Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Matadin Agarwal And Etc. vs Syed Abdul Razack And Others on 5 November, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR1997AP103, 1996(4)ALT999, AIR 1997 ANDHRA PRADESH 103, (1996) 4 ANDH LT 999 (1997) LACC 173, (1997) LACC 173
JUDGMENT
1. Plaintiff is the appellant. He filed the suit for specific performance of agreement for sale dated 27-7-1978, or in the alternative for refund of the advance money of Rs. 15.000/- together with damages of Rs. 15,000/-. The appellant's case is that he entered into an agreement with the first defendant to purchase the plaint schedule land measuring 1000 sq. metres at the rate of Rs. 50/- per sq. yard. The appellant paid a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as advance. The terms of the sale were negotiated by the first respondent, his brother Syed Abdul Rahman (R-2) and his sister Mahamooda Begum (R.6) who also entered into agreements to sell their contiguous land to some other persons under separate agreements. The first respondent represented to the appellant that as per the proceedings of the competent authority under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 hereinafter called 'the Act', he was permitted to retain, 1000 sq. metres in Survey No. 71, Syed Jalal Garden, Maredpalli, within the limits of Secunderabad Conton-ment Area. Along with the agreement of sale, a plan was also attached. As per the terms of the agreement, the first respondent had to obtain necessary permission from the competent authority under the Act. The sale transaction had to be completed by executing a registered sale deed within a period of six months from the date of intimation in writing by the first respondent to the appellant about the grant Of such permission. The first respondent also agreed to get his brother, sister and mother to sign the sale deed as attesting witnesses as a token of expressing their constent. The first respondent accordingly made an application to the competent authority. However on 1-4-1980 the first respondent represented to the appellant that it had become necessary to make a fresh application to the competent authority in view of the objections to the earlier application. Accordingly, he submitted a fresh application after obtaining the signature of the appellant. The appellant was repeatedly enquiring about the result of the proceedings before the competent authority and the first respondent went on stating that the matter was pending and final orders are awaited. However, on 19-3-1981 the first respondent by a notice informed the appellant to take back the advance paid by him as the competent authority refused permission on 24-8-1978. The appellant was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The first respondent had committed default. Hence the suit.
2. The first respondent in his written statement stated that he executed an agreement on 27-6-1978 and not on 27-7-1978 as wrongly mentioned in the plaint. It is further stated that it is made clear to the appellant that the agreement of sale was subject to obtaining permission to sell the said land from the competent authority, and in case permission was not granted, the appellant would only be entitled for refund of the advance money. In spite of his best efforts permission was refused by the competent authority by its letter dated 24-8-1978. The allegation that the first respondent made a representation that he should send a fresh application etc., is denied. At the request of the appellant another application dated 29-4-1980 was made and the same was rejected on 26-8-1980 which was duly intimated to the appellant. The application dated 30-7-1982 was not made by the first respondent in pursuance of any agreement to sell, but it was in the nature of enquiry as to how much he could retain or sell under the Act. As the permission contemplated in the agreement was refused twice, the appellant was intimated that he is entitled to collect back the advance money and also through a reply notice dated 1-7-1981 (sic). As the permission was refused, the agreement stands cancelled and, therefore, the question of enforcing the same does not arise.
3. In the trial Court, the appellant examined himself as P.W. 1 and marked Exs.
A-1 to A-40; while the first respondent examined himself as D. W. 1 and marked Exs.
B-1 to B-20. The trial Court on a consideration of the entire evidence on record held that the agreement of sale became unenforce able in view of refusal of exemption by the competent authority, and consequently a decree was granted in favour of the appellant for refund of the advance money of Rs. 15,000/- with interest at 6 per cent, per annum, together with damages of a further sum of Rs. 15,000/-. Dissatisfied with the said decree, this appeal is filed by the plaintiff seeking for the main: relief of specific performance.
4. While the appeal is pending in this Court, the appellant filed C. M.P. No. 3543 of 1991 to implead respondent Nos. 2 to 13 in the above appeal, who are the brother, mother, sisters of the respondent No. 1 and also subsequent purchasers.
5. The execution of the suit agreement (Ex. A-1) is admitted by the first respondent. As per the terms of the said agreement, it is seen that the first respondent along with respondent Nos. 2 to 6 own Survey No. 71 and they have filed separate statements under the Act before the competent authority and the competent authority had permitted the first respondent to retain 1000 sq. metres equivalent to 1196 sq. yards in Survey No. 71 situated at Syed Jalal Garden, Maredpalli, Secunderabad under Section 9 of the Act and the first respondent had agreed to sell 1000 sq. metres at the request of the appellant for a total consideration of Rs. 59,800/- i.e. at the rate of Rs. 50/- per sq. yard and the first respondent received a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as advance and the balance of Rs. 44,800/- shall be paid at the time of registration of the sale deed. It is further stipulated that the first respondent undertakes to obtain necessary sanction from the concerned ceiling authority to sell the land to the appellant and the registered sale deed shall be executed within six months from the date of intimation in writing by the first respondent to the appellant about the grant of permission by the concerned authority. If the first respondent fails to execute the sale deed after permission is granted, the first respondent shall not only refund the advance amount of Rs. 15,000/-but also pay an additional sum of Rs. 15,000/ - as damages. A plan is annexed to the said agreement.
6. The point that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant is entitled to specific performance of the agreement to sell as claimed by the appellant?
7. Point : The contention of the first respondent is that in spite of all efforts permission to sell the land was refused by the competent authority and the said decision was communicated to him by its letter No. ULC/ S.BAD/ GLR/SY. NO/SEC26/339/ 78, dated 24-8-1978 under Ex. B-9, dated 24-8-1978. At the request of the appellant another application dated 29-4-1980 was made by submitting prescribed forms signed by both the appellant and the first respondent and the same was also rejected by the Estate Officer, ULC by his letter dated 26-6-1980 under Ex, B-10, and the appellant was accordingly informed about the said refusal by furnishing a copy of the said letter. The application dated 30-7-1982 made by the first respondent for permission to sell Plot No. 2 or whatever area he is entitled under the Act is not in pursuance of any specific agreement to sell. No mention is made in the said application about the sale of land to the appellant But the contention of the appellant is that the first respondent was not actively pursuing the application for exemption, but went on representing that the matter is pending and final order is awaited. Though the competent authority directed the first respondent to submit a plan showing the built-up area of the vacant land which the first respondent wishes to retain, the first respondent purposely avoided complying with the said direction in order to avoid performance of the agreement as the prices of the property are raising.
8. From a perusal of the agreement and the plan attached to it, it is not clear where the Plot No. 2 is exactly situated in Survey No. 71. It is not disputed that by the time of the execution of the agreement (Ex. A-1), the declaration of the first respondent was not finalised and notification regarding excess vacant land held by him has not been published under Section 10(1) of the Act. The first respondent and the other five sharers, respondent Nos. 2 to 6 own 29,900 sq. metres including the built-up area. Ex. A-16 is the letter issued by the Military Estate Office (ULC) which is the competent authority. The break up of the built-up and open areas permitted to be retained by the first respondent and respondent Nos. 2, 4 and 6 is indicated, according to which the first re-spondent is permitted to retain only 436.75 sq. metres of open site together with 563.25 sq. metres of built-up area, that is agreed to be sold under Ex. A-1 is only the vacant site and not the built-up area as is evident from both, the agreement (Ex. A-1) and the plan attached thereto (Ex. A-2). Therefore, even by 8-8-1980 the competent authority has not allowed 1000 sq. metres of open site to the first respondent which can be alienated in favour of the appellant. Under the terms of the agreement prior permission from the competent authority is a sine qua non for executing the sale deed. Therefore, in the absence of permission from the competent authority the first respondent could not execute any registered sale deed in pursuance of the agreement (Ex. A-1).
9. Sri K.F. Baba, the learned counsel for the first respondent submits that there is a bar of alienation of vacant land under Section 5(3) of the Act until a notification regarding the excess vacant land has been published under sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act, and any transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be null and void. He also further submits that in view of the non obstante clause contained in Section 42 of the Act, the orders passed under this Act shall prevail over any other law for the time being in force. In other words his contention is that the orders passed by the competent authority under this Act cannot be challenge in a Civil Court; as long as the orders passed by the competent authority remained undisturbed, they shall be given effect to and when the competent authority intimated the first respondent that he shall hold only 436.75 sq. metres of open land, the performance of the contract for alienating 1000 sq. metres of open land is frustrated, and as such, the default cannot be laid at the door of the first respondent.
10. Sri S.C. Rangappa, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that even as early as 13-4-1977 the competent authority has intimated the first respondent to surrender 0.6744 hectares of vacant land and the details of the land which the person concerned desires to retain is shown as 1000 sq. metres. From this I am afraid it cannot be construed that the competent authority has allowed 1000 sq. metres of open site to the first respondent, as there is no indication in the said proceeding marked as Ex.A-25 that the first respondent was allowed 1000 sq. metres of vacant site. Even under Ex. A-35 what is mentioned is that the total extent of vacant land applicable to the person to whom the statement relates is shown as 1000 sq. metres. Therefore, from this it cannot be culled out that the first respondent was allowed 1000 sq. metres of open site for retention.
11. Sri S.C. Rangappa, the learned counsel for the appellant relying on State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson, , submits that the first respondent is entitled to retain 1000 sq. metres of open site in addition to his share in the built-up area in Survey No. 71. The facts of the case before the Supreme Court are simple. One L.J. Johnson had a piece of land of 2530 sq. metres in Dehradun, the State of Uttar Pradesh including a building. After interpreting Section 4(9), 2(g) and 2(q) (ii) and (iii) of the Act, the Supreme Court observed that the built-up area which is 464 sq. metres should be excluded first and then the deductions allowed under 2(g) i.e., 1000 sq. metres also should be deducted which comes to 1464 sq. metres. As the ceiling limit is 2000 sq. metres at Dehradun, as the total deductions which comes to 1464 metres is less than the said ceiling limit, the appellant therein will have to surrender 530 sq. metres. It is also made clear that when the parcel of land over which a building is existing, the owner is entitled to one unit of vacant land in addition to the land covered by a structure. It is necessary to extract the following passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court to understand the correct interpretation to be placed in this respect (para 30 of AIR).
"To sum up, the effect of the view taken in Johnson's case virtually comes to this. Section 4(9) would be attracted regardless of whether the landholder owned a distinct part of land on which there is no construction along with any other parcel of land where there is some construction. In other words, whether or not there is a surplus will not depend on whether the landholder holds a separate plot of land which is open land. To take the other view is to hold that if there is no separate plot but the construction is on the same plot then even if the entire plot comprises 10,000 sq. metres that would fall beyond the purview of Section 4(9) even if the structure is built only on 1000 sq. metres of land. Such an interpretation of Section 4(9) cannot be accepted by us as it goes against the very spirit and intent of the Act and allows the landholder to escape the ceiling area by merely putting a construction on a plot of land owned by him."
12. Sri S.C. Rangappa, the learned counsel for the appellant next relied on Meera Gupta v. State of W.B., . In this decision the main question that came up for decision was whether the land which was vacant on the appointed day as applicable for the city of Calcutta which is 28-1-1976 and where the actual construction of a building was commenced before the date of enforcement of the Act which is 17-2-1976, should be treated as vacant land as per Clause (9) of Section 4. The Supreme Court held that if the construction of a building with adwelling unit thereon had commenced after the appointed day, then the land on which such construction had commenced shall be the same as any other land to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person, and if the construction of a building with a dwelling unit thereon had been completed, or was in progress on the appointed day, then it cannot be treated as "any other land" to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person.
13. In fact this matter was referred to three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court as the dicta in L. J. Johnson's case is doubted. The observations of the Supreme Court may be usefully extracted :
"This means that if the building stood constructed on the land prior to January 28, 1976, the land occupied under the building is not vacant land. It also covers the land on which any building was in the process of construction on January 28, 1976 with the approval of the appropriate authority. That too is not "vacant land". Additionally, the land appurtenant to these two kinds of buildings is also not "vacant land". The third category likewise conditioned is of land occupied by any building in an area where there are no building regulations, which has been constructed before January 28, 1976 or is in the process of construction on such date, and the land apprutenant to these two kinds of buildings."
..............
If we wipe out the distinction of "vacant land"
and "any other land" as demonstrated in subsection (9) of Section 4, we strangulate and destroy the spirit, and life-blood of the "appointed day" and the gap period.
...........
If the construction of a building with a dwelling unit therein had begun after the appointed day, then it is all the same "any other land" to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person. And if the construction of a building with a dwelling unit therein on land had been completed or was in progress by and on the appointed day, then it is not "any other land" to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person. This is the interpretation which commends to us of sub-section (9) of Section 4 as also of sub-section (11) of Section 4 and the definitive expressions used therein as explained and highlighted earlier."
14. No doubt this later decision took the view that the land on which a building was constructed should be excluded from the definition of vacant land. But in Johnson's case (supra), out of 2530 sq. metres, the Supreme Court first excluded the built-up area which is 464 sq. metres and then excluded the deductions allowed-under Section 2(g) i.e. 1000 sq. metres. By this process the total deduction would come to 1464 sq. metres. As the ceiling limit is 2000 sq. metres, the Court found 530 sq. metres is in excess of the ceiling limit which will be taken over by the State. Therefore, it is clear that until the judgment in the later case Meera Gupta v. State of W.B. (supra) was delivered on 22-10-1991, the position was that the land on which the buildings were constructed also should be reckoned for purpose of determining the ceiling area. That is the reason why the parties have contemplated that the vendor (first respondent) should obtain necesssary permission from the competent authority before executing the sale deed.
15. Sri K.F. Baba, the learned counsel for the first respondent, in my view has rightly contended that the decision rendered by the competent authority declaring the excess land cannot be questioned in a Civil Court in view of the overriding effect of the provisions of the Act contained under Section 42 of the Act. As long as the proceedings of the competent authority stand unquestioned before appropriate forum, they have to be given effect to, and the first respondent being a party to it cannot ignore the same or act in derogation. Therefore, I am of the view that the first respondent could not execute the sale deed in pursuance of the suit agreement for want of necessary permission from the competent authority as his share of open land was only 436.75 sq. metres as per the letter of the competent authority dated 8-8-1980 and as such, he could not convey 1000 sq. metres of open site as per the agreement (Ex. A-1). It is nobody's case that 1000 sq. metres, the site proposed to be sold under Ex. A-1 should include the built-up area also. Accordingly, I agree with the finding of the lower Court on this aspect that as the first respondent has not got 1000 sq. metres of vacant land, he is justified in pleading that he cannot be compelled to part with 1000 sq. metres inclusive of built-up area in performance of Ex.A-1 contract.
16. Sri S.C. Rangappa, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the first respondent sold 1313 sq. metres of land in favour of Murthy Co-operative Housing Society Limited on 6-8-1992 and this circumstance shows that the first respondent was having more than 1000 sq. metres of vacant land. This sale deed was executed in favour of a Housing Society after obtaining necessary permission from the Government. The Housing Society as per the relaxation granted by the Government under the specific G.Os. is entitled to purchase the surplus land from the owner. Therefore, this sale, in my view, cannot help the contention of the appellant. So also the subsequent sale deeds under Ex. A-18 and A-20 by the first respondent on 7-7-1982 and 29-7-1982 in favour of Murthy Co-operative Housing Society Limited cannot come in aid of the appellant.
17. Sri S.C. Rangappa next contended that the third respondent sold certain land under an agreement of sale dated 4-6-1978 under similar circumstances, the vendee filed a suit for specific performance and obtained a decree. The said decree was confirmed in L.P.A. No. 208 of 1992, and therefore, the appellant also is entitled to a decree. In the said suit, the third respondent produced two letters dated 17-8-1978 and 19-10-1978 marked as Exs. B-6 and B-7 respectively, alleged to have been issued by the competent authority refusing grant of permission. The Courts found that the said letters are fabricated and that the third respondent did not seek any permission from the competent authority. It was also found that notice under Section 26 was issued by the third respondent to the competent authority and the State Government did not exercise its option for purchase of the land within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the notice. Therefore, taking all the cirumstances into consideration the trial Court decreed the suit which was confirmed in appeal as well as in Letters Patent Appeal. The situation in this case is entirely different. The circumstances mentioned above are not present in this case, and therefore, there is no analogy or similarity between the two cases.
18. Although Ex. A-1 contemplates permission from the competent authority for executing the sale deed in pursuance of the agreement of sale, it is not clear whether the parties contemplated permission under Section 20 for alienating the land in excess of the ceiling limit or under Section 27 for disposing the land within the ceiling limit. However, the first respondent made application under Section 26 of the Act, and the said applications were refused under Exs. B-9 and B-10. Under Ex. B-9, dated 24-8-1978 the competent- authority refused permission in view-of Section 5(3) of the Act, since the notification regarding excess land of the first respondent was not published under Section 10(1) of the Act. Ex. B-10 is another rejection letter issued by the competent authority rejecting the application of the first respondent under Section 26(1) of the Act stating that the area, applied for includes built-up area, and hence the request of the first respondent for transfer of the vacant land admeasuring 1060 sq. metres cannot be granted. Even assuming that me first respondent had made application for permission under Section 27 of the Act, still the competent authority has rejected the said application as the area applied for includes the built-up area also and there is no vacant land admeasuring 1000 sq. metres available for transfer. The first respondent has also made an application under Section 20 of the Act marked as Ex. B-17, dated 14-7-1980 and the stand of the competent authority is that the first respondent is not entitled to 1000 sq. metres of open site as his entitlement of 1000 sq metres is inclusive of built-up area. What contracted by the first respondent is only the vacant land of 1000 sq. metres; whereas he was allowed to retain under the Act 1000 sq. metres including the built-up area. So, it was beyond the reach of the first respondent to perform the contract. Therefore, the lower Court is right in coming to the conclusion that the contract has become frustrated and has become impossible of performance.
19. As already seen unless necessary permission is granted under the Act, the first respondent cannot alienate 1000 sq. metres of vacant land as contemplated under the agreement. Under Section 20 of the Act even the excess land can be alienated after obtaining necessary permission from the Government. The grant of such permission is not a certanity. The lower Court considering the question of giving a direction to the first respondent to make an application under Section 20 of the Act observed that such a permission from the Government is a con-tingency and it cannot be definitely stated whether the Government will grant permission or not, if such an application is made and that will again make the proceedings a long-drawn and cumbersome process. It also observed that already 12 years have elapsed; so at this stage it is not proper to direct the first respondent to make an application under Section 20 of the Act and to execute a sale deed on exemption being granted by the Government. By this process the litigation will be practically unending. As specific performance cannot be granted directly, the possibility of granting conditional relief was examined by the lower Court. In view of the, long-drawn litigation which has consumed 12 years and in view of the doubtful interpretation of the terms of the agreement as well as the relevant provisions of the Act, the lower Court rightly in my view thought of granting alternate relief rather than main relief of specific performance, even assuming that the appellant is entitled to the main relief since asked by the appellant himself by way of alternate relief.
20. Sri S. C. Rangappa, the learned counsel for the appellant relying on a Division Bench judgment in Shariff Iqbal Hussain Ahmed v. K. V. Subamma, submits that when specific relief of possession is sought, Court cannot exercise discretion to grant a decree for compensation by invoking doctrine of equity when the plaintiff has got right to recover possession. No doubt the Division Bench observed that if an alternate prayer is Sought for in the relief of possession, the Courts should record a finding that it is impossible to grant the main relief and hence alternative relief is being granted. He also next relied on another Division Bench judgment of this Court in B. Manmadha Rao v. Raja R. R. K. Ranga Rao, , in support of his contention that the plaintiff who is entitled to specific performance cannot merely be granted a decree for compensation on the ground that prices have gone up.
21. Sri K. F. Baba, the learned counsel for the first respondent to meet this contention relies on a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawal, . In the said judgment, the Supreme Court observed that though the rise in prices of the property during the pendency of the suit may not be the sole consideration for refusing to decree the suit for specific performance, but granting of a decree for specific performance of a contract of immovable property is not automatic, but it is one of discretion. When the respondent himself has claimed alternate relief for damages, the Courts would have been well justified in granting alternate decree for damages instead of ordering specific performance. In the said case an agreement of sale was executed on 7-4-1969 for sale of 100 sq. yards of site in Dayanand Colony, New Delhi for Rs. 16,000/- by paying Rs. 2,500/-as Earnest Money. The suit was filed on 13-7-1970 for specific performance of the agreement, and alternatively for damages for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- with interest. In view of the claim for alternative relief for damages, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree for specific performance and granted substantial damages.
22. The learned counsel next relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in B.R. Mulani v. A. B. Aswathanarayana, , to show that under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the Court. In the said case the agreement in question was a conditional agreement with an option to the respondents therein to pay off the debt or in the alternate to sell the property to the petitioner therein. The Supreme Court upheld the view taken by the High Court that inasmuch as the agreement is not without an option to pay off the amount advanced specific performance should be refused. Following these decisions, I am of the view that a decree for specific performance should be refused in this case also since the agreement in question is conditional on obtaining necessary permission from the competent authority.
23. In Satyanarayana v. Yelloji Rao, , the Supreme Court observed that the discretion referred to in Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act cannot be defined as it is not possible or desirable to lay down the circumstances under which the Court will exercise its discretion against the plaintiff, but at the same time the said discretion shall not be arbitrary and must be in accordance with the sound and reasonable judicial principles. Therefore, it is clear that the illustrations given under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 22 is which the Court could refuse specific performance are not exhaustive and there may be umpteen number of cases in which Court may deny such relief to the plaintiff. Specific performance is by no means an absolute right, but one which rests entirely in judicial discretion depending on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. When once the discretion has been exercised in a particular way by the trial Court, it is not open to the appellate Court to interfere lightly unless it is shown that the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or against judicial principles. What emerges from the above discussion is that as the appellant is aware of the fact of refusal of permission by the competent authority, he has rightly resorted to alternate remedy for refund of Earnest Money. As already noticed the Supreme Court in Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawal (1996 AIR SCW 2606) (supra) granted alternate relief of damages as the plaintiff himself claimed alternate relief of damages instead of ordering specific performance. The contract was executed 17 years ago. No doubt the period consumed in litigation may not by itself a ground justifying denial of relief of specific performance, but as observed by the Supreme Court in Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawal (1996 AIR SCW 2606) (supra) that though the rise in prices of the property during the pendency of the suit may not be sole consideration for refusing to decree the suit for specific performance, but it is equally settled law that granting decree for specific performance of contract of immovable property is not automatic. As the permission contemplated by the parties as per the terms of the agreement from the competent authority was refused, I cannot hold that the discretion exercised by the trial Court in refusing the relief of specific performance, but granting alternate relief of damages is arbitrary.
24. For all the above reasons, I do not find any ground to interfere with the decree and judgment of the trial Court. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
25. Respondent No. 6 inC.C.C. A. No. 47 of 1990 is the respondent herein. She also entered into an agreement with the appellant herein for sate of 1000 sq. metres comprised in Plot No. 4 in Survey-Nos. 71 and 10, West Maredpalli, Secunderabad on 26-7-1978 on identical terms as the one entered into by the first respondent in the other appeal. The rate per sq. yard was fixed at Rs. Rs. 48/- and on that day, the appellant paid a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as advance. Here also under the terms of the agreement, the respondent had to obtain necessary sanction from the competent authority under the "Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. As the respondent committed default of the terms of the agreement, the suit was filed for specific performance of the agreement, and in the alternate for recovery of the advance amount of Rs. 15,000/- together with a further sum of Rs. 15,000/- by way of damages.
26. Identical written statement was filed and as the suit was decreed for alternate relief refusing the main relief of specific performance, this appeal is filed.
27. The learned counsel for both parties did not advance any separate arguments in this appeal, but they merely expressed that the arguments advanced in the other appeal are adopted in this appeal also.
28. Therefore, for the reasons already recorded in the above appeal, this appeal also fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
29. order accordingly.