Madras High Court
Montfort Academy Matriculation Hr. ... vs The Secretary on 13 September, 2019
Bench: S.Manikumar, Subramonium Prasad
WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 13.09.2019
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR
AND
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
W.P.Nos.18008, 34242, 20519, 20537, 23676, 26574, 26633, 27451,
28099, 28113, 28123, 29204, 29211, 29217, 29234, 29242, 29388,
30236, 30274, 30364, 30371, 30679, 30689, 30695, 30703, 31060,
31063, 31100, 31107, 31120, 31129, 31134, 31196, 31336, 31368,
31418,31426, 31613, 32404, 32468, 33375, 33386, 33780, 26595 of
2018 and 4297, 4292, 21599 of 2019 and W.P.(MD).Nos.21071 of 2018
and 15658 of 2019
and
W.M.P.Nos.21308, 24118, 24150, 27620, 30926, 31007, 31963, 31965,
32754, 32764, 32770, 33786, 34128, 34135, 34142, 34163, 34168,
34348, 35290, 35329, 35446, 35448, 35786, 35797, 35805, 35819,
36238, 36240, 36242, 36243, 36283, 36286, 36290, 36290, 36292,
36313, 36316, 36323, 36325, 36329, 36331, 36398, 36525, 36526,
36553, 36554, 36621, 36847, 36849, 37601, 37603, 37668, 38749,
38750, 38758, 39784, 30955, 30957 of 2018 and 20808, 20805, 4835,
4836 of 2019 and W.M.P.(MD).Nos.18863 of 2018 & 12334 of 2019
Prayer in W.P.No.18008 of 2018:
Montfort Academy Matriculation Hr. Sec. School,
Rep. by the Correspondent ... Petitioner
vs.
1. The Secretary,
Department of Municipal Administration
and Water Supply Department,
The Government Secretariat,
Fort St. George,
Chennai - 600 009.
http://www.judis.nic.in
1/42
WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch
2. The Commissioner,
Chennai Municipal Corporation,
Ripon Building,
Chennai - 600 003.
3. The Assistant Revenue Officer,
Zone-IX, Corporation of Chennai,
No.1, Lake Area, 4th Cross Street,
Nungambakkam,
Chennai - 600 034. ... Respondents
WRIT Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying
for the issuance of a writ of declaration, declaring the impugned Tamil
Nadu Municipal Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 published in Section-2,
Part IV of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 25.01.2018, in respect
of the Amendment to Sec 101 (c) of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation
Act, 1919, cancelling the exemption granted to the buildings used for the
unaided educational institutions, on the file of the 3rd respondent, as ultra-
vires of the Constitution and illegal.
For Petitioner : Fr.A.Xavier Arul Raj
For Respondents : Mr.P.H.Arvind Pandian (for R1)
Additional Advocate General
Assisted by Mr.R.Udayakumar
Additional Government Pleader
Mr.K.Soundararajan (for R2 & R3)
Standing counsel for Chennai Corpn.
COMMON ORDER
(Order of the Court was delivered by SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J) Challenge in these batch of writ petitions is to Act 6 of 2018 i.e., Tamil Nadu Municipality Laws (Second Amendment) Act 2018. This Act seeks to amend Section 101 of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, Sections 122 (1)(c) and 122(2) of Madurai City Municipal Corporation http://www.judis.nic.in 2/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch Act, 1971 and Sections 123 (1)(c) and 123(2) of Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981 and Section 83 (1)(c) and 83(2) of the Tamilnadu District Municipalities Act, 1920.
2. The Tamil Nadu Act 6 of 2018, reads as hereunder:
ACT No. 6 OF 2018.
An Act further to amend the laws relating to the Municipal Corporations and Municipalities in the State of Tamil Nadu. BE it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Tamil Nadu in the Sixty-eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows:— PART-I. PRELIMINARY.
1. (1) This Act may be called the Tamil Nadu Municipal Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 2018.
Short title and commencement.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
PART-II.
AMENDMENTS TO THE CHENNAI CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, 1919. (Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1919). Amendment of Section 101.
2. In Section 101 of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919,— (1) for clause (c), the following clause shall be substituted, namely :— “(c) buildings used for educational purpose including hostels and libraries, run by the Government or corporation or any other local authority or institutions aided by the Government and buildings used for charitable purpose of sheltering the destitute or animals and orphanages, homes and schools for the deaf and dumb, asylum http://www.judis.nic.in 3/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch for the aged and fallen women and such similar institutions run purely on philanthropic lines as are approved by the council:
Provided that the buildings used for educational purpose by the Government aided institutions for conducting self-financing courses shall be subject to levy of property tax;”;
(2) in the proviso, for the expression “clauses (a), (c) and
(e)”, the expression “clauses (a) and (e)” shall be substituted.
PART-III.
AMENDMENTS TO THE MADURAI CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, 1971.
Tamil Nadu Act 15 of 1971.
Amendment of Section 122.
3. In Section 122 of the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971,— (1) for clause (c), the following clause shall be substituted, namely :— “(c) buildings used for educational purpose including hostels and libraries, run by the Government or corporation or any other local authority or institutions aided by the Government and buildings used for charitable purpose of sheltering the destitute or animals and orphanages, homes and schools for the deaf and dumb, asylum for the aged and fallen women and such similar institutions run purely on philanthropic lines as are approved by the council:
Provided that the buildings used for educational purpose by the Government aided institutions for conducting self-financing courses shall be subject to levy of property tax;”;
(2) in the proviso, for the expression “clauses (a), (c) and
(e)”, the expression “clauses (a) and (e)” shall be substituted.
PART-IV.
AMENDMENTS TO THE COIMBATORE CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, 1981.
http://www.judis.nic.in 4/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1981.
Amendment of Section 122.
4. In section 123 of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981,— (1) for clause (c), the following clause shall be substituted, namely :— “(c) buildings used for educational purpose including hostels and libraries, run by the Government or corporation or any other local authority or institutions aided by the Government and buildings used for charitable purpose of sheltering the destitute or animals and orphanages, homes and schools for the deaf and dumb, asylum for the aged and fallen women and such similar institutions run purely on philanthropic lines as are approved by the council:
Provided that the buildings used for educational purpose by the Government aided institutions for conducting self-financing courses shall be subject to levy of property tax;”;
(2) in the proviso, for the expression “clauses (a), (c) and
(e)”, the expression “clauses (a) and (e)” shall be substituted.
PART-V. AMENDMENTS TO THE TAMIL NADU DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES ACT, 1920.
Tamil Nadu Act V of 1920.
Amendment of section 83.
5. In section 83 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, in sub-section (1),— (1) for clause (c), the following clause shall be substituted, namely :— “(c) buildings used for educational purpose including hostels and libraries, run by the Government or municipality or any other local authority or institutions aided by the Government and buildings used for charitable purpose of sheltering the destitute or animals and orphanages, homes and schools for the deaf and dumb, http://www.judis.nic.in 5/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch asylum for the aged and fallen women and such similar institutions run purely on philanthropic lines as are approved by the council:
Provided that the buildings used for educational purpose by the Government aided institutions for conducting self-financing courses shall be subject to levy of property tax;”;
(2) in the proviso, for the expression “clauses (a), (c) and
(e)”, the expression “clauses (a) and (e)” shall be substituted."
3. The common feature in all the Sections, now sought to be amended, is exemption from payment of property tax, which had been given for all the buildings, used for educational purpose, has now been restricted only to the buildings which are used for educational institutions run by Government or Corporation or by any other local authority or educational institutions aided by the Government, meaning thereby, exemptions granted to educational institutions not run by Government or Corporation or any other local authority, stands withdrawn by this amendment. Majority of the writ petitioners are unaided minority institutions. It is the contention of the minority institutions that their rights under Article 30 of the Constitution of India, would get affected, if the exemption from the payment of property tax, is withdrawn. It is also the contention of the minority institutions that these institutions work on a no profit no loss basis and ensure imparting of excellent academic education and high discipline among students, on a very reasonable and nominal fee. These institutions state that they do not receive any capitation fee nor do http://www.judis.nic.in 6/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch they accept any donations except the fee, which they collect from the students is just sufficient for them to meet the regular expenditure of the school. It is submitted that if exemption from payment of property tax is withdrawn, then it would be an additional burden on the students, who would have to pay for the property tax.
4. It is further submitted that under Section 12 (c) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, a school has to admit in class I, to an extent of at least twenty-five per cent. of the strength of that class, children belonging to weaker section and disadvantaged group on the neighbourhood and provide free and compulsory elementary education till their completion. The schools cannot afford to fulfill the obligations put on them, under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, if the exemption from payment of property tax, is withdrawn from such schools. Schools contend that there is no basis for withdrawing exemption from the educational institutions which have the protection under Article 30 of the Constitution of India.
5. It has been contended by the minority institutions that most of the students in the school hail from very lower economic strata and belong to minority communities. The schools are only carrying out their philanthropic http://www.judis.nic.in 7/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch aim which is to provide good education to the children, at a very low / affordable fee. It is stated that these organisations are not driven by profit motive. It is the contention of the minority institutions that charitable organisations, cannot be clubbed with other private schools, in which high fees are charged and that these schools like schools run by the government, seek to perform the same duty, as the Government does, that is to provide good education at a very nominal cost. Exempting only the educational institutions run by the Government or any local authority alone from levy of property tax and clubbing the charitable institutions with other private institutions, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
6. The other schools which are not minority institutions under Article 30 would contend that the very concept of taxing the educational institutions for providing education is unconstitutional and void. 'Education' by itself is 'charitable and philanthropic' and therefore, all the buildings used for education purposes are obviously for charitable and philanthropic purpose. It is the contention of such schools that educational institutions which provide for education are not engaged in the trade or business in the country. It is more of a mission motivated by the object of doing charity. It is contended that schools collect fees as determined by the Fee Determination Committee under the Tamil Nadu Fee Regulation Act, 2009 http://www.judis.nic.in 8/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch and therefore, subjecting the buildings owned by such schools to property tax, would force the institutions to claim higher fee from the students. It is stated that schools do not have any other source of income, other than fees collected by them from the students.
7. It is also stated that denying exemption from paying property tax is contrary to Article 41 of the Constitution of India, which states as follows:
"The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education...."
8. It is therefore, argued that the Government cannot pass a law which is directly contrary to the constitutional mandate enshrined in Part-IV of the Constitution of India.
9. Learned counsel for the educational institutions would contend that merely because, they charge fees, that alone cannot be a factor to deny the exemption from levy of property tax, which has been extended to them. Minority institutions contend that they are providing education with a very subsidized fee and they are only performing acts of charity and philanthropy. It is also argued that the fact that some of the institutions http://www.judis.nic.in 9/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch make some profits, it does not mean that the exemption which was given to them should be taken away.
10. The argument of the petitioners therefore, can be summarised as under.
(i) there is no difference between educational institutions run by the Government or authorities and charitable institutions. Both provide education at a low cost. There is not much difference in the fee structure and therefore, there cannot be any discrimination between them.
(ii) Even though the charitable institutions provide education with a nominal fee, may have surplus revenue, it does not mean that they are run with a motive to earn profits. The surplus amount is spent for the welfare of the students and other philanthropic activities. Merely charging fees, does not lead to a conclusion that the institutions lose its character as a charitable institutions.
(iii) By virtue of Article 21A of the Constitution of India and the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 which mandates that a school has to admit students in class I, to an extent of at least twenty-five per cent. of the strength of that class, children belonging to weaker section and disadvantaged group on the http://www.judis.nic.in 10/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch neighbourhood and provide free and compulsory elementary education till their completion, classification between government and non government institutions cannot be made and exemption from payment of property tax, cannot be restricted only to the buildings used for education purposes, belonging to the Government, Corporation, authorities which are instrumentalities of the State and aided institutions.
(iv)The statement of objects and reasons do not state as to why the exemption to property tax has been withdrawn and therefore there is no intelligible differentia, as to why the exemption has been granted only to buildings used for education purposes, belonging to the Government, Corporation, authorities which are instrumentalities of the State and aided institutions.
(v) In the same area, some educational institutions including minority institutions have got two schools, one aided and one not aided. It will not be practically feasible or possible to tax one building which is aided and the other building which is not aided.
11. On behalf of the State, it is contended that State government have the power to impose tax and grant exemption. The Third State Finance Commission among others, has recommended that the provisions exempting http://www.judis.nic.in 11/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch all educational institutions from payment of property tax should be removed. Based on the recommendation, the government decided to do away with the exemption given from payment of property tax for all the buildings used for education purpose, except those which are run by the Government or Corporation or any other Municipalities, or institutions aided by the Government and also to have uniformity in the assessment of property tax. In accordance with the decision taken by the Third State Finance Commission, Government have decided to amend the provisions relating to the payment of property tax in the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 (Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1919), the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971 (Tamil Nadu Act 15 of 1971), the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981 (Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1981) and the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 (Tamil Nadu Act V of 1920).
12. It is further contended by the State that when the power to impose tax and grant exemption having been validly conferred on the State government, the State government can by amendment, decide to withdraw the exemption granted by it. The legislature cannot be denied of such a right. It cannot be urged that once exemption is validly granted, the legislature cannot withdraw it.
http://www.judis.nic.in 12/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch
13. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
14. The question that arises in these batch of cases is as to whether the legislature could be permitted to grant exemption from the payment of property tax only for the buildings used for education purpose, belonging to the government or Corporation or by any local authority or aided institutions and whether the amendment brought in by Act 6 of 2018 i.e., Tamil Nadu Municipality Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 2018, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
15. Section 98 of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, Section 115 of Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971, Section 117 of Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981 and Section 78 of the Tamilnadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, gives power to the Municipality council to levy property tax.
16. Section 101 of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, Sections 122 of Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971, Section 123 of Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981 and Section 83 (1)(c) and http://www.judis.nic.in 13/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch 83(2) of the Tamilnadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, prior to Act 6 of 2018 i.e., Tamil Nadu Municipality Laws (Second Amendment) Act 2018, gives exemption to all educational institutions.
17. Entry 49 List II permits the State Government to impose tax on land and buildings.
18. Under Article 243-X of the Constitution of India, a legislature of a State may, by law, authorize the Municipality to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits.
19. Article 243X of the Constitution of India, empowers the Municipal Council to levy and collect property tax on lands coming under the Municipality.
20. A State is entitled to change its earlier decision. It cannot be said that there is a vested right in the educational institutions to claim exemption from payment of property tax. There cannot be any vested right for a concession. Infact there is no vested right that concession once http://www.judis.nic.in 14/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch granted, cannot be withdrawn.
21. The State is entitled to alter, amend or rescind its policy decision. The Municipality has to augment its resources for providing facilities / amenities to the people living in Municipality. In order to augment its resources, if the government decides to restrict the exemption granted to the educational institutions only to places owned by such educational institutions run by the government alone, cannot be said to be one against public interest. It is well settled that a policy decision if taken in public interest should be given effect to. Infact Courts have gone to the extent of saying that even such decisions have an impact on retrospective effect, can also be upheld, unless it is shown that it deserves to be struck down on the ground of unreasonableness.
22. The petitioners have placed heavy reliance on the the judgment of a Bench of Five Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kannathat Thatehunni Moopil Nair, etc. Vs. State of Kerala and Another, reported in AIR 1961 SC 552. In the said judgment, the constitutionality of the Travancore Cochin Land Tax Act, 15 of 1955, as amended by the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax (Amendment) Act, 10 of 1957, was under
challenge. The forest lands in Kerala, before the State reoganisation, were covered under the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, Madras Act 27 http://www.judis.nic.in 15/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch of 1949. Even after the State reorganisation, the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, are applied to these forests. Under the said Act, the owners of forests, could not sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise alienate any portion of their forests without the previous sanction of the District Collector nor could they without similar permission, cut trees or do any act likely to denude the forest or diminish its utility as such. However power was given to the District Collector, to permit a small number of trees in the forest to be cut.
23. The petitioner in that case was given permission to cut certain trees in the forest which brought income to the petitioner. In that case, under the Act, the land Tax at a flat rate of Rs.2/- per acre was imposed. On the advent of the Travancore Cochin Land Tax Act, 15 of 1955, the District Collector of Palghat, purporting to act under Section 5-A of the Act, issued a notice to the petitioner provisionally assessing the petitioner's forest under the said Act, to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per annum. The said Act, which gave power to the Government to make provisional assessment of basic tax in the case of unsurveyed lands, was under challenge.
24. The State Government took a stand that Article 265 of the Constitution of India, is a complete answer to the challenge to the constitutionality of the State Act, for levy of tax. While dealing with these http://www.judis.nic.in 16/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch provisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that if property of the same character has to be taxed, then the taxation must be by the same standard, so that the burden of taxation may fall equally on all persons holding that kind and extent of property. If taxation, generally speaking, imposes a similar burden on everyone with reference to that particular kind and extent of a property, on the same basis of taxation, the law shall not be open to attack on the ground of inequality, even though the result of the taxation may be that the total burden of different persons may be unequal. It must be noted that in the very same paragraph the Hon'ble Supreme Court has gone to say that if the legislature has classified persons or properties into different categories, which are subjected to different rates of taxation with reference to income or property, such a classification would not be open to the attack of inequality, on the ground that the total burden resulting from such a classification is unequal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further went on to say that the different kinds of property can be subjected to different rates of taxation, but so long as there is a rational basis for the classification, Article 14 will not be in the way of such classifications resulting in unequal burdens on different classes of property. But, if the same class of property similarly situated is subjected to an incidence of taxation, which results in inequality, the law may be struck down as creating an inequality amongst holders of the same kind of http://www.judis.nic.in 17/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch property. Relying on these portions, it has been contended that the State cannot pick and choose buildings belonging to them and totally exempt them from the applicability of property tax. According to the petitioners, all educational institutions would come under one common class and the incidence of taxation, should be common to all the properties.
25. The petitioners would contend that granting exemption only to properties held by government educational institutions and government aided institutions, will result in inequality and the government cannot distinguish between properties held by educational institutions owned by the Government or by a private management.
26. It is worthwhile to mention that the proposition stated supra does not negate the basic proposition of Article 14 of the Constitution of India that a statute can give a discretion to the government to select and classify persons or things to whom the provisions are to be applied. This proposition also does not negate the principle that a classification by government may be found on intelligible differentia.
27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia Vs. S.R.Tendolkar, reported in AIR 1958 SC 538: 1959 SCR 279, observed as http://www.judis.nic.in 18/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch under.
“11. The principal ground urged in support of the contention as to the invalidity of the Act and/or the notification is founded on Article 14 of the Constitution. In Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar [(1955) 1 SCR 1045] a Constitution Bench of seven Judges of this Court at p. 1048-49 explained the true meaning and scope of Article 14 as follows;
“The provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution have come up for discussion before this Court in a number of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal Choudhuri v. Union of India [(1950) SCR 869], State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara [(1951) SCR 682], State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [(1952) SCR 284] , Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra [(1952) SCR 435] , Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. State of Bombay [(1952) SCR 710] , Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad [(1953) SCR 581] and Habeeb Mohamad v. State of Hyderabad [(1953) SCR 661] . It is, therefore, not necessary to enter upon any lengthy discussion as to the meaning, scope and effect of the article in question. It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or http://www.judis.nic.in 19/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.” The principle enunciated above has been consistently adopted and applied in subsequent cases. The decisions of this Court further establish—
(a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself;
(b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles;
(c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds;
(d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest;
(e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be concieved existing at the time of legislation; and
(f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is http://www.judis.nic.in 20/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and un-known reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation.
The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws."
12. A close perusal of the decisions of this Court in which the above principles have been enunciated and applied by this Court will also show that a statute which may come up for consideration on a question of its validity under Article 14 of the Constitution, may be placed in one or other of the following five classes:
(i) A statute may itself indicate the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons or things may appear on the face of the statute or may be gathered from the sorrounding circumstances known to or brought to the notice of the court. In determining the validity or otherwise of such a statute the court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply only to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or things. Where the court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the court will uphold the http://www.judis.nic.in 21/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch validity of the law, as it did in Chiranjitlal Chowdhri v. Union of India [(1950) SCR 869] State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara [(1951) SCR 682] Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal [(1954) SCR 30] , S.M. Syed Mohammad & Company v. State of Andhra [(1954) SCR 1117] , and Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar [(1955) 1 SCR 1045] .
(ii) A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing or to several individual persons or things but no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of common knowledge. In such a case the court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination, as it did in Ameerunnissa Begum v.
Mahboob Begum [(1953) SCR 404] and Ramprasad Narain Sahi v. State of Bihar [(1953) SCR 1129] .
(iii) A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply. In determining the question of the validity or otherwise of such a statute the court will not strike down the law out of hand only because no classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make the selection or classification but will go on to examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of the selection or classification. After such scrutiny the court will strike down the statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or classification, on the ground that the statute provides for the delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between persons or things similarly situate and that, therefore, the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself. In such http://www.judis.nic.in 22/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch a case the court will strike down both the law as well as the executive action taken under such law, as it did in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [(1952) SCR 284] Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1954) SCR 803] and Dhirendra Krishna Mandal v. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs [(1955) 1 SCR 224] .
(iv) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions and may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify the persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply but may at the same time lay down a policy or principle for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification, the court will uphold the law as constitutional, as it did in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra [(1952) SCR 435] .
(v) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things to whom their provisions are intended to apply and leave it to the discretion of the Government to select or classify the persons or things for applying those provisions according to the policy or the principle laid down by the statute itself for guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification. If the Government in making the selection or classification does not proceed on or follow such policy or principle, it has been held by this Court e.g. in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra that in such a case the executive action but not the statute should be condemned as unconstitutional.
28. This is one of the earliest judgments on the point. The other judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court are only expansion and explanation of the propositions enunciated in the judgment. http://www.judis.nic.in 23/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Municipal Committee, Patiala Vs. Model Town Residents Assn. and others, reported in 2007 (8) SCC 669, has taken a view that if a law deals equally with members of a well-defined class, it is not open to challenge such a law on the ground of denial of equal protection. Paragraph No.17 of the said judgment reads as under.
"17. The central test for permissible classification has to satisfy two conditions. It must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or premises that are grouped together from others left out of the groups and the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act in question. A law based on a permissible classification fulfils the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws and is valid whereas a law based on an impermissible classification violates the guarantee and is void. Equality is violated by treating persons similarly situated differently. In the present case, as stated above, that is not the case. If a law deals equally with members of a well- defined class, it is not open to challenge such a law on the ground of denial of equal protection. In order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the court can take into consideration matters of common knowledge and, at the same time, the court must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people. In the present case, the legislature seems to have taken cognizance of the fact that the land prices have been increasing which remains excluded from the composite valuation of an asset, namely, land or building which is self-occupied and for which there is no measurable, identifiable and quantifiable data of actual or hypothetical rent."
http://www.judis.nic.in 24/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch
30. Similarly, in Sri Krishna Das Vs Town Area Committee, Chirgaon, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 645, while dealing with the power to frame bye-laws imposing tax in nature of weighing dues on sale and purchase of commodities, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, observed as under.
"The contention that the tax is discriminatory in view of the exemptions granted to some of the products and to those that enter the TAC by rail or motor transport is equally untenable. It is for the legislature or the taxing authority to determine the question of need, the policy and to select the goods or services for taxation. The courts cannot review these decisions. In paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit the TAC tried to explain the reason of not taxing salt, sugar and rice stating that they were not local produce but were imported from distant places and that the tax was levied only on the local produce which came from the neigh- bouring places. Courts cannot review the wisdom or advisa- bility or expediency of a tax as the court has no concern with the policy of legislation, so long they are not incon- sistent with the provisions of the Constitution. It is only where there is abuse of its powers and transgression of the legislative function in levying a tax, it may be corrected by the judiciary and not otherwise. Taxes may be and often are oppressive, unjust, and even unnecessary but this can constitute no reason for judicial interference. When taxes are levied on certain articles or services and not on others it cannot be said to be discriminatory. Cooley observes: "Every tax must discriminate; and only the authority that imposes it can determine how and in what directions."
The TAC having decided to impose weighing dues on the goods mentioned in the Bye-Laws it is not for the court to ques- tion it on the ground that some similar commodities or commodities arriving http://www.judis.nic.in 25/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch by rail or road were not subjected to the tax."
31. Similarly, in the State of Gujarat and another Vs. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad and Another, reported in 1974 (4) SCC 656, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that once an objective is decided to be within legislative competence, the Court's attitude cannot be that the State either has to regulate all businesses, or even all related businesses, and in the same way, or, not at all.
"60. It may be remembered that article 14 does not require that every regulatory statute apply to all in the same business :
where size is an index to the evil at which the law is directed, discriminations between the large and small are permissible, and it is also permissible for reform to take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.
61. A legislative authority acting within its field is not bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it might possibly reach. The legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm and it may confine the restrictions to those classes of cases where the need seemed to be clearest.
62. In short, the problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same filed may be of different dimensions and proportions requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think.
63. Once an objective is decided to be within legislative competence, however, the working out of classifications has been only infrequently impeded by judicial negatives. The Courts attitude cannot be that the state either has to regulate all http://www.judis.nic.in 26/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch businesses, or even all related businesses, and in the same way, or, not at all. An effort to strike at a particular economic evil could not be hindered by the necessity of carrying in its wake a train of vexatious, troublesome and expensive regulations covering the whole range of connected or similar enterprises. ....
67. In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The Courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events--self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability."
32. Learned Additional Advocate General also placed reliance on a judgment of the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Sreenarayana Gurukulam College of Engineering Vs State of Kerala, reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Ker 38402, where a similar question arose for consideration and the State of Kerala granted an exemption from property tax under Section 207 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 to the buildings used for educational purpose or allied purpose and its hostel buildings owned by the Government, aided or functioning with the financial assistance of the Government alone. The learned Single Judge in paragraph Nos.9 and 10, http://www.judis.nic.in 27/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch observed as under.
"9. In the instant case whether the buildings and hostels for the purpose of education and stay owned or financed by the Government and owned by the private management of Self- financing Educational Institutions can be treated alike. Whether there is any intelligible differentia which distinguishes the buildings owned by the Government and owned by private management of self-financing institutions. The matter in issue involved in the instant case falls exclusively in the domain of taxation and has no connection with the academic affairs. Therefore, the extent of enquiry is confined to the fiscal status of institutions only. What is the basis of the classification? In my view, this classification is made, by granting exemption to the buildings owned or financed by the Government, on the basis that public money is utilised for the construction and maintenance of such buildings; whereas in the case of the buildings and hostels owned and maintained by private management of self-financing institutions, the public money has not been involved. Put it differently, this exemption is a privilege granted to the public money and it can be said that buildings and hostels constructed and maintained by using public money is exempted from payment of property tax and the people, as a whole, is the beneficiary of this exemption. If property tax is imposed on buildings and hostels owned by the Government, that amount also will be taken from the public fund. More importantly, exemption is given to the institutions, functioning under the administrative control of the Government and to which Governmental auditing of funds and expenditure is made compulsory; whereas, the case of self- financing institutions, such control and auditing of funds are absent.
http://www.judis.nic.in 28/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch
10. Secondly, the expression ‘self financing’ itself shows that such institutions are having their own fee structure, which cannot be compared with fees of a Government College. Though, it is regulated and controlled by the above referred statute, it is much higher than that of Government Colleges, wherein a nominal fee alone is collected from the students and certain rooms are reserved for students from socially and economically backward classes, in the hostels owned by the Government. In my view, this classification on the aforesaid basis is a rational one and there is an intelligible differentia in this classification. Self-financing Educational Institutions form a separate class, different from the Educational Institutions owned and financed or aided by the Government and the discrimination made under Sec. 207(b) of the Panchayat Raj Act is marked by intelligible differentia."
(emphasis supplied) We respectfully agree with the reasoning of the Kerala High Court.
33. While redressing a challenge to withdrawal of exemption from payment of building tax only to State, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Kusuman Hotels (P) Ltd Vs. Kerala State Electricity Board, reported in 2008 (13) SCC 213, observed as under.
27. The State of Kerala in this case did not grant any concession by itself. The Central Government took a larger policy of treating the tourism as an industry. A wide range of concessions were to be granted by way of one time measure; some of them, however, had a recurring effect. So far as grant of benefits which were to be recurring in nature, the State exercises its statutory power in the case of grant of exemption http://www.judis.nic.in 29/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch from payment of building tax wherefor it amended the statute. It issued directions which were binding upon the Board having regard to the provisions contained in Section 78A of the 1948 Act. The Board was bound thereby. The Board, having regard to its financial constraints, could have brought its financial stringency to the notice of the State. It did so. But the State could not have taken a unilateral decision to take away the accrued or vested right. The Board's order dated 11.10.1999 in law could not have been given effect to. The Board itself kept the said notification in abeyance by reason of order dated 8.11.1999.
Appellants, indisputably, continued to derive the benefits in terms of the original order. They obtained certificates of classification. It is on the aforementioned context, the question as regards construction of the impugned notification dated 26.9.2000 arises. Ex facie, the said policy decision could not be given a retrospective effect or retroactive operation. The State was not exercising the power under any statute to grant or withdraw the concession. It was exercising its statutory power of issuing direction. It is, therefore, a statutory authority. The 1948 Act does not authorize the State to issue a direction with retrospective effect. The Board, therefore, could only give prospective effect to such directions in absence of any clear indication contained therein. By reason of withdrawal of concession with retrospective effect, the accrued right of the appellants had been affected. In Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [(2006) 5 SCC 702], this Court held :
"In a case of this nature, where the State has the exclusive privilege and the citizen has no fundamental right to carry on business in liquor, in our opinion, the policy which would be applicable is http://www.judis.nic.in 30/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch the one which is prevalent on the date of grant and not the one, on which the application had been filed. If a policy decision had been taken on 16.9.2005 not to grant L-52 licence, no licence could have been granted after the said date."
We, however, are not concerned with a similar situation.
28. However, in Ramchandra Murarilal Bhattad & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors, [(2007) 2 SCC 588], it was held :
"64. It is not a case where the court is called upon to exercise its equity jurisdiction. It is also not a case where ex facie the policy decision can be held to be contrary to any statute or against a public policy. A policy decision may be subject to change from time to time. Only because a change is effect, (sic) the same by itself does not render a policy decision to be illegal or otherwise vitiated in law."
34. Statute itself indicates the persons to whom the provisions apply. In this circumstances, this Court is required to examine as to whether the classification is based on reasonable differentia, distinguished from the persons the group from those left out and whether such differentia has reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Whether the Act and rules framed satisfy the twin test namely, (i) the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which must distinguish persons or things that are grouped together from others leaving out or left out and (ii) such a differentia has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved http://www.judis.nic.in 31/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch by the statute or legislation in question.
35. In the present case, the Government have chosen to exempt tax on buildings used for educational purposes including hostels and libraries run by the Government or Corporation or any local authority or institutions aided by the Government. The Government need not impose tax for the property belonging to it. Similarly, Government spends on aided institutions. After giving aid to the institution it does not make sense to levy tax for the very same institutions, which receives aid.
36. Further it has been noticed that the Government is not making any distinction for properties that are not owned by government or an authority which is an instrumentality of the State. Property belonging to the Government or authorities which are instrumentality of the State can be treated as a separate and distinct class in the matter of exemption from levy of property tax. This Court is of the opinion that the argument that since minority institution also provide education with a lesser fee and they have to be treated akin to Government run educational institutions, cannot be accepted. The amount of fees collected by the minority institutions does not go to the Government. It may remain with the management for further charitable activities, unlike the fees collected by educational institutions http://www.judis.nic.in 32/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch belonging to the government or an authority, which is an instrumentality of the State. The judgment of the Constitution Bench in Kannathat Thatehunni Moopil Nair's case would therefore, not apply to the case on hand.
37. Equally reliance placed by the petitioners on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D.S.Nakara and Others Vs. Union of India, reported in (1983) 1 SCC 305, cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case. Paragraph Nos.15 & 16 of the judgment, reads as under.
"15. Thus the fundamental principle is that Art.14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation which classification must satisfy the twin tests of classification being founded on an intelligible differntia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
16. As a corrolary to this well established proposition, the next question is, on whom the burden lies to affirmatively establish the rational principle on which the classification is founded correlated to the object sought to be achieved ? The thrust of Art. 14 is that the citizen is entitled to equality before law and equal protection of laws. In the very nature of things the society being composed of unequals a welfare state will have to strive by both executive and legislative action to help the less fortunate in the society to ameliorate their condition so that the social and economic inequality in the society may be bridged. This would necessitate a http://www.judis.nic.in 33/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch legislation applicable to a group of citizens otherwise unequal and amelioration of whose lot is the object of state affirmative action. In the absence of doctrine of classification such legislation is likely to flounder on the bed rock of equality enshrined in Art. 14. The court realistically appraising the social stratification and economic inequality and keeping in view the guidelines on which the State action must move as constitutionally laid down in part IV of the Constitution, evolved the doctrine of classification. The doctrine was evolved to sustain a legislation or State action designed to help weaker sections of the society or some such segments of the society in need of succor. Legislative and executive action may accordingly be sustained if it satisfies the twin tests of reasonable classification and the rational principle correlated to the object sought to be achieved. The State, therefore, would have to affirmatively satisfy the Court that the twin tests have been satisfied. It can only be satisfied if the State establishes not only the rational principle on which classification is founded but correlate it to the objects sought to be achieved. This approach is noticed in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India [(1979) 3 SCR 1014] when at page 1034, the Court observed that a discriminatory action of the Government is liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory."
38. D.S.Nakara's case [quoted supra] is no authority for the proposition that the Government cannot make classification regarding persons and properties based on intelligible differentia. This judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case. Further D.S.Nakara's case has been http://www.judis.nic.in 34/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch in subsequent decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
39. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on Modern School Vs. Union of India and others, reported in 2004 (5) SCC 583, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court after relying on the judgment of T.M.A. Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2002 (8) SCC 481 and Unni Krishnan J.P. Vs. State of A.P., reported in 1993 (1) SCC 645, held that Articles 19(1)(g) and 26 of the Constitution of India, confer rights on all citizens and religious denominations respectively to establish and maintain educational institutions, on the facts and circumstances of the present writ petitions, cannot be accepted, while deciding the constitutional validity of Act 6 of 2018 i.e., Tamil Nadu Municipality Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 2018.
Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, gives the right to religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institution of their choice. However, the right to establish an institution under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, is subject to reasonable restriction in terms of clause (6) thereof. Similarly, right conferred on minority institutions, religious / linguistic, to establish and administer an educational institution of their own choice under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India, is subject to reasonable regulations which inter alia may be framed http://www.judis.nic.in 35/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch having regard to public interest and national interest. The institutions should be permitted to make reasonable profit after providing for investment and expenditure. Capitation fee and profiteering were held to be forbidden. These questions are not relevant while deciding the issue on the constitutional validity of withdrawal of exemption of property tax on buildings used for educational purposes other than those, belonging to government, corporation or local authority or aided institutions. Mere status of an educational institution, being minority, would not clothe the right to claim exemption from payment of property tax. But if the institution is aided by the government, for its very existence and maintenance, such institution is exempted from payment of property tax.
40. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners would only state that the educational institutions are actually endeavouring to fulfill the constitutional mandate on the State to provide education, which is enshrined in Article 41 of the Constitution of India. It is therefore contended that the educational institutions have to be treated as a whole. We are afraid, this argument can be accepted. All educational institutions are exempted from levy of property tax prior to the amendment. The Government have decided to restrict the exemption only to educational institutions, hostels and libraries, which are run by the Government and http://www.judis.nic.in 36/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch local authorities or aided by government. It cannot be said that it is not within the power of the Government to levy, to make classification between properties owned by Government and municipalities, which are instrumentalities of the State and those not aided. Such a classification cannot be held to fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that tax does not know any equity. The policy of State Government to restrict the exemption from payment of property tax only to the buildings used for education purpose, which are run by the Government or Corporation or any other Municipalities and aided, cannot be held to be contrary to the statute or against public policy. A policy decision may subject to change from time to time. Only because change is effected, the same by itself does not render a policy decision to be illegal or otherwise vitiated in law. The argument of various minority institutions that withdrawal of exemption is violative of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India, also cannot be accepted.
41. The right to establish and administer educational institutions cannot be linked to levy of property tax. It cannot be said that government cannot pass a law under Entry 49 List II on educational institutions, established and administered by minorities.
42. Minority institutions are not immune from the operation of http://www.judis.nic.in 37/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch general laws of the land such as Contract Law, Tax measures, Economic Laws, and Social Welfare Legislations, Labour and Industrial Law and similar other laws, which are intended to meet the need of the Society [St. John's Teacher Training Institute (for Women), Madurai Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors, reported in 1993 (3) SCC 595.
43. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Video Electricals Vs. State of Punjab, reported in 1990(3) SCC 87, while selectively withdrawing exemptions, held as under.
"26. It was also submitted that if all the parts of India i.e. to say all the States are economically strong or developed then only can economic unity as a whole be assured and strengthened. Hence, the concept of economic unity is ever changing with very wide horizons and cannot and should not be imprisoned in a strait- jacket of the concept and notion as advocated by the petitioner. Economic unity of India is one of the constitutional aspirations of India and safeguarding the attainment and maintenance of that unity are objectives of the Indian Constitution. It would be wrong, however, to assume that India as a whole is already an economic unit. Economic unity can only be achieved if all parts of whole of Union of India develop equally, economi- cally. Indeed, in the affidavits of opposition various grounds have been indicated on behalf of the respondents suggesting the need for incentives and exemptions, and these were suggested to be absolutely necessary for economic viability and survival for these industries in these States. These were based on cogent and intelligible reasons of economic encouragement and growth. There was a rationale in http://www.judis.nic.in 38/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch these which is discernible. The power to grant exemption is always inherent in all taxing Statutes. If the suggestions/submissions as advanced by the petitioners are accepted, it was averted, and in our opinion rightly, that it will destroy completely or make nugatory the plenary powers of the States. If the exemption is based on natural and business factors and does not involve any intentional bias, the impugned notifications to grant exemption for limited period on certain specific conditions cannot be held to be bad. Judged by that yardstick, the present notifica- tions cannot be held to be violative of the constitutional provisions."
44. Similarly in All Bihar Christian Schools Association and Another Vs. State of Bihar and Others, reported in 1988 (1) SCC 206, it was observed as under.
"9.....Minority institutions may be categorised in three classes, (i) educational institutions which neither seek aid nor recognition from the State, (ii) institutions that seek aid from the State, and (iii) educational institutions which seek recognition but not aid. Minority institutions which fall in the first category are free to administer their institution in the manner they like; the State has no power under the Constitution to place any restriction on their right of administration. This does not mean that an unaided minority institution is immune from operation of general laws of the land. A minority institution cannot claim immunity from contract law, tax measures, economic regulations, social welfare legislation, labour and industrial laws and similar other measures which are intended to meet the need of the society. But institutions falling within the second and third categories are subject to regulatory provisions which the State may impose. It is open to the State to prescribe http://www.judis.nic.in 39/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch conditions for granting recognition or disbursing aid."
45. In view of the above, challenge to Act 6 of 2018 i.e., Tamil Nadu Municipality Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 cannot be upheld and that the same is rejected. Writ petitions are dismissed. No Costs.
46. This Court is not going into the demanded quantum of tax in the notices issued by various Corporations on various schools. Competence in demanding tax is upheld. It is open to the institutions to file appropriate petitions challenging the demand notices, in accordance with law. Interim order, restraining the municipality authorities from taking any coercive steps, stands vacated. Consequently, other connected writ miscellaneous petitions are closed.
(S.M.K., J.) (S.P., J.) 13.09.2019 Index: Yes Internet: Yes Speaking/Non speaking ars http://www.judis.nic.in 40/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch To
1. The Secretary, Department of Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, The Government Secretariat, Fort St. George, Chennai - 600 009.
2. The Commissioner, Chennai Municipal Corporation, Ripon Building, Chennai - 600 003.
3. The Assistant Revenue Officer, Zone-IX, Corporation of Chennai, No.1, Lake Area, 4th Cross Street, Nungambakkam, Chennai - 600 034.
http://www.judis.nic.in 41/42 WP.Nos.18008 of 2018 etc. batch S.MANIKUMAR,J.
AND SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.
ars/dm W.P.Nos.18008, 34242, 20519, 20537, 23676, 26574, 26633, 27451, 28099, 28113, 28123, 29204, 29211, 29217, 29234, 29242, 29388, 30236, 30274, 30364, 30371, 30679, 30689, 30695, 30703, 31060, 31063, 31100, 31107, 31120, 31129, 31134, 31196, 31336, 31368, 31418,31426, 31613, 32404, 32468, 33375, 33386, 33780, 26595 of 2018 and 4297, 4292, 21599 of 2019 and W.P.(MD).Nos.21071 of 2018 and 15658 of 2019 and Connected WMPs 13.09.2019 http://www.judis.nic.in 42/42