Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Pinnelli Ramakrishna Reddy vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 26 June, 2024
APHC010243512024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY,, THE TWENTY SIXTH DAY OF JUNE
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3788/2024
Between:
Pinnelli Ramakrishna Reddy ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. RAMALAKSHMANA REDDY SANEPALLI Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1. N ASHWANI KUMAR
2. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) The Court made the following ORDER:
1. The petitioner/A. /A. 1 has filed the Criminal Petition, as per Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking anticipatory bail concerning Crime No.53 of 2024, registered at the Rentachinthala Police Station of Palnadu District.
2. A case has been registered against the petitioner etitioner and others for the offences punishable under Section 147, 148, 324, 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC) and Section 131(2) of The Representation of the People Act, 1951 ("RP Act").
3. In brief, the Prosecution Prosecution's case is that on 13.05.2024, general elections were conducted in the Andhra Pradesh State. The defacto complainant, acting 2 as an agent for the Telugu Desam Party at polling station 202 of Palavaigate, reported that the Petitioner visited the polling booth at 10:30 AM and subsequently left. Later, around noon, the Petitioner returned to the polling booth with A.2 and A.3 and allegedly damaged the EVM machine. When questioned by the defacto complainant about the incident, the Petitioner reportedly threatened him. After this altercation, the Petitioner left the polling station but returned shortly after that. Upon leaving again, polling officials closed the doors of the booth. Outside the polling booth, as soon as the complainant stepped out, the Petitioner allegedly instigated others to attack him. Following the initial incident, 15 individuals, identified as followers of the Petitioner, gathered unlawfully and retrieved weapons such as sticks, rods, and knives from their vehicles. One of them, A.3, allegedly attacked the defacto complainant with an iron rod, aiming to cause fatal injuries while A.1 was present. The others proceeded to beat him with sticks, causing him to fall to the ground. Subsequently, the accused departed from the scene of the offence.
4. The learned counsel representing the petitioner/A.1 argues that although the alleged incident took place on 13.05.2024, the FIR was not filed until 23.05.2024, following the filing of a Lunch Motion before this Court; the Petitioner contends, in Criminal Petition No.3775 of 2024, that the offences registered under Crime No.48 of 2024 at Rentachintala Police Station are punishable with a term below seven years. It is stated that two reports, FIR No. 52 of 2024, registered at 9:00 AM and FIR No. 53 of 2024, registered at 9:30 AM, seem to relate to the same incident as described in FIR No.48 of 2024, but no such incident occurred as detailed in these reports. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further contends that the police officials, aiming to implicate the defacto complainant in multiple cases, filed a Memo on 23.05.2024, at 4:00 PM, naming him as A.24 in Crime No. 59 of 2024 at Karampudi Police Station. The offence under Sections 143, 147, 307, 332, 435, and 427 read with Section 149 of IPC are contested by the Petitioner, who claims he was not involved in the offence. It is clear from the F.I.R. that 3 the individuals who attacked the defacto complainant are identified, and the Petitioner had no direct or indirect involvement. Furthermore, the learned counsel argues that the Station House Officer has been actively pursuing the Petitioner's arrest to prevent him from selecting agents for the counting process and briefing them on counting procedures.
5. The Respondent-State has submitted a counter, refuting all the allegations presented in the Petition. The contentions outlined in the Counter need not be reiterated, as they essentially mirror the report's content dated 23.05.2024. Additionally, the counter asserts that the Petitioner is a Member of the Legislative Assembly and a current candidate for MLA in the Macherla Assembly Constituency, involved in violent activities. It states that the Petitioner is the primary accused in this case and has numerous ruthless associates. It states that if the Petitioner remains free in public, it could endanger the lives of many innocent people and create widespread fear in the villages. The counter further asserts that the Petitioner is implicated in 12 cases. It claims that the victims in these incidents are living in fear for their lives and are reluctant to cooperate due to threats from the Petitioner and his associates. It states in the counter that granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner would likely lead to non-cooperation from victims and direct eyewitnesses in further investigations out of fear of retaliation from the Petitioner and his henchmen.
6. Heard Sri T. Nirajnan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Rama Lakshmana Reddy Sanepalli, learned Counsel for the petitioner/A.1, and Sri N. Ashwani Kumar, learned Special Counsel, representing on behalf of the Respondent-State and Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned Senior Counsel representing on behalf of Sri P. Vivek, learned counsel for the injured/victim. Both sides reiterated their submissions on par with the contentions presented in the Petition and Counter. Consequently, the contentions raised by learned counsel need not be reproduced.
7. In the common Order of I.A.No.1 of 2024 in Crl.P.Nos.3788, 3789, 3790 of 2024 and I.A.No.1 of 2024 in Crl.P.No.3775 of 2024, this Court granted 4 interim protection to the Petitioner, ensuring no coercive steps and no arrest until 06.06.2024 under specified conditions. Dissatisfied with the Court's Order in Crl.P.Nos.3775 and 3788 of 2024, a Special Leave Petition (criminal) Diary No(s).25204 of 2024 and 25512 of 2024 were filed before the Hon'ble Apex Court. After hearing arguments from the learned counsel representing both parties, the Hon'ble Apex Court passed an order prohibiting the Petitioner from entering the counting station at Macherla Assembly Constituency on 04.04.2024. Additionally, the Hon'ble Apex Court requested this Court to expeditiously dispose of the pending petitions based solely on their merits without being uninfluenced by the Apex Court's Order.
8. The parameters for granting anticipatory bail have been succinctly laid down in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre V. State of Maharashtra1, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows:
"112. The following factors and parameters can be taken into consideration while dealing with anticipatory bail:
"(i) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made;
(ii) The antecedents of the applicant, including the fact as to whether the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court in respect of any cognizable offence;
(iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice;
(iv) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or other offences;
(v) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her;
(vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a very large number of people;
(vii) The courts must evaluate the entire available material against the accused very carefully. The Court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of the accused in the case. The cases in which the accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860, the Court should consider with even more excellent care and caution because over-implication in the cases is a matter of common knowledge and concern;
(viii) While considering the prayer for the grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to the free, fair and full investigation, and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused;1
(2011) 1 SCC 694 5
(ix) The Court to consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant;
(x) Frivolity in Prosecution should always be considered; it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the Prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail."
9. In Rakesh Baban Borhade V. State of Maharashtra and another 2, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that;
"Anticipatory bail not to be granted as a matter of rule but should be granted only when a case is made out and the Court is convinced that the accused would not misuse his liberty".
10. The learned counsel for the Petitioner relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sushila Aggarwal V. State (N.C.T. of Delhi)3, wherein it held that:
"91.1. .............. it should ensure in favour of the accused without any restriction on time. Normal conditions under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) should be imposed; if there are specific facts or features in regard to any offence, it is open for the court to impose any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its being tied to an event), etc. 91.2. .............. it is held that the life or duration of an anticipatory bail order does not normally end at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court or when charges are framed but can continue till the end of the trial. Again, if there are any special or peculiar features necessitating the court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for it to do so.
11. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further relied on a decision reported in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others vs. State of Punjab 4 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"4. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, did not contain any specific provision corresponding to Section 438. Under the old Code, there was a sharp difference of opinion amongst the various High Courts on the question of whether courts had the inherent power to pass an order of bail in anticipation of arrest; the preponderance of view is that it did not have such power. The need for extensive amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure was felt for a long time, and various suggestions were made in 2 2015 SAR (Criminal) 156 3 (2020) 5 S.C.C. 1 4 (1980) 2 SCC 565 6 different quarters in order to make the Code more effective and comprehensive. The Law Commission of India, in its 41st Report dated September 24, 1969, pointed out the necessity of introducing a provision in the Code enabling the High Court and the Court of Session to grant "anticipatory bail". It observed in para 39.9 of its report (Volume I):
"The suggestion for directing the release of a person on bail prior to his arrest (commonly known as "anticipatory bail") was carefully considered by us. Though there is a conflict of judicial opinion about the power of a court to grant anticipatory bail, the majority view is that there is no such power under the existing provisions of the Code. The necessity for granting anticipatory bail arises mainly because sometimes influential persons try to implicate their rivals in false cases for the purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting them detained in jail for some days. In recent times, with the accentuation of political rivalry, this tendency is showing signs of steady increase. Apart from false cases, where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, there seems no justification to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for bail."
12. In Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat 5 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down certain guidelines in respect to applications for anticipatory bail. In paragraph 25.10, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"25.10. We all also reproduce para 112 of the judgment in the Siddaram Satingappa case, where the Court delineated the following factors and parameters that need to be taken into consideration while dealing with anticipatory bail:
(a) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made;
(b) The antecedents of the applicant, including the fact as to whether the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence;
(c) The possibility of the applicant of fleeing from justice;
(d) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or other offence;
(e) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting them;
(f) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a vast number of people;
(g) The Courts must carefully evaluate the available material against the accused. The Court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of the 5 (2016) 1 SCC 152 7 accused in the case. The cases in which the accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860, the Court should consider with even greater care and caution because over-implication in the case is a matter of common knowledge and concern;
(h) While considering the prayer for the grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to a free, fair and full investigation, and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused;
(i) The Court should consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.
(j) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered, and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail,"
13. As stated in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre (supra), the nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused are the prime factors that must be considered while granting or refusing to grant anticipatory bail to the accused.
14. The Petitioner contends that as a contestant for MLA in the Macherla Constituency, he has raised objections regarding the biased conduct of police officers. He asserts that the allegations against him have been fabricated with malicious intent.
15. As per the records, the crime was initially reported on 23.05.2024 at 9:30 AM, while the incident occurred at noon on 13.05.2024. As per the prosecution's case, on 13.05.2024, the defacto complainant acted as an agent for the TDP party at Polling Booth No. 202 in MPP School in their village. The Petitioner and three others arrived at the Polling Booth around noon. Allegedly, the Petitioner approached the EVM box and forcefully threw it to the ground, causing it to break into pieces. When the defacto complainant questioned this action, the Petitioner criminally intimidated him by pointing his finger and threatened him with dire consequences. Subsequently, according to instructions from the polling officer, the defacto complainant left the polling booth. On his way out, the Petitioner allegedly instructed his followers to attack the defacto complainant. About 15 individuals reportedly retrieved 8 sticks, rods, and knives from their cars and assaulted the defacto complainant, threatening to kill him. Kathi/Sathi Subba Rao allegedly struck him on the head with an iron rod, causing an injury. Other individuals joined in, hitting him with sticks after he fell. The Petitioner purportedly declared the defacto complainant dead, after which all individuals left the scene. The Petitioner then sought treatment at a private hospital.
16. Based on the records, eyewitness statements indicate that individuals identified as A.11 to A.20 were implicated as accused persons in this case during the investigation.
17. According to the prosecution's case, the incident occurred on 13.05.2024 outside the Polling Booth. Before this incident, the Petitioner allegedly entered the Polling Booth and threw E.V.M box on the floor. On 15.05.2024, based on the report from the VRO, Palvauigate, the Sub- Inspector of Police registered an FIR in Crime No.48/2024 at Rentachinthala Police Station. The alleged offence in Crime No.48/2024 occurred within a polling booth, where it is claimed that the Petitioner entered and committed the act. It is important to note that polling officers, party agents, and police personnel stationed at the booth were in a position to recognize the Petitioner upon entry. It is implied that had he not been recognized, his entry would have been challenged. Despite this recognition among polling staff, the initial report filed on 15.05.2024 did not name the Petitioner as an accused MLA, despite the incident occurring on 13.05.2024. A reasonable person might question why the Petitioner's name was withheld in the initial report. However, in this case, this Court does not find it appropriate to give significant weight to the delay in lodging the report as a prima facie factor.
18. The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the police, upon learning about the filing of anticipatory bail in Crime No.48/2024 and considering that the alleged offences are punishable with less than seven years of imprisonment, intentionally registered multiple cases against the Petitioner. It is contended that in doing so, the police aimed to circumvent 9 statutory protections laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, with the objective of depriving the Petitioner of legal safeguards.
19. The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contends that as a candidate for MLA in the Macherla Constituency, the petitioner has raised objections concerning biased conduct by police officers and the allegations against the petitioner are malicious fabrications. The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner further contends that the prosecution failed to present the Wound Certificate detailing injuries sustained by the complainant, nor did they provide any evidence of the Petitioner receiving medical treatment at a hospital. Additionally, whether the defacto complainant got treatment at a hospital remains unclear.
20. The prosecution has placed statements recorded during their investigation, where the complainant stated that he was taken to an RMP doctor for treatment. This version is supported by some witnesses examined by the prosecution. However, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner disputes the credibility of the prosecution's account, pointing out the absence of medical records. It is contended that without documented evidence of medical treatment, especially considering the delayed report of the incident to the police, the prosecution's version remains questionable and lacks sufficient credibility.
21. The learned Senior Counsel representing the Petitioner argues that the ingredients outlined in Section 307 of IPC do not apply to the circumstances of the case due to the absence of a wound certificate. In Vasant Vithu Jadhav V. State of Maharashtra6, where the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
9. In the aforesaid factual scenario, it has to be seen whether Section 307 has application. Section 307 IPC reads as follows:
"307. Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by 6 (2004) 9 SCC 31 10 such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned."
10. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if an intent is present coupled with some overt act in the execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section distinguishes between the accused's act and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under the circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, it is not correct to acquit an accused of the charge under Section 307 IPC merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt."
22. Learned counsel for the Petitioner relied on a decision reported in Parasuram Pandey and others vs. State of Bihar7, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"14. To constitute an offence under Section 307, two ingredients of the offence must be present:-
(a) An intention of or knowledge relating to the commission of murder; and
(b) The doing of an act towards it.
For the purpose of Section 307, what material is the intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention? The section clearly contemplates an act which is done to cause death but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge, which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there can be no offence 'of attempt to murder'.
23. Section 307 IPC reads as follows:
"307. Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned."7
2004 CRLLJ 4978 11
24. From a bare perusal of Section 307 of IPC, it is evident that the first part does not contemplate that receipt of any injury on the part of the Victims is a prerequisite for convicting an accused.
25. The court must determine whether the act, regardless of its outcome, was performed with the intention or knowledge and under the circumstances specified in the relevant legal section. Whether there was an intention to cause death or knowledge that death would occur is a factual question that depends on the specific circumstances of each case.
26. Based on the observations made in the decisions as mentioned earlier, this Court is of view that, at this stage, it cannot be concluded that section 307 of IPC has no application on the ground that the wound certificate was not filed. Although the nature of the injury caused may often assist in coming to a finding as to the accused's attention, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances.
27. The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the contents of FIR No. 48/2024, 52/2024, and 53/2024 suggest they relate to a single incident. Still, in reality, no such incident occurred as described in the reports. It is contended that the Police Department, to create multiple FIRs against the Petitioner, fabricated these crimes. Despite occurring on the same day, the material on record indicates that the incidents took place in different locations with different victims. Specifically, the incident at the Polling Booth on 13th May 2024 was reported by the VRO, while the current incident involved a report by the defacto complainant on 23rd May 2024. The VRO who reported Crime No. 48/2024 may not have been aware of the incident outside the Polling Booth, which the complainant, in this case, claims to be a victim of. Furthermore, the victim/defacto complainant in Crime No. 52/2024 is different. Therefore, prima facie, it cannot be concluded that multiple crimes were registered against the Petitioner solely to inconvenience him, even though they may be related to a single incident.
1228. Learned Special Counsel for the Respondent relied on a decision reported in Vipan Kumar Dhir vs. the State of Punjab and another8, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"11. In addition to the caveat illustrated in the cited decision(s), bail can also be revoked where the court has considered irrelevant factors or has ignored relevant material available on record which renders the Order granting bail legally untenable. The gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused and societal impact of an undue indulgence by Court when the investigation is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations, where a Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent the miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administration of criminal justice system. This Court has repeatedly viewed that while granting bail, especially anticipatory bail which is per se extraordinary in nature, the possibility of the accused to influence prosecution witnesses, threatening the family members of the deceased, fleeing from justice or creating other impediments in the fair investigation, ought not to be overlooked."
29. A perusal of the parameters for granting anticipatory bail laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court shows that the Court must consider the seriousness of the offence, the likelihood of the Petitioner's absconding from justice, the antecedents of the accused and chances of the Petitioner tampering with evidence or threatening the witnesses.
30. The learned counsel representing the Respondent-State asserts that the Petitioner is a habitual offender involved in 11 cases, including two similar offences. The Prosecution has provided details of these cases, which are outlined below:
Sl.
Crime Number Offences Police Station
No.
1. Cr. No.64 of 2009 341, 324, 506 r/w 34 of IPC Rentachintala
2. Cr. No.78 of 2014 147, 148, 324, 506 r/w 149 of IPC Veldurthy
147, 148, 324, 302 r/w 149, 120B of
3. Cr. No.34 of 2017 Veldurthy
IPC
4. Cr.No.97 of 2014 188, 341, 283 of IPC Karempudi
147, 148, 307, 324, 354, 427 r/w 149
5. Cr. No.75 of 2014 of IPC, Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Machavaram
(POA) Act & Section 3 of E.S. Act
6. Cr. No.252 of 2015 143, 341, 188 r/w 149 of IPC Macherla Town
8
(2021) 15 SCC 518
13
147, 148, 427, 307 r/w 149, 188 of
7. Cr. No.125 of 2018 IPC, section 32 of P.A. Act, 1861, Macherla Town
section 132(1) of R.P.Act
143, 188 of IPC, Section 32 of P.A.
8. Cr. No.92 of 2019 Act, 1861, section 131(1)(A) of Macherla Town
R.P.Act
9. Cr.No.331 of 2018 143, 341, 188 r/w 149 of IPC Gurazala Town
10. 506, 509 of IPC & Section 131 (2) of
Cr. No.52 of 2024 Rentachintala
R.P.Act
143, 147, 448, 427, 353, 452, 120-B
of IPC & 149 of IPC and Section 3 of
11. Cr. No.48 of 2024 Rentachintala
PDPP Act and Sections 131 and 135
of R.P. Act
31. The pendency of the aforesaid criminal cases itself demonstrates the criminal antecedents of the Petitioner.
32. As per the G.O.Rt.No.577 Home (Courts. A) Department, dt.12.06.2024, the Andhra Pradesh State Government has appointed Sri N. Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel as Special Counsel to appear before the High Court in certain cases of Macherla Assembly Constituency incidents involving the serious and grave violation of Model Code of Conduct. The learned Senior Counsel representing the Petitioner made submissions regarding the appointment of Special Counsel in this case. It is not the case for the Petitioner that the Government is not empowered to appoint Special Counsel on behalf of the de facto complainant/State.
33. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied on a decision reported in Paras Kumar Jain and another vs. State of M.P. and others 9, wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court, observed in Para 16, which reads as under:
"16. Thus the position in law is settled that while appointing a Special Public Prosecutor the State is required to apply its mind on the relevant aspects of the matter and see that only a fair and impartial advocate is appointed as Special Public Prosecutor. If an advocate has appeared on behalf of the complainant in earlier proceedings, then this aspect needs consideration by the State while appointing him as Special Public Prosecutor. The appointment of the Special Public Prosecutor cannot be made in a mechanical manner on mere asking by the complainant. It is the responsibility of the State to ensure the fair trial and see that the advocate appointed as Special Public Prosecutor, acts in non prejudicial manner."9
2012(3) MPLJ 14
34. The learned Special Counsel for the Respondent relied on a decision reported in Sri Omprakash Baheti and others vs. The State of Maharashtra10 , wherein the High Court of Bombay held that:
"18. xxx The records disclose that there has been application of mind by respondent no. 1 before appointing Advocate Gupta as Special Public Prosecutor and therefore, it cannot be said that respondent no. 1 has appointed Advocate Gupta as Special Public Prosecutor mechanically at the request of the complainant."
35. The Petitioner does not argue that the State Government failed to follow proper procedures when appointing Sri N. Ashwani Kumar as Special Counsel, nor has the Petitioner challenged these proceedings. Furthermore, the Petitioner does not claim that the appointment of Sri N. Ashwani Kumar as Special Counsel has caused him any prejudice.
36. In light of these facts, this Court finds that the Petitioner's submission regarding the appointment of Sri N. Ashwani Kumar as Special Counsel is not significantly relevant to the disposal of the current application.
37. The learned counsel for the Petitioner argues that custodial interrogation is unnecessary, citing the Prosecution's assertion that it has gathered all pertinent evidence demonstrating the Petitioner's involvement in the offence. Furthermore, the Prosecution has not argued for the necessity of the Petitioner's custodial interrogation.
38. In Ashok Kumar V. State of Union Territory Chandigarh 11 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
12. There is no gainsaying that custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating the alleged crime. It is equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not required, it may also not be grounds for releasing an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are severe. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for investigation.10
2006 SCC OnLine Bom 82 11 2024 S.C.C. OnLine SC 274 15
39. This Court views that the investigating officer deserves a free hand to take the investigation to its logical conclusion in a case containing severe allegations. The possibility of the investigation being affected once the Petitioner is released on bail is very much foreseen. Concerning the Prosecution's case, the investigation remains incomplete. Granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner could hinder the ongoing investigation. There is a concern regarding threats to witnesses, and a prima facie case implicating the Petitioner in a serious offence exists. The allegations are severe, and the investigating agency has not yet been able to interrogate the Accused/Petitioner.
40. The established legal principle is that anticipatory bail is not granted as a matter of routine; it should only be provided when the Court is convinced that exceptional circumstances warrant such an extraordinary remedy.
41. The Prosecution is concerned that the Petitioner, having cultivated a strong grassroots following across every village and town over his four consecutive terms as MLA, poses a risk if released on bail. There is a severe apprehension that he may influence his followers and associates to seek retribution against the witnesses or the victim. The Petitioner is shown to be involved in multiple cases, making his antecedents a crucial factor to consider when deciding on an application for anticipatory bail. The investigation concerning the Petitioner is ongoing.
42. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the gravity of the offence, and by the settled principle of law that the power to grant bail under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. should be sparingly exercised in extraordinary circumstances, and no such circumstances having been made out in this case, the possibility of the Petitioner repeating similar offences and the impact on the public if anticipatory bail is granted, as well as the potential prejudice to a free, fair, and thorough investigation, lead this Court to conclude that this is not a suitable case for granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner/Accused.
1643. As a result, the Petition is dismissed.
44. It is explicitly clarified that the observations made in this Order are preliminary and pertain solely to the decision on the present application without indicating a stance on the case's merits. The Investigating Agency is affirmed to have the freedom to investigate without being influenced by the observations in this Order.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
_____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 26.06.2024 MS / SAK 17 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Criminal Petition No.3788 of 2024 Date: 26.06.2024 MS