOC for obtaining a Passport for himself and his wife under the Tatkal Scheme. By Annexure A-11 dated 07.08.2017, CFSL sought further details. Since NOC was not forthcoming, by Annexure A-12 dated 09.08.2018 reminder was submitted. Ultimately by Annexure A-13 dated 24.08.2017, NOC was sanctioned to him.
4. Much later, on 11.03.2019, Annexure A-14 Office Note was issued by the 5th respondent informing the applicant that he had submitted false information to the Passport Office that he was serving as a private employee and concealing the fact that he was functioning as an Intelligence Officer under the CFSL. It was alleged that he had thereby violated various provisions of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. He was called upon to give his explanation as to why the Conduct shall not be treated as a misconduct and why suitable action shall not be taken. He was also informed that Annexure A-13 NOC was revoked. In the meanwhile, the Regional Passport Officer by Annexure A-15 dated 14.03.2019 required the applicant to surrender the Passport and offered to return after confirmation of the employee type. He gave Annexure A-16 reply stating that since he was not conversant with the process of applying for Passport and he had entrusted 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 5 O.A No.040/00371/2023 the job with a private agency who had committed the error. He further stated that there was no malafide intention to suppress any fact. He also stated that fine of Rs. 2500/- was imposed on him by the Passport Authorities, which was remitted by him.
5. Thereafter Annexure A-17 Memorandum of Charges dated 19.08.2019 was served on the applicant proposing to hold an inquiry under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Two charges were attributed to the applicant. The first change was that the applicant had applied for Tatkal Passport on 10.07.2017 deliberately suppressing the fact that he was scientific officer and giving false information that he was a private employee. Second charge was that while functioning in CFSL, Hyderabad, a colleague of the applicant had submitted a complaint alleging sexual harrassment. After inquiry, he was found guilty. Along with the memo, various documents relating to both the charges were referred. It included a complaint dated 19.08.2019 submitted by the complainant in charge number two, addressed to the 4th respondent, seeking action against the applicant.
6. The applicant submitted Annexure A-18 reply to Annexure A-17 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 6 O.A No.040/00371/2023 notice. Consequently by Annexure A-19, an Inquiry Authority was appointed. Annexure A-20 notice of inquiry was given. The applicant submitted Annexures A-21, A-22 & A-23 representations to the inquiry officer. By Annexure A26 dated 03.02.2020, the appellant was informed by the 5th respondent that though inquiry report was submitted on 30.12.2019, the matter required further inquiry, and hence remitted the matter to the inquiry authority for fresh consideration with direction to follow provisions of Rule 14 (18) of CCS (CCA) and to incorporate it in the inquiry report. After conclusion of proceedings, Annexure A-27 further inquiry report dated 11.03.2020, was submitted to the inquiry authority, R-6. By Annexure A-28, applicant was required to submit his comments on the report. Applicant submitted Annexure A-31 reply to Annexure A-27, inter alia, contending that the charges were false and the second charge cannot be proceeded against him, since the matter was compromised and a decision arrived at.
7. By Annexure A-32 order dated 07.12.2020 issued by the 1 st respondent, the applicant was removed from service with immediate effect on the ground that 5th respondent was of the view that already admitted materials established the misconduct of the applicant which can be termed 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 7 O.A No.040/00371/2023 as one involving moral turpitude. It was held by the 5 th respondent that the 6th respondent had rightly concluded that the applicant had deliberately submitted false information. Challenging this, Annexure A-33 appeal dated 16.02.2020 was filed before the 3 rd respondent. According to the applicant, impugned order of R-5 was bad for the fact that the applicant was kept on probation since his joining and the same was in violation of OM dated 11.03.2019 issued by the DoP&T, which estopped that the period of probation shall not exceed more than one year and in no circumstance, employee should be kept on probation for more than double the period. The DoP&T order dated 08.09.2011 was produced as Annexure A-35. The DoP&T circular dated 11.03.2019 was produced as Annexure A-36.
8. Since no steps were taken on appeal, the applicant filed O.A No. 10 of 2021 before the this Tribunal. It was disposed of by Annexure A-41. It was directed that the appeal be disposed of by the appellate authority within a period of two months. It was directed that the applicant would be given an opportunity to be heard on the appeal. Thereupon, the applicant was heard and after much delay, appellate order dated 14.06.2021 was issued by the 3 rd respondent produced as Annexure A44.
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9. Challenging the appellate order, the applicant filed O.A No. 149 of 2021, which was dismissed by this Tribunal, by Annexure A-46 on a premise that there was no malafide, perversity or arbitrariness in the orders of both the disciplinary and the appellate authorities. It upheld the punishment also.
10. The applicant preferred W.P (C) No. 3229 of 2023 before the Hon'ble High Court of Guwahati challenging the order of removal dated 07.12.2020, the speaking order dated 14.06.2021 and the order of the Tribunal in O.A No. 149 of 2021.
11. The Hon'ble High Court allowed the Writ Petition by Annexure A-47 order holding that the disciplinary authority has power and discretion to impose penalty only on the basis of findings in Article no. 1 and not on the findings in both Articles of Charges. It was held that when the recommendation of the Internal Committee to transfer the petitioner outside CFSL, Hyderabad and to extend the probation period having been acted upon, the same issue could not have been made a part of subject of subsequent inquiry under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, which issue was settled under S.10 of the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the respondent 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 9 O.A No.040/00371/2023 authorities were given liberty to consider the case of applicant from the stage of taking a decision in the inquiry proceeding as to whether any penalty should be imposed on the applicant in terms of the finding of guilt against the applicant pertaining to Article no. 1 of the Memorandum of Charges dated 19.08.2019. The order of the appellate authority dated 14.06.2021 and the order dated 21.03.2023 in O.A No. 149/2021 were set aside.
12. Pursuant to the above order of the Hon'ble High Court by Annexure A-47, the applicant submitted a certified copy of order dated 07.06.2023 and requested the 5th respondent by Annexure A-48 communication dated 16.06.2023 that before any orders passed by 5 th respondent afresh, applicant may be heard in person and may be allowed to be represented by a Defence Assistant. However, the respondent No. 5 passed Annexure A-1 impugned order dated 14.07.2023 by which it was held that facts revealed that the applicant had submitted false information to Government organisation and he deliberately suppressed the true information from the Director CFSL, while submitting the leave applications. It was further held that in the light of the above finding, the applicant was holding sensitive post and confidence and the applicant failed to maintain absolute integrity in his 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 10 O.A No.040/00371/2023 Conduct and continuance of officer in public service cannot be said to be in public interest.
13. The applicant filed an appeal before the respondent No. 3, the Appellate Authority, by Annexure A-49 appeal memorandum dated 27.07.2023. It was rejected by Annexure A-2 order dated 18.09.2023. These orders are under challenge in the present proceeding. Accordingly, it was held that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority removing him from service with immediate effect in exercise of powers under Rule 17 of CCS (CCA) Rules was maintained. The request of the applicant to reinstate him from service was rejected. The applicant has approached this Tribunal assailing both the orders on various definite grounds seeking the following reliefs :-
8.1 Set aside and quash the impugned removal order dated 14.07.2023 (Annexure-A/1) issued by the Respondent No. 5, 8.2 Set aside and quash the impugned speaking Order dated 18.09.2023 (Annexure-A/2) issued by the Respondent No. 3, 8.3 That the Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to direct the respondents to reinstate the Applicant in service w.e.f. 07.12.2020 with all consequential benefits.
14. A detailed reply statement was filed by the respondents vehemently disputing the averments in the Original Application. Heard the learned 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 11 O.A No.040/00371/2023 Senior Counsel for the applicant and the learned SCGSC.
15. Before proceeding to consider the various grounds, it is essential to refer to the crucial part of the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 3229 of 2023 evidenced by Annexure-A 47 order. The operative portion of Annexure-A 47 is as follows :
...The recommendation of the Internal Committee to transfer the petitioner outside CFSL, Hyderabad and to extend the probation period having been acted upon, the same issue could not have been made a part of a subsequent Enquiry under Article 311, when the issue was settled under Section 10 of the 2013 Act. As the respondent authorities had acted upon the recommendations made by the Internal Committee and transferred the petitioner to CFSL, Guwahati and also extended his probation period, the issue with regard to the sexual harassment complaint was to have come to an end. No further action could have been taken beyond the settlement recorded and the proposed actions in the recommendations made by the Internal Committee, as the same would amount to double jeopardy. Once the probation period was extended, the question of removal of service does not arise. In that view of the matter, the impugned Order dated 07.12.2020, removing the petitioner from service by taking into account the finding of guilt against the petitioner, in terms of both the Article Nos. 1 & 2 of the Memorandum of Charge dated 19.08.2019 is arbitrary and not sustainable. Accordingly, the impugned Order dated 07.12.2020 is set aside. The Disciplinary Authority has the power and discretion to impose a penalty only on the basis of the findings in Article-I only and not on the findings on both the Articles of Charge..."
16. Thereafter, the Hon'ble High Court proceeded to hold as follows.
"...17. The respondent authorities/ Disciplinary Authorities are accordingly given the liberty to re-consider the case of the 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 12 O.A No.040/00371/2023 petitioner, from the stage of taking a decision in the Enquiry Proceedings, as to whether any penalty should be imposed upon the petitioner, in terms of the finding of guilt against the petitioner pertaining to Article No. 1 of the Memorandum of Charge dated 19.08.2019. Consequently, the Order dated 14.06.2021 issued by the Appellate Authority and the impugned Order dated 21.03.2023 passed by the learned Tribunal in O.A No. 040/00149/2021 are hereby set aside also.
18. The Disciplinary Authority shall take a decision as to what penalty is to be imposed, if any, in respect of the finding of the Enquiry Officer, in respect of Article of Charge No. 1 of the Memorandum of Charges, within a period of 1 (one) month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The question of reinstatement of the petitioner into service will depend upon the decision to be taken by the Disciplinary Authority." (emphasis supplied)
17. Assailing Annexure A-1 order, the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant contended that in the course of fresh analysis of the evidence after Annexure A-47 order of the Hon'ble High Court, the authority arrived at a three new factual charges regarding which no memo of charge was issued to the applicant. It was held at 2 nd sub para of para 10 of the order as follows :-
"He had also submitted false statement to CFSL vide application dated 09/08/2017 stating that he is going to apply for Tatkal Passport, whereas, he bad already applied for the same on 10/07/2017 directly to the Passport Office, Hyderabad. By acting in such a manner, Sh. Ravinder Daravath, ACIO-I (Doc.) has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of Government servant and thereby amounting to misconduct in violation to Rule 3(1) (III) of CCS Conduct Rules 1965. By acting in such a manner, Sh. Ravinder 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 13 O.A No.040/00371/2023 Daravath, ACIO-I (Doc.) has also failed to maintain high ethical standards and honesty and thereby amounting to misconduct in violation to Rule 3(1) (vi) of CCS Conduct Rules 1965. He has also failed to refrain himself from doing anything which is or may be contrary to any law, rules, regulations and established practices and thereby amounting to misconduct in violation to Rule 3(1) (xviii) of CCS Conduct Rules 1965."
"...The Inquiry also further revealed that Sh. Ravinder Devarath had utilized the said passport and visited Malaysia during 29 th October, 2017 to 2nd November, 2017 without intimating the office. As per the leave records of the individual, he availed the leave and also Hometown LTC for 'urgent domestic and personal work'...."
18. Thereafter, in the last paragraph of para 10 at page 56 of the O.A, another new charge is attributed to the applicant as follows.
"...Even after police verification conducted on 22.07.2017, he did not act for rectification, which implies that it was well known to him and he has hardly any respect on the rules and regulations of the Union of India, if not, he would not have visited foreign country without intimating the authority. These are nothing but deliberately suppression of facts on the part of Sh. Ravinder Daravath. The Inquiring Authority has rightly concluded that he had deliberately submitted false information to Passport Office and the charge vide Article-I is proved. The considered view of the undersigned being the Disciplinary Authority that the charge vide Article-I is proved..."
19. Evidently, para 10 deals with the conclusions arrived at by the authority regarding various factual findings under Article-I of the Memorandum of Charge dated 19.08.2019. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant contended that not only that all the three 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 14 O.A No.040/00371/2023 above allegations dismissed under Charge I are absolutely new and did not form part of Article-I charge. The learned Counsel further contended that allegation in para 10 that he visited Malaysia without informing the office was factually false. The learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to Annexure A-12 which was an application for issuance of identity certificate and NOC for obtaining passport wherein he had referred to his proposed visit to Malaysia, during the 4 th week of September, 2017 around 12 to 15 days. It is true that the above document refers to his proposed visit to Malaysia. However, it was not for obtaining the leave, but only for the purpose of NOC. Further, he had actually visited Malaysia in 29 th October, 2017.
20. The learned SCGSC contended that those three were not new charges, but allegations of fact on record, and the conclusions of the disciplinary authority did not rest on it. Notwithstanding the above facts, the learned Senior Counsel was right in contending that the three factual allegations now raised are foreign to Charge No. 1. The authority evidently has relied on these grounds also for holding the applicant guilty of charge no. 1 and to impose penalty of removal on him. To that extent, the authority went wrong in relying on these three reasons for concluding that the applicant was guilty of Charge No. 1.
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21. Regarding the charge No. 1 which was found against the applicant, the learned Senior Counsel advanced twin contentions. It was firstly contended that the Charge No. 1 from the face of the allegations made therein, even if established, cannot be considered as one constituting a misconduct under the relevant Rules and statute. Secondly, it was contended that if it is perceived to be a misconduct, does not call for the major penalty, but should have been restricted with a minor penalty.
22. In this regard, it is essential to refer to Charge No. 1 which is available in Annexure A-1 as follows :-
"...Article I - That Sh. Ravinder Daravath, while functioning as Assistant Central Intelligence Officer Gr. I (Documents) had applied for Tatkal Passport on 10.07.2017 to the Passport Office at Hyderabad by declaring himself as 'Private employee' though as on 10.07.2017 he was working as Assistant Central Intelligence Officer Gr. I (Documents) in CFSL under DFSS, MHA, Government of India. Hence, he had deliberately submitted false information to the Passport Office..."
23. There is no dispute that the applicant had applied to Tatkal Passport and in the documents that he had submitted, he had declared himself as a private employee, though during the relevant time he was an Assistant Central Intelligence Officer Grade-I in the CFSL. In answer to Charge No. 1, the consistent contention of the applicant was that he had submitted 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 16 O.A No.040/00371/2023 application for issue of Passport under the Tatkal Scheme and since he did not have the requisite knowledge regarding the knowledge of submitting application, he engaged a private consultant, who had submitted the application. It was contended the agent had made a wrong entry, that applicant was a private employee, instead of Government servant. This, according to the learned Counsel, is projected as a major misconduct and the maximum penalty of dismissal was imposed.
24. It was contended by the learned Senior Counsel that even assuming that the facts in Charge No. 1 are be true, that does not constitute a misconduct warranting punishment. It was contended that, at the most, it can only be considered as an inadvertent error or at the most be an inadvertent averment made without due care and caution. It was contended that no purpose will be served by making such a suppression. It was contended by the learned Senior Counsel that there was no reason as to why the applicant should suppress his status as a Government employee and no advantage would be derived from claiming himself to be a private employee. Hence, according to the learned Senior Counsel, it constitutes only an information given wrongly or carelessly and cannot be bloated to the level of a misconduct. It was contended that this defence set up by him 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 17 O.A No.040/00371/2023 was not considered by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority.
25. To supplement the above contention, the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant relied on the decision reported in Union of India & Ors. vs J. Ahmed [(1979) 2 SCC 286], wherein the question whether a negligence in performance of duty or inefficiecy in discharge of duty falls within the ambit of commisson or ommission under Rule 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules or a failure to maintain devotion to duty under Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules. What constitutes a misconduct was also considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
26. In the above case, the officer who was proceeded against was an IAS officer. It was alleged that there were large scale disturbances in his jurisdiction leading to considerable damage. He allegedly failed to take effective proactive measures against widespread disturbances and showed complete lack of leadership when the disturbance did actually break out and failed to give proper directions to his subordinates. He was proceeded against in the disciplinary action and penalty imposed. This was the subject matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
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27. After analysis of the case laws in the background of the factual matrix, the Hon'ble Supreme Court proceeded to consider what generally constitutes misconduct especially in the context of disciplinary proceeding entailing penalty. It was stated in para 11 of the above judgment that code of conduct as set out in Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of service. It would follow that the conduct which is blame worthy for a Government servant in the context of the Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the due and faithful discharge of his duty, it is a misconduct.
28. Referring to the definition of misconduct in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, it was held that "misconduct means misconduct arising from ill motive; except negligence, error of judgment or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct." Relying on the decision in Govind Menon vs Union of India [AIR 1966 SC 1051], it was held that a single act of omission or error results in serious atrocious consequences and the same may amount to misconduct as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.H. Kalyani vs M/s. Air France, Calcutta [AIR 1963 SC 1756]. It was held that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached with public office would ipso facto constitute a misconduct.
2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 19 O.A No.040/00371/2023 There may be negligence in performance of duty or the lack in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation, may be negligence in discharge of the duty, but could not constitute misconduct, unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as of irreparable or result in damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high and error can be indicative of negligence and degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. Carelessness can often be productive of more harm than deliberate wickedness or malevolence, it was held.
29. Identical view was expressed by the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab & Ors vs Ram Sing Ex- Constable [1992 4 SCC 54]. Much later, in Inspector Prem Chand vs Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors [(2007) 4 SCC 566], the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to State of Punjab vs Ram Singh Ex-Constable (supra) as well as Union of India vs J. Ahmed (supra). On facts, it was held that disciplinary authority was required to arrive at a finding of fact that the applicant was guilty of an unlawful behaviour in relation to discharge of his duty and service, which was willful in character and error of judgment per se was not a misconduct. A negligence simpliciter also 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 20 O.A No.040/00371/2023 would not be a misconduct.
30. It is true that both the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority has not looked at this issue from this angle. Before the Hon'ble High Court, the contentions advanced was that Charge no. II was not sustainable and that grievance was regarding the penalty as revealed from para 11 of Annexure A-47. Applicant did not have a case there, that Charge I allegation did not constitute any misconduct as correctly pointed out by the learned SCGSC. Hence, we are not inclined to accept that limb of the contention.
31. The learned Senior Counsel, assailing the penalty imposed, vehemently contended that even assuming that the guilt against the applicant was established, that did warrant an extreme penalty of removal from service. It was contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the authority did not even consider the proportionality of the penalty imposed on the applicant. It was contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the records revealed that the only allegation was that the applicant at the time of submitting the application for passport under the Tatkal had indicated in the application form that he was a private employee, though at that point of time he was employed under CFSL. It was contended by the learned Senior 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 21 O.A No.040/00371/2023 Counsel that the applicant had given plausible explanation for it, by affirming that the application was filled up by his agency which might have wrongly described him as a private employee. It could only be a bonafide mistake, it was contended. The only wrong that could be attributed to him was that he signed the application without verifying the entries. That would not amount to a misconduct, that too a serious one warranting imposition of a harsh punishment of removal from service. It was also contended that there was no reason as to why the applicant should suppress the status as an employee of the Government. There was absolutely no reason to believe that the applicant would derive any benefit by making such a representation. Hence, it could only be considered as a mistake committed by the applicant and which did not call for any penalty, much less, a major penalty. It was also contended that his young age was also not taken into consideration while imposing the penalty.
32. To substantiate the contention regarding proportionality that the facts established did not warrant any punishment at all and further that the punishment imposed on him is disproportionately shocking, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision reported in Om Kumar & Ors vs Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC 386]. Referring to the limited scope of the 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 22 O.A No.040/00371/2023 High Courts and Administrative Tribunals in interfering with the penalty, the Hon'ble Supreme at paragraph 24 held as follows.
"...We agree that the question of the quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as Wednesbury principles, (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn.). This Court had occasion to lay down the narrow scope of the jurisdiction in several cases. The applicability of the principle of "proportionality" in administrative law was considered exhaustively in Union of India v. Ganayutham where the primary role of the administrator and the secondary role of the Courts in matters not involving fundamental freedoms, was explained..."
33. Proceeding further considering on the question of proportionality, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows.
"...By "proportionality", we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least-restrictive choice of measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will see that the legislature and the administrative authority "maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve". The legislature and the administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively or not is for the court. That is what is meant by proportionality..."
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34. On an evaluation of the facts of the case, it is evident that the contention of the learned Senior Counsel regarding the nature of penalty cannot be completely brushed aside. Evidently, neither the appellate authority nor the disciplinary authority had looked at the materials on record from this angle, in spite of reference to the judgment of the Hon'ble Guwahati High Court in Annexure A-47 order as to whether "penalty if any"
should be imposed on the applicant, in respect of the finding of the disciplinary authority. This exercise was not undertaken by the authorities concerned.
35. Yet another limb of the contention of the learned Senior Counsel was that earlier the applicant was proceeded against for Charges No. 1 & 2. Punishment of removal from service was imposed on him by Annexure A-
44. Later, by the order of the Hon'ble High Court, it was held that Charge No.II, cannot be proceeded against and Charge no. I alone will lie. Even for that single charge, the same penalty has been imposed without considering the fact that Charge No. 2 was not considered by the authority. That means, the same penalty which was imposed cumulatively for charges I and II has again been imposed even when he is proceeded for Charge No. 1 alone. Even for arriving at that conclusion under Charge No. 1, three 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 24 O.A No.040/00371/2023 extraneous factors which did not form part of the Charge Sheet were also considered. In the light of it, the authority should have considered the question of proportionality in detail and a reasoned order passed.
36. The learned Senior Counsel advanced an ancillary contention to the above. It was contended that even after arriving at a conclusion regarding guilt and when several penalties of varying degree are available, the authority was bound to give reasons as to why it chose to impose the specific penalty that was imposed on the officer concerned. The authorities below have not given specific cogent and convincing reason as to why the specific punishment was chosen in preference to other penalties. To supplement this argument, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision reported in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Shri Ram Yadav [1995 (3) WLC 16], wherein the Single Bench of the Hon'ble High Court held as follows.
"...The learned Counsel for the respondent was requested to point out as to whether the competent authority has stated reasons for imposing the penalty in question upon the petitioner workman. The learned Counsel for the respondent has not been able to place any material before the court to show that the competent authority had "good and "sufficient reasons" to choose the penalty of removal from service and forfeiture of wages for the period of suspension. Thus it is an established 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 25 O.A No.040/00371/2023 position that the competent authority has not applied its mind as regards the quantum of punishment to be imposed upon the workman, nor the competent authority has stated "good and sufficient reasons for imposing the drastic penalty of removal from service which would amount to economic death sentence of workman. Similarly, no reason is assigned for forfeiting the wages for the period of suspension. In the order, it is also not mentioned as to for how much period the petitioner workman remained under suspension and how much amount of wages has been ordered to be forfeited..."
37. It has been held that when wide discretion is given to the competent authority to select any particular penalty from a set of penalties of varying degree and imposed one among it on the employee, the Rule making authority must be deemed to have cast an obligation on the competent authority to consider the question of penalty rationally and excerised the discretion in choosing the penalty in just, fair and reasonable manner. That is the reason why the rule making authority has made it obligatory upon the competent authority to indicate good and sufficient reasons while selecting and imposing particular penalty upon the delinquent employee. It was further held as follows.
"...Selection of maximum penalty and naming it from out of the list of alternative penalties which could have been imposed cannot be done arbitrarily. Similarly, it cannot be a matter of 'ipse dixit' of the disciplinary authority. He has to inform himself of the relevant considerations. He must re-assure himself that the particular penalty deserves to be imposed in order to meet the requirements of the situation. It will not be sufficient for the competent authority to say in a general, vague and ambiguous 2026.02.04 VISHAL 13:44:32+05'30' 2024.3.0 26 O.A No.040/00371/2023 manner that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case the employee concerned deserves to be removed or dismissed from service. The competent authority is bound to take into consideration the gravity of the charge, the nature of its consequences,..."
38. Though the rule applicable to the applicant does not specifically say that authority should state reasons while imposing a specific penalty, it can be presumed that the statute impliedly warranted it. This decision in Rajasthan State Transport Corporation v. Shri Ram Yadav was followed by the Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Sher Singh Yadav v. Bank of Baroda and Ors [AIR Online 2025 RAJ 167]. It was held in that case also that the disciplinary authority had not applied its mind with regard to the requirement of indicating good and sufficient reasons for choosing penalty of removal from service. On the other hand, learned SCGSC contended that choosing the appropriate penalty was in the domain of the authority concerned and that cannot be interfered by the Tribunals.
39. Appreciation of facts shows that the facts squarely apply to the facts of the present case. This is all the more so, since the Hon'ble High Court had remanded the matter for a fresh consideration and also whether "Penalty if any" is to be imposed on the applicant. There is absolutely no discussion as to why extreme penalty has been choosen and imposed.
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40. The last contention advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant was that the competent authority is entitled to impose lesser punishment from among the various choices available to the authority. It was stated that during the said period of disciplinary proceedings, the applicant was not gainfully employed. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision in Deepali Gundu Surwase vs Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. ED) and Ors [(2013) 10 SCC 324]. That was a case wherein it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the termination of the employee was wrongful and he was entitled to full back wages. It was contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the authority could have chosen any lesser penalty from among the several alternative penalties with or without back wages.
41. As rightly contended by the learned SCGSC, that the decision strictly relates to claim under the Industrial Dispute Act. Section 11A of the Industrial Dispute Act specifically confers wide discretionary power to reinstate, if the termination found to be illegal, with or without back wages, That cannot be fully extended to the case of an Government employee.
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However, the principles can also be kept in mind while moulding the relief.
42. Having considered the entire facts, we are satisfied that the appellate authority as well as the disciplinary authority went wrong in analysing the materials on record and arriving at conclusions. We find that the matter needs to be reconsidered afresh by the disciplinary authority. Accordingly, Annexures A-1 and A-2 are quashed. The matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority for considering the question, Whether the alleged facts fall within the parameters of a major misconduct and if so, whether the penalty imposed on him calls for any interference in the light of the observations made supra. Appropriate speaking order shall be passed specifically on the issues referred to us in the preceeding paragraphs as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. O.A is allowed to the above extent. No costs.
(Dated, this the 04th day of February, 2026)
SANJIV KUMAR JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER
v
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