Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
M/S Crayons Advertising Pvt Ltd And Ors vs State Of Rajasthan Through Pp on 22 May, 2017
-1-
र जस न उच न ल ज पर प ठ ज पर
आदश
1. S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 3012/2016
1.M/S. Crayons Advertising Pvt. Ltd., a company registered under
the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at NSIC
Complex, Maa Anand Mayee Marg, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-3,
New Delhi - 110020, through its Director Ajay Chopra s/o Shri
Dharam Chand Chopra.
2. Ajay Chopra, S/o Shri Dharam Chand Chopra, aged about 59
years, Director, Crayons Advertising Ltd., 2, Mysore House, Jacob
Road, Civil Lines, Jaipur.
3. Lokesh Gupta, S/o Shri Ram Sahai Gupta, aged about 45 years,
Senior Manager, Media Crayons Advertising Ltd., 2, Mysore House,
Jacob Road, Civil Lines, Jaipur.
..Accused-Petitioners.
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor.
2. Shankar Lal Gurjar, S/o Shri Ram Singh Gurjar, aged about 29 years, R/o B-99, Kheda Mahapura, VKI Area, Jaipur ...Respondents.
2. S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 3016/2016
1.M/S. Crayons Advertising Pvt. Ltd., a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at NSIC Complex, Maa Anand Mayee Marg, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-3, New Delhi - 110020, through its Director Ajay Chopra s/o Shri Dharam Chand Chopra.
2. Ajay Chopra, S/o Shri Dharam Chand Chopra, aged about 59 years, Director, Crayons Advertising Ltd., 2, Mysore House, Jacob Road, Civil Lines, Jaipur.
3. Lokesh Gupta, S/o Shri Ram Sahai Gupta, aged about 45 years, Senior Manager, Media Crayons Advertising Ltd., 2, Mysore House, -2- Jacob Road, Civil Lines, Jaipur.
..Accused-Petitioners.
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor.
2. Shankar Lal Gurjar, S/o Shri Ram Singh Gurjar, aged about 29 years, R/o B-99, Kheda Mahapura, VKI Area, Jaipur ...Respondents.
3. S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 3017/2016
1.M/S. Crayons Advertising Pvt. Ltd., a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at NSIC Complex, Maa Anand Mayee Marg, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-3, New Delhi - 110020, through its Director Ajay Chopra s/o Shri Dharam Chand Chopra.
2. Ajay Chopra, S/o Shri Dharam Chand Chopra, aged about 59 years, Director, Crayons Advertising Ltd., 2, Mysore House, Jacob Road, Civil Lines, Jaipur.
3. Lokesh Gupta, S/o Shri Ram Sahai Gupta, aged about 45 years, Senior Manager, Media Crayons Advertising Ltd., 2, Mysore House, Jacob Road, Civil Lines, Jaipur.
..Accused-Petitioners.
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor.
2. Shankar Lal Gurjar, S/o Shri Ram Singh Gurjar, aged about 29 years, R/o B-99, Kheda Mahapura, VKI Area, Jaipur ...Respondents.
4. S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 3018/2016
1.M/S. Crayons Advertising Pvt. Ltd., a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at NSIC Complex, Maa Anand Mayee Marg, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-3, New Delhi - 110020, through its Director Ajay Chopra s/o Shri -3- Dharam Chand Chopra.
2. Ajay Chopra, S/o Shri Dharam Chand Chopra, aged about 59 years, Director, Crayons Advertising Ltd., 2, Mysore House, Jacob Road, Civil Lines, Jaipur.
3. Lokesh Gupta, S/o Shri Ram Sahai Gupta, aged about 45 years, Senior Manager, Media Crayons Advertising Ltd., 2, Mysore House, Jacob Road, Civil Lines, Jaipur.
..Accused-Petitioners.
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor.
2. Shankar Lal Gurjar, S/o Shri Ram Singh Gurjar, aged about 29 years, R/o B-99, Kheda Mahapura, VKI Area, Jaipur ...Respondents.
5. S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 3019/2016
1.M/S. Crayons Advertising Pvt. Ltd., a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at NSIC Complex, Maa Anand Mayee Marg, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-3, New Delhi - 110020, through its Director Ajay Chopra.
2. Ajay Chopra, S/o Shri Dharam Chand Chopra, aged about 59 years, Director, Crayons Advertising Ltd., 2, Mysore House, Jacob Road, Civil Lines, Jaipur.
3. Lokesh Gupta, S/o Shri Ram Sahai Gupta, aged about 45 years, Senior Manager, Crayons Advertising Ltd., 2, Mysore House, Jacob Road, Civil Lines, Jaipur.
..Accused-Petitioners.
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor.
2. Shankar Lal Gurjar, S/o Shri Ram Singh Gurjar, aged about 29 years, R/o B-99, Kheda Mahapura, VKI Area, Jaipur ...Respondents.
-4-आदश ददन क : 22 मई , 2017
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420,467,468,471,474,120-ब 3र दणड सदह क अपर प म
दष पम णण प ग जजस पर श सज व न5ण, अत . पभलस अ कक,
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जजस पर अभ3 कगण क ववरद आल<च एफ आई आर सख -405/2014
अन ग# र -13(1)(D),13(2) भष र तनव रण अध तन म एव र-
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एकलप ठ द जणडक वववव ध क सख -3016/2016 प म सD न
ररप'ट# सख - 408/2014 स सCबजन पकरण मK द<र न ज प ग कक:-
र जस न सरक र क सव त श सन वव3 ग मK तनदश ल स न
तनक वव3 ग, ज पर द र इलकi'तनक म डड मK वर# 2013-14 मK ल'कल
कबल नटवक# पर क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग एजनस क म फ# ''पश सन शहर@
क सग फpल'अप अभ3 न 2013 '' एव '' सव त ददवस 2012 '' क
अन ग# प र पस र क ववभ3नन क # कक ग । जजसक बबल सख -
J05T0001 ददन क 08.05.2013 र भश 4896986/-रप , बबल सख -J06T0001 ददन क 30.06.13 र भश 48,96,986/- रप क बबल न.J09T0001 ददन क 26.9.13 र भश 13,67,646/- रप क क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र तनदश ल स न तनक वव3 ग, ज पर मK पस कक ग । इन सCबजन कबल नटवक# क बबल, अनम'दद ववज पन दर, ववज पन अवध , पस रण कत एव ल 3 जनव @ क वववरण, क # सप दद /पस रर करन क शप पत आदद क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग एजनस द र पस नह" कक ग । अवप ल'कल कबल नटवक# पर उपर'क ववज पन पस रण क 3ग न क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. दर प प कक ग जजनक म भलक न हक क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. क नह" ह5 । 3ग न क, पकक क द<र न वव3 ग न सCबजन ववज पन पस रण क शप पत, ल'कल कबल नटवक# स कक ग एc मK ट/ ऑ 'ररट", 175, कबल नटवक# क, सD , कबल क सव भमतव 3ग न क, प तप क अध क र पत क, पत , क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. स ह"
लककन क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र 3ग न प तप क भलए 175 ल'कल कबल नटवक# रक@ स तD नसन सवव#सज क एc मK ट क, फ'ट'पत वव3 ग मK पस क,। ज स ह थ स मन आ कक इस दस वज मK कबल नटवक# रक' क फजU हस कर कक ग हn। क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र 3ग न प प क भलए कDटरध दस वज फजU हस कर@ क स पस करन प म दष पम णण प ग ह5 ।
क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र इन ववज पन@ क तन म नस र कम शन -9- क, 10 पत श र भश ह" प प क, ज न लककन इन ववज पन@ क पस रण क, 85 पत श र भश प प करन क भलए फजU हस कर स कDटरध दस वज पश कक जबकक इस 85 पत श र भश क 3ग न ववज पन पस रर करन व ल सCबजन कबल नटवक# पद क' पस रण शप पत दन पर स कक जन लककन क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र Dतनसन सवव#सज स भमल"3ग कर कDटरध बबल एव दस वज वव3 ग मK पस कक । ज स आर'प -
1 अध क र"/कम# र"गण, तनदश ल सD न एव जनसCपक# वव3 ग, र जस न, ज पर
2.अध क र"/कम# र"गण, तनदश ल , स न तनक वव3 ग, र जस न ज पर.
3.श अज <पड , तनदशक, म5सस# क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल.,02,म5सDर ह ऊस, ज5कब र'ड, भसववल ल ईनस, ज पर.
4.श ल'कश गप , म5नजर, वररष पबन क, म डड क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल., 02, म5सDर ह ऊस, ज5कब र'ड, भसववल ल ईनस, ज पर एव अन
5.नर'तम शम # पत श 3वर ल ल शम #
6. श ववमल शम # पत श न र ण पस द शम #
7. श अभम गप , प ट# नर Dतनसन सवव#सज, 697, ज ट क कए क र स , दप'ल ब ज र ज पर एव अन क ववरद अन ग# र -13(1)(ड ),13(2) प स एकट 1988 एव र-
420,467,468,471,474,120-ब 3र दणड सदह क अपर प म
दष पम णण प ज न पर श सज व न5ण, अत ररक पभलस अ कक,
भष र तनर' क ब Dर', (इनट.) ज पर न प भमक ज ररप'ट# पश क,
जजस पर आल<च एफ आई आर सख -408/2014 पभलस न- प न
आरक कनj, भष र तनर' क ब Dर', ज पर उपर'क अपर मK दज# कर
अनस न प रC3 कक ग ।
एकलप ठ द जणडक वववव ध क सख -3017/2016 प म सD न
ररप'ट# सख -404/2014 स सCबजन पकरण मK द<र न ज प ग कक:-
र जस न सरक र क सव त श सन वव3 ग मK तनदश ल स न
तनक वव3 ग, ज पर द र इलकi'तनक म डड मK वर# 2012-13 मK ल'कल
कबल नटवक# पर क 'नस ववज पन एजनस क म फ# '' पश सन शहर@ क
सग अभ3 न 2012 '' क अन ग# प र पस र क ववभ3नन क # कर ग
हn। जजसक बबल सख J01T0001 र भश 34,27,877/- रप बबल सख -
-10-
J01T0002 र भश 4149536/- रप , बबल सख J03T0001 र भश 4811056/-
रप क बबल क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र तनदश ल स न तनक
वव3 ग मK पस कर 3ग न सव कZत आदश कम क प आर ओ/ड एल
ब /2012-13/1652 ददन क 29.03.2013 क द र ज र" कर 3ग न प प कक ग । ज स ह थ स मन आ कक जजन ल'कल कबल नटवक# पर पश सन शहर@ क सग अभ3 न 2012 क ववज पन पस रण ककए ग हn। उन सCबजन कबल नटवक# फम# क बबल, अनम'दद ववज पन दर, ववज पन-अवध , पस रण कत एव ल 3 जनव @ क वववरण, क # सप दद /पस रर करन क शप पत आदद क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग एजनस द र पस नह" कक ग । अवप ल'कल कबल नटवक# पर उपर'क ववज पन पस रण क 3ग न क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र प प कक ग जजनक म भलक न हक क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. क नह" ह5 ।
क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र इन ववज पन@ मK तन म नस र कम शन क, 10 पत श र भश ह" प प क, ज न लककन इन ववज पन@ क पस रण क, 85 पत श र भश 3 उसक द र प प क, ग जबकक इस 85 पत श र भश क 3ग न ववज पन पस रर करन व ल सबध कबल नटवक# पद त क' पस रण शप पत दन पर स कक जन । लककन क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल.
दर तD नसन सवव#सज स भमल"3ग कर कDटरध बबल एव दस वज वव3 ग
मK पस कर एव क # क पण
D # ह'न क, पवष वव3 ग द र कक बबन ह"
वव3 ग क कम# रर @ स भमल"3ग करक 3ग न प प कक रज
सरक र क' ह तन पह ई। ज स आर'प -
1 अध क र"/कम# र"गण, तनदश ल सD न एव जनसCपक# वव3 ग, र जस न,
ज पर.
2.अध क र"/कम# र"गण, तनदश ल स न तनक वव3 ग, र जस न, ज पर.
3..श अज <पड , तनदशक, म5सस# क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल., 0.2,म5सDर
ह ऊस, ज5कब र'ड, भसववल ल ईनस, ज पर.
4.श ल'कश गप , म5नजर, वररष पबन क, म डड म5सस# क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग
भल., 02, म5सDर ह ऊस , ज5कब र'ड, भसववल ल ईनस, ज पर एव
5.श अभम गप , प ट# नर Dतनसन सवव#सज, 697, ज ट क कए क रस , दप'ल ब ज र ज पर एव अन क ववरद अन ग# र -13(1)(ड ),13(2) प स एकट 1988 एव र-
420,467,468,471,474,120-ब 3 र दणड सदह क अपर प म दष
पम णण प ज न पर श सज व न5ण, अत ररक पभलस अ कक, भष र
-11-
तनर' क ब Dर', (इनट.) ज पर न प भमक ज ररप'ट# पश क, जजस पर
आल<च एफ आई आर सख -404/2014 पभलस न - प न आरक कनj,
भष र तनर' क ब Dर', ज पर उपर'क अपर मK दज# कर अनस न प रC3
कक ग ।
एकलप ठ द जणडक वववव ध क सख -3018/2016 प म सD न ररप'ट#
सख -406/2014 स सCबजन पकरण मK द<र न ज प ग कक:-
र जस न सरक र क तनदश ल सD न एव जनसCपक# वव3 ग, ज पर मK
इलकi'तनक म डड मK वर# 2011-12 मK '' जल ह5 ' कल ह5'' ववज पन ल'कल
कबल नटवक# पर क नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. क म फ# 22.6.11 स 19.7.11
क पस रर कर न क ररल"ज ऑड#र र जस न सव द द र ज र" कक ग
ह5 । ह" ववज पन ऑनल ईन इनटरनट पर ददन क 23.6.11 स 12.7.11 क
क नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. क म फ# पस रर कर न क ररल"ज ऑड#र
र जस न सव द द र ज र" कक ग । जजसक बबल न . J07T0004 ददन क
21.7.2011 र भश 26,93,394/- रप , बबल सख -J07T0005 ददन क 31.7.2011 र भश 12,18,815/- रप क नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र तनदशक सD न एव जनसCपक# वव3 ग र जस न ज पर क' पस कक । उन सCबजन कबल नटवक# फम# क बबल, अनम'दद ववज पन दर, ववज पन अवध , पस रण कत एव ल 3 जनव @ क वववरण पस नह" कक ग । अवप ल'कल कबल नटवक# पर उपर'क ववज पन पस रण क 3ग न क नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र प प कक ग जजनक म भलक न हक क नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. क नह" ह5 ।
क नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र वबस ईटस पर ज र" कक ग ववज पन@ क सCबन मK सCबजन वबस ईटस क बबल@ क, पत पस नह" क,। उक वबस ईटसपर ज र" कक ग ववज पन@ क औध त क सCबन मK सCबजन वबस ईटस क म5कतनकल डट , वबस ईट क, व Dअस# सख , ववज पन प'ज शन, ड टD डट पस रर ववभ3नन ववज पन@ क वपनट आउट, पस रर अवध , इCपशन सCबजन सक एव पम ण पस नह" कक ।
क नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र इन ववज पन@ मK तन म नस र कम शन क, 10 पत श र भश ह" प प क, ज न लककन इन ववज पन@ क पस रण क, 85 पत श 3 उसक द र प प क, ग जबकक इस 85 पत श र भश क 3ग न ववज पन पस रर करन व ल सCबजन कबल नटवक# पद त एव सबध वबस ईट क अध कZ पत तनध क' पस रण शप पत दन पर स -12- कक जन लककन क नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र कDटरध बबल एव दस वज वव3 ग मK पस कर एव क # क पDण# ह'न क, पवष कक बबन ह"
वव3 ग क कम# रर @ स भमल"3ग करक 3ग न प प कक रज सरक र क' ह तन पह ई। ज स आर'प - 1 अध क र" / कम# र"गण, तनदश ल सD न एव जनसCपक# वव3 ग, र जस न, ज पर. 2.श अज <पड , तनदशक, म5सस# क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल., 02, म5सरD ह ऊस, ज5कब र'ड, भसववल ल ईनस, ज पर. 3.श ल'कश गप , म5नजर, वररष पबन क, म डड क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल.,
02, .म5सDर ह ऊस , ज5कब र'ड, भसववल ल ईनस, ज पर एव
4.श अभम गप , प ट# नर Dतनसन सवव#सज, 697, ज ट क कए क रस , दप'ल ब ज र ज पर एव अन क ववरद अन ग# र -13(1)(ड ),13(2) प स एकट 1988 एव र-
420,467,468,471,474,120-ब 3 र दणड सदह क अपर प म दष
पम णण प ज न पर श सज व न5ण, अत ररक पभलस अ कक, भष र
तनर' क ब Dर', (इनट.) ज पर न प भमक ज ररप'ट# पश क, जजस पर
आल<च एफ आई आर सख -406/2014 पभलस न - प न आरक कनj,
भष र तनर' क ब रD ', ज पर उपर'क अपर मK दज# कर अनस न प रC3
कक ग ।
एकलप ठ द जणडक वववव ध क सख -3019/2016 प म सD न ररप'ट#
सख - 407/2014 स सCबजन पकरण मK द<र न ज प ग कक:-
र जस न सरक र क सव त श सन वव3 ग मK तनदश ल स न
तनक वव3 ग द र इलकi'तनक म डड मK वर# 2012-13 मK '' मख मत शहर"
ब .प . एल आव स 'जन '' ववज पन ल'कल कबल नटवक# पर क 'नस
एडवरट ईजजग क म फ# पस रर कर ग जजसक बबल सख J09E0001
र भश 363965 रप बबल सख J09T0003 र भश 13,53,109 क 'नस
एडवरट इजजग भल. द र तनदश ल स न तनक वव3 ग ज पर क' पस
कक ग । इस बबल क 3ग न क, सव कZत तनदश ल , स न तनक
वव3 ग, र जस न ज पर द र कम क प आर ओ/ड एल ब /2012-13/650 ददन क 23.03.2013 द र ज र" कर 3ग न क 'नस एडवरट इजजग भल. क' कर दद । उन सCबजन कबल नटवक# फम# क बबल, अनम'दद ववज पन दर, ववज पन अवध , पस रण कत एव ल 3 जनव @ क वववरण, क # सप दद / -13- पस रर करन क शप पत आदद क 'नस एडवरट इजजग एजनस द र पस नह" कक ग अवप ल'कल कबल नटवक# पर उपर'क ववज पन पस रण क 3ग न क 'नस एडवरट इजजग भल. द र प प कक ग जजनक म भलक न हक क 'नस एडवरट इजजग भल. क नह" ह5 ।
क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र इन ववज पन@ मK तन म नस र कम शन क, 10 पत श र भश ह" प प क, ज न लककन इन ववज पन@ क पस रण क, 85 पत श र भश 3 उसक द र प प क, ग जबकक इस 85 पत श र भश क 3ग न ववज पन पस रर करन व ल सCबजन कबल नटवक# पद क' पस रण शप पत दन पर स कक जन लककन क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल. द र Dतनसन सवव#सज स भमल"3ग कर कDटरध बबल एव दस वज वव3 ग मK पस कर एव क # पDण# ह'न क, पवष वव3 ग द र कक बबन ह"
वव3 ग क कम# रर @ स भमल"3ग करक 3ग न प प कक रज
सरक र क' ह तन पह ई। ज स आर'प -
1. अध क र"/कम# र"गण,तनदश ल सD न एव जनसCपक# वव3 ग,
र जस न, ज पर
2. अध क र"/कम# र"गण, तनदश ल , स न तनक वव3 ग, र जस न
ज पर.
3. श अज <पड , तनदशक, म5सस# क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग भल., 02, म5सरD
ह ऊस, ज5कब र'ड, भसववल ल ईनस, ज पर.
4. श ल'कश गप , म5नजर, वररष पबन क, म डड क 'नस एडवरट इजजग
भल., 02, म5सरD ह ऊस , ज5कब र'ड, भसववल ल ईनस, ज पर एव अन
5. श अभम गप , प ट# नर Dतनसन सवव#सज, 697, ज ट क कए क र स , दप'ल ब ज र ज पर एव अन क ववरद अन ग# र -13(1)(ड ),13(2) प स एकट 1988 एव र -420,467,468,471,474,120-ब 3 र दणड सदह क अपर प म दष पम णण प ज न पर श सज व न5ण, अत ररक पभलस अ कक, भष र तनर' क ब Dर', (इनट.) ज पर न प भमक ज ररप'ट# पश क, जजस पर आल<च एफ आई आर सख -407/2017 पभलस न - प न आरक कनj, भष र तनर' क ब Dर', ज पर उपर'क अपर मK दज# कर अनस न प रC3 कक ग ।
ववद न 1 अध वक गण श एस एस ह'र न तनवदन कक ह5 कक
पकरण मK अ सख -2 क, ओर स पस प म सD न ररप'ट# क' दज# न
कर उस पर प भमक ज ररप'ट# क आ र पर ररप'ट# दज# क, ग ह5, ज'
-14-
र -162 दणड पकक सदह क प व न@ क' प3 वव करन स उस प म
सD न ररप'ट# नह" म न ज सक और इस पक र प भमक ज क आ र
पर प म सD न ररप'ट# दज# कर महतवपDण# क नDन क प व न क उललघन कक ग ह5 । प म सD न ररप'ट# क अवल'कन स ह" प म दष आर'वप अपर क घटक पDण# नह" ह' हn एव क'ई अपर बनन नह" प ज ह5 ।
उनह'न तनवदन कक ह5 कक प म सD न ररप'ट# क' व मन 3
भल जव ' 3 गण क ववरद क'ई अपर बनन पकट नह" ह' ह5 ।
प म सD न ररप'ट# र जन5त क दर क क रण द3 #वन वश दज# करव ग
ह5 ।
एक ह" घटन क, एक ह" ररप'ट# ह' ह5 लककन भष र तनर' क
वव3 ग न एक ह" घटन व भशक क, प अलग अलग ररप'ट# दज# करव
ग ह5, ज' ववध अनस र प'रण नह" ह5 । अभ3 कगण क आर'वप अपर
स ककस पक र क क'ई सCबन नह" ह5 । भष र तनर' क ब Dर' क' 3 र
दणड सदह क अपर मK अनस न करन क अध क र नह" ह5 और भष र
तनर' क अध तन म क क'ई अपर बनन पकट नह" ह' ह5 ।
अ : भष र तनर' क वव3 ग द र दज# क, ग उक प ' प म सD न
ररप'ट@ क' व उसक अनसधगक क, ग समस क व
# ह" क' तनरस कक
ज व।
ववद न 1 अध वक गण न अपन कe क सम न
# मK तनCन न त क
दष न पश कक हn :-
1. T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala and Others 2001(6) SCC 181
2. Lalita Kumari Vs. Govt. Of U.P. And Others 2014(2) SCC 1
3. Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah Vs. CBI and another 2013(6)SCC 348
4. Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat and others 2010(12)SCC254
5. A. Subair Vs. State of Kerela 2009(6) SCC 587
6. B.Jayaraj Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2014 (13) SCC 55
7. Satvir Singh Vs. State of Delhi 2014 (13) SCC 143
8. M.R.Purushotham Vs. State of Karnataka Criminal 1578 (2011) SC
9. Dr. Manmohan Singh Vs. CBI Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) CRLMP No. 5056-5057/2017 -15-
10.Sharad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangeeta Rane 2015(12) SCC 781
11.R. Kalyani Vs. Janak C. Metha and others 2009(1) SCC 516
12.S.K. Alagh Vs. State of U.P. And others 2008 (5) SCC 662
13.GHCl Employee Stock Option Trust Vs. India Infoline LTD 2013 (4) SCC 505 उक कe क ववर' कर हए ववद न 1 अत ररक मह ध वक श अनर ग शम # न तनवदन कक ह5 कक अ पररव द" श शकर ल ल गज#र द र ज' ररप'ट# प प हई , वह असपष , उस पर रन प म सD न ररप'ट# दज# नह"
क, ज कर पहल प भमक ज क, ज कर ब द मK प म सD न ररप'ट# दज# क, ग ह5 । उनह'न तनवदन कक ह5 कक प भमक ज अलग-अलग सम , अलग-अलग वव3 ग@, अलग-अलग क क # म@ क सCबन मK वक# ऑड#र स अपर पकट ह'न प ग ह5 । इसभलए प अलग अलग प म सD न ररप'ट# दज# क, ग ह5, ज' ववध अनस र सह" ह5 । उनह'न तनवदन कक ह5 कक पकरण मK अनस न पDण# कक ज कर आर'प पत पश कक ज क ह5 और अनस न मK आर'वप अपर पम णण प ग ह5, इसभलए ह नह" म न ज सक कक आर'वप अपर प म दष नह" बन ह5 । उनह'न तनवदन कक ह5 कक गण क, ओर स पस न त क दष न गण क' क'ई मदद नह" कर हn और न ह" पस कe क आ र पर प म सD न ररप'ट# क' तनरस कक ज सक ह5 । उनह'न स3 ध क ओ क' तनरस कक जन क, प न # क,।
ववद न 1 अत ररक मह ध वक श अनर ग शम # न अपन कe क सम न
#
मK तनCन न त क दष न पश कक हn :-
1.State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
2.Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Allias Ramu Vs. Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy and Others. (2011)12 SCC 437
3. Teeja Devi Alias Triza Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan and others (2014) 15 SCC 221
4. State of Karnataka and Another Vs. Pastkor P. Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728
5. Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2014)2 SCC-1
6. Awadesh Kumar Jha Alias Akhilesh Kumar Jha and Another Vs. State -16- of Bihar (2016)3 SCC 8
7. Parkash Singh Badal and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Others.
(2007)1 SCC-1
ववद न 1 अध वक अ पररव द" श अज कम र ज5न न 3 ववद न 1
अत ररक मह ध वक श अनर ग शम # द र पस कe क सम न
# कर हए
समस ध क ए असव क र करन क तनवदन कक ह5 ।
उ3 पक क कe पर वव र कक ग ।
जह क गण क इस क# क पश ह5 कक अ सख -2 द र
ररप'ट# द" और उसक आ र पर प भमक ज क आ र पर दज# क, ग
प म सD न ररप'ट# क' प म सD न ररप'ट# नह" म न ज सक । इस
सCबन मK ववद न 1 अध वक गण क, ओर स पस न त क दष न
Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others (उपर'क) क पकरण क प5र सख 86 स 89 व 119,120.4 एव 120.7 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
Therefore, conducting an investigation into an offence after registration of FIR underSection 154 of the Code is the "procedure established by law" and, thus, is in conformity with Article 21 of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the right of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution is protected, if the FIR is registered first and then the investigation is conducted in accordance with the provisions of law.
The term inquiry as per Section 2(g) of the Code reads as under:
'2(g) - "inquiry" means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court." Hence, it is clear that inquiry under the -17- Code is relatable to a judicial act and not to the steps taken by the Police which are either investigation after the stage ofSection 154 of the Code or termed as 'Preliminary Inquiry' and which are prior to the registration of FIR, even though, no entry in the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary has been made.------------------------------------.
Though there is reference to the term 'preliminary inquiry' and 'inquiry' under Sections 159 and Sections 202 and 340 of the Code, that is a judicial exercise undertaken by the Court and not by the Police and is not relevant for the purpose of the present reference--------------------------.
Besides, learned senior counsel relied on the special procedures prescribed under the CBI manual to be read into Section 154. It is true that the concept of "preliminary inquiry" is contained in Chapter IX of the Crime Manual of the CBI. However, this Crime Manual is not a statute and has not been enacted by the legislature. It is a set of administrative orders issued for internal guidance of the CBI officers. It cannot supersede the Code. Moreover, in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the Code itself, the provisions of the CBI Crime Manual cannot be relied upon to import the concept of holding of preliminary inquiry in the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to submit that the CBI is constituted under a Special Act, namely, the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and it derive its power to investigate from this Act.110) Therefore, in view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are -18- not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR. iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.
vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes
b) Commercial offences
c) Medical negligence cases
d) Corruption cases
e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.
While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.
-19-जजसमK क'ई ववव द नह" ह5 ।
उपर'क लभल कम र" क पकरण क ह" प5र सख -120.2 मK सपष रप
स अभ3तन #रर कक ग ह5 कक दद प प सD न स क'ई सज अपर
ह'न पकट नह" ह' ह5 बजलक ज आवश क ह', ' ह थ सतनजश करन
क भलए कक क'ई सज अपर पकट ह' ह5 नह"। प रजC3क ज क, ज
सक ह5 स ह" प5र 120.6 मK सपष रप स भष र स सCबजन पकरण@
मK थ ' व पररजस त @ क' मध नजर रख हए प भमक ज क, अनमत
द" ग ह5 ।
अ : उपर'क Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others (उपर'क) जजस द'न@ पक@ क ववद न 1 अध वक न पश कक ह5, क आ र पर ह नह" कह ज सक कक हस ग पकरण मK प भमक ज नह" क, ज सक ।
अ : ववद न 1 अध वक गण क इस क# मK क'ई स र नह" प ज
ह5 कक अ सख -2 क द र पस ररप'ट# पर ह" प म सD न ररप'ट# दज#
क, ज न दहए और प भमक ज अव5 ह5 ।
जह क ववद न 1 अध वक गण क इस क# क पश ह5 कक अ
सख -2 द र पस ररप'ट# पर एक ह" प म सD न ररप'ट# दज# क, ज न
दहए । प प Z क प Z क ररप'ट# दज# नह" क, ज सक ।
इस सCबन मK उनक, ओर स पस न त क दष न T.T. Antony
Vs. State of Kerala and Others (उपर'क) क प5र सख -18 स 20 मK
अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
An information given under sub-section (1) of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. is commonly known as First Information Report (F.I.R.) though this term is not used in the Code. It is a very important document. And as its nick name suggests it is the earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station. It sets the criminal law into motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends up with the formation of opinion under Section 169 or 170 of -20- Cr.P.C., as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. It is quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more informations than one are given to a police officer in charge of a police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case he need not enter every one of them in the station house diary and this is implied in Section 154 of Cr.P.C. Apart from a vague information by a phone call or a cryptic telegram, the information first entered in the station house diary, kept for this purpose, by a police officer in charge of a police station is the First Information Report - F.I.R. postulated by Section 154 of Cr.P.C. All other informations made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the First Information Report and entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling under Section 162 of Cr.P.C. No such information/statement can properly be treated as an F.I.R. and entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme of the Cr.P.C. Take a case where an FIR mentions cognizable offence under Section 307 or 326 I.P.C. and the investigating agency learns during the investigation or receives a fresh information that the victim died, no fresh FIR under Section 302 I.P.C. need be registered which will be irregular; in such a case alteration of the provision of law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt. Let us consider a different situation in which H having killed W, his wife, informs the police that she is killed by an unknown person or knowing that W is killed by his mother or sister, H owns up the responsibility and during investigation the truth is detected; it does not require filing of fresh FIR against H - the real offender-who can be arraigned in the report under Section 173(2) or 173(8) of Cr.P.C., as the case may be. It is of course permissible for the investigating officer to send up a report to the concerned Magistrate even earlier that investigation is being directed against the person suspected to be the accused.
-21-The scheme of the Cr.P.C. is that an officer in charge of a Police Station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 of Cr.P.C. on the basis of entry of the First Information Report, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of evidence collected he has to form opinion under Section 169 or 170 of Cr.P.C., as the case may be, and forward his report to the concerned Magistrate under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. However, even after filing such a report if he comes into possession of further information or material, he need not register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further investigation, normally with the leave of the court, and where during further investigation he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports; this is the import of sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C.
From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156,157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of Cr.P.C. only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 Cr.P.C. Thus there can be no second F.I.R. and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the F.I.R. in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a Police Station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 of the Cr.P.C.
उपर'क न त क दष न क प5र सख -18 मK म नन सव\च न ल
-22-
न ज' शबद क म मK भल हn, उनक अनस र
''It is quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more informations than one are given to a police officer in charge of a police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences.'' जजसस सपष ह5 कक एक ह" घटन क बब एक स अध क सज अपर घदट हआ ह5, ' उसक, एफ आई आर एक ह" ह'न दहए ।
ज5स कक ऊपर वववध कक ग ह5 कक अलग अलग सम म अलग अलग घटन ए , अलग अलग सज अपर अभ3 कगण द र कक जन प भमक ज न मK आ ह5 । इसभलए अलग अलग प म सD न ररप'ट# दज# क, ग ह5 । इसभलए ह न त क दष न गण क' क'ई मदद नह" कर ह5 ।
Awadesh Kumar Jha Alias Akhilesh Kumar Jha and Another Vs. State of Bihar (उपर'क) क पकरण मK T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala and Others ( उपर'क) क पकरण मK पत प दद भसद न @ पर वव र करन क ब द प5र सख -21 स 27 मK ह अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
21. We have carefully examined the rival contentions urged on behalf of both the parties and the decision of this Court in the case of Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah Vs. CBI and another 2013(6) SCC 348 upon which the strong reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the Appellants. The relevant paras of the abovesaid case cited by him read thus:
37. This Court has consistently laid down the law on the issue interpreting the Code, that a second FIR in respect of an offence or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction is not only impermissible but it violates Article 21 of the Constitution. In T.T. Antony, this Court has categorically held that registration of second FIR (which is not a cross-case) is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The following conclusion in paras 19, 20 and 27 of that judgment are relevant which read as under: (SCC pp. 196-97 & 200)
19. The scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure is that an officer in charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form an opinion Under Section 169 or 170Code of Criminal Procedure, as the case may be, and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned Under Section 173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure.-23-
However, even after filing such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, he need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to make further investigation, normally with the leave of the court, and where during further investigation he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports; this is the import of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure.
20. From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 17 3 Code of Criminal Procedure only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure.
xx xx xx
27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens Under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that Sub-section (8) of Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report Under Section 173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 Code of Criminal Procedure, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or -24- successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report Under Section 173 (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure or Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
The above referred declaration of law by this Court has never been diluted in any subsequent judicial pronouncements even while carving out exceptions.
38. Mr. Raval, learned ASG, by referring T.T. Antony submitted that the said principles are not applicable and relevant to the facts and circumstances of this case as the said judgment laid down the ratio that there cannot be two FIRs relating to the same offence or occurrence. The learned ASG further pointed out that in the present case, there are two distinct incidents/occurrences, inasmuch as one being the conspiracy relating to the murder of Sohrabuddin with the help of Tulsiram Prajapati and the other being the conspiracy to murder Tulsiram Prajapati - a potential witness to the earlier conspiracy to murder Sohrabuddin. We are unable to accept the claim of the learned ASG. As a matter of fact, the aforesaid proposition of law making registration of fresh FIR impermissible and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution is reiterated and reaffirmed in the following subsequent decisions of this Court: (1) Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2) Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, (3) Chirra Shivraj v. State of A.P., and (4) C. Muniappan v. State of T.N. In C. Muniappan this Court explained the "consequence test" i.e. if an offence forming part of the second FIR arises as a consequence of the offence alleged in the first FIR then offences covered by both the FIRs are the same and, accordingly, the second FIR will be impermissible in law. In other words, the offences covered in both the FIRs shall have to be treated as a part of the first FIR.
xx xx xx 58.3. Even after filing of such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, there is no need to register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further investigation normally with the leave of the court and where during further investigation, he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports which is evident from Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code. Under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the Code, only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 of the Code. Thus, there can be no second FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.
22.The second FIR was registered against the Appellants on a written complaint of Arvind Kumar Singh, Inspector of Police at Kishanganj police station. It was found by the investigating officer during the course of investigation in the first FIR that real name of the Appellant No. 1 was Awadesh Kumar Jha s/o Late Kaladhar Jha r/o Gram Akbarpur, District Purnea and was found to be working as Development Officer at New India Assurance Company Ltd. Branch Purnia, contrary to the same the personal information was furnished by him at the time of investigation of the case on the first FIR. Similarly, with regard to the Appellant No. 2 his father's name was found to be Late Ramendra -25- Prasad and not Late Ramanand. His actual address was found to be Ranipatti P.S. Kumarkhand, District Madhepura and he was found to be working as surveyor and investigator of all branches of General Assurance Company. It is also alleged in the second FIR that both the Appellants had not disclosed their correct names, father's name, their address and occupation in the bail applications filed by them in respect of the case arising out of first FIR before the Additional Sessions Judge.
23.From a bare perusal of second FIR, it is abundantly clear that both the Appellants have furnished wrong information to the police as to their names, father's name and address during the course of investigation made on the first FIR. This Court is of the view that the offences alleged to have committed by them are mentioned in second FIR, which offences are distinct offences committed by both the Appellants and the same have no connection with the offences for which the first FIR was registered against them. Therefore, for the reason stated supra, the contention urged by the learned Counsel on behalf of both the Appellants that instead of institution of second FIR for the said offences, a further investigation as provided Under Sub-section (8) to Section 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure should have been done by the investigation officer on the ground of they being the part of same transaction with offences registered under first FIR is wholly untenable in law and liable to be rejected.
24. Further, the decision of this Court in the case of Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra) upon which strong reliance is placed by the learned Counsel on behalf of both the Appellants does not render any assistance to them in the case at hand. This Court in the said case after examining the relevant provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure has categorically held thus:
58.2. The various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly show that an officer-in-charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 of the Code on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, the investigating officer has to form an opinion Under Section 169 or 170 of the Code and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned Under Section 173(2) of the Code. 58.3. Even after filing of such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, there is no need to register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further investigation normally with the leave of the court and where during further investigation, he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports which is evident from Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code. Under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the Code, only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 of the Code. Thus, there can be no second FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.
xx xx xx 58.5. The first information report is a report which gives first information with regard to any offence. There cannot be second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first FIR.-26-
27. Therefore, for the above said reasons the submissions made on behalf of both the Appellants are not tenable in law and the same cannot be accepted by this Court. Further, the case of Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra) upon which strong reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for both the Appellants is also totally inapplicable to the fact situation and it does not support the case of both the Appellants.
जजसक अनस र अन क'ई प म सD न स सCबजन ररप'ट# स सज
अपर /अपर @ क अल व भ3नन सज अपर कक ग ह5, ' उसक भलए
अन प म सD न ररप'ट# दज# करन क' सह" म न ह5 ।
इस क रण 3 ववद न 1 अध वक गण क इस न त क दष न क
पररपक मK पस क# मK क'ई स र नह" प ज ह5 ।
इस सCबन मK ह ल ह" मK म नन सव\च न ल न State of
Jharkhand Through SP, CBI Vs. Lalu Prasad @ Lalu Prasad Yadav ककभमनल अप ल सख - 394/2017, ज' कक म नन सव\च न ल दर ददन क 08.05.2017 क' तनणण# क, ग ह5, क प5र सख - 31,32,33 व 35 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ग ह5 कक :-
31. Section 218 deals with separate charges for distinct offences.
Section 219 quoted above, provides that three offences of the same kind can be clubbed in one trial committed within one year. Section 220 speaks of trial for more than one offence if it is the same transaction. In the instant case it cannot be said that defalcation is same transaction as the transactions are in different treasuries for different years, different amounts, different allotment letters, supply orders and suppliers. Thus the provision of section 221 is not attracted in the instant case. There are different sets of accused persons in different cases with respect to defalcation.
32. There may be a conspiracy in general one and a separate one. There may be larger conspiracy and smaller conspiracy which may develop in successive stages involving different accused persons. In the instant case defalcations have been made in various years by combination of different accused persons. Thus, there can be separate trials on the basis of law laid down by this Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) (1979) 2 SCC 322 wherein this Court has laid down thus :
"11. ....The offences alleged in the first case were Section 120-B read with Section 420 and Section 406, Indian Penal Code, while the offences alleged in the second case were Section 120-B read with Section 411, Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972.......... We are clear, in the present case, that the conspiracies which are the subject-matter of the two cases cannot be said to be identical though the conspiracy which is the subject-matter of the first case may, perhaps, be said to have turned out to be part of the conspiracy which is the subject-matter of the second case. As we mentioned earlier, when investigation commenced in FIR. R.C. 4 of -27- 1976, apart from the circumstance that the property involved was the same, the link between the conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate and the conspiracy to dispose of the stolen property was not known."
33. In the instant case, offences are not the same offence. There can be different trials for the same offence if tried under two different enactments altogether and comprised of two different offences under different Acts/statutes without violation of the provisions of Article 20 (2) or Section 300 Cr.PC. This Court has decided the issue in various cases:-
(a) In Kharkan & Ors. v. The State of U.P. (1964) 4 SCR 673 this Court has laid down thus : "Even if the two incidents could be viewed as connected so as to form parts of one transaction it is obvious that the offences were distinct and required different charges. The assault on Tikam in fulfilment of the common object of the unlawful assembly was over when the unlawful assembly proceeded to the house of Tikam to loot it. The new common object to beat Puran was formed at a time when the common object in respect of Tikam had been fully worked out and even if the two incidents could be taken to be connected by unity of time and place (which they were not), the offences were distinct and required separate charges. The learned Sessions Judge was right in breaking up the single charge framed by the magistrate and ordering separate trials. In this view the prior acquittal cannot create a bar in respect of the conviction herein reached."
(b) In Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay (1953) SCR 730 this Court has laid down thus : "Appellant had smuggled gold into India and was booked u/s 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and subsequently when no one came to claim the gold, he was charged 11/8 8 0f FERA. He challenged this as violation of Art. 20(2). The Court analysed the scope of Art. 20(2) and held that the "prosecution" must be before a court of law or judicial tribunal. The plea of double jeopardy was discarded as it was held that the Customs authorities were not a judicial tribunal or court. For double jeopardy, the test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other and not that the facts relied on by the prosecution are the same in the two trials."
(c) In State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte (1961) 3 SCR 107 a Constitution Bench of this Court has laid down as to the issue regarding conviction under section 409 IPC and section 105 of Insurance Act. The submission of double jeopardy was repelled with respect to offences under section 11 of IPC and section 105 of Insurance Act. It was held that the offences under both the Acts are distinct due to their ingredients. So as to constitute double jeopardy two offences should be identical.
(d) In T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rengachari (1969) 3 SCR 65, appellant was sought to be prosecuted under section 177 IPC and section 52 of Income Tax Act, 1922 for furnishing wrong information in his tax returns. On consideration of section 26 of General Clauses Act, this Court held that the provision did not provide a bar on trial and conviction for the same offence under more than one enactment in case ingredients of offences are distinct. It only barred double punishment and not double conviction.
-28-(e) In V.K. Agarwal v. Vasantraj B. Bhatia (1988) 3 SCC 467 the question arose whether acquittal of an accused charged with having committed the offence punishable under section 111 read with section 135 of Customs Act, 1969 created a legal bar to the accused, subsequently being prosecuted under section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. It was held that the ingredients of offence under each of the enactments were quite different. The Court applied the test developed in Maqbool Hussain (supra) and held the two offences to be different in scope and contents of their ingredients. The Court also relied upon S.L. Apte's decision (supra) and observed that what is necessary is to analyse the ingredients of the two offences and not the allegations made in two complaints. No doubt about it that there can be separate offences but ingredients would remain same under penal provision but that would also not make out a case of violating the provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution and Section 300 Cr.P.C.
(f) In case ingredients of the offences to be tried separately arise out of the same offence, there can be separate trials under two enactments, if the ingredients constituting two offences are different under different Acts, there is no bar for separate trials. In State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Ors. (1988) 4 SCC 655 it was held :"The expression "any act or omission which constitutes any offence under this Act" in Section 56 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 merely imports the idea that the same act or omission might constitute an offence under another law and could be tried under such other law or laws also. Further held that, if there are two distinct and separate offences with different ingredients under two different enactments. A double punishment is not barred. The same set of facts can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under the IPC and at the same time constitute an offence under any other law."
(g) In State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh & Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 152 this Court was dealing with vires of Rajasthan Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987. It was urged that sections 5 and 6 of new Sati Act were overlapping. It was held that with regard to Article 20(2) that subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment are not barred if the ingredients of two offences are distinct. There can be separate offences from same set of facts and hence no double jeopardy.
(h) In Monica Bedi v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) 1 SCC 284 this Court considered the meaning of the expression "same offence"
employed in Article 20(2) and observed that second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. This Court has observed thus :
"26. What is the meaning of the expression used in Article 20(2) "for the same offence"? What is prohibited under Article 20(2) is, that the second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. ....
29. It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20(2) is not available. It is settled law that a -29- person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form the same offence."
(i) In Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of M.P. (2012) 7 SCC 621, with respect to double jeopardy, this Court has laid down thus :
"33. In view of the above, the law is well settled that in order to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution i.e. doctrine of autrefois acquit or Section 300 Code of Criminal Procedure. or Section 71 Indian Penal Code or Section 26 of General Clauses Act, ingredients of the offences in the earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the same and not different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences are the same is not identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offence. Motive for committing offence cannot be termed as ingredients of offences to determine the issue. The plea of autrefois acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the judgment of acquittal in the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter charge."
.(j) In State of Rajasthan v. Bhagwan Das Agrawal (2013) 16 SCC 574 there were 3 FIRs. registered with respect to illegal supply of explosives. Charge was under the Explosives Act. This Court held that the nature and manner of the offences committed by the accused persons were not identical but were different, and as such FIRs. were not relating to the same offence as different acts happened in different places. As such the provisions contained in section 186 Cr.PC would not apply.
(k) In State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjay etc. (2014) 9 SCC 772 this Court considered the maxim "nemo debet bis vexari prouna et eadem causa"
i.e. no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. In case ingredients are different there can be separate trial for the same offence also.
This Court has laid down thus :
"52. It is well known principle that the rule against double jeopardy is based on a maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, which means no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. Article 20 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the offence more than once. However, it is also settled that a subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment has no bar if the ingredients of the two offences are distinct."
34. In the light of aforesaid discussion, it is appropriate to consider the submissions raised by Shri Surendra Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Lalu Prasad Yadav. It was submitted by learned senior counsel that since the conspiracy was between 1988 and 1996 which included the period of 1994-1995, the conviction has been made on the charge of conspiracy from 1988 to 1996 which included all the treasuries of the erstwhile State of Bihar. There was no charge of separate conspiracy. Charges being similar in the cases which have been quashed. No case is made out for trial under section 120-B. Same and identical circumstances are being relied upon by the prosecution.
-30-There are no new or additional circumstances in the cases which have been quashed. The conspiracies referred to are one and the same and not different conspiracies. Thus, in view of the trial which had concluded, there cannot be further trial on the charge of conspiracy.
35. We are unable to accept the submissions raised by learned senior counsel. Though there was one general charge of conspiracy, which was allied in nature, the charge was qualified with the substantive charge of defalcation of a particular sum from a particular treasury in particular time period. The charge has to be taken in substance for the purpose of defalcation from a particular treasury in a particular financial year exceeding the allocation made for the purpose of animal husbandry on the basis of fake vouchers, fake supply orders etc. The sanctions made in Budget were separate for each and every year. This Court has already dealt with this matter when the prayers for amalgamation and joint trial had been made and in view of the position of law and various provisions discussed above, we are of the opinion that separate trials which are being made are in accordance with provisions of law otherwise it would have prejudiced the accused persons considering the different defalcations from different treasuries at different times with different documents. Whatever could be combined has already been done. Each defalcation would constitute an independent offence. Thus, by no stretch, it can be held to be in violation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 Cr.P.C. Separate trials in such cases is the very intendment of law. There is no room to raise such a grievance. Though evidence of general conspiracy has been adduced in cases which have been concluded, it may be common to all the cases but at the same time offences are different at different places, by different accused persons. As and when a separate offence is committed, it becomes punishable and the substantive charge which has to be taken is that of the offence under the P.C. Act etc. There was conspiracy hatched which was continuing one and has resulted into various offences. It was joined from time to time by different accused persons, so whenever an offence is committed in continuation of the conspiracy, it would be punishable separately for different periods as envisaged in section 212(2), obviously, there have to be separate trials. Thus it cannot be said to be a case of double jeopardy at all. It cannot be said that for the same offence the accused persons are being tried again.
उपर'क अव श कम र व ल लD पस द दव क पकरण@ मK पत प दद
भसद न @ क अनसरण मK गण क अध वक क उक कe मK क'ई स र नह"
प ज ह5 ह नह" म न ज सक ह5 कक हस ग म मल मK प
प Z क प Z क प म सD न ररप'ट# गल दज# क, ग ह5 ।
ववद न 1 अध वक गण न तनवदन कक ह5 कक दद प म सD न
ररप'ट# अव5 ह5 और उसक अनसरण मK क'ई अनस न नह" कक ग ह5, '
प म सD न ररप'ट# व उसक अनसधगक कक ग अनस न क' रद कक
जन दहए।
-31-
इस सCबन मK Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat and others
(उपर'क) क पकरण मK म नन सव\च न ल न प5र सख -10,20,21,
44 स 46 व 46 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ग ह5 कक:-
Thus, in view of the above, the law on the subject emerges to the effect that an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. is a very important document. It is the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by the Officer In-Charge of the Police Station. It sets the machinery of criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends with the formation of an opinion under Section 169 or 170 Cr.P.C., as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Thus, it is quite possible that more than one piece of information be given to the Police Officer In- charge of the Police Station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case, he need not enter each piece of information in the Diary. All other information given orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the facts mentioned in the First Information Report will be statements falling under Section 162 Cr.P.C.
In such a case the court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case, the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR comes forward with a different version or counter claim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted.
The charge sheets filed by the investigating agency in both the cases are against the same set of accused. A charge sheet is the outcome of an investigation. If the investigation has not been conducted fairly, we are of the view that such vitiated investigation cannot give rise to a valid charge sheet. Such investigation would ultimately prove to be precursor of miscarriage of criminal justice. In such a case the court would -32- simply try to decipher the truth only on the basis of guess or conjunctures as the whole truth would not come before it. It will be difficult for the court to determine how the incident took place wherein three persons died and so many persons including the complainant and accused got injured .
Not only the fair trial but fair investigation is also part of constitutional rights guaranteed under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, investigation must be fair, transparent and judicious as it is the minimum requirement of rule of law. Investigating agency cannot be permitted to conduct an investigation in tainted and biased manner. Where non- interference of the court would ultimately result in failure of justice, the court must interfere. In such a situation, it may be in the interest of justice that independent agency chosen by the High Court makes a fresh investigation.
परन हस ग पकरण मK ज5स कक ऊपर ववव न कक ग ह5 कक एक
स अध क प म सD न ररप'ट# दज# करन अव5 नह" म न ग ह5 क @कक
स3 एफ आई आर अलग-अलग लन-दन (transaction) स सCबजन ह5
एक ह" लन-दन (transaction) स सCबजन नह" ह5 । इसभलए ह न त क
दष न 3 गण क' क'ई मदद नह" कर ह5 । जब उक पक र स प म
सD न ररप'ट# क' अव5 नह" म न ज सक , ' पस कe क आ र पर
उसमK हस कप कर प म सD न ररप'ट# क' क' तनरस कक ज न क क'ई पश
ह" नह" उठ ह5 ।
अ : ववद न 1 अध वक गण क इस क# मK क'ई स र नह" प ज
ह5 ।
प म सD न ररप'ट# क' तनरस कक ज न क सCबन मK म नन
सव\च न ल न State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
"108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise -33- of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that -34- there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
हमK इस पकरण मK ह" दखन ह5 कक '' आ उक आ र@ मK स ककस
आ र पर प म सD न ररप'ट# व उसक अनसधगक समस क व
# ह" क'
पस कe क सCबन मK उक स @ आ र@ मK स प म सD न ररप'ट# व
उसक अनसधगक क व
# ह" क' तनरस कक ज न क क'ई आ र वव म न ह5
नह"।
Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Allias Ramu Vs. Kovvuri
Satyanarayana Reddy and Others.( उपर'क) पकरण मK म नन सव\च
न ल न अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
It is neither feasible nor practicable to lay down exhaustively as to on what ground the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised. But some attempts have been made in that behalf in some of the decisions of this Court vide State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335), Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary and Others (1992 (4) SCC 305), Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and Another vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Another (1995 (6) SCC
194), and Indian Oil Corp. vs. NEPC India Ltd. and Others -35- In Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. and Others (2006) 6 SCC 736 a petition under Section 482 was filed to quash two criminal complaints. The High Court by a common judgment allowed the petition and quashed both the complaints. The order was challenged in appeal to this Court. While deciding the appeal, this Court laid down the following principles:
"1. The High courts should not exercise their inherent powers to repress a legitimate prosecution. The power to quash criminal complaints should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
2. The criminal complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the alleged offence. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the criminal complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the criminal proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the alleged offence.
3. It was held that a given set of facts may make out (a) purely a civil wrong, or (b) purely a criminal offence or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence."
In State of Orissa & Anr. vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540, it has been held that probabilities of the prosecution version cannot be analysed at this stage. Likewise the allegations of mala fides of the informant are of secondary importance. The relevant passage reads thus:
"It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with."
In Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr. vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. AIR 1988 SC 709, this Court held as under:-
"The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is -36- likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."
This Court, while reconsidering the Judgment in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr. vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. AIR 1988 SC 709, consistently observed that where matters are also of civil nature i.e. matrimonial, family disputes, etc., the Court may consider "special facts", "special features" and quash the criminal proceedings to encourage genuine settlement of disputes between the parties.
The said Judgment was reconsidered and explained by this Court in State of Bihar & Anr. vs. Shri P.P. Sharma & Anr. AIR 1991 SC 1260 which reads as under:
"Madhaorao J. Scindhia v. Sambhaji Rao AIR 1988 SC 709, also does not help the respondents. In that case the allegations constituted civil wrong as the trustees created tenancy of Trust property to favour the third party. A private complaint was laid for the offence under Section 467 read with Section 34 and Section 120B I.P.C. which the High Court refused to quash under Section 482. This Court allowed the appeal and quashed the proceedings on the ground that even on its own contentions in the complaint, it would be a case of breach of trust or a civil wrong but no ingredients of criminal offences were made out. On those facts and also due to the relation of the settler, the mother, the appellant and his wife, as the son and daughter-in-law, this Court interfered and allowed the appeal. Therefore, the ratio therein is of no assistance to the facts in this case. It cannot be considered that this Court laid down as a proposition of law that in every case the court would examine at the preliminary stage whether there would be ultimate chances of conviction on the basis of allegation and exercise of the power under Section 482 or Article 226 to quash the proceedings or the charge-sheet."
Thus, the judgment in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) does not lay down a law of universal application. Even as per the law laid down therein, the Court can not examine the facts/evidence etc. in every case to find out as to whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in conviction. The ratio of Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) is applicable in cases where the Court finds that the dispute involved therein is predominantly civil in nature and that the parties should be given a chance to reach a compromise e.g. matrimonial, property and family disputes etc. etc. The superior Courts have been given inherent powers to prevent the abuse of the process of court where the court finds that the ends of -37- justice may be met by quashing the proceedings, it may quash the proceedings, as the end of achieving justice is higher than the end of merely following the law. It is not necessary for the court to hold a fullfledged inquiry or to appreciate the evidence, collected by the Investigating Agency to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.
Teeja Devi Alias Triza Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan and others (उपर'क) क पकरण मK म नन सव\च न ल न प5र सख -5 व 9 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
It has been rightly submitted by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that ordinarily power Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should not be used to quash an FIR because that amounts to interfering with the statutory power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence in accordance with the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure. As per law settled by a catena of judgments, if the allegations made in the FIR prima facie disclose a cognizable offence, interference with the investigation is not proper and it can be done only in rarest of rare cases where the court is satisfied that the prosecution is malicious and vexatious.
We have no hesitation in holding that in the facts of the case, the High Court was not justified in interfering with the police investigation and quashing the FIR. This is not at all a rare case. Without a thorough investigation, it is not possible or proper to hold whether the allegataions made by the complainant are true or not. Hence the investigation should have been allowed to continue so that on filing of the report under Section 173 CrPC the affected party could pursue its remedy against the report in accordance with law. Keeping in view the fact the the criminal case was at the stage of investigation by the police the High Court was not justified in holding that the investigation of the impugned FIR is totally unwarranted and that the same would amount to gross abuse of the process of the court.
State of Karnataka and Another Vs. Pastkor P. Raju ( उपर'क) क पकरण मK म नन सव\च न ल न अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :--38-
There is another aspect of the matter which deserves notice. The FIR in the case was lodged on 15.1.2005 and the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed within 12 days on 27.1.2005 when the investigation had just commenced. The petition was allowed by the High Court on 23.2.2005 when the investigation was still under progress. No report as contemplated by Section 173 Cr.P.C. had been submitted by the incharge of the police station concerned to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. Section 482 Cr.P.C. saves inherent powers of the High Court and such a power can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This power can be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings pending in any Court but the power cannot be exercised to interfere with the statutory power of the police to conduct investigation in a cognizable offence. This question has been examined in detail in Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja & Anr. (2003) 6 SCC 195, where after referring to King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18, H.N. Rishbud & Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196, State of West Bengal v. SN Basak AIR 1963 SC 447, Abhinandan Jha & Ors. v. Dinesh Mishra AIR 1968 SC 117 and State of Bihar & Anr. v. JAC Saldanha & Ors. (1980) 1 SCC 554, it was observed as under in para 20 of the reports :-
"20. Thus the legal position is absolutely clear and also settled by judicial authorities that the Court would not interfere with the investigation or during the course of investigation which would mean from the time of the lodging of the First Information Report till the submission of the report by the officer in charge of police station in court under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., this field being exclusively reserved for the investigating agency."
This being the settled legal position, the High Court ought not to have interfered with and quashed the entire proceedings in exercise of power conferred by Section 482 Cr.P.C. when the matter was still at the investigation stage.
16. In the concluding paragraph of the judgment under challenge, the High Court has also observed that considering the facts and circumstances and the allegations made in the complaint it could be said that the initiation of criminal proceedings is abuse of process of Court and miscarriage of justice. No reasons in support of the aforesaid observation have been given. As already stated, the case -39- was still under investigation and the police was in the process of collecting evidence. The sweeping remark made by the High Court in the circumstances of the case was wholly unjustified.
उपर'क न त क दष न @ मK पत प दद भसद न @ क पररपक मK प म
सD न ररप'र#स क' तनरस करन क उपर'क आ र@ मK स क'ई आ र पकट
नह" ह' ह5
जह क गण क ववद न 1 अध वक क इस क# क पश ह5 कक
र जन5त क दर क क रण प म सD न ररप'ट# दज# करव ज कर झDठ आर'प
लग ग हn। इस सCबन मK इ न ह" कहन प #प ह'ग कक दद
र जन5त क क रण@ स क'ई दद क'ई आर'प लग ग ह5 और वह आर'प
अनस न मK सत प ग ह5, ' 3 प भमक रप स इस थ क' दवषग
रख हए कक आर'प र जन5त क स परर ह' सक ह5, उसक, ज कक जन
मK क'ई अवर' नह" ह5 और दद ज क ब द आर'प सत प ज हn,
ज मK क'ई स र प ज ह5, ' प भमक ज करन मK क'ई अवर' नह"
ह5 ।
इस सCबन मK Parkash Singh Badal and Another Vs. State of
Punjab and Others (उपर'क) क पकरण मK म नन सव\च न ल न
प5र सख - 60,62 व 74 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
Great emphasis has been led by the appellants on some factual scenario to show that the complainant was close to incumbent Chief Minister and he has been rewarded subsequently for making the complaint. In essence, the plea is that mala fides are involved. This allegation of mala fides is also linked with the so called conferment of power with the particular police station at Mohali and conferment of jurisdiction on a particular Special Judge by Notification dated 17.11.2003.
So far as the allegation that political opponent had lodged the complaint is concerned, that itself is not sufficient for the Court to interfere. When the allegation is made, investigation is undertaken to find out whether there is any substance in the allegation. Merely because the political opponent was the complainant that does not per se lead to an inference that the complaint has to be thrown out or that -40- no notice should be taken thereof.
The ultimate test therefore is whether the allegations have any substance. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold because a political opponent or a person with political difference raises an allegation of commission of offence. Therefore, the plea of mala fides as raised cannot be maintained.
अ : ववद न 1 अध वक गण क उक क# मK 3 क'ई स र नह" प ज ह5 ।
Sharad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangeeta Rane ( उपर'क) क पकरण मK म नन सव\च न ल न प5र सख -8 स 10 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
8. Barring the aforesaid allegation, there is no allegation against him. In the initial statement made Under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the complainant after narrating the facts, has stated thus:
Sanghi Brothers Limited run by Mr. Sharad Sanghi committed cheating with the Applicant by delivering accidented vehicle in place of a new one and caused gross financial loss. Applicant is operating the vehicle after borrowing loan from Bank and the vehicle is not worth operating at present due to said defects. I have filed the Photostat copies of the concerning documents in the case.
9. The allegations which find place against the Managing Director in his personal capacity, as we notice, are absolutely vague. When a complainant intends to proceed against the Managing Director or any officer of a company, it is essential to make requisite allegation to constitute the vicarious liability. In Maksud Sajyad v. State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 668, it has been held, thus:
Where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. The Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the Company. The learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct question viz. as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be -41- correct in its entirety, would lead to the conclusion that the Respondents herein were personally liable for any offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligator on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.
In this regard, reference to a three-Judge Bench decision in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 89 would be apposite. While dealing with an offence Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the Court explaining the duty of a Magistrate while issuing process and his power to dismiss a complaint Under Section 203 without even issuing process observed thus:
...a complaint must contain material to enable the Magistrate to make up his mind for issuing process. If this were not the requirement, consequences could be far-reaching. If a Magistrate had to issue process in every case, the burden of work before the Magistrate as well as the harassment caused to the Respondents to whom process is issued would be tremendous. Even Section 204 of the Code starts with the words "if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding". The words "sufficient ground for proceeding" again suggest that ground should be made out in the complaint for proceeding against the Respondent. It is settled law that at the time of issuing of the process the Magistrate is required to see only the allegations in the complaint and where allegations in the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute an offence against a person, the complaint is liable to be dismissed.
After so stating, the Court analysed Section 141 of the Act and after referring to certain other authorities answered a referent and relevant part of the answer reads as follows:
It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint Under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this -42- averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.
10. The same principle has been reiterated in S.K. Alagh v. State of UP ; Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v.
Datar Switchgear Ltd. GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Ltd.
जजसमK क'ई ववव द नह" ह5 परन हस ग पकरण मK प रजC3क ज क
पश गण व कCपन द र कक ग आपर ध क कZत क वववरण दद
ग ह5 अ : ववद न 1 अध वक गण क, ओर स ह 3 तनवदन कक ग
ह5 कक -अभ3 क सख -1 म5सस# क 'नस एडवरट ईजजग प .भल. ह5 , अ :
उसक ड रकटर क ववरद प म सD न ररप'ट# दज# करव न क भलए उनक द र कक ग कZत सपष ह'न दहए आर'प सपष ह'न दहए। कCपन द र कक ग कZत क भलए ड रकटर क' उतरद नह" ठहर ज सक , मK क'ई स र नह" प ज ह5 ।
R. Kalyani Vs. Janak C. Metha and others (उपर'क) क पकरण मK म नन सव\च न ल दर प5र सख -32,33 व 41 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ग ह5 कक :-
Allegations contained in the FIR are for commission of offences under a general statute. A vicarious liability can be fastened only by reason of a provision of a statute and not otherwise. For the said purpose, a legal fiction has to be created. Even under a special statute when the vicarious criminal liability is fastened on a person on the premise that he was in- charge of the affairs of the company and responsible to it, all the ingredients laid down under the statute must be fulfilled. A legal fiction must be confined to the object and purport for which it has been created.
In Sham Sunder & Ors. v. State of Haryana [(1989) 4 SCC 630], this Court held :
"9. But we are concerned with a criminal liability under penal provision and not a civil" liability. The penal provision must be strictly construed in the first place. Secondly, there is no vicarious liability in criminal law unless the statute takes that also within its fold. Section 10 does not provide for such liability. It does not make all the -43- partners liable for the offence whether they do business or not."
27. If a person, thus, has to be proceeded with as being variously liable for the acts of the company, the company must be made an accused. In any event, it would be a fair thing to do so, as legal fiction is raised both against the Company as well as the person responsible for the acts of the Company.
-अभ3 क कCपन , प .भल. कCपन ह5 और प भमक ज मK कCपन
क ड रकटर श अज <पड क ववरद सपष रप स आर'प लग ग हn।
अ : उपर'क न त क दष न मK पत प दद भसद न स गण क'ई
ल 3 प प करन क अध क र" नह" ह5 ।
S.K. Alagh Vs. State of U.P. And others ( उपर'क) क पकरण मK म नन सव\च न ल न प5र सख 19 व 20 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
As, admittedly, drafts were drawn in the name of the company, even if appellant was its Managing Director, he cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. If and when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides specifically therefor. In absence of any provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence committed by the company itself. {See Sabitha Ramamurthy and Anr. v. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhy We may, in this regard, notice that the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, Negotiable Instruments Act, Employees' Provident Fund (Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 1952 etc. have created such vicarious liability. It is interesting to note that Section 14A of the 1952 Act specifically creates an offence of criminal breach of trust in respect of the amount deducted from the employees by the company. In terms of the explanations appended to Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, a legal fiction has been created to the effect that the employer shall be deemed to have committed an offence of criminal breach of trust. Whereas a person in charge of the affairs of the company and in control thereof has been made vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company along with the company but even in a case falling under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code vicarious liability has been -44- held to be not extendable to the Directors or officers of the company. {See Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and Ors GHCl Employee Stock Option Trust Vs. India Infoline (उपर'क) क पकरण मK म नन सव\च न ल न प5र सख -12,14,18 व 19 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
From a bare perusal of the complaint and the allegations made therein, we do not find in any of the paragraphs that the complainant has made specific allegations against respondent Nos.2 to 7. In paragraph 2 of the complaint, it is alleged that respondent Nos.2 to 6 are looking after the day-to-day affairs of the Company. With whom the complainant or its authorized representative interacted has also not been specified. Although in paragraph 11 of the complaint it is alleged that the complainant on numerous occasions met accused Nos.2 to 7 and requested to refund the amount, but again the complainant has not made specific allegation about the date of meeting and whether it was an individual meeting or collective meeting. Similarly, in paragraph 17 of the complaint, there is no allegation that a particular Director or Managing Director fabricated debit note. In the entire complaint there are bald and vague allegations against respondent Nos.2 to 7.
Be that as it may, as held by this Court, summoning of accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Hence, criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. The order of Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The Magistrate has to record his satisfaction with regard to the existence of a prima facie case on the basis of specific allegations made in the complaint supported by satisfactory evidence and other material on record.
From a bare perusal of the order passed by the Magistrate, it reveals that two witnesses including one of the trustees were examined by the complainant but none of them specifically stated as to which of the accused committed breach of trust or -45- cheated the complainant except general and bald allegations made therein. While ordering issuance of summons, the learned Magistrate concluded as under :-
"The complainant has submitted that the accused Nos.2 to 6 are the directors of the company and accused No.7 is the secretary of the company and were looking after the day to day affairs of the company and were also responsible for conduct and business of the accused No.1 and some time or the other have interacted with the complainant.
I have heard arguments on behalf of the complainant and perused the record. From the allegations raised, documents placed on record and the evidence led by the witnesses, prima facie an offence u/s 415, 409/34/120B is made out. Let all the accused hence be summoned to face trial under the aforesaid sections on PF/RC/Speed Post/courier for 2.12.2008."
In the order issuing summons, the learned Magistrate has not recorded his satisfaction about the prima facie case as against respondent Nos.2 to 7 and the role played by them in the capacity of Managing Director, Company Secretary or Directors which is sine qua non for initiating criminal action against them. Recently, in the case of M/s.Thermax Ltd. & Ors. vs. K.M. Johny & Ors. 2011 (11) SCALE 128, & ors. while dealing with a similar case, this Court held as under :-
"20. Though Respondent No.1 has roped all the appellants in a criminal case without their specific role or participation in the alleged offence with the sole purpose of settling his dispute with appellant-Company by initiating the criminal prosecution, it is pointed out that appellant Nos. 2 to 8 are the Ex-Chairperson, Ex- Directors and Senior Managerial Personnel of appellant No.1 - Company, who do not have any personal role in the allegations and claims of Respondent No.1. There is also no specific allegation with regard to their role
21. Apart from the fact that the complaint lacks necessary ingredients of Sections 405, 406, 420 read with Section 34 IPC, it is to be noted that the concept of 'vicarious liability' is unknown to criminal law. As observed earlier, there is no specific allegation made against any person but the members of the Board and senior executives are joined as the persons looking after the management -46- and business of the appellant-Company."
A. Subair Vs. State of Kerela (उपर'क) क पकरण मK म नन सव\च न ल न प5र सख -14 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
Insofar as Section 13 (1)(d) of the Act is concerned, its essential ingredients are: (i) that he should have been a public servant; (ii) that he should have used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position as such public servant and (iii) that he should have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any person.
इस पक र B.Jayaraj Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (उपर'क) क पकरण मK म नन सव\च न ल न प5र सख -7,8 व 9 मK अभ3तन #रर कक ह5 कक :-
In so far as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma Vs. State of A.P. and C.M. Girish Babu Vs. C.B.I.
8.In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case in so far as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Exbt.P-11) before LW-9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW-1 and the contents of Exhibit P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned -47- trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section
7. The above also will be conclusive in so far as the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established.
9. In so far as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.
उपर'क स3 न त क दष न @ क थ हस ग पकरण क थ @ स
भ3नन ह'न क क रण गण क' इस पकरण मK इस स र पर क'ई मदद
नह" कर हn।
Dकक इस म मल मK अनस न पDण# ह'कर कछ अभ3 कगण क ववरद
आर'प पत पश कक ज क ह5 । अ : गण क ववरद दद भष र
तनव रण अध तन म क अपर नह" बन ह5, ' व इस सCबन मK ह बबनद
वव रण न ल क समक बहस ज# क, सटज पर उठ सक हn और ज#
क, सटज पर उठ ज न व ल बबनदओ पर इस पकम पर वव र कक जन
उध प नह" ह' ह5 ।
उक नस र उक प @ ध क ओ मK क'ई स र नह" प ज ह5, ज'
-48-
ए दनस र असव क र क, ज ह5 । उक जस त मK सलगन स गन प न
# पत
3 असव क र कक ज हn। इस आदश क, एक-एक फ'ट' पत सलगन
ध क ओ मK रख ज व।
(न 0 बनव र" ल ल शम # )
अतनलशम /-S-
#