Kerala High Court
Muhammed Safir vs Sub Collector on 9 September, 2021
Author: S. Manikumar
Bench: S.Manikumar, Shaji P.Chaly
-1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
THURSDAY, THE 9TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2021 / 18TH BHADRA, 1943
WA NO. 1102 OF 2021
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 25685/2015 OF HIGH COURT OF
KERALA, ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/S:
MUHAMMED SAFIR
S/O MUHAMMEDALI, THOTTIYIL HOUSE, NETHIRIMANGALAM
P.O., PATTAMBI TALUK, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.
P.JAYARAM
GIGI PAPPACHAN
SARATH CHANDRAN K.B.
RESPONDENT/S:
1
THE TAHSILDAR, OTTAPALAM - 679 101.
2
THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, PALAKKAD - 678 001.
3
THE SUB COLLECTOR, OTTAPALAM - 679 101.
4 STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF TAXES,
GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.
OTHER PRESENT:
SRI.K.P.HARISH,SENIOR GOVERNMENT PLEADER FOR
RESPONDENTS
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
09.09.2021, ALONG WITH WA.1103/2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
THURSDAY, THE 9TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2021 / 18TH BHADRA, 1943
WA NO. 1103 OF 2021
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 24728/2015 OF HIGH COURT OF
KERALA, ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/S:
MUHAMMED SAFIR
S/O. MUHAMMEDALI, THOTTIYIL HOUSE, NETHIRIMANGALAM
P.O., PATTAMBI TALUK, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
BY ADV P.JAYARAM
GIGI PAPPACHAN
SARATH CHANDRAN K.B.
RESPONDENT/S:
1 SUB COLLECTOR
OTTAPALAM-679 101.
2 TAHSILDAR
OTTAPALAM-679 101.
3 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF TAXES,
GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 001.
OTHER PRESENT:
SRI.V.TEKCHAND,SENIOR GOVERNMENT PLEADER FOR
RESPONDENTS
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
09.09.2021, ALONG WITH WA.1102/2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -3-
C.R.
JUDGMENT
S. Manikumar, C. J.
Instant writ appeals are filed against the common judgment in W. P. (C) Nos. 24728 and 25685 of 2015 dated 11.10.2017, whereby a learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions.
2. Before the writ court, petitioner has sought for the following reliefs:-
"(i) issue a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, direction or order quashing Exhibit P3 order.
ii) declare that the petitioner is entitled for refund of the amount paid for the purchase of stamp papers.
iii) issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, direction or order directing the 1st respondent to refund the value of the spoiled stamp/spoiled instrument legally due to the petitioner."
3. Writ court, after considering the rival submissions, dismissed the writ petitions as follows:-
W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -4-
"5. I have considered the contentions advanced. Section 47 of the Kerala Stamp Act provides for refund of impressed stamps spoiled. It is stated that on an application made, within the period prescribed in Section 48, the Collector is competent to make allowance for impressed stamps spoiled. Section 47 (b) refers to the stamp on any document which is written out wholly or in part, but which is not signed or executed by any party thereto. It is therefore clear that the application for refund has to be made within the time limit specified in Section 48. Section 48 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959 reads as follows:
"48. Application for relief under Section 47 when to be made.
The application for relief under Section 47 shall be made within the following periods, that is to say - (1) In the cases mentioned in clause (c) (5), within two months of the date of the instrument;
(2) in the case of a stamped paper on which no Instrument has been executed by any of the parties thereto, within six months after the stamp has been spoiled;
(3) in the case of a stamped paper in which an Instrument has been executed by any of the parties thereto, within six months after the date of the instrument or, if it is not dated, within six months after execution thereof by the person by whom it was first or alone executed;
Provided that (a) when the spoiled instrument has been for sufficient reasons sent out of the State, the application may be made within six months after it has been received back in the State.
(b) when, from unavoidable circumstances, any instrument for which another instrument has been substituted, cannot be given up to be cancelled within the aforesaid period, the application may be made W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -5- within six months after the date of execution of the substituted instrument."
This is a specific provision relating to the time limit within which the request for refund is to be made. Section 48(3) specifically states that in the case of a stamped paper in which an instrument has been executed by any of the parties thereto, the application for refund is to be made within six months after the date of instrument or if the instrument is not dated, within six months after execution thereof by the person by whom it was first or alone executed. The contention raised by the petitioner that the stamps become spoiled only on the expiry of four months after the date of execution cannot be accepted. In view of the specific provision contained in Section 48(3) that the application has to be filed within the time specified therein, I am of the opinion that the stand taken in the impugned orders cannot be found fault with. The writ petitions therefore fail and the same are accordingly dismissed."
4. Both the writ appeals arise out of an issue relating to refund of stamp paid on the documents, executed for sale of properties in different survey numbers situated in Vallapuzha Village, Palakkad District, and in the abovesaid circumstances, suffice to incorporate the facts leading to the filing of the writ appeals from one such case (W. A. No. 1103 of 2021).
The appellant is the petitioner in both the writ petitions. W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -6- According to the appellant, he entered into an agreement for sale for purchase of property bearing survey No. 200/1, re-survey No. 187/1 situated in Vallapuzha Village, Palakkad District. The consideration fixed was Rs. 15,50,000/-. For execution of the sale deed, stamp papers worth Rs. 1,08,500/- were purchased by the appellant from Sub Treasury, Pattambi. The purchase of the stamp papers was on 03.05.2012. The sale deed was, in fact, prepared and executed on 04.05.2012 on the same stamp papers. The parties have affixed signatures in the deed. But the appellant was unable to organize the balance consideration to be paid before the registration of the deed and the assignment deed could not be registered. Ultimately, the conveyance fizzled out and the stamp papers have become spoiled/useless.
Appellant has contended that the registration did not take place not due to any willful laches or failure on the part of the petitioner. Appellant is employed abroad. He was not able to pay the balance sale consideration in time due to paucity of funds. In this unforeseen scenario, the appellant made an application for refund of the value of the stamp papers purchased. The application was made on 22.01.2013. W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -7- Referring to Sections 47 and 48 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, the 1 st respondent has rejected the application on the ground that the application was submitted out of time.
Appellant has further contended that the limitation provided under the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, is not an inflexible rule and the limitation starts to run from the date on which the stamp papers become spoiled. In the instant case, 4 months after 04.05.2012, the date of execution of the sale deed. This is in view of the operation of Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908, providing for a time of four months from the date of execution to register a document. Thus, the stamp papers became actually spoiled only on 04.09.2012. Consequently, the limitation period of six months started to run from 04.09.2012 alone. Cause of action for refund arose only on 04.09.2012 as sale is compulsorily to be registered. Therefore, according to the appellant, the application made for refund by him was perfectly in time.
Appellant has also contended that denial of refund causes unjust enrichment in favour of the State as the rules of construction specify strict interpretation in taxing statutes. W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -8-
5. As the proceedings of the Sub Collector, Ottappalam, rejecting the request of the appellant for refund of stamp duty, is impugned, suffice to extract Ext. P3 dated 26.11.2014 impugned in W. P. (C) No. 1103 of 2021.
"PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE OFFICE OF SUB COLLECTOR, OTTAPALAM (Present: P.B. Nooh, IAS) Sub: Stamp Act- Application for re-fund of amount of unused stamp paper Regarding order L.D.S.7230/2014/K Date: 26.11.2014 Ref: 1) Application submitted by Muhammed Safir, S/o. Muhammadalli, Nethirimangalam.
2) Report of the Tahasildar, Ottapalam B3-6756/14 dated 21/8/14.
3) Report of the Tahasildar, Pattambi D2-2013/3501/9/400 dated 16/2/13.
Mr. Muhammed Safir, S/o. Muhammadali, Nethirimangalam, Pattambi submitted an application for re-fund of the value of unused stamp paper of Rs. 1,08,500/- (One lac eight thousand five hundred) purchased in his name from Sub Treasury, Pattambi.
On the above subject an enquiry was conducted through Tahasildar, Ottapalam and from the report submitted by him it become clear that the applicant purchased the stamp paper on 03.05.2012 and application for re-fund was submitted on W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -9- 25.01.2013. The application was submitted after six months from the date of purchase of stamp paper, which is the maxim time limit to submit application for re-fund as per Section 47, 48 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959 and hence it can be rejected. The original stamp papers and the report of the Tahasildar Pattambi is enclosed.
ORDER As the application for re-fund of value of stamp paper was submitted by Mr. Muhammed Safir, S/o. Muhammadali, Nethirimangalam, Pattambi after the lapse of six months, the maxim time limit prescribed for application for re-fund as per Section 47, 48 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, the same is rejected by this order.
Sd/ Sub Collector, Ottapalam To Muhammed Safir S/o.Muhammadali Thodiyil Nethiri Mangalam Pattambi (With original stamp paper of Rs. 1,08,500)"
6. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that both Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908, and Section 48 (3) of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, have to be read together, and thus the period of limitation has to be computed, for making an application for W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -10- refund of spoiled stamps.
7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.
8. The details of the properties for which agreements of sale, survey numbers, place of the properties, date of purchase of stamp papers, date of execution of the sale deed, are tabulated as hereunder:-
Writ Appeal Survey/Re- Place of Date of purchase Date of execution Nos. survey No. properties of stamp papers of sale deed W.A. No. Survey Vallapuzha 03.05.2012 04.05.2012 1102 of 2021 No. 171/6 Village, Palakkad Re-survey District No. 174/8 W. A. No. Survey Vallapuzha 03.05.2012 04.05.2012 1103 of 2021 No. 200/1 Village, Palakkad Re-survey District No. 187/1
9. According to the appellant, time for applying for allowance for spoiled stamps should be computed after six months from the date prescribed for registration. As contentions have been raised with reference to Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908, Section 47 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, which deals with allowance for spoiled stamps, and Section 48 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, which enables filing of an application for relief under Section 47 of the abovesaid W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -11- Act, we deem it fit to extract the statutory provisions:-
"23. Time for presenting documents. Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 24, 25 and 26, no document other than a will shall be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution:
Provided that a copy of a decree or order may be presented within four months from the day on which the decree or order was made, or, where it is appealable, within four months from the day on which it becomes final.
47. Allowance for spoiled stamps.- Subject to such rules as may be made by the Government as to the evidence to be required, or the enquiry to be made, the Collector may, on application made, within the period prescribed in Section 48, and if he is satisfied as to the facts, make allowance for impressed stamps [or e-stamps] spoiled in the cases hereinafter mentioned, namely:
(a) the stamp on any paper inadvertently and undersignedly spoiled, obliterated or by error in writing or any other means rendered unfit for the purpose intended before any instrument written thereon is executed by any person;
(b) the stamp on any document which is written out wholly or in part, but which is not signed or executed by any party thereto;W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -12-
(c) the stamp used for an instrument executed by any party thereto which-
(1) has been afterwards found to be absolutely void in law from the beginning;
(2) has been afterwards found unfit, by reason of any error or mistake therein, for the purpose originally intended; (3) by reason of the death of any person by whom it is necessary that it should be executed, without having executed the same, or of the refusal of any such person to execute the same, cannot be completed so as to effect the intended transaction in the form proposed; (4) for want of the execution thereof by some material party, and his inability or refusal to sign the same, is in fact incomplete and insufficient for the purpose for which it was intended;
(5) by reason of the refusal of any person to act under the same, or to advance any money intended to be thereby secured or by the refusal or non-acceptance of any office thereby granted, totally fails of the intended purpose; (6) becomes useless in consequence of the transaction intended to be thereby effected, being effected by some other instrument between the same parties and bearing a stamp of not less value;
(7) is deficient in value and the transaction intended to be thereby effected has been effected by some other instrument between the same parties and bearing a stamp of not less value;W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -13-
(8) is inadvertently and undesignedly spoiled, and in lieu whereof another instrument made between the same parties and for the same purpose is executed and duly stamped:
Provided that, in the case of an executed instrument, no legal proceeding has been commenced in which the instrument could or would have been given or offered in evidence and that the instrument is given up to be cancelled.
48. Application for relief under Section 47 when to be made.- The application for relief under Section 47 shall be made within the following periods, that is to say-
(1) in the cases mentioned in Clause (c)(5), within two months of the date of the instrument;
(2) in the case of a stamped paper on which no instrument has been executed by any of the parties thereto, within six months after the stamp has been spoiled;
(3) in the case of a stamped paper in which an instrument has been executed by any of the parties thereto, within six months after the date of the instrument or, if it is not dated, within six months after execution thereof by the person by whom it was first or alone executed:
Provided that
(a) when the spoiled instrument has been for sufficient reasons sent out of the State, the application may be made within six months after it has been received back in the State.
(b) when, from unavoidable circumstances, any instrument for which another instrument has been substituted, cannot be given up to be cancelled within the aforesaid period, the W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -14- application may be made within six months after the date of execution of the substituted instrument."
10. Section 23 speaks about registration of a document and the time from the date of execution. Bare reading of Section 23, makes it clear that no document other than a will shall be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of execution.
11. In the given case, if a document is executed on 04.05.2012, as per the abovesaid statutory provision, the document has to be registered within four months from the date of execution, i.e. 03.09.2012.
12. Section 47 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959 speaks about the allowance for spoiled stamps, provided an application is made within the period prescribed under Section 48 of the said Act.
13. Bare reading of Section 48(3) of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, makes it clear that in the case of a stamped paper, in which an instrument has been executed by any of the parties thereto, within six months after the date of the instrument or, if it is not dated, within six W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -15- months after execution thereof by the person by whom it was first or alone executed.
14. Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908, prescribes a period within which a document has to be presented for registration and Section 48(3) prescribes a period within which an application has to be made to the District Collector for seeking allowance for spoiled stamps.
15. Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908, and Section 48(3) of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, operate in different spheres, prescribing the period of limitation for the purpose under the said Sections, i.e. one is for registration, the other for seeking allowance for spoiled stamps on application to the District Collector.
16. Bare reading of Section 48(3), makes it abundantly clear that the period prescribed is six months after the execution thereof by the person by whom it was first or alone executed.
17. Time prescribed under Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908, cannot be incorporated into Section 48(3) of the Kerala Stamps Act, 1959, and computation of time for making an application under W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -16- Section 48(3) of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, cannot be made from the date of registration of the document.
18. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, then the expression in Section 48(3) of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, 'within six months after execution', has to be changed as 'within six months after registration'.
19. Needless to state that while interpreting the statutes, courts have to give the literal meaning of the words used, and courts have no power to add or delete the words. Reference can be made to few decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:-
(i) In Satheedevi v. Prasanna reported in (2010) 5 SCC 622, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well-recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -17- Act can legitimately arise--Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907]
13. The other important rule of interpretation is that the court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not there in it. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission - Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323] and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. [AIR 1966 SC 1678]"
(ii) In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors., v. A.G.Syed Mohideen & Ors. [2010 CIJ 273 SC (1)], it was held that, "6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be."
(iii) In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -18- reported in (2011) 9 SCC 354, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with a provision under Section 17(3-A) of the Act, held as under:
"54. .........................Therefore, the provision of Section 17(3-A) cannot be viewed in isolation as it is an intrinsic and mandatory step in exercising special powers in cases of emergency. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) and 17(3-A) must be read together. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) cannot be worked out in isolation.
55. It is well settled as a canon of construction that a statute has to be read as a whole and in its context. In Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957 AC 436], Lord Viscount Simonds very elegantly stated the principle that it is the duty of court to examine every word of a statute in its context. The learned Law Lord further said that in understanding the meaning of the provision, the Court must take into consideration "not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy."(All ER p. 53 I) xx xxx xxxxx
57. These principles have been followed by this Court in its Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth [(1977) 4 SCC 193 At SCC p. 240], Bhagwati, J. as His Lordship then was, in a concurring opinion held that words in a statute cannot be read in isolation, their colour and content are derived from their context and every word in a statute is to be examined in its context. His Lordship explained that the word context has to be taken in its widest sense and expressly quoted the formulations of Lord Viscount Simonds, set out above."
(iv) In Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. Noida reported W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -19- in (2011) 6 SCC 508, at paragraphs 22 and 23, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"22. It is a settled proposition of law that whatever is prohibited by law to be done, cannot legally be affected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance on the principle of "quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur at omne per quod devenitur ad illud", which means"
"whenever a thing is prohibited, it is prohibited whether done directly or indirectly". (See: Swantraj & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 517; Commissioner of Central Excise, Pondicherry v. ACER India Ltd., (2004) 8 SCC 173; and Sant Lal Gupta & Ors., v. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd., & Ors., JT (2010) 11 SC 273). "23. In Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh & Anr. AIR 1979 SC 381, this Court has observed that an authority cannot be permitted to evade a law by "shift or contrivance." While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance on the judgment in Fox v. Bishop of Chester, (1824) 2 B &C 635, wherein it was observed as under:
"To carry out effectually the object of a statute, it must be construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined."
(v) In Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. [(2017) 14 SCC 663], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the principle that statute must be read as a whole is equally applicable to different parts of same section. Paras 35, 36 & 38 of the said decision are quoted below:
"35. The conclusion that the language used by the legislature is plain or ambiguous can only be arrived at by studying the statute as a whole. Every word and expression which the legislature W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -20- uses has to be given its proper and effective meaning, as the legislature uses no expression without purpose and meaning. The principle that the statute must be read as a whole is equally applicable to different parts of the same section. The section must be construed as a whole whether or not one of the parts is a saving clause or a proviso, it is not permissible to omit any part of it, the whole section should be read together as held in State of Bihar v. Hira Lal Kejriwal [AIR 1960 SC 1107].
36. The author has further observed that the courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statutes to a futility as held in M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa (AIR 1961 SC 1107) and Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, [(1989) 3 SCC 709]. When the words of a statute are clear or unambiguous i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences as held in Nelson Motis v. Union of India [(1992) 4 SCC 711], Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra [(2001) 4 SCC 534] and Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta [(2005) 2 SCC 271]. It is also a settled proposition of law that when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises for the Act speaks for itself as held in State of U.P. v. Vijay Anand Maharaj [AIR 1963 SC 946].
38. The words cannot be read into an Act, unless the clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. It is one of the principles of statutory interpretation that may matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute, cannot be supplied by courts, as to do so will be legislation and not W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -21- construction as held in Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. [AIR 1933 PC 63], Kamalaranjan Roy v. Secy., of State [AIR 1938 PC 281] and Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N. Narasimahaiah [(2008) 5 SCC 176]. The Court cannot supply casus omissus."
20. Now, let us consider a few decisions, as to whether, the Courts can add or delete or substitute any word to a statute or section:-
(i) In CIT v. Badhraja and Company reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 280, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that an object oriented approach, however, cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the plain meaning of the Section used by rewriting the Section or substituting the words in the place of actual words used by the legislature.
(ii) In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu reported in (2001) 7 SCC 71, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"13. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -22- legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there."
(iii) In Institute of C.A. of India v. Ajit Kumar Iddya reported in AIR 2003 Kant. 187, the Karnataka High Court held thus:
"So far as the cardinal law of interpretation is concerned, it is settled that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it is to be read with the clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise also, any addition/subtraction of a word is not permissible. In other words, it is not proper to use a sense, which is different from what the word used ordinarily conveys. The duty of the Court is not to fill up the gap by stretching a word used. It is also settled that a provision is to be read as a whole and while interpreting, the intention and object of the legislation have to be looked upon. However, each case depends upon the facts of its own."
(iv) In Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission reported in (2007) 3 SCC 720, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:
"It is well settled that courts will not add words to a statute or read into the statute words not in it. Even if the courts come to the conclusion that there is any omission in the words used, it cannot make up the deficiency, where the wording as it exists is clear and unambiguous. While the courts can adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislative or the rule- making authority, it cannot set at naught the legislative intent clearly expressed in a statute or the rules."W. A. Nos. 1102 & 1103 of 2021 -23-
(v) In Phool Patti v. Ram Singh reported in (2009) 13 SCC 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:
"9. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that the court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear."
In the light of the above discussion and decisions, we are of the view that there is no error in the impugned judgment, warranting interference.
Accordingly, writ appeals are dismissed.
Sd/-
S. MANIKUMAR CHIEF JUSTICE Sd/-
SHAJI P. CHALY JUDGE Eb ///TRUE COPY/// P. A. TO JUDGE