Delhi District Court
Sachin Sharma And Anr vs State (Govt Of Nct Of Delhi) on 19 January, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL,
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL
DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-006390-2025
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 220/2025
1. SACHIN SHARMA,
S/o. Shri. Vinod Sharma,
R/o. 577, Gali Ghanteshwar,
Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk,
Delhi-110006.
2. BHAWNA SHARMA,
S/o. Shri. Vinod Sharma,
R/o. 577, Gali Ghanteshwar,
Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk,
Delhi-110006. ... REVISIONISTS/
PETITIONERS
VERSUS
STATE (GNCT OF DELHI). ... RESPONDENT
Date of e-filing : 29.04.2025
Date of institution : 02.05.2025
Date when judgment was reserved : 10.12.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 19.01.2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been filed under Sections 438/440 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS')/pari materia with Sections 397/399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.'), seeking setting aside of the order dated 21.03.2025 (hereinafter referred to as the 'impugned order'), passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (Mahila Court)-02/Ld. JMFC (Mahila Court)-02, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. JMFC/Ld. Trial Court'), in case bearing, 'State v. Sachin Sharma & Anr., Cr.
CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 1 of 35
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19
15:56:59 +0530
Case No. 15786/2022', arising out of FIR No. 312/2022, PS. Lahori Gate, under Sections 323/354/506/509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'). Pertinently, by virtue of the impugned order the Ld. Trial Court directed framing of charges under Section 506/509/34 IPC against Sachin Sharma and Bhawna Sharma (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 'revisionists') as well as that under Sections 323/354 IPC (additionally) against revisionist no. 1/Sachin Sharma.
2. Pithily put, the genesis of the present proceedings is a complainant of the victim, namely, Ms. 'S1' (hereinafter referred to as the 'complainant/prosecutrix/victim') to the police official(s), tendered on 10.06.2022. Markedly, under her complaint, the complainant inter alia proclaimed that she was residing at the first floor of the premise at Chandani Chowk (particulars deliberately withheld in view of the decisions of the superior courts) and that there was a temple of the ground floor of the said premise, which was managed/maintained by the complainant (और इसी पते पर श्री लाडली जौ का बड़ा मन्दिर है। जिसकी देख भाल पूजा-पाठ में स्वंय करती हूँ। मैं 1st Floor पर रहती हूँ। ग्राउण्ड फ्लोर पर मन्दिर है।).
Congruently, as per the complainant, her brother in law's family also resided on the ground floor of the said premise, where her kitchen was also located (मेरे जेठ वि** श** का परिवार भी ग्राउण्ड फ्लोर पर रहता है। मेरा एक कमरा, रसोई भी ग्राउण्ड फ्लोर पर है।). It was further proclaimed by the complainant under her complaint that on 09.06.2022, at around 05:00 p.m., while she was present in the kitchen and filling water using a hose, revisionist no. 1, who was the son of complainant's brother-in-law, reached there, pulled the said water house, out of 1 Identity of the complainant/prosecutrix and that of her relatives and other particular have been deliberately withheld in view of the decisions in; Birbal Kumar Nishad v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3464; X v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 279; and Saleem v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 3 HCC (Del) 365: 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2190.
CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 2 of 35
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.01.19
15:57:07 +0530
her/complainant's hand and started to abuse her ( दिनांक 09/06/2022 को मैं समय करीब 5.00PM पर अपनी रसोई ग्राउण्ड फ्लोर में पानी भरने के लिए रबर का पाईप पानी की टू टी में लगा रही थी इसी दौरान मेरे जेठ वि** श** का लड़का सचिन शर्मा वहां पर आ गया और मेरे हाथ से पानी का पाइप छीनकर मुझे गन्दी गन्दी गालियां देने लगा). Congruently, as per the complainant, revisionist no. 1 told her that he would not let her fill water or open the temple, as well as that he would disrupt all the celebrations ( और बोला की मैं तुम्हें पानी नहीं भरने दूंगा, और मन्दिर नहीं खोलने दूंगा, सारा उत्सव खराब कर दूंगा,). As per the complainant, when she objected, revisionist no. 1 grabbed her/complainant's left hand and twisted it ( जब मैंने सचिन शर्मा को ऐसा व्यवहार करने के लिए मना किया तो सचिन शर्मा ने मेरा बाँया हाथ पकड़कर जोर से मोड़ दिया). Correspondingly, as per the complainant, when she tried to withdraw her hand, revisionist no. 1, grabbed her/complainant's neck and chest as well as shoved his knee, three times on her hips, with malicious/wrongful intent (जब में अपना हाथ छु ड़ाने की कोशिश करने लगी, तो सचिन शर्मा ने गलत नीयत से मेरे गले व छाती से मुझे पकड़कर मेरे पीछे कू ल्हे पर तीन बार जोर-जोर से घुटने मारे). In the meanwhile, revisionist no. 2 is asserted to have reached at the said spot as well as, while abusing the complainant threatened that she/revisionist no. 2 would not permit the complainant's husband and son to enter the temple and that in case, they endeavored to enter the temple, she/revisionist no. 2 would falsely implicate them in a case/criminal proceeding (इसी दौरान सचिन शर्मा की पत्नी भावना शर्मा भी आकर मुझे जोर जोर से गन्दी गालियाँ देते हुए बोली कि मैं अब तुझे मंदिर के अंदर नहीं घुसने दूंगी और अगर तेरा पति और तेरा बेटा प** यहां मन्दिर के अन्दर आये तो मैं गलत आरोप लगा कर उन्हें फं सा दूंगी). Congruently, revisionist no. 1 is avowed to have threatened the complainant that he would kill her/the complainant, in case she made a complaint to the police (सचिन शर्मा ने गाली देते हुए कहा कि अगर पुलिस में रिपोर्ट करेगी ती में CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 3 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:57:13 +0530 तुझे जान से मार दुगा).
2.1. The complainant's complaint further chronicles that she made a call at 112 number in the meanwhile and subsequently, she proceeded to Aruna Asaf Ali Hospital to get herself medically examined. However, as per the complainant, she returned to her home on the said day, as she was not feeling well and it was on the following day that she/the complainant tendered her aforenoted complaint to the concerned police official(s). Markedly, under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the instant FIR came to be registered, and the investigation ensued. Relevantly, during the course of ensuing the site plan of the incident spot was prepared as well as the statements of witnesses were recorded.
Correspondingly, statement of the complainant was got recorded on 27.06.2022, in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C., wherein the complainant inter alia proclaimed, as under;
"... हमारा श्री लाडली जी का मंदिर है यहाँ के महंत श्री संजय गोस्वामी है मैं उनकी power of attorney हूँ। इससे पहले मेरे जेठ power of attorney थी, उससे पहले मेरे ससुर power of attorney थे। 2010 में मेरे जेठ ने resign कर दिया था। 2021 में power of attorney मुझे मिली। मैं मंदिर के उत्सव महोत्सव करती हूँ . देखभाल करती हूँ वहां मेरे जेठ का परिवार भी रहता है। मेरे जेठ के बड़े लड़के सचिन शर्मा और उनकी पत्नी भावना शमी और जेठ वि*** श** मुझे 2 साल से harass कर रहे है । आये दिन झगड़ा करना, गाली देना, गंदे आरोप लगाना, देख कर मुझे गलत हरकत करना। सचिन शमी मेरे पास से टच करते हु ए निकलते है और कमेट्स करते है हमारे कई बार झगडे हु ए। पीछे 9 June को मंदिर की रसोई से मैं नल में नली लगा रही थी तभी मेरे जेठ का लड़का Sachin आया और उसने मुझसे बोला कि मैं पानी नहीं भरने दूंगा और कोई उत्सव, महोत्सव नहीं करने दूंगा। उसी दिन जल विहार था। उसने मुझे कहा कि अगर तुम्हारा बेटा यस पति आया तो मैं उसे मारूं गा। उनकी पत्नी Bhavna Sharma ने कहा मैं तुम्हारे पति और बेटे को फं सा दूंगी। मंदिर में आने की हिम्मत मत करना। मैं ने ऐसा करने को मन किया तो Sachin ने मेरा बान्या हाथ पकड़ कर मोडा औए मेरी chest और गले को पकड़ा और मेरे कु ल्हे पर अपने घुटनों से मारा। तभी दर्शन करने एक lady आई और उसको देख कर वो मुझे धक्का देकर भाग गया। और चिल्लाने लगा मुझे इस lady से CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 4 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:57:19 +0530 बचाओ। Bhawna Sharma ने कहा कि इसको मैं देख लूंगी हम इसको मारो। मैं word use नहीं कर सकता। गंदा शब्द का use किया। दोनों ने मुझे जान से मारने की धमकी दी, मंदिर में जो लोग आए थे उनके सामने।..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.2. Remarkably, during the ensuing investigation, the revisionists were joined in the investigation, and the MLC of the victim/complainant was collected, whereupon the opinion of the concerned Doctor was obtained. Markedly, the nature of injuries of the complainant were opined to be 'simple' in nature. Further, on completion of investigation in the instant case, the concerned IO prepared and filed the chargesheet before the concerned Ld. MM. prepared and filed the chargesheet before the concerned Ld. MM. Pertinently, upon such chargesheet being filed, Ld. MM (Mahila Court)-02, Central, Tis Hazari Court vide order dated 12.10.2022, took cognizance of the offence(s) and issued summons to the revisionists. Subsequently, on the revisionists' entering appearance before the Ld. Trial Court and upon compliance of the provisions under Section 207 Cr.P.C. by the Ld. MM on 21.04.2023, matter was listed for arguments on charge. Subsequently, upon arguments on charge being addressed by/on behalf of the revisionist/accused, Ld. Addl. PP for the State and Ld. Counsel for the complainant, the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 21.03.2025, directed framing of charges against the revisionists, inter alia under the following observations;
"...Submissions heard. Record perused. It is settled principle that at the stage of framing of charge it is to be seen whether prima facie case is made out. At this stage, merits of the case shall not be examined and roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter/evidence is not to be made and the consideration cannot be whether the accused will be convicted or acquitted.
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.01.19
15:57:25 +0530
Prima facie, a case under section 506/509/34 IPC is made out against accused persons namely Sachin Sharma and Bhawna Sharma, prima facie case U/s 323/354 IPC is made out against accused Sachin Sharma. There are no allegations of offence /s 341 IPC against accused Sachin Sharma, and accordingly accused Sachin Sharma is discharged for aforementioned offence i.e. 341 IPC. Perusal of the record discloses a prima facie case under Section 506/509 IPC is made out against both accused persons namely Sachin Sharma and Bhawna Sharma and prima facie case u/s 323/354 is made out against accused Sachin Sharma.
Put up for framing of charge on ..."
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Ld. Counsel for the revisionists submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled cannons of law, deserving to be set aside at the outset, as suffering with gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent reasons have been delineated under the said order. Ld. Counsel further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that the entire story of the complainant is concocted, false and unreliable. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for the revisionists vehemently asserted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the assertion/statement of the revisionists that they have been falsely implicated in the present case by the complainant. Congruently, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel that the Ld. Trial Court completely ignored the revisionist no. 2's plea of alibi that she/revisionist no. 2 was not present at the place of occurrence at the alleged time of incident, i.e., revisionist no. 2 was not present at katra Neel CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 6 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:57:30 +0530 Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006 on 09.06.2022 at approx. 05:30 p.m. Even otherwise, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the Ld. Trial Court completely ignored the fact that the allegations levelled by the complainant are also not proved from the videography/video of the incident, filed/placed on record as the revisionists are not seen present in the said videography/video, besides no incident as alleged happened between the revisionists and the complainant. However, despite the same, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court completely ignored the contents of the said CCTV footage/videography, while passing the impugned order.
3.1. Ld. Counsel for the revisionists further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that from the material placed on record, even the basic ingredients of the provisions/offence under Sections 354/323/506/509/34 IPC are not even prima facie established against the revisionists. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that even on appreciation of the material brought on record, in light of the videography of the place of alleged incident, no ingredients of offence are made out against the revisionists herein. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate the fact that revisionists have not committed any act any manner so as to even prima facie implicate/make out a case for framing any charges against them/the revisionists. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, while passing the order to the prejudice of the revisionists, the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the complainant is a habitual litigant and that the present case has been initiated by the CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 7 of 35 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.01.19 15:57:36 +0530 complainant as counter blast/retaliatory exercise to an incident of dog bite, against which proceedings are already ensuing before the concerned court. Even otherwise, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel that from the inception, the complainant desired to throw the revisionists from the lawful possession of their premise and had, consequently made several false complaints/initiated frivolous proceedings against the revisionists, to harass them. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, even during the pendency of the present proceedings, the complainant, while acting in connivance with her associates and other anti-social elements, committed several illegal acts with an intention to throw the revisionists and their family members out of the house. It was further reiterated that the impugned order is not maintainable, as the same has been based on the baseless, false, fabricated, incorrect and concocted facts.
3.2. Ld. Counsel for the revisionists further vehemently reiterated that from the facts and material placed on record, ingredients of offence under Sections 354/323/506/509/34 IPC are not even prima facie made out in the instant case as there is no mens rea on the part of the revisionists, demonstrable even from the material placed before the Ld. Trial Court. Correspondingly, it was argued that the impugned order is not only vague and notional, rather, passed by the Ld. Trial Court without application of mind. In this regard, Ld. Counsel reiterated that the Ld. Trial Court mechanically passed the impugned order against the revisionists by not appreciating/taking into consideration, the facts of the present case as well as the material brought forth. Even otherwise, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court was further oblivious to the fact that CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 8 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:57:42 +0530 even in case when prosecution would lead the evidence collected during investigation, no conviction would ensue. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, no fruitful purpose would be served in continuing the trial against the revisionists on the basis of the material, which clearly shows that neither any incident transpired at the behest of the revisionists, nor were the revisionists, in any way involved in the commission thereof. It was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court also failed to give any sound, cogent or justified reasons for passing the impugned order, which adversely affects the rights of the revisionists. Consequently, the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists entreated that the impugned order, being passed in gross violation of law and settled judicial precedents, deserves to be set aside, outrightly. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2014 SC 1400; Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 322; and Nitya Dharmananda v. Gopal Sheelum Reddy, AIR 2017 SC 5846.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further submitted that no irregularity, impropriety, or incorrectness can be attributed to the impugned order, which was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizant of the settled principles of law, as well as wary of the facts and circumstances brought forth. As per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, the arguments contended by/on behalf of the revisionists are in the nature of revisionists' defence, which cannot be considered by the Court at the stage of framing of CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 9 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:57:47 +0530 charge. Even otherwise, sufficiency of the material/evidence placed on record, is not a fact which can be considered at the stage of framing of charges.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionists as well as that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State have been heard as well as the records, including the Ld. Trial Court records as well as the written submissions and case laws, placed on record, thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the determination of the merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, it would be apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant provisions under law, in particular that under law/Section 438 BNSS 2, as under;
"438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.
*** *** *** (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding...."
2Pari materia with Section 397 Cr.P.C., which provides, "397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.***Explanation - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding..."
(Emphasis supplied)
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19
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(Emphasis supplied)
7. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is quite evident that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be agitated either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein the Hon'ble Court while explicating the various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. (pari materia with Section 438 BNSS), observed as under;
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 11 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:57:59 +0530 properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Similarly, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in V.K. Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC Online Del 1192, in a similar context noted as under;
"67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test the waters of what might happen in the trial. The Revisional Court has to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the impugned order on the face of record."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a settled law3 that trite law that in a case where the order of subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality, "merely because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine manner." Reference in this regard is made to the decision 3 Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC Online MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC Online MP
958.
CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 12 of 35
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in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC Online Del 312, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi expounded as under;
"9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case . A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Notably in the context of the foregoing, it is further apposite to observe here that it is no longer res integra that the orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature, rather, intermediate in nature 4, and are, therefore, not affected by the bar of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. (pari materia with Section 438(2) BNSS). However, the scope of interference under Section 397 Cr.P.C. at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also equally settled5. In this regard, it is pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Manendra Prasad Tiwari v. Amit Kumar Tiwari, 2022 SCC Online SC 1057, wherein the Hon'ble Court enunciated the law in regard the foregoing as under;
"22. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 of CrPC has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference under Section 397 CrPC at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the court 4 Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of U.P., (2022) 15 SCC 720.5
State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, (2017) 3 SCC 198.
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is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage the final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure.
23. Section 397 CrPC vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Germane for the purpose(s) of present discourse to now consider the principles governing framing of charges. In this regard, it is relevant to outrightly note the settled law 6 that at the stage of framing of charges, neither can the truth, veracity and effect of the prosecution case be meticulously7 judged, nor can any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. On the contrary, at such a stage, only the sufficiency of ground for proceeding against the accused, on a general consideration of materials placed before the Court by the investigating police officer is relevant. Further, though, sifting of evidence is permissible8, however, scanning of evidence in detail is not. Quite understandably, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Reena v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC Online Del 630, iterated the said principles in unequivocal terms as under;
6State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 7 Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
8State of Maharashta v. Priya Sharan Maharaj & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 393.
CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 14 of 35
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"12. Thus it is settled position of law that at the time of framing of charge, the Court is not supposed to look into the evidence of the case in detail and is only to consider whether there is a strong suspicion against the accused on the basis of the material that comes before it. The court has the power to sift the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out, whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused. However, the Court is not supposed to delve deeply into the merits of the matter and start a roving expedition into the evidence that is brought forth it, as if conducting a trial. Further there is no one fixed definition that may be ascribed to the term prima facie' nor can the term strong suspicion have a singular meaning. While coming to the conclusion of a strong prima facie case or strong suspicion, the Court shall have to decide each case on the basis of its own independent facts and circumstances."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Concomitantly, it is settled law9 that the inconsistency in the material produced by the prosecution or the defect in investigation10, cannot be looked into for discharge of an accused, in the absence of full-fledged trial. In fact, the probative value11 of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material placed on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu, (2023) 6 SCC 768, wherein the Hon'ble Court remarked as under;
"59. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P. [Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21] , it was observed by this Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the 9 Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476.10
State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police v. N. Suresh Ranjan & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 709.11
Soma Chakravarty v. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403.
CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 15 of 35
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court is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. It was held that the court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions and inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Relevant to further note that it is trite law12, at the stage of framing of charge, only the police report is required to be considered and the defence of the accused13 cannot be looked into. Needless to mention that the superior courts14 have persistently deprecated the practice of holding a mini trial at the time of framing of charge. Relevantly, in this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharat Parikh v. CBI, (2008) 10 SCC 109, wherein the Hon'ble Court enunciated the judicial principle(s), as under;
"19. As observed in Debendra Nath Padhi case [(2005) 1 SCC 568: 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] at the stage of framing charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible and a mini trial cannot be conducted at such stage. At the stage of framing of charge the submissions on behalf of the accused have to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. The accused will get an opportunity to prove the documents subsequently produced by the prosecution on the order of the Court, but the same cannot be relied upon to reopen the proceedings once charge has been framed or for invocation of the High Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."
(Emphasis supplied) 12 State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad & Anr. v. P. Suryaprakasam, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 373 and State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) SCC 568.
13State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294.
14Indu Jain v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 341.
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14. Apposite to further emphasize15 that at the stage of charge, court(s) is/are not even required to record detailed reasons for framing charge, rather16, a very strong suspicion founded upon materials placed before it, which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charges. In fact17, it is only when no case is made out even after presuming entire prosecution evidence, can an accused be discharged. Needless to accentuate18, "at the stage of framing of charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only if the court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the purpose of trial." Notably, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715, while inter alia illuminating the principles as well as the scope of enquiry for the purpose of charge/discharging an accused, observed as under;
"14. ... It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into."15
Bhawna Bai v. Dhanshyam & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 217 16 Supdt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52 and Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 17 Manjit Singh Virdi v. Hussain Mohammed Shattaf, (2023) 7 SCC 633 18 Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta & Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 424 CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 17 of 35 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.01.19 15:58:33 +0530 (Emphasis supplied)
15. Ergo, being mindful of the principles hereinunder noted, this Court would now proceed with the determination of the arguments raised by Ld. Counsel for the revisionists as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the State. Markedly, one of the primary contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists is that even from the material placed on record prima facie ingredients of offence under the allegations levelled/charges framed against the revisionists are not made out. However, in order to appreciate the said contention, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/IPC as under;
"319. Hurt-Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.
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321. Voluntarily causing hurt-Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt".
323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt- Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
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354. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty-Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
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503. Criminal intimidation-Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 18 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:58:37 +0530 do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
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506. Punishment for criminal intimidation-
Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;...
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509. Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman-Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also with fine."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Notably, it is observed from a perusal of Section 323 IPC that the essence of the said offence lies in the accused's causing hurt to the victim, voluntarily, i.e., intentionally or with knowledge that in the process, hurt would be caused. Significantly, the term, hurt, in turn, is defined under Section 319 IPC as causation of any bodily pain, disease or infirmity to a victim. Quite evidently, disease or infirmity may have external manifestation, however, bodily pain may not be easily perceivable from any medical report. Ergo, it is quite understandable that the superior courts have persistently avowed that in order for conviction under Section 323 IPC to stand, it is not essential for production of an injury/medical report. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar, (2021) 9 SCC 191, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in unambiguous terms noted as under;
"11. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellant-accused that all the appellants were alleged to have been armed with lathis and so far as PW 8 is CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 19 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:58:42 +0530 concerned, no injury report is forthcoming and/or brought on record and therefore they cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 323 IPC is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that PW 8 in his examination-in-chief/deposition has specifically stated that after he sustained injuries, treatment was provided at Government Hospital, Paatan. He has further stated in the cross- examination on behalf of all the accused persons except accused Dinanath Singh that he sustained 2-3 blows of truncheons. He has also stated that he does not exactly remember that how many blows he suffered. According to him, he first went to Police Station, Paatan along with the SHO of Police Station, Paatan, where his statement was recorded and thereafter the SHO sent him to Paatan Hospital for treatment. Thus, he was attacked by the accused persons by lathis/sticks and he sustained injuries and was treated at Government Hospital, Paatan has been established and proved. It may be that there might not be any serious injuries and/or visible injuries, the hospital might not have issued the injury report. However, production of an injury report for the offence under Section 323 IPC is not a sine qua non for establishing the case for the offence under Section 323 IPC. Section 323 IPC is a punishable section for voluntarily causing hurt. "Hurt" is defined under Section 319 IPC. As per Section 319 IPC, whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause "hurt". Therefore, even causing bodily pain can be said to be causing "hurt". Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, no error has been committed by the courts below for convicting the accused under Section 323 IPC..."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. In so far the provisions under Section 354 IPC are concerned, it is settled law that in order to attract culpability under the said provision, it is required for the prosecution to prove; (i) commission of criminal assault or use of criminal force on a person, who is a woman; (ii) use of criminal force on such victim by the aggressor/accused; and (iii) use of criminal force upon such a woman with a mens rea (intention or knowledge) to 'outrage her modesty'. In this regard, this Court deems it apposite to refer to the CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 20 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:58:47 +0530 decision in Vidyadharan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 1 SCC 215, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court19, while explicating the basic ingredients of Section 354 IPC, noted as under;
"9. In order to constitute the offence under Section 354 mere knowledge that the modesty of a woman is likely to be outraged is sufficient without any deliberate intention of having such outrage alone for its object. There is no abstract conception of modesty that can apply to all cases. (See State of Punjab v. Major Singh [AIR 1967 SC 63 : 1967 Cri LJ 1] .) A careful approach has to be adopted by the court while dealing with a case alleging outrage of modesty. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 354 IPC are as under:
(i) that the person assaulted must be a woman;
(ii) that the accused must have used criminal force on her; and
(iii) that the criminal force must have been used on the woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
10. Intention is not the sole criterion of the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC, and it can be committed by a person assaulting or using criminal force to any woman, if he knows that by such act the modesty of the woman is likely to be affected. Knowledge and intention are essentially things of the mind and cannot be demonstrated like physical objects. The existence of intention or knowledge has to be culled out from various circumstances in which and upon whom the alleged offence is alleged to have been committed..."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Analogously, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 371, cogitating on the ingredients of the offence under Section 354 IPC and the meaning of the term, 'modesty', remarked as under;
"11. Coming to the question as to whether Section 354 of the Act has any application, it is to be noted that the provision makes penal the assault or use of criminal force to a woman to outrage her modesty. The essential ingredients of offence under Section 354 IPC are:19
Premiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 10 SCC 81.
CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 21 of 35
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(a) That the assault must be on a woman.
(b) That the accused must have used criminal force on her.
(c) That the criminal force must have been used on the woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex. The act of pulling a woman, removing her saree, coupled with a request for sexual intercourse, is such as would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman; and knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged, is sufficient to constitute the offence without any deliberate intention having such outrage alone for its object. As indicated above, the word 'modesty' is not defined in IPC. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Third Edn.) defines the word 'modesty' in relation to woman as follows:
"Decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lowe; Shame-fast, Scrupulously chast."
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14. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines modesty as "freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in dress, speech or conduct". In the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn.), the meaning of the word 'modesty' is given as "womanly propriety of behavior; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reverse or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions"..."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Correspondingly, for bringing home charges under Section 506 of IPC, the prosecution is required to prove that the;
(i) accused threatened some person; (ii) such threat must extend to causing any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested; and (iii) the accused did so with intent to cause alarm CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 22 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:58:57 +0530 to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Pertinently, the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana Behera, 1995 SCC Online Ori 317, while explicating the meaning of the word, 'alarm' used under Section 503/506 IPC, noted as under;
"...The threat must be intended to cause alarm from which it follows that, ordinarily, it would be sufficient for that purpose. The degree of such alarm may very in different cases, but the essential matter is that it is of a nature and extent to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates and take away from his acts that element of free voluntary action which alone constitutes consent. The case where the threat produces an alarm is comparatively a simple one, for all that has then to be proved is that threat was given and that the alarm was due to the threat: but where the threat has not that effect, it involves a question whether it was sufficient to overcome a man of ordinary nerves. The Court may hold it to be an empty boast, too insignificant to call for penal visitation of Section 506. "Intimidate" according to Webstar's Dictionary means" (1) to make timid, make afraid, overawe; (2) force or deter with threats or violence, cow". Threat referred to in the Section must be a threat communicated or uttered with intention of its being communicated to the person threatened for the purpose of influencing his mind. Question whether threat amounts to a criminal intimidation or not does not depend on norms of individual threatened if it is such a threat as may overcome ordinary free will of a man of common firmness. "Threat" is derived from Anglo-sexam word "threotou to life", (harass). It is the dicleration of an intention to inflict punishment, loss or pain on another. "Injury" is defined in Section 44. It involves doing of an illegal act. If it is made with intention mentioned in the section, it is an offence. Whether threat was given with intention to cause alarm to the person threatened has to be established by evidence to be brought on record..."
(Emphasis supplied) CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 23 of 35 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.01.19 15:59:02 +0530
20. Significantly, in the aforenoted dictate, the Hon'ble Court explicitly observed that the mens rea/ intention envisaged under Section 503/506 IPC must be to cause alarm to the victim and whether or not such a victim is alarmed, is not of any consequence. Here, it is further apposite to make reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with the ingredients of offence under Section(s) 503/506 IPC, inter alia, observed as under;
"11. ...A reading of the definition of "criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Pertinent to further note that the essential ingredients of Section 509 IPC are; (i) intention on the part of an accused to insult the modesty of a woman; and that the (ii) insult must be caused by; (a) uttering any words, or making any sound or gesture, or exhibiting any object intending that such word or sound shall be heard or that the gesture or object shall be seen by such woman, or (b) by intruding upon the privacy of such a woman. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Varun Bhatia v. State, 2023 SCC Online Del 5288, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, while explicating the contours of the provisions under Section 509/354 IPC, noted as under;
"18. Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code delineates two pivotal components for establishing an offence: firstly, the presence of an intention to insult the modesty of a woman, and secondly, the manner CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 24 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2026.01.19 15:59:07 +0530 in which this insult is perpetrated. The cornerstone of this provision is the requirement of intent, where the accused must possess a deliberate intention to affront or insult the modesty of a woman. This intent sets apart ordinary speech or actions from those that amount to an offence under Section 509. The insult itself can take place through two distinct modes. It can occur verbally or visually by uttering specific words, making sounds, or displaying gestures or objects, with the deliberate intent that these words, sounds, gestures, or objects are heard or seen by the woman involved. Alternatively, insult can manifest as an intrusion upon the woman's privacy, meaning thereby encroaching upon her personal space or violating her sense of privacy intentionally, in a manner that affronts her modesty. In essence, Section 509 emphasizes that intent is the linchpin of this offence, necessitating a deliberate affront to a woman's modesty for the Section to be invoked.
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21. In essence, both Section 354 and Section 509 of Indian Penal Code addressed the issue of outraging the modesty of a woman, but they do so in distinct ways. Section 354 primarily deals with cases involving physical assault or the use of force against a woman, wherein her modesty is violated through actions that involve direct contact or physical harm. On the other hand, Section 509 concerns instances where words, gestures, or acts are employed with the deliberate intent to insult or offend a woman's modesty, without necessarily involving physical force. This distinction in legal provisions reflects the recognition that outraging a woman's modesty can take various forms, both physical and verbal, and the law seeks to address each of these forms distinctly to ensure justice and protection for women in different situations. In the present case, the complainant has raised allegations solely under Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Consequently, being mindful of the above, when facts of the present case are conscientiously evaluated, in light of aforenoted judicial precedents as well as the arguments addressed, it is outrightly observed that the complainant has made/levelled specific allegations against the revisionists herein, inter alia to the CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 25 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.01.19 15:59:12 +0530 effect that on 09.06.2022 at around 05:00 p.m., while she/the complainant was present in the kitchen and filling water using a hose, revisionist no. 1, pulled the said water house, out of her/complainant's hand and started to abuse her and told her/the complainant that he/revisionist no. 1 would not let her fill water or open the temple, as well as that he/revisionist no. 1 would disrupt all the celebrations. Congruently, the complainant asserted under her complaint that upon her objecting to revisionist no. 1's conduct, he/revisionist no. 1 grabbed her/complainant's left hand and twisted it. Further, as per the complainant, when she tried to withdraw her hand, revisionist no. 1, grabbed her/complainant's neck and chest as well as shoved his knee, three times on her hips, with malicious/wrongful intention. In the meanwhile, as per the complainant, revisionist no. 2 reached at the said spot as well as, while abusing the complainant threatened that she/revisionist no. 2 would not permit the complainant's husband and son to enter the temple and that in case, they endeavored to enter the temple, she/revisionist no. 2 would falsely implicate them in a case/criminal proceeding. Correspondingly, revisionist no. 1 is avowed to have threatened the complainant that he would kill her/the complainant, in case she made a complaint to the police.
23. Needless to mention that the complainant reiterated her aforesaid assertion even under her statement dated 27.06.2022, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C., inter alia to the effect that on 09.06.2022, revisionist no. 1 threatened her that he would not permit her to celebrate as well as fill water from kitchen tap, besides also avowed that he would also kill the complainant's husband and son, in case they interjected. The complainant further proclaimed under the said CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 26 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:59:17 +0530 statement that even revisionist no. 2 threatened her that she would falsely implicate the complainant's husband and son in a false case, in case they tried to enter the temple. Further, as aforenoted, it was also avowed by the complainant under her said statement that when she objected, revisionist no. 1 grabbed her left hand, twisted it, grabbed complainant's chest and neck, as well as hit her hips with his/revisionist no. 1's knees. Needless to reiterate that it was also asserted by the complainant under her statement to the Ld. Magistrate that the revisionists threatened to kill her as well as abused her in filthy language, which she expressed inability to reiterate. Here, it is further pertinent to note that as per the MLC of the complainant, she is observed to had sustained injuries, which were opined to be simple in nature. Accordingly, under such facts and circumstances and being wary of all the material brought on record, this Court is in concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that prima facie case, strong suspicion and sufficient material/ground(s) to proceed with the charges under Section 354/323 IPC exists against revisionist no. 1, as well as that with the charges under Sections 506/509 IPC against both the revisionists/revisionist nos. 1 and 2.
24. Here, it is pertinent to deal with the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists inter alia to the effect that there are variations and/or contradictions in the statements of the complainant recorded at different points in time, i.e., in her complaint/statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and that under the subsequent statement, record under Section 164 Cr.P.C. However, as aforenoted, such contradictions/inconsistencies, in the considered opinion of this Court, are not sufficient enough for discharge accused/revisionists herein at this stage. Needless in this CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 27 of 35 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.01.19 15:59:23 +0530 regard to reiterate that the superior courts have persistently avowed that contradictions and inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge. In as much as the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists pertaining to the revisionists' false implication in the present case by/at the behest of the complainant or that of variance in the assertion of the complainant and that of the CCTV footage placed on record or that of the instant proceedings being initiated by the complainant out of ill-will/malicious intentions, in the considered opinion of this Court, are all subject matters of trial, which can only be determined only once evidence is led before the Ld. Trial Court. Congruently, this Court deems it apposite to reiterate that mere defect in investigation, as alleged by the revisionists/Ld. Counsel for the revisionists, cannot be a ground for discharge in light of the aforenoted judicial dictates.
25. In so far as the aforenoted contention of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists pertaining to absence of corroboration of the statement of the complainant by any public witnesses/eyewitnesses or CCTV footage/videography is concerned, without commenting on the merits of the present case, this Court deems it pertinent to note here that considering the nature of charges/offences/allegation levelled/charged against revisionist no. 1, it is not necessary that public persons are always joined as witnesses. In fact, it is a settled law 20 that even the conviction for offence(s) of sexual nature/one affecting modesty of woman, can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if the same is determined to be unblemished and the witness determined in trial to be 'sterling' nature. Needless to reiterate at 20 State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384; and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pratap Singh, 2016 SCC Online Del 3207.
CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 28 of 35
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this stage that the superior courts have persistently avowed21 that though, the sense of modesty in all women is not the same for all and that the same may vary from woman to woman, however, considering that the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex, touching of the victim's body, i.e., breasts, mouth any other body parts, etc., by an accused, without the consent of the complainant/victim, brings such an act within the ambit of the provisions under Section 354 IPC.
26. Further, this Court deems it pertinent to note that this stage that it is also not convinced with the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists that since the material placed on record is insufficient to convict the revisionists, he ought to be discharged. In fact, in this regard, it is reiterated that at the stage of framing of charge, sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only if the court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the purpose of trial, which is not the case here. Appositely, in as much as the contention of Ld. Counsel for the revisionists to the effect that the Ld. Trial Court did not consider revisionist no. 2's plea of alibi while passing the impugned order, is concerned, the said contention too, fails to impress this Court. In fact, in this regard, this Court unmistakably records that it is conscious of the repeated avowals of the superior courts22 that plea of 'alibi' is a question of fact which is required to be proved by an accused at the stage of trial to show by adducing appropriate evidence that he/she was elsewhere and was falsely implicated in a case. Reference in this regard is further made to the decision in 21 State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51.
22Satish v. State of U.P. & Ors., MANU/UP/3612/2024.
CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 29 of 35
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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Neetesh Sharma v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., MANU/MP/4449/2024, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, while scrupulously delving into the said issue, explicated the law as under;
"5. The moot question for consideration is whether this Court can discharge the petitioner by accepting his defence of plea of alibi or not?
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Pal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), reported in MANU/SC/0230/2015: 2015:INSC:194: (2015) 4 SCC 749 has held as under:
*** *** *** The said principle has been reiterated in Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana, Sk. Sattar v. State of Maharashtra and Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of S.K.Sattar v.
State of Maharashtra, reported in MANU/SC/0649/2010: 2010:INSC:546: (2010) 8 SCC 430 has held as under :
*** *** ***
8. The Supreme Court in the case of Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in MANU/SC/0088/1997: 1996:INSC:1260: (1997) 1 SCC 283 has held as under:
*** *** *** Thus, it is clear that so far as defence of plea of alibi is concerned, it is required to be proved by leading cogent evidence and it cannot be proved by preponderance of probabilities. It is a disputed question of fact that cannot be adjudicated by the Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India..."
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Congruently, this Court further does not concede with contention of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists that Ld. Trial Court ought to have considered the CCTV footage/videography placed on record by the revisionists. In this regard, this Court deems it apposite to reiterate that at the stage of framing of charge, only the police report is required to be considered and the material placed on record by the CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 30 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:59:39 +0530 accused/defence of the accused cannot be looked into. Correspondingly, this Court deems it further pertinent to note in respect of the foregoing that the superior courts have oft declared that the provisions under Section 94 BNSS/Section 91 Cr.P.C. cannot be even exploited at the behest/by an accused at the stage of framing of charge. Remarkably, reference in this regard is made to the decision23 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, wherein the Hon'ble Court in unambiguous terms, remarked as under;
"25. Any document or other thing envisaged under the aforesaid provision can be ordered to be produced on finding that the same is "necessary or desirable for the purpose of investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code". The first and foremost requirement of the section is about the document being necessary or desirable. The necessity or desirability would have to be seen with reference to the stage when a prayer is made for the production. If any document is necessary or desirable for the defence of the accused, the question of invoking Section 91 at the initial stage of framing of a charge would not arise since defence of the accused is not relevant at that stage. When the section refers to investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings, it is to be borne in mind that under the section a police officer may move the court for summoning and production of a document as may be necessary at any of the stages mentioned in the section. Insofar as the accused is concerned, his entitlement to seek order under Section 91 would ordinarily not come till the stage of defence. When the section talks of the document being necessary and desirable, it is implicit that necessity and desirability is to be examined considering the stage when such a prayer for summoning and production is made and the party who makes it, whether police or accused. If under Section 227, what is necessary and relevant is only the record produced in terms of Section 173 of the Code, the accused cannot at that stage invoke Section 91 to seek production of any document to show his innocence. Under Section 91 summons for production of document can be issued 23 Swaminathan v. State of Delhi, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 1248.
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by court and under a written order an officer in charge of a police station can also direct production thereof. Section 91 does not confer any right on the accused to produce document in his possession to prove his defence. Section 91 presupposes that when the document is not produced process may be initiated to compel production thereof."
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Appositely, it is observed from a perusal of the aforesaid dictate that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it has been inter alia asserted therein that the provisions under Section 91 Cr.P.C. (pari materia with Section 94 BNSS) cannot be invoked at the behest of/by an accused to place on record, his defence at the stage of charge and that the appropriate stage for invoking the said provision would be at the stage of accused's defence. Correspondingly, quite recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Swarn Singh, 2024 SCC Online SC 5537, while exhaustively reviewing the aforenoted dictates, declared as under;
"4. ...The respondent-accused had filed an application before the Trial Court for summoning of the call details of the Seizure Officer and some other police officials for the date of seizure, i.e., 15.02.2019.
5. The said application was rejected by the Trial Court vide the order dated 03.01.2020, against which the respondent had filed the Miscellaneous Petition, which has been allowed by the High Court vide the impugned order.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant- State has rightly drawn the attention of this Court to the legal position settled by this Court in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, in which a Three Judge Bench of this Court has held as under:
*** *** ***
7. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decision in the case of Nitya Dharmananda Vs. Gopal Sheelum Reddy, (2018) 2 SCC 93, to submit that the court being under the obligation to impart justice, is not debarred from CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 32 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:59:49 +0530 exercising its power under Section 91 Cr.P.C., if the interest of justice in a given case so requires. However the said decision is not helpful to the respondent. In the said decision also, it has been observed that the accused cannot invoke and would not have right to invoke Section 91 Cr.P.C. at the stage of framing of charge. In view of the law laid down by the Three Judge Bench in State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, (supra), we are inclined to accept the present appeal.
8. In that view of the matter, the impugned order is set aside. The Criminal Appeal stands allowed accordingly.
*** *** ***
10. It is needless to say that the respondent-
accused shall be at liberty to file the application at the appropriate stage. It is further clarified that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case..."
(Emphasis supplied)
29. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further being wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the State, this Court observes that from the facts and circumstances of the case, material and the documents placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court, including inter alia the contents of the chargesheet, statements of witnesses, including that of the complainant, MLC and other documents/case laws, etc., placed on record, prima facie case under Section 354/323 IPC stands established against revisionist no. 1 and prima facie case under Sections 506/509 IPC stands established against both the revisionists/revisionist nos. 1 and 2, in as much as 09.06.2022 at around 05:00 p.m. onwards at 577, Gali Ghanteshwar, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi, revisionist no. 1 used criminal force against the complainant 'S' by touching her breast as well as neck, inappropriately, with an intention to outrage her modesty or with a knowledge that he is likely by such an act, to outrage her/ CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 33 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 15:59:55 +0530 complainant's modesty, besides caused hurt to her. Congruently, both the revisionists, as per the complainant filthily abused her as well as threatened to implicate complainant's relatives into false case as well as kill her. Needless to reiterate that the complainant, both, under her initial complaint as well as her statement, recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., made specific allegations qua the revisionists, besides her/complainant's MLC demonstrates existence of injuries on her body, opined to be 'simple' in nature.
30. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court unswervingly records and reiterates that the Ld. Trial Court did not commit any illegality and/or impropriety under the impugned order, while directing framing of charges under Section 323/354 IPC against revisionist no. 1 and that under Sections 506/509 IPC, both against revisionist nos. 1 and 2. Consequently, in the considered opinion of this Court the present revision petition deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. As a corollary, order dated 21.03.2025 passed by Ld. JMFC (Mahila Court)-02, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case bearing, 'State v. Sachin Sharma & Anr., Cr. Case No. 15786/2022', arising out of FIR No. 312/2022, PS. Lahori Gate, directing framing of charges under Section 506/509/34 IPC against revisionist no. 1/Sachin Sharma and revisionist no. 2/Bhawna Sharma as well as that under Sections 323/354 IPC (additionally) against revisionist no. 1/Sachin Sharma is hereby upheld/affirmed. Apposite at this stage for this Court to further note that, though, it/this Court holds highest regard for the decisions relied upon by Ld. Counsel for the revisionists, however, the same would not, in the considered opinion of this Court, come to the aid/rescue of the case put forth by the revisionists in the manner as prayed for, as the facts and CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 34 of 35 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19 16:00:00 +0530 circumstances of the present case as well as the stage of proceedings before this Court, are clearly, distinguishable.
31. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court concerned for information and compliance. Needless at this stage to note that nothing stated hereinabove shall be construed as opinion on final outcome of the case and the same shall be decided in accordance with law upon conclusion of evidence.
32. Revision file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.01.19
16:00:06 +0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 19.01.2026. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CR. No. 220/2025. Sachin Sharma & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 35 of 35