Karnataka High Court
Sri T B Mahadevaiah vs State Of Karnataka on 29 November, 2018
Author: G.Narendar
Bench: G.Narendar
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2018
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE G.NARENDAR
WRIT PETITION Nos.2953-2954/2012 (SCST)
BETWEEN
1. SRI T B MAHADEVAIAH
S/O LATE BASAPPA
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
2. SRI T B NAGARAJ
S/O LATE BASAPPA
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
BOTH ARE R/O THYAGATOOR
NITTOR HOBLI, GUBBI TQ.,
TUMKUR DISTRICT. ... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. M B CHANDRA CHOODA, ADV.)
AND
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVT.
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
M S BUILDINDG,
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BANGALORE-560001.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
TUMKUR DISTRICT,
TUMKUR.
3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
TUMKUR SUB DIVISION,
TUMKUR.
4. SRI T C MAHALINGAPPA
S/O CHIKKAMALLAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
R/O MADENAHALLI VILLAGE,
CHELUR HOBLI, GUBBI TQ.,
TUMKUR DISTRICT.
4(a) SHANTHA KUMAR
S/O.LATE MAHALINGAPPA
AGE: MAJOR
2
4(b) MAHADEVAIAH
S/O.LATE MAHALINGAPPA
AGE: MAJOR
BOTH ARE RESIDENTS OF
MADENAHALLI AT & POST:
HOBLI: CHELUR, TALUK: GUBBI
DISTRICT: TUMKUR
4(c) SMT.VANAJAKSHAMMA
D/O.LATE MAHALINGAPPA
W/O.NANJAPPA
AGE: MAJOR, R/A.SATHENAHALLI
HOBLI: CHELUR, TALUK: GUBBI
DISTRICT: TUMKUR. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. SAVITHRAMMA, HCGP FOR R1 TO R3,
R-4 (A TO C) - SERVED UNREPRESENTED.)
THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER
DT.4.11.11 PASSED BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, TUMKUR DIST.
TUMKUR VIDE ANN-B, BY ISSUE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI ETC.
THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
AND POSTED FOR FURTHER ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT
PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the respondents.
2. The case of the petitioner is that the land to an extent of 2 acres of Ankapura Village, Nittoor Hobli, Gubbi, Tumkur District was allotted to one Chikkamallaiah in Sy.No.18/12 under the `Grow More Food' scheme as per the order GMS No.07/1956-57 dated 31.05.1957. That the allottee sold 1 acre 20 guntas of land in favour of one 3 Channabasamma under the registered sale deed dated 05.05.1966.
3. That the petitioners are the successors to the said Channabasamma and succeeded to her estate after her demise. That pursuant to the registered sale deed, the name of said Channabasamma has been mutated and entered in the revenue records. Subsequently, names of the petitioners have been entered as the legal representatives and that they continued to be in absolute possession and enjoyment of the said property except in respect of 20 guntas of land out of the said survey number. That proceedings were initiated before the land Tribunal, Gubbi and the said proceedings got concluded in favour of a third party vide order dated 13.06.1977 and that the said 20 guntas of land is not part and parcel of the land alienated in favour of the petitioners predecessors-in-title.
4. On 17.06.2000, respondent No.4 preferred an application under the PTCL Act alleging that as he belongs to Scheduled Caste and land having been allotted in favour of his father under the GMF scheme, the alienation on 4 05.05.1966 is contrary to the conditions imposed at the time of allotment of the land under GMF Scheme and hence, the application under Section 4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (PTCL) Act, 1978 was preferred.
5. The petitioners entered appearance and filed their objections contending that the conditions imposed under Rule 43-G of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 was not attracted to the land leased under GMF Scheme and which lease was confirmed under Rule 43-G.
6. In this regard, the petitioners placed reliance on the ruling of this Court in the case of Smt.Shivlingamma v.
Special Deputy Commissioner and others reported in 1991(2) Kar.L.J.421, wherein this Court has been pleased to hold that the conditions of non-alienation are inapplicable to land originally leased under the GMF Scheme and lease under Section 43-G of the Rules and subsequent confirmation under Rule 43-J of the Rules and hence, it is contended that the said Act is inapplicable.
57. The respondent No.3 after hearing the parties was pleased to reject the application preferred under Section 4 of the Act. The respondent No.4 being aggrieved by the order dated 30.11.2004 preferred an appeal before respondent No.2. That respondent No.2 without looking into the validity of the condition was pleased to allow the appeal by its order dated 04.11.2011 vide Annexure-B to the writ petition. Being aggrieved, the petitioners are before this Court.
8. Respondent No.4 having passed away during the pendency of the petition, his legal representatives have been brought on record as respondent Nos.4(a) to 4(c).
Respondents have not preferred any statement of objections.
9. There is no dispute with regard to the dates & events mentioned above.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the application under Section 4 of the PTCL 6 Act is unsustainable in the light of the law laid down by this Court as stated supra in Smt.Shivalingamma's case.
11. Learned counsel for the respondents would reiterate the findings rendered by respondent Nos.2 and 3.
12. Though the contentions with regard to the applicability of the conditions enumerated under Rule 43- G of the Rules is put forth, learned counsel for the petitioners would also alternatively contend that the application is also vitiated by delay and laches and the action of respondent Nos.2 and 3 is also vitiated on account of the same being beyond a reasonable period.
13. The learned AGA would submit that the instant writ petition is covered by the orders passed by this Court in similar circumstances while disposing of WP No.30614/2015 DD 4.6.2018. The dates and events are undisputed. There is no dispute that the land in question was allotted under Grow More Food Scheme on 31.5.1957 and allottees were in possession and cultivation of the land even prior to the order of allotment. The allottee, one 7 Chikkamallaiah alienated the to an extent of 1 acre 20 guntas under a registered sale deed dated 5.5.1966 to the purchaser one Smt.Channabasamma who is predecessor in title of the present petitioners. The petitioners are successors in interest of said Channabasamma and contend that the provisions of PTCL Act are not attracted.
14. It is submitted that an application was preferred by the 4th respondent during the year 200-01 before the third respondent who, by order dated 30.11.2004 rejected the application preferred under Section 5 of the PTCL Act.
Aggrieved by the same, the 4th respondent preferred an appeal before the second respondent. The second respondent by order dated 4.11.2011 was pleased to allow the appeal and thereby rendered void the sale transaction of the year 1966 by which, the property came to be conveyed to the mother of the petitioners.
15. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the proceedings under Section 5 of the PTCL Act is vitiated by a delay of more that 38 years and assuming the first sale is of the year 1966, the respondent 8 nos. 1 to 3 were required to act within a reasonable time.
They geared up into action after the lapse of 34 years.
That, the 4th respondent permitted the legal heirs of grantee to invoke the provisions of PTCL Act 25 years after the Act coming into force.
16. This Court in similar circumstances upholding the contention of delay and laches and the action of the official respondents entertaining the application beyond reasonable time has been pleased to dispose of several petitions in the light of the order dated 04.06.2018 rendered in W.P.No.30614/2015 wherein this Court has been pleased to hold as follows:
"5. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the ruling of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka and Another reported in 2018(1) Kar. L.R.5 (SC) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to hold as hereunder:
"8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer 9 annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy.
Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No.3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably 10 long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R.Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly."
6. By the said ruling, the Hon'ble Apex Court has settled the law, in respect of inordinate and gross delay in invoking the statutory provisions or exercising powers vested by the statute. After examining the issue and following its earlier ruling rendered in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr.Lrs.& Ors. reported in 2017(6) SCC 459 wherein it has been reiterated that in respect of a statute that does not provide for a period of limitation to exercise the power, then the statutory provisions must be invoked within a reasonable time.
117. Learned HCGP would also place on record the Judgment rendered by this Court in WP No.6051/2008(SC/ST) C/w.WP No.1951/2016(SC/ST) disposed of by order dated 20.2.2018 whereby, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, placing reliance on the ruling of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Nekkanti Ram Lakshmi's case referred supra was pleased to dismiss the writ petitions preferred by the legal heirs of the original grantee.
8. In the instant case, the provisions of Section 5 are invoked after passage of more than 30 years. And by no stretch of imagination can it be considered as a reasonable period. The law in this regard has been well settled and is squarely applicable to the facts of the case.
9. The contention on behalf of the petitioner merits consideration. The counsel for respondent would submit that the decision reported in the case cited supra cannot be looked into in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Manchegowda vs. State of Karnataka reported in (1984) 3 SCC 301. That in the 12 case of Manchegowda, the law is settled by a Division Bench of three Judges whereas, the cited ruling is rendered by a Division Bench of two Judges. This contention requires to be rejected in the light of the fact that, the Hon'ble Apex Court was not seized with the issue regarding delay in invoking the provisions of the Act while disposing of Manchegowda's case. Thus, the Apex Court has not considered the issue with regard to unreasonable delay in invoking the provisions of the statute as the said ruling came to be rendered in a short span after coming into force of the enactment.
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Manchegowda's case referred supra in fact visualized the present conundrum by holding that any negligence and delay on the part of the authorities, entitled to take action to avoid such transfers through appropriate legal process for resumption of such grant may be further impediments in the matter of avoiding such transfers and resumption of possession of the granted lands. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder for quick reference.
13"12. In pursuance of this policy, the Legislature is undoubtedly competent to pass an enactment providing that transfers of such granted lands will be void and not merely voidable for properly safeguarding and protecting the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for whose benefit only these lands had been granted. Even in the absence of any such statutory provisions, the transfer of granted lands in contravention of the terms of the grant or in breach of any law, rule or regulation covering such grant will clearly be voidable and the resumption of such granted lands after avoiding the voidable transfers in accordance with law will be permitted. Avoidance of such voidable transfers and resumption of the granted lands through process of law is bound to take time. Any negligence and delay on the part of the authorities entitled to take action to avoid such transfers through appropriate legal process for resumption of such grant may be further impediments in the matter of avoiding such transfers and resumption of possession of the granted lands. Prolonged legal proceedings will undoubtedly be prejudicial to the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for whose 14 benefit the granted lands are intended to be resumed. As transfers of granted lands in contravention of the terms of the grant or any law, regulation or rule governing such grants can be legally avoided and possession of such lands can be recovered through process of law, it must be held that the Legislature for the purpose of avoiding delay and harassment of protracted litigation and in furthering its object of speedy restoration of these granted lands to the members of the weaker communities is perfectly competent to make suitable provision for resumption of such granted lands by stipulating in the enactment that transfers of such lands in contravention of the terms of the grant or any regulation, rule or law regulating such grant will be void and providing a suitable procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice for achieving this purpose without recourse to prolonged litigation in court in the larger interests of benefiting the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes."
(underlining by this Court)
11. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been prophetic in rendering the said ruling by observing that, in statues where no 15 limitation is provided, the Authorities and the State must act consciously and if the process of invoking the provisions of statute is delayed and is initiated after a long lapse of time, the delay by itself would act as an impediment. The action on the application filed by the third respondent after more than 30 years cannot by any standards or parameters be construed as being made within a reasonable period and hence, cannot be sustained. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent is liable to be rejected.
12. It is relevant to state the principle enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the exercise of power vested in an authority should be exercised in a reasonable manner and more importantly even a reasonable time more so, when time is not stipulated under the statute is not a principle of recent origins and the Hon'ble Apex Court way back in 1983 itself has enunciated the principle in the case of Mansaram vs. S.P.Pathak and others reported in 1984(1) SCC 125 where the issue involved was one of eviction of a tenant and the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that where the time limit for taking action for 16 eviction is not stipulated in the statute, the eviction after an unreasonable long lapse of time on the ground of initial occupation of the premises being unlawful is not sustainable. In para.12 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held thus:
"12. What is stated hereinbefore is sufficient to quash and set aside the order of the House Allotment Officer. However, there is one more aspect of the matter which we cannot overlook.
The appellant entered the premises in 1954. There have been numerous proceedings between him and the late Basantrai Sharma who let out the premises to the appellant but no one ever raised the question whether the appellant had entered the premises in contravention of clause 22(2). Till Basantrai Sharma died, no one raised the controversy about the entry of the appellant in the premises as being unauthorised or in contravention of clause 22. Basantrai Sharma in his life time tried to obtain possession of the premises from the appellant alleging grounds available to him under the Rent Control Order other than unauthorized entry. This would permit an inference that Basantrai Sharma accepted the appellant as his tenant and his tenancy did not suffer from any infirmity. After 17 Basantrai Sharma died, his successor-in-interest one Smt. Usha Rani N. Sharma did not raise any controversy about the occupation of the premises by the appellant. One Mr. S.P. Pathak, a total stranger has come forward to complain about the unauthorised entry of the appellant in the premises. The unauthorised entry according to the appellant was in the year 1954. Appellant retired in 1967. Basantrai Sharma was alive in 1967. If appellant came into the premises because he was holding an office of profit, obviously Basantrai Sharma would not miss the opportunity to evict the appellant because he was otherwise also trying to do the same thing. Rent was accepted without question from the appellant by Basantrai Sharma till his death and thereafter. Could he be at this distance of time, thrown out on the ground that his initial entry was unauthorized. To slightly differently formulate the proposition, could the initial unauthorized entry, if there be any, permit a House Allotment Officer, 22 years after the entry, to evict the appellant on the short ground that he entered the premises in contravention of clause 22(2) ? Undoubtedly, power is conferred on the Collector to see that the provisions of the Rent Control Order which 18 disclosed a public policy are effectively implemented and if the Collector therefore, comes across information that there is a contravention, he is clothed with adequate power to set right the contravention by ejecting anyone who comes into the premises in contravention of the provisions. But when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, no limitation is prescribed in this behalf but one would stand aghast that a landlord to some extent in pari delicto could turn the tables against the person who was in possession for 22 years as a tenant. In such a situation, even though the House Allotment Officer was to reach an affirmative conclusion that the initial entry 22 years back was an unauthorised entry and that failure to vacate premises till 9 years after retirement was not proper, yet it was not obligatory upon him to pass a peremptory order of eviction in the manner in which he has done. In such a situation, it would be open to him not to evict the appellant. In this connection, we may refer to Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of U.P. wherein one Ram Agyan Singh who came into possession of 19 premises without an order of allotment in his favour as required by sec. 7(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was permitted to retain the premises by treating his occupation lawful and this court declined to interfere with that order. No doubt it must be confessed that sec. 7A conferred power on the District Magistrate to take action against unauthorised occupation in contravention of the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, but there was a proviso to the section which enabled the District Magistrate not to evict a person found to be in unauthorized occupation, if the District Magistrate was satisfied that there has been undue delay or otherwise it is inexpedient to do so. There is no such proviso to clause 28 which confers power on the Collector to take necessary action for the purpose of securing compliance with the Rent Control Order. But as stated earlier, where power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of power inheres its exercise within a reasonable time. This is too well established to need buttressing by a precedent. However, one is readily available in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha & Ors. In that case Commissioner 20 exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction under sec. 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code which did not prescribe any period of limitation for exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The Commissioner exercised revisional jurisdiction one year after the Collector made the order which was sought to be revised. The High Court set aside the order of the Commissioner. In the appeal by State of Gujarat, this Court declined to interfere holding inter alia that the revisional power in the absence of prescribed period of limitation must be exercised within a reasonable time and period of one year was held to be too late. This aspect must be present to the mind of House Allotment Officer before just rushing in on an unproved technical contravention brought to his notice contrived by the successor-in-interest of the deceased landlord, and evicting the appellant 22 years after his entry and 9 years after his retirement on the short ground that his entry in the year 1954 was in contravention of clause 22(2)."
13. The above decision has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its subsequent judgment in the case of Santhoshkumar Shivgonda Patil & others vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale 21 and others reported in (2009) 9 SCC 352 wherein at para.10 referring to the ruling in the case of State of Punjab vs. Bhatinda District Co-op Milk Producers Union Ltd., held that where the statute does not prescribe the time limit, same has to be exercised within a reasonable time be it suo motu or otherwise. It was pleased to hold that the reasonable period under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code could be three years subject to exceptional circumstances and categorically held that the exercise of revisional power after lapse of 17 years can by no stretch of imagination be construed as being within a reasonable time. The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in para.10,11 and 12 is reproduced below.
'10. Recently, in the case of State of Punjab and Others v.
Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd. while dealing with the power of revision under Section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, it has been held: (SCC p.367, paras 17-19) "17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefore, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time.
2218. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors.
19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years."
11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribed the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercises at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is playing that exercise of such power 23 within reasonable time is inherent therein.
12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be 3 years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstance of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30.03.1976 is flawd and legally not correct.'
14. Thus, without exception and across various fields of law, the Apex Court has categorically stated the law in respect of exercise of powers/jurisdiction under a statute where no limitation is stipulated. Hence, law in this regard is no more res integra. Apart from the embargo placed by the Apex Court in exercise of jurisdiction by the authorities under the statute where no limitation is specified, the Apex Court has also settled the law in respect of delay on the part of litigants in seeking redressal of the grievances.
2415. Law on the point of delay and laches is well settled by a catena of Judgments be it, in the matter of land acquisition or in the field of service law. The Apex Court has been pleased to hold that unexplained gross delay would be fatal to the right of the party, to seek a judicial adjudication of his rights."
17. The law settled by the Apex Court squarely applies to the facts of the instant case also. The grant was of the year 1957 and the alienation was on 05.05.1966. In effect third party rights came to be created and the parties were also in settled positions. There is no dispute with regard to the dates.
18. In this context, gainful reference could be made to the catena of decisions and the recent decisions in this regard are:
1) (1996) 6 SCC 445 in the case of STATE OF RAJASTHAN & OTHERS vs. D.R.LAKSHMI & OTHERS wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has cautioned the High Courts not to entertain the writ petitions where there is inordinate delay while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.25
2) Similarly in the case of THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR & ANR. Vs. SHAH HYDER BEIG AND ORS.
(2002) 2 SCC 48 wherein it has been opined that the real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to disturb unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.
19. On the ground of gross delay and laches also, the application by the respondent-grantee under Section 5(2) of the Act requires to be rejected and consequently, the writ petition requires to be allowed.
20. It is not in dispute that the PTCL Act came into force with effect from 1.1.1979. Assuming that either the grantee or his legal representatives were keen on establishing the right vested in them under the provisions of Sec.5, they were required to act in a diligent manner. In the instant case, diligence is woefully lacking. The party wakes up and gears into action after 38 years and there is 26 absolutely no ground urged which is worthy of being called as explanation for the gross and inordinate delay. Hence, even on this ground, the writ petitions are required to be allowed.
21. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds merit in the present writ petitions. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed. Annexure-B dated 4.11.2011 to the writ petitions is quashed.
In the light of the law and facts involved in the litigation, there shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sk/-
CT-HR