Delhi District Court
Delhi Development Authority vs Stallion Security on 20 April, 2024
IN THE COURT OF SH. AJAY PANDEY
DISTRICT JUDGE (COMMERCIAL COURT-10)
CENTRAL, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
OMP Comm 87/2023
Delhi Development Authority
Through its Vice-Chairman
Vikas Sadan, INA
New Delhi-110019 Objector
Vs
M/s Stallion Security
A-40/41, Sector-3, Phase-III
Near DPS School, Dwarka
New Delhi-110078 Respondent/Claimant
Date of Institution : 26.05.2023
Date of Arguments : 06.03.2024
Date of Judgment : 20.04.2024
JUDGMENT:-
OBJECTIONS UNDER SECTION 34 OF THE ARBITRATION & CONCILIATION ACT 1996 AGAINST THE AWARD DATED 15TH FEBRUARY 2023
1. The present objections under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 have been filed by DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 1 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 the applicant/objector, a Statutory Authority, Delhi Development Authority created by Delhi Development Act 1957 through its Superintending Engineer SCC-2 against the award dated 15.02.2023 and orders dated 20.12.2022 passed by sole Arbitrator Sh. Vijay Singla in Arbitration case no. DL/10/S/SWC/01296 of 2022 titled as M/s Stallion Security Vs Executive Engineer SMD-3, DDA with following averments amongst other:-
1.1 The applicant objector/DDA invited tenders for providing watch and ward security for its vacant plots/lands and all the roads under the jurisdiction of South Zone, DDA.
1.2 The respondent/claimant submitted its bid which was accepted and award letter no. F.7(501) SMD- 3 (ED-7)/SZ/DDA/A/19-20/214 dated 04.06.2020 was issued in favour of respondent/claimant. On 05.06.2020 a work agreement was duly executed between the parties.
1.3 As per the agreement the stipulated period of work was 365 days with stipulated date of start of work being 19.06.2020 and for completion of work being 18.06.2021 respectively but the work was actually completed on 01.10.2021.
1.4 As per Clause 8 of the agreement respondent/claimant was required to submit a notice of completion within 30 days of completion of work. The respondent/claimant however did not submit the same.
DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 2 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 1.5 As per Clause 9 of the agreement respondent/claimant was further required to submit a final bill within three months of completion of work. The said clause prohibited the submission of any further claims after submission of final bill and further prohibited to not to raise any claim or seek further payments from the objector.
1.6 After completion of work objector/DDA paid a gross sum of Rs.2,23,86,263/- (Two crores twenty three lakhs eighty six thousand two hundred sixty three only) to the respondent/claimant on 15.02.2022 towards full and final settlement of the entire work. The said payment was accepted by the respondent/claimant.
1.7 As per Clause 25 of the agreement all disputes and claims arising out of the agreement were required to be decided amicably or through the process of arbitration. A person with qualification of a graduate engineer and who had been a Chief Engineer in Public Works Department could have been appointed as arbitrator.
1.8 After receiving entire payments respondent/claimant, in violation of terms and conditions of the agreement claimed a sum of Rs.1,07,18,544/- in following heads:-
i. Payment under Clause 10C of the
agreement.
ii. Payment towards reimbursement of GST.
DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 3 of 43
OMP Comm 87/2023
iii. Refund of security deposit
iv Balance payment towards ESI/EPF.
v. Reimbursement of amount deducted against
QC paras, audit & vigilance.
vi. Interest
vii. Costs
1.9 As the claims were against the terms and
conditions of the agreement, objector/DDA did not accept the same. The respondent/claimant approached the Delhi Arbitration Centre, Tis Hazari Courts, acting as Delhi Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. The Delhi Arbitration Centre appointed Sh. Vijay Singla, as the sole Arbitrator to settle the claims raised by the respondent/claimant.
1.10 The learned sole Arbitrator initiated proceedings and objector/DDA filed an application under section 12, 13 & 16 of The Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 thereby challenging the jurisdiction and qualification of the Arbitrator along with his authority to act as an Arbitrator because at the time of execution of agreement the respondent/claimant was not registered as per provisions of The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred as MSME Act) and therefore the only remedy available to the respondent/claimant was to invoke Arbitration clause in terms of Clause 25 of the agreement. DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 4 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 1.11 The said application was dismissed by the learned Arbitrator vide order dated 20.12.2022.
1.12 Even in its statement of defence the objector/DDA had taken specific objections to the jurisdiction and authority of learned Arbitrator to entertain and decide claims raised by the respondent/claimant.
1.13 On 23.12.2022, learned Arbitrator kept the matter for 'Claimant's Evidence'. The respondent/contractor filed its affidavit of evidence. On the said date, the objector through an email requested the learned Arbitrator to adjourn the matter in first week of January 2023.
1.14 Learned Arbitrator in violation of the principles of natural justice, reserved the matter for passing the award with liberty to objector/DDA to file its affidavit of evidence on 06.01.2023 without affording an opportunity for addressing oral arguments.
1.15 The objector/DDA filed its affidavit of evidence vide email dated 03.01.2023 and requested learned Arbitrator to fix the date for addressing oral arguments. However, vide email dated 04.01.2023 learned Arbitrator directed the objector/DDA to file its written arguments and vide his email dated 07.01.2023 he refused to give opportunity for making oral arguments and pronounced impugned award on 15.02.2023.
1.16 The impugned award is thus stated to be in DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 5 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 violation of public policy, principles of natural justice, equity, fair play and rules of audi-alteram-partem and is challenged on the grounds that:-
i) Award is against terms and conditions of agreement.
ii) Award is against public policy and law of land.
iii) Award is patently illegal, unfair and unreasonable.
iv) Award is in violation of principles of natural justice, equity, good conscience and rule of audi-alteram-
partem as no opportunity of hearing was given by the Arbitrator to the objector/DDA to present its case or to make submissions.
v) Arbitrator acted in a biased manner and travelled beyond terms of agreement.
vi) Learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that
on the date of execution of agreement
respondent/contractor was not registered under the provisions of MSME Act and therefore invocation of the said Act of 2006 and appointment of Arbitrator under the said Act was vitiated.
vii) The provisions of said Act were not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
viii) Provisions of Clause 25 of the agreement could not have been overruled or ignored by the sole DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 6 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 Arbitrator. Clause 25 of the agreement clearly provide the complete mechanism for settlement of all sorts of disputes as well as qualification of the Arbitrator to be appointed for resolution of disputes between the parties. No such qualification was possessed by learned Arbitrator.
ix) The award is against the law of land because after failure and termination of the conciliation proceedings initiated as per section 18(2) of MSME Act, provisions of The Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 were supposed to apply and the arbitration had to be conducted as per the provisions of said Act of 1996. Therefore reference of dispute to learned Arbitrator was not in accordance with the provisions of agreement and learned Arbitrator was lacking jurisdiction, qualification and competency to entertain and decide the claims in dispute.
x) The award lacks requisite judicial approach as the learned Arbitrator did not deal with the matter in a fair, reasonable and objective manner because in the internal page no.25 of the impugned award learned Arbitrator wrongly observed that since DDA did not challenge the order dated 20.12.2022, therefore, it had become final and binding, though as per settled law the interim orders passed by Tribunal can be challenged along with final award. Further learned Arbitrator himself observed in order dated 20.12.2022 that merits DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 7 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 of the agreement would be considered at appropriate stage.
xi) Learned Arbitrator had applied outdated, invalid & inapplicable circulars in violation to the terms and conditions of the agreement.
xii) Learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that the entire proceedings were bad in law and against section 3, 51 and 53B of The Delhi Development Act, 1957 because the agreement was executed between respondent/contractor and the objector/DDA and not with the Executive Engineer, SMD-3, DDA who was only an employee of DDA. Under section 3 of Delhi Development Act 1957, DDA has to be sued in its own name, whereas respondent/contractor had sued Executive Engineer of DDA.
xiii) The Arbitrator travelled beyond the terms of agreement and made substantial changes therein. In the agreement and in the award letter as well as in the schedule of rates it was clearly stated "GST, other all statutory taxes and labour cess shall be payable by the contractor;
The amount quoted shall be inclusive of all taxes; GST and other statutory taxes (if any) in respect of this contract shall be payable by the contractor and DDA shall not entertain any claim whatsoever in this respect;
GST, Building and other Construction Workers DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 8 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 Welfare Cess of any other tax, levy or Cess in respect of input for or output by this contractor shall be payable by the contractors and DDA shall not entertain any claim whatsoever in this respect;
Total Amount Inclusive of All Taxes in Rs.P"
However, the learned Arbitrator ignored and acted against aforesaid terms of agreement and exceeded his jurisdiction.
xiv) As per Section 53B of The Delhi Development Act 1957 any suit or proceedings against the objector/DDA could be initiated only within a period of 6 months from the first date of cause of action and after serving an advance notice to the DDA. The respondent/contractor neither initiated proceedings within the period of limitation nor served any notice under section 53-B of the Delhi Development Act 1957. In the present case as per own admission of the respondent/contractor the work was completed on 01.10.2021. Therefore the limitation to claim any amount started to run with effect from the said date i.e. 01.10.2021. Hence, any claim raised after 31.03.2022 was barred by limitation.
xv) The respondent/claimant did not submit requisite documents for release of payment of ESI/EPF.
Despite this learned Arbitrator awarded the same in favour of respondent/claimant against the terms of DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 9 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 agreement.
xvi) Arbitrator failed to appreciate that respondent/contractor filed only self-made invoices without any proof that he had deposited any amount towards the alleged GST. Therefore no amount can be awarded to the respondent/contractor towards GST.
xvii) The respondent/contractor did not produce any document to show payment of wages to its employee to claim ESI EPF but the Arbitrator awarded a sum of Rs.7,96,657/- under this head.
xviii) The Arbitrator wrongly placed reliance on provisions of Delhi Schedule Rates (DSR) or CPWD manual against the clear, specific and unambiguous terms of agreement.
xix) Respondent/claimant did not provide requisite documents for application of Clause 10 C of the agreement and therefore was not entitled for any claim under the said clause.
xx) Respondent/claimant did not mention the number of guards deployed during period of work and did not file any wage slip, attendance register, salary register etc. which was required to be produced to the Engineer-in-charge.
xxi) Learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that respondent/contractor had not submitted final bill in view of Clause 9 of the Agreement and therefore was estopped from claiming any further amount from the DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 10 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 objector/DDA. Learned Arbitrator wrongly held that provisions of MSME Act 2006 were applicable and the provisions of Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 were not applicable. Arbitrator had provided interest to the claimant against the terms of agreement which provide that no interest would be paid on withheld amount. Further as per clause 9 of the agreement only simple interest @ 5% per annum can be payable, whereas, by applying provisions of MSME Act 2006, learned Arbitrator has awarded compound interest @ 13.95% per annum.
xxii) By awarding GST in favour of claimant/contractor, learned Arbitrator had travelled beyond the terms and conditions of agreement under which GST was not at all payable by the objector/DDA.
xxiii) Award is in conflict with the basic notion of morality and justice as there was no evidence in favour of respondent/claimant.
1.17 The objector/DDA thus prayed for summoning record of the impugned award dated 15.02.2023 and for quashing the said award and to set- aside the order dated 20.12.2022 passed by learned Arbitrator in Arbitration case no. DL/10/S/SWC/01296 of 2022 titled as M/s Stallion Security Vs Executive Engineer SMD-3, DDA.
DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 11 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023
2. The opposite party respondent filed its reply to the objections stating inter-alia that the present objections is a instance of the applicant, government body, abusing its dominant powers against private bodies who already rendered their services to the entire satisfaction of the applicant; that allowing the objections would set a dangerous precedent; that applicant is wasting precious time of the court.
2.1 In the preliminary objections of the reply to the petition, it is inter-alia stated that petitioner has sought setting-aside of the impugned award upon factual position on merits, which cannot be done by this court under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 in view of the judgments by Hon'ble Supreme Court and of Hon'ble High Courts. It is also stated that there is very limited scope of inquiry by the court under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Canara Nidhi Limited VS M. Shashikala & Ors, 2019 SCC Online SC 1244 and the court would not construe the nature of claim by adopting too technical approach or by indulging into hair-splitting, otherwise the whole purpose behind holding the arbitration proceedings as an alternative to Civil Court Forum would stand defeated as was held in the case of Sangamner Bhag Sahakari Karkhana Ltd Vs Krupp Industries Ltd, AIR 2002 SC 2221. It is further stated that award is not open to challenge on the DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 12 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 ground that Arbitrator had reached wrong conclusion or had failed to appreciate some facts and the award is only open to challenge if there is error apparent on the face of award or if there is misconduct on the part of Arbitrator. It is further stated that in case of ambiguous contracts, an ambiguity is needed to be resolved by the Judge/Arbitrator and if the conclusion of the Arbitrator is based on a possible view of the matter, court is not expected to interfere with the award; and that the award is not open to challenge on the ground that Arbitral Tribunal had reached wrong conclusion or had failed to appreciate some facts; and that appreciation of evidence by the Arbitrator is never a matter which can be considered by the court in proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996, as the court is not sitting in appeal over the adjudication by the Arbitrator.
2.2 It is further stated that no ground mentioned under section 34(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 is made out in the instant petition. It is further stated that petitioner is not represented by authorized or competent person because there is no power of attorney or any specific resolution that the person signing the petition is competent to sign the same.
2.3 It is further stated that facts as well as law has been properly appreciated by Arbitrator and the petitioner has taken lame, baseless and misconceived DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 13 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 pleas in the present petition. It is further stated that no special question of law is involved and the petition is highly misconceived and devoid of merits and the petitioner has failed to highlight or mention any evidence which reflect any irregularirty or illegality in the impugned award.
2.4 It is further stated that petitioner has quoted terms of the clause of agreement and his self- interpretation of these terms which suited his own requirement. Arbitrator duly considered all the facts in his reasoned award. It is further stated that contention of the petitioner that Arbitrator was not competent to entertain and decide the dispute between the parties, is totally misconceived as the provisions of MSMED Act 2006 have an overriding effect and learned Arbitrator already framed material question no. '6.B.iv.' regarding this contention which was considered in detail by learned Arbitrator. It is denied that respondent was not an entity or supplier as per MSMED Act on the date of execution of the agreement between the parties and it is stated that respondent has been a registered MSME unit since 09.12.2017, much prior to the execution of agreement between the parties. It is further stated that had the respondent not been registered as MSME unit prior to the agreement with the petitioner, MSEFC Council would not have entertained the respondent's case at the outset. Petitioner was well cognizant of this fact from the DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 14 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 inception of MSME proceedings and never raised concern regarding non registration of respondent as MSME unit before the MSEFC or before learned Arbitrator and inducting this new fact at this stage is inappropriate. It is further stated that the application under section 12, 13 and 16 of the Arbitration Act filed by the petitioner was rightly dismissed by learned Arbitrator and section 19 of MSMED Act allows that any order can be challenged through an appeal under MSMED Act. It is denied that learned Arbitrator passed the award in absolute violation of public policy, principles of natural justice, equity and fairplay or by violating rules of audi-alteram-partem and it is stated that petitioner took excessive period of approximately 2 ½ months and sought 8 different dates before learned Arbitrator to file its statement of defence. It is further stated that section 18(5) of the MSMED Act 2006 stipulates that a reference must be decided within 90 days period. In the case of Indian Highwasy Managment Company Limited Vs Mukesh & Associates, ARB.P. 209/2020, Hon'ble High Court held that timeline set in MSMED Act are to be substantially adhered to. It is stated that no injustice was done to the petitioner as the learned Arbitrator gave eight extensions to the petitioner to file statement of defence. Learned Arbitrator also permitted the petitioner to file its evidence and written submissions and a contested award DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 15 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 was rendered after considering all the contentions and written submissions of the petitioner. Any violation of law or public policy by the learned Arbitrator is denied and it is stated that well reasoned award after appreciating all documentary and oral evidence was passed by the learned Arbitrator. It is further stated that proceedings of arbitration clearly make out that acts of petitioner resulted in delay of statutory arbitration proceedings and it was the petitioner who intentionally prolonged the proceedings and despite that learned Arbitrator refrained from issuing any adverse orders against the petitioner. It is repeated that provisions of MSMED Act have an overriding effect in view of section 24 of the said Act and learned Arbitrator was very much competent to decide the issue and circulars relied upon by the learned Arbitrator cannot be dismissed as outdated, invalid or inapplicable. It is further stated that learned Arbitrator has not travelled beyond terms of agreement or has re-written the same. It is also stated that no term was added, altered or revoked by learned Arbitrator and any liability imposed upon the petitioner do not constitute addition, alteration or deletion of the terms of contract. The petitioner's claim that as per the agreement, GST was to be born by the respondent, has been meticulously addressed by learned Arbitrator in his award. It is further stated that petitioner has willfully suppressed the information that vide application dated DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 16 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 19.12.2022 learned Arbitrator waived cost of R.10,000/- imposed upon the petitioner and also removed the remarks against the erring officer i.e. Executive Engineer of the petitioner from the arbitration proceedings but the conduct of petitioner was always of delaying the proceedings.
2.5 It is further stated that plea of the petitioner that the claim of the respondent was barred by limitation is self-contradictory because both parties were bound with the terms of the agreement till 14.02.2023 i.e. one year of the quality control and return of security deposit amount by the petitioner, and if for the moment it is presumed that section 53B of DD Act 1957 applies, still action taken by MSEFC and resulting arbitration proceedings were definitely within the limitation period. It is further stated that the provisions of MSMED Act 2006 have overriding effect and that section 53 (B) Delhi Development Act 1957 pertains to filing of suits only and nowhere deals with the other proceedings more particularly with the arbitration proceedings.
2.6 It is stated that submissions made by petitioner in respect of ESI/EPF are self-contradictory because earlier petitioner stated that he has no liability to pay ESI/EPF but lateron stated that the said payment can be released only on production of required documents. It is further stated that learned Arbitrator has given reasoned observation from internal pages no.43-44 while DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 17 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 awarding ESI/EPF deduction. It is further stated that the invoices raised by the respondent cannot be held as self- made and there was no need of proof of production of actual payment of GST before learned Arbitrator, because the petitioner had already availed its GST input, and after availing benefit of GST input the petitioner cannot avoid to pay liability towards GST bills of the respondent. It is stated that ground of non-production of documents has been taken for the first time before this court, which is not allowed under law.
2.7 It is further stated that internal circulars of the petitioner made it clear that GST was supposed to be reimbursed by the petitioner and petitioner's own proceeding sheet dated 27.05.2021 has recommended and allowed the case of respondent for reimbursement of GST. The other sub-division of the petitioner had duly reimbursed the payment of 10C clause to the respondent against similar contract for same duration and time period. It is also stated that invoices for reimbursement of 10C payment were duly submitted to the petitioner and there was no discrepancy or deficiency in the documents submitted by the respondent. It was also observed by learned Arbitrator that SMD-04 had already released the pending payment of the respondent towards "10C head". It is stated that submissions regarding production of wage slip, attendance register, salary register etc. were not pleaded before the learned DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 18 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 Arbitrator. It is repeated that after availing GST input of every invoice raised to it by the respondent, petitioner cannot take a plea that invoices were not submitted to it. It is further repeated that as per the judgments pronounced by the Apex Court and various Hon'ble High Courts of the country, MSMED Act is a special statute and has the overriding effect over all other statues including Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996, being a general law. It is also stated that despite having no agreement or clause for payment of interest, grant of interest is mandatory as per section 16 of the MSMED Act as has been observed by learned Arbitrator in the impugned award. Dismissal of the petition/application is prayed.
3. Applicant/petitioner filed rejoinder to the reply of the respondent thereby reiterating facts stated in the petition. In the rejoinder it is stated that respondent has not provided copy of its registration certificate as MSME unit since 09.12.2017 and question no.6A has been wrongly decided by the learned Arbitrator in a biased manner. It is however not denied that objector/DDA has taken benefit of GST input on the invoices submitted by respondent.
4. Oral arguments were addressed by both the parties. Respondent also filed written submissions. Court has considered arguments advanced by learned counsels DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 19 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 for parties and has carefully gone through material available on file and arbitration record.
5. It is fairly conceded by learned Sh. Anupam Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner that arbitration award may be set-aside by the court only on the grounds mentioned under section 34 (2) and 2A of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996. Said provision is reproduced herein below:-
34.Application for setting aside arbitral award (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-
section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if--
2(a) the party making the application 1[establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that]--
(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, underthe law for the time being in force; or DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 20 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, wasnot in accordance with this Part; or
(b) the Court finds that--
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 21 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 under the law for the time being in force,or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.
[Explanation 1.--For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,--
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice.
Explanation 2.--For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.] [(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award:
PROVIDED that an award shall not DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 22 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.] ...........
6. Learned Sh. Anupam Sharma has submitted that the objections filed by the applicant fall within sub- section 2 (a) (iv) (v) and sub-section 2 (b) (ii) of section 34 of the Act. He submitted that Arbitration award contain decision beyond the scope of submission to arbitration. He further argued that composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was against the agreement of parties more specifically it was in contravention of clause 25 of the contract entered between the parties. He further argued that Arbitration award is in conflict with public policy of India in as much as, the learned Arbitrator did not give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and passed the award without fixing the date for oral arguments in the matter.
7. It is rightly submitted by learned Sh. G.S. Suhag, learned counsel for respondent that there is only limited scope of interference by the court in the petitions under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. In the case of Associate Builders Vs Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49, wherein it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court "the interference with an arbitral award is permissible only when the findings of the arbitrator are arbitrary, capricious or DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 23 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 perverse or when conscience of the Court is shocked or when illegality is not trivial but goes to the root of the matter. It is held that once it is found that the arbitrator's approach is neither arbitrary nor capricious, no interference is called for on facts. The arbitrator is ultimately a master of the quantity and quality of evidence while drawing the arbitral award. Patent illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be trivial nature."
8. In the case of Navodaya Mass Entertainment Ltd VS J.M. Combines MANU/SC/0735/2014, it was held :-
"scope of interference of the Court is very limited. Court would not be justified in reappraising the material on record and substituting its own view in place of the Arbitrator's view. Where there is an error apparent on the face of the record or the Arbitrator has not followed the statutory legal position, then and then only it would be justified in interfering with the award published by the Arbitrator. Once the Arbitrator has applied his mind to the matter before him, the Court cannot reappraise the matter as if it were an appeal and even if two views are possible, the view taken by the Arbitrator would prevail. (See: Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. L.K. Ahuja, (2004) 5 SCC 109; Ravindra & Associates Vs. Union of India, (2010) 1 SCC 80; Madnani Construction DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 24 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 Corporation Private Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2010) 1 SCC 549; Associated Construction Vs. Pawanhans Helicopters Limited, (2008) 16 SCC 128;
and Satna Stone & Lime Company Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Anr., (2008) 14 SCC".
9. In the case of M/s Arosan Enterprises Ltd Vs Union of India & Anr MANU/SC/0595/1999, it was held:-
"that reappraisal of evidence by the court is not permissible and as a matter of fact exercise of power by the Court to reappraise the evidence is unknown to a proceeding under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act. In the event of there being no reasons in the award, question of interference of the court would not arise at all. In the event, however, there are reasons, the interference would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the Court unless of course, there exist a total perversity in the award or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law: In the event however two views are possible on a question of law as well, the Court would not be justified in interfering with the award. The common phraseology `error apparent on the face of the record' does not itself, however, mean and imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record: The court as a matter of fact, cannot substitute its evaluation and come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. If the view of the arbitrator is a possible view the award or the reasoning contained therein cannot be DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 25 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 examined. In this context, reference may be made to one of the recent decision of this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd. (1994 (6) SCC
485) wherein this court relying upon the decision of Sudarsan Trading Co.'s case case (Sudarsan Trading Co. v. Government of Kerala and Anr. (1989 (2) SCC 38) observed in paragraph 31 of the Report as below:- "A court of competent jurisdiction has both right and duty to decide the lis presented before it for adjudication according to the best understanding of law and facts involved in the lis by the judge presiding over the court. Such decision even if erroneous either in factual determination or application of law correctly, is a valid one and binding inter parts. It does not, therefore, stand to reason that the arbitrator's award will be per se invalid and inoperative for the simple reason that the arbitrator has failed to appreciate the facts and has committed error in appreciating correct legal principle in basing the award. An erroneous decision of a court of law is open to judicial review by way of appeal or revision in accordance with the provisions of law. Similarly, an award rendered by an arbitrator is open to challenge within the parameters of several provisions of the Arbitration Act. Since the arbitrator is a judge by choice of the parties and more often than not a person with little or no legal background, the adjudication of disputes by an arbitration by way of an award can be challenged only within the limited scope of several provisions of the Arbitration Act and the legislature in its wisdom has limited the scope and ambit of challenge to an award in the Arbitration Act.
Over the decades, judicial decisions have DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 26 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 indicated the parameters of such challenge consistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. By and large the courts have disfavoured interference with arbitration award on account of error of law and fact on the score of misappreciation and misreading of the materials on record and have shown definite inclination to preserve the award as far as possible. As reference to arbitration of disputes in commercial and other transactions involving substantial amount has increased in recent times, the courts were impelled to have fresh look on the ambit of challenge to an award by the arbitrator so that the award does not get undesirable immunity. In recent times, error in law and fact in basing an award has not been given the wide immunity as enjoyed earlier, by expanding the import and implication of "legal misconduct" of an arbitrator so that award by the arbitrator does not perpetrate gross miscarriage of justice and the same is not reduced to mockery of a fair decision of the lis between the parties to arbitration. Precisely for the aforesaid reasons, the erroneous application of law constituting the very basis of the award and improper and incorrect findings of fact, which without closer and intrinsic scrutiny, are demonstrable on the face of the materials on record, have been held, very rightly, as legal misconduct rendering the award as invalid. It is necessary, however, to put a note of caution that in the anxiety to render justice to the party to arbitration, the court should not reappraise the evidences intrinsically with a close scrutiny for finding out that the conclusion drawn from some facts, by the arbitrator is, according to the understanding of the court, erroneous. Such DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 27 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 exercise of power which can be exercised by an appellate court with power to reverse the finding of fact, is alien to the scope and ambit of challenge of an award under the Arbitration Act. Where the error of finding of facts having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily demonstrable without the necessity of carefully weighing the various possible viewpoints, the interference with award based on erroneous finding of fact is permissible. Similarly, if an award is based by applying a principle of law which is patently erroneous, and but for such erroneous application of legal principle, the award could not have been made, such award is liable to be set aise by holding that there has been a legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. In ultimate analysis it is a question of delicate balancing between the permissible limit of error of law and fact and patently erroneous finding easily demonstrable from the materials on record and application of principle of law forming the basis of the award which is patently erroneous. It may be indicated here that however objectively the problem may be viewed, the subjective element inherent in the judge deciding the problem, is bound to creep in and influence the decision. By long training in the art of dispassionate analysis, such subjective element is, however, reduced to minimum. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, the challenge to the validity of the impugned award is to be considered with reference to judicial decisions on the subject."
10. It is thus clearly established by catena of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble High DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 28 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 Court that the interference with an arbitral award is permissible only when the findings of the Arbitrator are arbitrary, capricious or perverse or when conscience of the court is shocked or when illegality is not trivial but goes to the root of the matter. The Arbitrator is master of the quality and quantity of the evidence. The court would not be justified in re-appraising the material on arbitral record and substitute its own view in place of the view of learned Arbitrator. Once the Arbitrator has applied his mind to the matter before him, the court cannot re- appraise the matter as if it was an appeal and even if two views are possible, the view taken by Arbitrator would prevail. No interference in the award is required unless there is existence of total perversity in the award or the judgment is passed on wrong proposition of law. Even when the Arbitrator makes a mistake either in law or in fact but such mistake does not appear on the face of award, the award is good not withstanding the mistake and would not be remitted or set-aside.
11. It is further rightly submitted by learned Sh.
Suhag that court would not construe the nature of claim by adopting too technical an approach or by indulging into hair-splitting, otherwise the whole purpose behind holding the arbitration proceedings as an alternative to Civil Courts forum would stand defeated as was held by Apex Court in the case of Sangamner Bhag Sahakari Karkhana Ltd Vs Krupp Industries Ltd, AIR 2002 DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 29 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 SC 2221. Further in the case of P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers Pvt Ltd Vs B.H.H. Securities Pvt Ltd & Ors, (2012) 1 SCC 594, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that in order to provide the balance and to avoid excessive intervention the arbitration award is not to be set-aside merely on the ground of erroneous application of law or by re-appreciating evidence.
12. In the case of NTPC Ltd Vs Maratho Electric Motors India Ltd, 2012 SCC Online Del 3995, it was held that appreciation of evidence by the Arbitrator is never a matter which the court considers in the proceedings under section 34 of the Act as the court is not sitting in appeal over the adjudication of the Arbitrator and the court do not act as court of appeal. An error relatable to interpretation of the contract by an Arbitrator is an error within his jurisdiction and such error is not amenable to the correction by courts as such error is not an error on the face of the award.
13. In the recent judgment of Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd Vs Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 5627 of 2021, AIR ONLINE 2021 SC 708, Hon'ble Apex Court, keeping in view the amendment of the Arbitration and Conciliation laws by the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 decided the Contours of the court's power to review arbitral awards. DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 30 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 Relevant principles can be summarized amongst others, as follows:-
- One of the principal objectives of the 1996 Act is to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process.
- An application for setting aside an arbitral award can only be made in accordance with provisions of Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
- While deciding applications filed under Section 34 of the Act, courts are mandated to strictly act in accordance with and within the confines of Section 34, refraining from appreciation or re-appreciation of matters of fact as well as law.
- As it is only such arbitral awards that shock the conscience of the court that can be set aside on grounds under section 34.
- There must be patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, which refers to such illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of the law.
- Reappreciation of evidence, which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be permitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.
- The construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no fair- DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 31 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 minded or reasonable person would; in short, that the arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to take.
- A finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality.
- There is a disturbing tendency of courts setting aside arbitral awards, after dissecting and reassessing factual aspects of the cases. This approach would lead to corrosion of the object of the 1996 Act and the endeavours made to preserve this object, which is minimal judicial interference with arbitral awards. Several judicial pronouncements of the Court would become a dead letter if arbitral awards are set aside by categorising them as perverse or patently illegal without appreciating the contours of the said expressions.
- Every error of law committed by the Arbitral Tribunal would not fall within the expression 'patent illegality'. In addition, contravention of law not linked to public policy or public interest is beyond the scope of the expression 'patent illegality'.
- Courts do not sit in appeal against the arbitral award. The permissible grounds for interference with a domestic award under Section 34(2-A) on the ground of patent illegality is when the arbitrator takes a view which is not even a possible one.
DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 32 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023
14. Now we look into the award passed by learned Arbitrator. Following questions were framed by him for proper adjudication of the dispute between the parties at internal page no. 18 and 19 of the award :-
6.B.i. Whether claimant and respondent herein are not a party to the privity of contract, as pleaded by respondent?
6.B.ii. Whether claim raised herein, is barred by Section 3 of the Delhi Development Act (DD Act), 1957?
6.B.iii. Whether present proceedings are not maintainable being reason pleaded by respondent that upon failure of Conciliation Proceedings Section 18(2) MSMED Act, provisions of Arb. & Conc. Act, 1996 applies, but not Sec. 18(3) MSMED Act applies?
6.B.iv. Whether, present proceedings are not maintainable being reason there is separate provision/clause-25 into agreement of appointing Arbitration having special knowledge and experience of engineering?
6.B.v. Whether, respondent's plea is tenable regarding non-payment of claimant's dues against security-deposits till one year of passing of final bill of claimant by respondent, under Clause-17 of agreement?
6.B.vi. Whether, respondent has no liability of paying claimant the claim amount of GST & Other Taxes (which already paid by claimant and already DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 33 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 availed input tax benefit by respondent), as provided under Clauses-33 & 34 of agreement but overriding the provisions of GST Act, or not?
15. In the Arbitration proceedings as well as in the present objection, the objector has taken a plea that Executive Engineer SMD-3 DDA was not a party to the contract and proceedings could not have been initiated against him because he was only an employee of the DDA.
16. These objections were dealt by learned Arbitrator in detail in question no.6B (i) and 6B (ii) of the questions framed by him after discussing various provisions of law, learned Arbitrator gave a reasoned order that it was the Executive Engineer SMD-3 DDA who signed every document i.e. agreement, notice/tenders, bills etc. and was benefited from the services of the agreement and further that the said Executive Engineer was a limb of the DDA, a corporate body and that claim petition filed under his title signifies impleadment of DDA as party to the present suit. The view taken by the learned Arbitrator is after detailed discussion of the provisions of law and the facts applicable to the present case and same is a plausible view. The objections under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 cannot be sustained on this ground.
DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 34 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023
17. Nextly, the petitioner/objector has taken a plea that the respondent was not registered as a MSME unit on the date of agreement. It is rightly submitted by learned Sh. Suhag that such plea is not available to the petitioner at this stage because no such plea was taken before learned Arbitrator. Moreso, there is no specific denial of the fact stated in the reply to the objections that the respondent is registered as MSME unit since 2017 i.e. much prior to the execution of agreement between the parties, moreso the copy of certificate of registration of the respondent as MSME unit is available at internal page no. 153 of the arbitration record which clearly reflects that respondent commenced his business on 25.03.2008 and applied for registration as a MSME unit on 09.12.2017. Hence, this plea of the respondent not been a MSME unit at the time of agreement between the parties, raised for the first time in the present objections, holds no ground and is liable to be rejected. Learned Arbitrator therefore rightly applied the provisions of The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.
18. The next question raised in the objections that the arbitration proceedings were not maintainable because after failure of conciliation proceedings under section 18 (2) of MSMED Act, provisions of Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 were applicable, was also answered by learned Arbitrator in discussing question no. 6B (iii). While deciding this question learned DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 35 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 Arbitrator has discussed in detail the relevant provisions of the MSMED Act 2006 as well as the provisions of Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 and has cited relevant case laws. Based upon the relevant provisions of law more specifically section 24 of the MSMED Act as well as catena of judgments passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble High Courts in India, learned Arbitrator has rightly held that the provisions of MSMED Act were required to be applied for the recovery of dues of the respondent, who was MSME unit on the date of entering into agreement with the petitioner. Petitioner has feebly attempted to put forward that on the date of agreement with the respondent, it was not an MSME unit. Same is negated from the record of arbitration. There is nothing to suggest in the objections to rebut the observations of learned Arbitrator that MSMED Act, being a special statue, prevails over and above the general statue or Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996. Furthermore section 24 of MSMED Act, discussed by learned Arbitrator with relevant case laws makes it clear that provisions of section 15 to 23 of the MSMED Act, shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in other law for the time being in force.
19. Similarly, objections raised about the competency of the learned Arbitrator in view of Clause 25 of the agreement was also dealt by learned Arbitrator in DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 36 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 question no.6B (iv). The contention of learned counsel for objector that while deciding this question 6B (iv), learned Arbitrator had relied upon and referred the order dated 20.12.2022 passed by him on miscellaneous application under section 16 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act is not tenable. In the order dated 20.12.2022 learned Arbitrator has dealt with all objections to his authority and competency in detail by referring to the relevant provisions of law as well as judgments passed by superior courts. The reference of the reasoning of the order dated 20.12.2022, in the final award dated 15.02.2023 do not vitiate the arbitral proceedings. Learned Arbitrator was not supposed to give his separate and distinct reasoning in the final award, when he has already dealt with the objections through a detailed reasoned order dated 20.12.2022. Hence, it is rightly submitted by learned Sh. Suhag that it is rightly held by learned Arbitrator that as per the mandate of MSMED Act 2006, the arbitration had to be continued under the provisions of said Act which have an overriding effect over the general law i.e. Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996. It is not argued on behalf of objector that any procedure prescribed under MSMED Act has not been followed by learned Arbitrator.
20. The objections that no GST was payable by DDA, has already been dealt by learned Arbitrator in detail while deciding question no.6 (b) (vi). Learned Arbitrator DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 37 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 dealt in detail with the terms and conditions of the notice inviting tender (NIT) as well as the agreement between the parties, internal circulars of the objector and approval of payment of GST by another division of the objector/DDA against the similar contract for similar period and under similar conditions. Learned Arbitrator has clearly observed that the objector has taken benefit of the GST, already paid by the respondent. Apart from other reasoning, it is rightly held by learned Arbitrator that once the petitioner had taken benefit of GST input, he cannot deny the payment of GST to the respondent. Once it is not denied that petitioner has taken benefit of GST input, it do not lie in his mouth to say that the respondent failed to submit proof of GST deposit in the concerned department.
21. Learned Arbitrator has also discussed in detail about how it was the mistake on the part of petitioner to not to take into effect the impact of GST and taxes while preparing tender amount. In this respect relevant circulars of Delhi Schedule of Rates were righlty relied upon by learned Arbitrator. Has rightly observed after taking benefit of GST inputs, the petitioner cannot deny the reimbursement of the same to the respondent. Production of documents as proof of depositing the GST is therefore not required nor any such claim was made by the petitioner before the learned Arbitrator. Hence, it is rightly submitted by learned Sh. Suhag that findings of DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 38 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 learned Arbitrator that the petitioner is liable to pay GST, cannot be interfered with.
22. Learned Arbitrator categorically observed that 'The payment of GST is also a statutory payment which works on B2B and reverse charge mechanism basis. The person who makes the payment gets the GST input and the person who deposits the GST gets the reimbursement". Petitioner nowhere denied to the fact that it has claimed GST input on the tax paid invoice by the claimant. Once the tax paid invoices were submitted to the petitioner and the petitioner also claimed GST input on the same, he cannot compel the respondent to produce those invoices again and again before every authority. Such exaggeration is only to avoid his liability.
23. Similarly, it was not denied by the petitioner before the learned Arbitrator or in these proceedings that respondent was required to give benefit to its workers under Clause 10 C i.e. towards payment of wage revision. Hence, it was rightly held by learned Arbitrator that impact of wage revision has to be borne by the objector/petitioner. The bid was filed by the respondent considering the wages as on the date of tender. Enhancement of wages by the government has to be borne by the objector/petitioner.
24. Similarly, non-production of documents about employment of number of guards or payment of wages or payments towards ESI/EPF, cannot be raised by the DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 39 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 petitioner at this stage. Such documents were not called by the petitioner during the arbitration proceedings. The petitioner did not claim that respondent employed any lesser number of guards or did not pay wages to them or did not make contribution towards ESI/EPF. There is no complaint or report received by the petitioner in this respect from any corner. Hence, petitioner is not allowed to raise this issue in the objections under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996.
25. Similarly, learned Arbitrator dealt with the bar of limitation under Delhi Development Act and held that on the basis of bare reading of provisions such bar was applicable to suits and not on arbitral proceedings.
26. It is admitted by both the parties that petitioner has already refunded security deposit of the respondent. Hence, there is no need to go into that issue.
27. On perusal of arbitration proceedings, court do not see any violation of the rules of natural justice. Learned Arbitrator had given ample opportunities to the petitioner to file his statement of defence. It is rightly submitted by learned Sh. Suhag that as many as 8 dates were given to the petitioner to file his statement of defence. Learned Arbitrator also granted an opportunity to the petitioner to lead his evidence. Infact the affidavit in evidence of the petitioner was duly considered by learned Arbitrator. The pain taken by the learned Arbitrator to conclude the proceedings within the period DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 40 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 of 90 days, as required by MSMED Act 2006 need to be appreciated. It appears from the arbitral award that petitioner was delaying the proceedings on one pretext or the other despite best efforts of learned Arbitrator. No prejudice is caused to the petitioner just by refusal of learned Arbitrator to grant an adjournment for oral hearing of arguments on behalf of petitioner. The petitioner duly filed his written submissions. The contentions raised by the petitioner in his written submissions were duly considered by learned Arbitrator and thereafter only a reasoned award was passed. Learned Arbitrator dealt with each and every aspect raised by the petitioner in his statement of defence, evidence as well as in the written arguments. No material plea which was not raised by the petitioner before the learned Arbitrator, has been raised in the present objections. Hence, it cannot be said that petitioner in any way was prejudiced just by not addressing oral arguments before learned Arbitrator. It has to be kept in mind that learned Arbitrator was master of his proceedings as well as the quality and quantity of the evidence before him. A detailed reasoned award has been passed after considering all aspects of the matter. Since the provisions of MSMED Act 2006 were to be applied to the agreement, learned Arbitrator has rightly awarded the interest in favour of respondent as per mandate of provision of section 16 MSMED Act 2006 which DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 41 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 provides :-
16. Where any buyer fails to make payment of the amount to the supplier, as required under section 15, the buyer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, be liable to pay compound interest with monthly rests to the supplier on that amount from the appointed day or, 'as the case may be; from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, at three times of the bank rate notified by the Reserve Bank.
28. General contract between the parties in contravention of provisions of section 16 of MSMED Act, could not have prohibited the learned Arbitrator to award interest in favour of respondent.
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion of the court, this court is of the humble opinion that no ground mentioned under section 34(2) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 is made out for interfering in the arbitral award dated 15.02.2023 and orders dated 20.12.2022 passed by sole Arbitrator Sh. Vijay Singla in Arbitration case no. DL/10/S/SWC/01296 of 2022 titled as M/s Stallion Security Vs Executive Engineer SMD-3, DDA. The objections filed by the applicant/objector are accordingly dismissed. Award file along with copy of DDA Vs M/s Stallion Security Page no. 42 of 43 OMP Comm 87/2023 this order, be sent back to learned Arbitrator.
30. FDR of Rs.75,60,206/- bearing no. 322535, UCO Bank, Shahpur Jat Branch, Delhi, dated 25.08.2023 in the name of "SANJEEV KR. AGGARWAL" District Judge (Commercial Court) 01 Central, deposited by the petitioner in terms of order dated 27.07.2023 be released to the respondent. At request of learned counsel for respondent, on presentation of said FDR, concerned bank(s) is/are directed to encash the same in the name of respondent i.e. Stallion Security in his account no.342805000101, ICICI Bank, Dwarka Sector 12 Branch, IFSC Code: ICIC0003428. The release of FDR would be subject to filing of undertaking in the form of affidavit of respondent that he shall repay the amount to the court or petitioner or any other person subject to orders of any superior court/authority.
31. File be consigned to record room.
Digitally signedAnnounced in the open court by AJAY
on the 20th day of April, 2024 AJAY PANDEY
PANDEY Date:
2024.04.20
16:23:09 +0530
(Ajay Pandey)
District Judge
(Commercial Court-10)
Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
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