Allahabad High Court
Nar Singh vs Deputy Director Of Consolidation, ... on 4 March, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(2)AWC1526
JUDGMENT R.H. Zaidi, J.
1. By means of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner prays for Issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation dated 7.1.1981 and 16.9.1980, respectively.
2. The relevant facts of the case giving rise to the present petition, in brief, are that the dispute related to Chak No. 39 of village Bisrapur and Chak No. 44 of village Gajpur, district Basti, (for short 'the land in dispute'). In the basic year, the names of Smt. Pandubba and Smt. Jhunuk Dei were recorded over the land in dispute in the revenue papers.
3. On receipt of C.H. Form No. 5, objections were filed by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, claiming that Smt. Pandubba executed a gift deed in respect of her half share in the land in dispute in their favour on 9.2.1970. Another objection was filed by the petitioner who has claimed that Smt. Pandubba during her lifetime executed a registered sale deed of her share in his favour on 22.9.1969 and also delivered possession to him, therefore, the basic year entries as indicated above were liable to be corrected accordingly. In the present case, the dispute is confined to the share of Smt. Pandubba in the land in dispute. The share of Smt. Jhunuk Del, widow of Umapati is not disputed.
4. The Consolidation Officer, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues ;
(1) Whether gift deed dated 9.2.1970 is valid and operative in eye of law?
(2) Whether sale deed dated 22.9.1969 is valid and operative in eye of law?
(3) Who is legal heir of Smt. Pandubba?
(4) Whether Hari Ram etc. are bhumidharis of the land in suit on the basis of gift deed?
(5) Whether Narsing Prasad is bhumidhar of the land in suit on the basis of sale deed?
5. The Consolidation Officer took up all the aforesaid five issues together and after going through the evidence on the record, allowed the objection of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in part. The objection of the petitioner was also allowed in respect of some land on the basis of the sale deed dated 22.9.1969 by judgment and order dated 16.10.1979. Challenging the validity of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer, three appeals were filed before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, i.e., one by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and two by the petitioner. All the three appeals were heard together by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation after hearing the parties and perusing the material on the record reversed the findings recorded in favour of petitioner by the Consolidation Officer on material issues. It was held that the petitioner has failed to prove the execution of sale deed in accordance with law in his favour by Smt. Pandubba. The findings on other issues were also recorded against him and thereafter the appeal filed by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 was allowed and the two appeals filed by the petitioner were dismissed by a common judgment and order dated 16.9.1980. Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, the petitioner filed two revisions before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Deputy Director of Consolidation also affirmed the findings recorded by the Settlement Officer. Consolidation on relevant issues and dismissed the revision by his judgment and order dated 7.1.1981. Hence, the present petition.
6. It was on 23.2.1981 that this petition was admitted and notices were directed to be issued to the respondents. The contesting respondent Nos. 3 and 4 filed counter-affidavit in reply to the allegations made in the writ petition. They have re-asserted their case as was pleaded before the authorities below. The petitioner also filed a rejoinder-affidavit controverting the facts stated in the counter-affidavit and re-affirming the facts stated in the writ petition.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have ignored and misread the evidence on the record and that they have also acted illegally in disbelieving the statement of Luxmi Narain, one of the attesting witnesses of the sale deed. It was also urged that the petitioner was entitled to the protection of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act and further that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were not the sons of the daughter of Smt. Jhunuk Dei, therefore, they were not entitled to inherit the land in dispute. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 has supported the validity of the impugned order passed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It was urged that the Judgments and orders passed by the authorities below are concluded by concurrent findings of fact. The findings recorded by the authorities below are based on relevant evidence on the record and cannot be said to be perverse. This Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the authorities below. It was also submitted that according to the findings recorded by the authorities below, whole chak was not the subject-matter of the alleged sale deed dated 22.9.1969 inasmuch as in the said sale deed, there was no reference of plot No. 261/1 of Village Blsrapar, thus, the said sale deed was also hit by the provisions of Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The authorities below have rightly held that the sale deed was also hit by the aforesaid provisions. According to his submissions, the writ petition was concluded by findings of fact and was liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to and relied upon certain decisions in support of his submissions, which I will deal with at appropriate place.
8. It is not disputed that the land in dispute was owned by Smt. Pandubba and Smt. Jhunuk Dei, half share each. Their names were also recorded in the revenue papers in the basic year. Admittedly. Smt. Jhunuk Dei gifted her share to the respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The share of Smt. Jhunuk Dei and subsequently of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 is now not in dispute. Dispute remains with respect to the share owned by Smt. Pandubba, the petitioner claimed his share on the basis of sale deed dated 22.9.1969, alleged to have been executed in his favour by Smt. Pandubba. On the other hand, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 claimed her one half share on the basis of gift deed dated 2.2.1970 executed by her in their favour and also on the basis of inheritance. Admittedly. Smt. Pandubba was an illiterate lady. The principles of Pardanashin lady which have been extended to illiterate man and woman in our country, therefore, apply in this case and the burden of proof of due execution of the sale deed by Smt. Pandubba was upon the petitioner. During her life time, admittedly. Smt. Pandubba as soon as she came to know about the alleged execution of the sale deed, filed a first information report against the petitioner under Sections 420. 465, etc. and also made an application for cancellation of the bhumidhari sanad. The petitioner was prosecuted in the criminal case on the basis of the said F.I.R. and was ultimately given benefit of doubt. Smt. Pandubba has, thus, denied the execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, there were two attesting witnesses, namely. Nar Singh son of Hardwar and Luxmi Narain. Nar Singh, who denied his signature on the sale deed before the criminal court, was not produced before the consolidation authorities. So far as Luxmi Narain is concerned, he happened to be the son of Hardwar, a near relation (cousin brother) of the petitioner, the authorities below called him interested witness and rightly disbelieved his statement. Thus, the execution of sale deed in question was not proved in accordance with law. Strictly speaking, in cases of execution of sale deeds by illiterate ladies, the person who pleads execution of the sale deed is required to prove that the lady had independent advice, she was intelligent enough to understand the nature of transaction and that she knew what she executed and in whose favour after clearly understanding the contents of such document. The Privy Council has observed in AIR 1928 PC 303 ; that in case of disposition of property by a Pardanashin lady, specially when she is illiterate, a very heavy onus is cast on those supporting her disposition to establish that the transaction was one which the maker of the disposition thoroughly comprehended and deliberately executed on her own free will. In Mst. Kharbhuja Kuer v. Jang Bahadur Rai. AIR 1963 SC 1203, the Apex Court also ruled that legal position has been very well-settled. The burden of proof shall always rest upon the person who seeks to sustain a transaction entered into with a Pardanashin lady to establish that the said document was executed by her after clearly understanding the nature of the transaction. It should be established that it was not only her physical act but also her mental act. Similar view has been taken by this Court in various decisions following the verdicts of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council. Neither the petitioner nor his attesting witnesses attempted to prove the due execution of the sale deed in the light of the decisions referred to above by Smt. Pandubba, who was admittedly an illiterate lady. It may also be noted that as soon as Smt. Pandubba came to know about the alleged sale deed, she filed a first information report against the petitioner denying the execution of the sale deed and prosecuted him under Sections 420. 465 etc. She also filed an application before the competent authority for cancellation of the bhumidhari sanad, which was allowed on 8.10.1969. The order cancelling the bhumidhari sanad was never challenged by the petitioner and the same has become final. These facts have been stated in the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation at page No. 41 to the writ petition and in the writ petition there is no denial of these facts. Thus, the sale deed relied upon by the petitioner was a bogus document. The petitioner utterly failed to prove the same. The authorities below, therefore, did not commit any error of law or Jurisdiction in holding that execution of the sale deed in question was not proved. Besides, the aforesaid findings, the authorities below have also recorded the findings that plot No. 361/1 measuring 4 biswas 3 biswansis was part of the chak of Smt. Pandubba. The said plot does not find mention in the sale deed in question. Thus, the whole holding or whole share in it was not transferred by means of the sate deed in question. The sale deed was thus, in respect of a part of the said holding/chak. The same was therefore, hit by Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) as no permission of the Settlement Officer. Consolidation was obtained before execution of the sale deed and that the thumb impression existing on sale deed in question was not the thumb impression of Smt. Pandubba. Luxmi Narain was a near relation of the petitioner and was an Interested witness, therefore, his statement was not reliable and no reliance could be placed upon his statement. That Nar Singh, son of Hardwar specifically denied his signatures on the sale deed in the criminal case and no attempt was made by the petitioner to produce him before the authorities below. Luxmi Narain was a near relation of the petitioner and was an interested witness. The authorities below, under these facts and circumstances, rightly declined to place reliance upon his statement. It was also held by the authorities below that execution of gift deed dated 9.2.1970 in favour of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 was proved, as the execution of the same was admitted by the petitioner. The aforesaid findings are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. which are based on the relevant evidence on the record.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submissions referred to and relied upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of Lutawan and others v. Smt, Narain Dei and others, 1978 RD 201 ; Ram Padarath and others v. IInd Additional District Judge. Sultanpur and others, 1989 ACJ 1 (FB) and Smt. Sushila Devi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation. Uttar Pradesh. Lucknow and others, 1992 (1) AWC 259: 1991 All LJ 727.
10. In my opinion, the aforesaid decisions are distinguishable on facts and have got no application to the present case. In Lutawan's case, (supra), it was held by this Court that If ten times rent was deposited on May 17. 1961 and sale deed was also executed on the same date, if the order for grant of sanad was passed subsequently, i.e., on May 20. 1961, the same will not affect the validity of the sale deed. In the present case, according to the findings recorded by the authorities below, the petitioner has utterly failed to prove the execution of the sale deed. The authorities below have recorded clear and categorical findings of fact that the sale deed in question was obtained by producing an Imposter and twenty times rental was also not deposited by Smt. Pandubba. As soon as Smt. Pandubba came to know about the aforesaid fraudulent transaction, she filed first Information report and also applied for cancellation of bhumidhari sanad. The petitioner was prosecuted in the criminal case. It is another thing that he was given benefit of doubt but merely on the basis of benefit of doubt, the execution of sale deed cannot be proved. The execution of the sale deed will have to be proved as stated above, specifically in accordance with law as Smt. Pandubba was an illiterate lady. The sale deed in question, relied upon by the petitioner was thus, of no consequence and a void document, which was liable to be ignored.
11. Ram Padarath's case, (supra) deals with the jurisdiction of the civil and revenue courts with respect to cancellation of documents. It is no doubt true that a suit for cancellation of a document lies in the civil court. In the present case, the transaction of sale being void ab initio inasmuch as execution of the sale deed Itself was not proved in accordance with law, therefore, there was no question of cancellation of the sale deed alleged to have been executed in favour of the petitioner by Smt. Pandubba and the same was liable to be ignored. A reference in this regard may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh and others, AIR 1973 SC 2451. It was ruled in the above noted case that if the document in question was found to be void and invalid, the same does not require to be cancelled. It is liable to be ignored whenever and in whatever proceedings it is set up before any authority or Court. Even in Ram Padarath's case, it was observed by the full bench that a suit or action for cancellation of a void document will generally lie in civil court and a party cannot be deprived of his right getting this relief permissible under law except when a declaration of right or status of a tenure holder is necessarily needed in which event relief for cancellation will be surplus age. In the case of Gorakh Nath Dube (supra), the distinction between void and voidable sale deed was pointed out by the Apex Court and it was held that void sale deed is to be Ignored by the consolidation authorities and as such the civil suit in which the same is under question, the suit will abate. In the present case, the petitioner having utterly failed to prove the execution of the sale deed in accordance with law, as pointed out above, it was, therefore, not necessary to get the sale deed in question cancelled before the matter was taken up to the consolidation authorities as there was no question of cancellation of sale deed.
12. In Smt. Sushila Devi's case (supra), this Court while considering the question as to from which date the transfer would take effect, it was held that it would take effect from the date 20 times land revenue was deposited and not from date on which sanad was issued. In the present case, the said question does not arise inasmuch as neither 20 times rent was deposited by Smt. Pandubba nor the sale deed was executed by her and the sanad which was alleged to have been Issued was got cancelled and the cancellation order has become final as the validity of the said order was not challenged before the competent authority by the petitioner. It was with the help of some imposter that 20 times rent was got deposited and sanad was got obtained by the petitioner In the instant case, according to the findings recorded by the authorities below. Thus, the petitioner also cannot take advantage of the decision in Smt, Sushfla Devi's case.
13. So far as regarding the validity of the findings recorded by the authorities below is concerned, the arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the said findings recorded by the authorities below. Learned counsel for the petitioner failed to show that any evidence was either misread, misconstrued or ignored by the authorities below. The petitioner having failed to prove the due execution of the sale deed was also not entitled to the protection of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. The petitioner also failed to prove that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were not sons of the daughter of Smt. Jhunuk Del, therefore, the statement made on his behalf to the contrary cannot be accepted. The writ petition is concluded by concurrent findings of fact, the same has got no merit, therefore, it is liable to be dismissed.
14. The writ petition falls and is hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs.