Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shivraj Tobacco Company Pvt. Ltd. vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 November, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1991CRILJ156
ORDER
Gulab C. Gupta J.
1. By this application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. 1973, the applicant-accused person facing trial before the Judicial Magistrate for adulteration of 'Pan Masala', contrary to the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Rule), invokes extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to quash proceedings in the said criminal trial.
2. The applicant is a registered firm engaged in the business of production and manufacture products known as Pan Masala. It is alleged that on 25-8-1985 Shri P. D. Khare, Food Inspector, Shahdol purchased, for analysis, a sealed container of Pan Masala manufactured by applicant from the shop of one Laxman Prasad Gupta at Rajendra Gram district Shahdol and seized the same in accordance with law. The said Pan Masala was forwarded to the Public Analyst appointed under the Act for analysis. The Public Analyst, by his report dated 8-10-1985 declared that the said sample contained saccharin and, therefore, was adulterated. The Food Inspector, thereafter, filed a complaint against the applicant alleging that Rules 44 and 47 of the Rules prohibit mixing saccharin in the Pan Masala which was the article of food and, therefore, the applicant was guilty of the said offence. The Learned Magistrate registered the complaint and summoned the applicant to appear before him to answer the charge. The applicant felt aggrieved by the aforesaid summons and has approached this Court with the prayer that the proceedings be quashed.
3. The submission, in the main, is that the similar prosecutions were launched against the applicant in several courts in the State of Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh and have been quashed by the decision of Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 137/ 1981 decided on 15-7-1981 and Allahabad High Court in Cri. Mis. Application No. 3516 of 1980 decided on 17-11-1980. The Act, as is well known, seeks to prevent adulteration of foodstuffs and the manufacture, storing and sale of adulterated foptstuffs for human consumption. It, therefore, aims at ensuring the purity of articles of food sold to the public and to eradicate the anti-social evil of adulteration. This social mission of legislation should, therefore, inform the interpretative process so that the legal blow may fall on every adulterator. That is why in Delhi Municipality v. Kacheroo Mal (1975 Cri LJ 589): AIR 1976 SC 394, and Murlidhar v. State of Maharashtra (1976 Cri LJ 1527): AIR 1976 SC 1929, it was held that efforts should be made to see that the object and purpose of this law is not defeated and for this purpose any narrow and pendantic, literal and lexical construction likely to leave loopholes for this dangerous criminal tribe to Sneak out of the meshes of the law should be discouraged. In A.F.G. & S. M. Asson. v. Union of India 1971 Cri LJ 1556 : AIR 1971 SC 2346, Constitutional validity of the Act and Rules Were also upheld. Under the circumstances, it is the obligation of this Court to interpret and enforce the provision of the Act and Rules with a determination to secure aforesaid aims and objects and promote its purpose. Section 7 of the Act provides that:
"No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale or store, sell or distribute any adulterated food; any misbranded food; any article of food for the sale of which a licence is prescribed, except in accordance with the conditions of the licence; any article of food the sale of which is for the time being prohibited by the Food (health) Authority; in the interest of public health; any article of food in contravention of any other provision of this Act or of any rule made thereunder or any adulterant."
A plain reading of this provision would indicate that even manufacture for sale or store of any article of food in contravention of any provision of this Act or Rules made thereunder is also prohibited by this provision. Section 16 of the Act provides for penalties for manufacture, sale or store, adulterated article of food. The principal aim and object of Sections 7 and 16 being the eradication of anti-social activities deleterious to the health of those who would consume the adulterated articles, as clarified in Jai Narain v. Delhi Municipality AIR 1972 SC 2607 : 1973 Cri LJ 49, and Inderjeet v. State of U.P. 1979 Cri LJ 1410 : AIR 1979 SC 1867 efforts should be made to give effect to the provisions and secure the purpose. Since there is no dispute that Pan Masala in question is manufactured for sale by the applicant's firm, the applicant would be bound by the mandate of Section 7 of the Act and would be liable to be punished under Section 16 of the Act for breach thereof. In such a situation the question that may arise for consideration is whether Pan Masala is an article of food within the meaning of Section 2(v) of the Act. This section defines 'Food' very widely and covers every article used as food and every component which enters into it and even flavouring matter and condiments. In P. K. Tejanji v. M. R. Dange AIR 1974 SC 228 : 1979 Cri LJ 313, it was noticed that it is commonplace knowledge that the word 'food' is a very general term and applies to all that is eaten by men for nourishment and takes in subsidiaries. In Ramesh Chandra v. State of U.P. 1972 Cri LJ 5 : AIR 1972 SC 16, it was held that an article will be 'food' if it ordinarily enters into or is ordinarily used in the composition or preparation of human food. By application of this principle, the Tobacco used in Pan was held to be an article of food. Because of this wide meaning, there appears to be no serious doubt in the mind of any one that Pan Masala manufactured by the applicant is an article of food. In this connection reference may also be made to P. K. Tejanji v. M. R. Dange 1974 Cri LJ 313 (supra) wherein "Supari" eaten with relish by men for taste and nourishment was held to be an article of food. Under the circumstances the only question requiring consideration is whether the seized Pan Masala is adulterated constituting the offence under Section 7 of the Act.
4. As noticed earlier manufacture for sale or store of any article of food in contravention of any provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder is prohibited by Section 7(v) of the Act. Since the complainant alleges breach of Rules 44 and 47 of the Rules the same may be looked into to ascertain their meaning and scope. These rules read as under:
"Rule 44. Sale of certain admixtures prohibited :
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 43 no person shall either by himself or by any servant or agent sell:--
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(g) any article of food which contains any artificial sweetener, except where such artificial sweetener is permitted in accordance with the standards laid down in Appendix 'B'."
"Rule 47 Addition of artificial sweetener to be mentioned on the label:
Saccharin or any other artificial sweetener shall not be added to any article of food, except where the addition of such artificial sweetener is permitted in accordance with the standards laid down in Appendix 'B'..........."
5. Rule 44 indicates that it prohibits sale of any article of food which contains any artificial sweetener except where such artificial sweetener is permitted in accordance with the standards laid down in appendix 'B'. If saccharin be included within the words 'artificial sweetener' used in this rule, the rule would prohibit sale of Pan Masala containing saccharin except where addition of saccharin is permitted in accordance with the standard laid down in Appendix 'B'. It is common ground that no standard is prescribed for Pan Masala and, therefore, the exception contained in this rule will have no application. The exception, as is well known, acts as a proviso to the main rule and indicates that but for this clause even the exception would fall within the scope of the main rule. Under the circumstances, except the two cases dealt with by it the exception has no repercussion on the interpretation of the main rule which must be given its full meaning in the context of its object and purpose. Under the circumstances, unless mixture of articifical sweetener in Pan Masala an article of food is permitted in accordance with the standard laid down in Appendix 'B', the said mixture would be prohibited by the rule and would be done only in violation of the mandate of Section 7 of the Act. The Bombay High Court decision notices the distinction between the word 'saccharin' and 'artificial sweetener', creating an impression that 'saccharin' is not an 'artificial sweetener' in this rule. There does not appear to be any justification for such a distinction. The heading under which 'saccharin and other artificial sweetener" are described is, by itself, sufficient to indicate that they all belong to the same group. The learned Judge of the Bombay High Court has missed the word "any other" appearing immediately before the "artificial sweetener" in Rule 5. These words would have, if noticed, indicated that saccharin itself is an artificial sweetener. The Bombay High Court has also not noticed the heading under which saccharin and other artificial sweeteners have been grouped together. A heading, as is well known, is regarded as giving the key to the interpretation of the clauses rowed under it and is, therefore, treated as preamble to the provision following it. Though the heading is not used to restrict the plain 'meaning of enactment, it is taken into consideration to determine the true meaning of the contents following it. On this principle the heading would have clarified that saccharin is also a kind of artificial sweetener. Then the Appendix 'B' does not prescribe any standard for Pan Masala though it lays down the standard for saccharin. This Court is not concerned with the question whether saccharin is adulterated. If that was so the standard prescribed at item A.07.10 would have been relevant. This Court would assume that the saccharin mixed with the Pan Masala in question was of the prescribed standard. Simply because an item of food confirming to the prescribed standard is sold in the market it cannot be held that the same is permitted to be mixed with any other item of food. The logic of Bombay and Allahabad High Courts' judgments is that since saccharin has to be of prescribed quality, mixing such qualitative saccharin with other article of food is permissible. This logic wholly ignores the language of Rule 44 or 47 of the Rules. While ironing out creases in language may be permissible, it is not permissible to ignore the language in entirety and give a new meaning and purpose to the enactment, if the logic of aforesaid judgment is accepted, it would mean that any article of food which is of the standard prescribed in Appendix 'B' can be mixed with any other article and the same would not make the resulting article an adulterated article of food. Under such a logic, mixing pure vegetable oil or coconut oil with pure ghee would not amount to the adulteration. This would, in the opinion of this Court, defeat the very object and purpose of the Act and Rules made thereunder: It would also, in the opinion of this Court, be contrary to well established principle of interpretation of statute which requires that every word of the statute should be given meaning; no word should be held superfluous and efforts should be made to promote the object and purpose of the enactment. This Court is, therefore, unable to to accept the reasoning of the aforesaid two judgments and respectfully different with them. The language of Rules 44 and 47, in the opinion of this Court, leaves no doubt in its mind that even mixing a standardized item of food with another item of food would be in breach of Rules 44 and 47 unless the same is specifically provided in Appendix 'B' In the present factual situation, the fact that the saccharin mixed in Pan Masala was pure and conformed to the prescribed standard in Appendix 'B', is, by itself, not sufficient to justify its mixture with the Pan Masala. There is nothing in Appendix 'B' from which it could be inferred that mixing saccharin to any particular extent or degree was permitted in any other item of food. In this view of the matter, trial of the applicants must be held to be legal justifying no interference of this Court.
6. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds no substance in this application and is pleased to dismiss the same.