Gujarat High Court
Commissioner Of Wealth Tax-I vs Hhm Jyotindrasinhji....Opponent(S) on 26 March, 2014
Author: Sonia Gokani
Bench: Akil Kureshi, Sonia Gokani
O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
TAX APPEAL NO. 1153 of 2008
TO
TAX APPEAL NO. 1162 of 2008
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI
and
HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as
to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any
order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
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COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX-I,....Appellant(s)
Versus
HHM JYOTINDRASINHJI....Opponent(s)
================================================================
Appearance:
MR PRANAV G DESAI, ADVOCATE for the Appellant(s)
MR RK PATEL, ADVOCATE for the Opponent(s)
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI
and
Page 1 of 18
O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT
HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI
Date : 26/03/2014
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI)
1. All these Tax Appeals since raised common questions of facts and law, they have been decided by way of this common judgment.
2. While admitting the Tax Appeals preferred by the Revenue aggrieved by the common judgment of the Tribunal, following substantial questions of law have been framed.
"A) Whether on the facts and in circumstances of the case and in law Hon'ble ITAT is right in confirming the CIT (A)'s order rejecting the value adopted by the AO in respect of immovable properties derived from the DVO's earlier report in respect of each immovable property decided by the ITAT?
(B) Whether on the facts and in circumstances of the case and in law the Hon'ble ITAT is right in confirming the CIT (A)'s order that value of life interest only is to be taken for valuation of taxable wealth in respect of U.K. Trusts?
(C) Whether on the facts and in circumstances of the case and in law the Hon'ble ITAT is right in confirming the CIT (A)'s order that nothing is to be taxed in the hands of the assessee as far as USA trusts are concerned?
(D) Whether the ITAT erred in confirming the CIT (A)'s order as it overlooked the fact that the issue regarding foreign trust is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in assessee's own case for A.Ys 1970-71 to 1976-77 and 1978-79?"
3. At the outset, both sides agree that question 'D' admitted is Page 2 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT essentially part of the arguments and therefore while deciding the present group of appeals, questions A, B and C shall be dealt with.
4. We have heard learned counsel Mr.Pranav Desai for the Revenue and learned counsel Mr.R.K.Patel for the respondent- assessee who have both extensively argued on the line of respective strengths of different issues.
5. The first issue pertains to value adopted by the Assessing Officer in respect of immovable properties derived from DVO's report on each property. The immovable properties of the respondent which are subject matter of valuation as narrated in the order of the Assessing Officer along with their valuations are as follows:
"Flat at Bombay (exempt) as discussed in earlier order. Rs.Nil
2. Land at Kotharia Rs.1,95,300
3. House at Bangalore (Red house) As per working attached dt. 23.3.98 Rs. 62,230
4. Kailash Baug as per DVO's report dt.22.3.91 Rs.18,74,000
5. European Guest House -do- dt. 20.2.91 Rs. 9,87,300
6. Operate house, Bombay -do- dt. 2.5.97 Rs.35,28,000
7. Jaymahal Palace, Hotel and stud farm along with land dt.20.3.98 Rs.44,53,810 Page 3 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT
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Rs.1,11,01,140"
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6. Predominantly, three different aspects shall have bearing on the first issue and all these three need to be individually examined in the context of different immovable properties. And, thus, hereinafter these three parameters shall be examined in reference to the valuation of immovable properties classified under each such head.
Legal parameters and immovable properties classified under relevant head.
(a) Reduction of value of the property declared surplus under the Urban Land Ceiling Act (ULC for short).
(2) Land at Kotharia
(7) Jaymahal Palace, Hotel and stud farm
(b) Deduction towards development charges and deferment of sale
in case of large properties.
(3) House at Bangalore
(4) Kailash Baug (26 acres 26 gunthas)
(5) European Guest House
(c) Application of schedule III for valuation of properties
Page 4 of 18
O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT
introduced with effect from 1.4.89 by Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989.
(1) Flat at Bombay
(6) Opera House
7. Taking up firstly the first parameter of reduced valuation in respect of those immovable properties which have been declared surplus land under the ULC Act, Assessing Officer chose to follow report of DVO disregarding settled judicial pronouncements on the subject.
8. From two properties, viz. land at Kotharia and Jaymahal Palace Hotel and stud farm along with surplus land was declared under the ULC where the question had come up about accepting the report of DVO with regard to value of such properties.
Assessing Officer chose to accept DVO's report without considering the coverage under the ULC Act.
8.1 When aggrieved respondent approached CIT (A) against such valuation, it held in favour of the assessee, relying essentially on its earlier order of 26.4.2004 except for AY 1977-78 where result was inconsequential as admitted by both the sides. It noted that land at Kotharia was admeasuring 28,927.44 sq. mtrs. and Jaymahal Palace Hotel and Stud farm though had some constructed property, huge area was open, covered by form No.1 pursuant to ULC Act.
Page 5 of 18O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT 8.2 Revenue challenged such order of CIT(A) before the Tribunal which also extensively dealt with the said issue property-wise to hold in favour of assessee and against the Revenue.
8.3 As could be noted from the order of the Tribunal reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of CIT v. G.S.Krishnavati Vahuji Maharaj Kalyanraiji Temple, 264 ITR 517 (Guj.), wherein this Court had laid down that whenever there is any restriction on the transfer of any land, it is a matter of common knowledge that the value of the property would be normally reduced. The Tribunal having noted the detailed reasoning of the CIT(Appeals) and by virtue of its reliance on this decision, chose to endorse the view of the CIT (Appeals).
8.4 We notice that such decision of CIT v. G.S.Krishnavati Vahuji Maharaj Kalyanraiji Temple (supra) was referred to the Full Bench, which delivered a decision in the case of Aims Oxygen Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, 345 ITR 456 (Guj.) by holding thus:
"19.In the present case, it is not in dispute that the land of the assessee was acquired as early as in 1960. The Assessee Company filed return of net wealth on 28th September, 1984 in which the value of the open land situated on Old Padra Road was shown to be Rs. 62,538/-. The Assessee got another Govt. Regd. Valuer's report on 16th March, 1989 and on that basis, the Assessee filed revised return of wealth showing the value of the open land in question at Rs. 1,44,146/-. The land in question was the subject matter in the matter of Urban Land [Ceiling & Regulation] Act, 1976. Having noticed the same, in the case of Assessee for the Assessment Year Page 6 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT 1988-89 to c1990-91, when the matter moved up to Commissioner of Wealth-tax [Appeals], he directed the Wealth-tax Officer to revise the value of the open land as per the Urban Land [Ceiling & Regulation] Act, 1976 as against the value taken by the Assessing Officer on the basis of the valuation made by the Departmental Valuation Officer. The Revenue filed an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench 'C' in WTA Nos. 345 to 347-A-94. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, after hearing both the sides, by its order dated 1st March, 2000, upheld the decision of the Commissioner of Wealth-tax [Appeals], that the valuation of the land owned by the Assessee in excess of limit laid down under the Land Ceiling Act is to be made on the basis of the compensation which the Assessee would be entitled to receive under the said Act. For the Assessment Year 1991-92, when the matter was again taken up, the assessee Aims Oxygen Pvt. Ltd., had to move before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench 'B', Ahmedabad, in WTA No. 910-Ahd-
95. In the said case, in view of the decision of the Tribunal passed in the case of the Assessee for the Assessment Years 1988-89 to 1990-91, by order dated 12th May, 2000, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad directed to examine the issue in light of the said decision.
20.On the aforesaid facts, as it is evident that the land in question was declared surplus land under the Urban Land [Ceiling & Regulation] Act, 1976 which was having depressing effect on the value of the asset, the valuation had to be made on the basis of assumption that the purchaser would be able to enjoy the property as the holder, but with restrictions and prohibitions contained in the ULC Act and in such case value of the property or land would be reduced. Following the same principle, the Revenue, having already accepted the depressed valuation during the Assessment Years 1988-89 to 1990 and then for Assessment Year 1991-92, it was not open to the Revenue to assess the property on the basis of the market value, which normally could have fetched without any restriction or prohibition, but ought to have accepted the value of open land with such restriction and prohibition at Rs. 1,44,146/-, as assessed by the Govt. Regd. Valuer by report dated 16th March, 1989.Page 7 of 18
O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT
21.In view of the finding aforesaid and the settled law as discussed above, we are of the considered view that the Appellate Tribunal was incorrect in holding that immovable property should be valued as per the open market rate, without any restriction and prohibition. In the result, the question, as referred for our opinion is required to be answered in the negative, against the Revenue and in favour of the Assesee."
8.5 Both the properties which had been covered under the ULC Act would be directly covered by the decision rendered by this court. Both the CIT (Appeals) and the Tribunal, therefore have rightly applied the ratio laid down in the case of G.S.Krishnavati Vahuji Maharaj Kalyanraiji Temple (supra) in respect of these properties.
8.6 Valuation of both the properties had been reduced on account of surplus land declared under the ULC Act. By judicial pronouncement, it is made amply clear that valuation of properties covered under the ULC Act would surely be not the same as market value. It is a major prohibiting and restricting factor to diminish the value consideration.
9. Three properties of the respondent at Sr.No.3, House at Bangalore, (4) Kailash Baug and (5) European Guest House were to be valued for taxing them under the prevalent tax regime.
9.1 One of the criteria insisted upon by the respondent assessee was the deduction towards development charges and deferment of sale for these being large properties. According to respondent, 30% Page 8 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT of the value of the property would need to be deducted from the total value as is done in case of land acquisition cases and moreover, there would be deferment of sale in such cases unlike in case of ordinary sized immovable assets. AO did not agree to such contention and held in favour of the Revenue.
9.2 CIT (Appeals) when was moved by the respondent, it had taken into account various factors as contained also in the Town Planning Rules. It took note of the fact that in large properties, sale would be deferred for number of years. Taking into account further aspect of the common amenities and the deferment of the sale aspect, it concluded reduction of 25% in the area as against 30% deduction claimed.
9.3 The Tribunal while examining this aspect sought to rely upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Spl. Tehsildar, Land Acqn. Vishakapatnam v. Smt. A.Mangala Gowri, AIR 1992 SC 666. The Tribunal also endorsed the view of the CIT (Appeals) that large properties would usually sell over a period of time and considering the aspect of development and common amenities, it allowed 25% of the deduction of the total land area and deferment of sale by average of 2½ years and the rate was reduced to a certain amount.
9.4 We notice that the decision sought to be relied upon by the Tribunal was rendered by the Apex Court in a land acquisition case where the Court having discussed various decisions, that while Page 9 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT developing the land, a portion of the land has to be deducted for roads, drainage and other amenities and accordingly from the value of land, deduction of 1/3rd amount would be necessary. It thus culled out an acceptable principle of 1/3 of such area to be considered as reasonable amount of deduction for the purpose of considering market value of the property in case of large properties by holding thus:
"4. In Tribeni Devi v. Collector of Ranchi, (1972) 3 SCR 208 at p. 213 : (AIR 1972 SC 1417 at p. 1421), this Court held that "in order to develop that area at least the value of 1 / 3 of the land will have to be deducted for roads, drainage and other amenities". On this basis the value of the land at Rs. 2,08,135.70 per acre would, after the deduction of 1/ 3 come to Rs. 1,38,757 per acre. In Smt. Kaushalya Devi Bogra v. The Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad, (1984) 2 SCR 900: (AIR 1984 SC 892). This Court held that deduction of 1/3 was held to be reasonable. In Vijay Kumar Motilal v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 2 SCC 719: (AIR 1981 SC 1632) 1/3rd was deducted towards developmental charges in undeveloped area. In Vijaysingh Liladhar v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 3 SCC 760 : (AIR 1988 SC 1652) the deduction of 1/4th by the High Court which was not challenged in this Court was upheld. In Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty (AIR 1959 SC 429) (supra), deduction of 25 per cent was held to be reasonable.It is to be noted that in building Regulations, setting apart the lands for development of roads, drainage and other amenities like electricity etc. are condition precedent to approve lay out for building colonies. Therefore, based upon the situation of the land and the need for development the deduction shall be made. Where acquired land is in the midst of already developed land with amenities of roads, drainage, electricity etc. then deduction of 1/3 would not be justified. In the rural areas housing schemes relating to weaker sections deduction of 1/ 4 may be justified. On that basis, this Court in R. Dharma Rao's case upheld deduction of 1/ 5 because the owner while obtaining the lay out had already set apart lands for road and drainage.Therefore, deduction of 1/3 would be reasonable. In fact in The Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Vishakapatnam v. P. Narasing Page 10 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT Rao (1985) 1 A P L J (HC) 99, a Division Bench of the High Court surveyed judgments of the High Court relating to housing schemes of Visakhapatnam upholding deduction of 1/3 to be reasonable. Accordingly we hold that 1/3 of the market value should be deducted for development of the lands. The High Court committed grievous error in giving a curious reasoning of valuing at Rs. 12 and upholding Rs. 10 to be the market value after deduction, though the market value was determined at Rs. 10. Accordingly the appeal is allowed. The market value is determined at Rs. 6 per sq. yard and after deducting 1/ 3 the market value is Rs. 4 per sq. yard. The respondents are entitled to 15 per cent solatium on market value and 4 per cent interest thereon from the date of dispossession. But in the circumstances parties are directed to pay and receive their own costs."
9.5 The Tribunal in this case, at the time of endorsing the findings of the CIT (Appeals), allowed deduction of 20% of the land area before valuing both the large properties for the purpose of taxing them as and also provided for discount on deferment of the sale and thereby committed no error in applying the principle of valuation in case of the respondent assessee.
10. With regard to remaining immovable properties, namely, Opera House at Bombay and a flat at Bombay, the Assessing Officer had taken value of the properties on the basis of DVO's report where the impact of Schedule III was not given.
10.1 CIT (A) elaborately threadbare discussed the entire issue. Having noted that Opera House is a theater located at Bombay and from 1964 to 1975, DVO had valued the same as per Schedule III and subsequently since tenancy that existed was terminated the same was evaluated at market price. CIT(A) Page 11 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT accepted the contention of assessee that applications of Schedule III is mandatory to all pending proceedings. It also held that letting out of the property on rent also would have no bearing on the applicability of Schedule III of the Wealth Tax Act.
10.2 The Tribunal here in Revenue's appeal also concurred with the decision of the CIT (Appeals) which had relied upon various decisions particularly of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Sharvan Kumar Swamp & Sons, 210 ITR 886 (SC) and a decision of this Court delivered in the case of Commissioner of Wealth-Tax v. Rajeshkumar R. Gandhi, 219 ITR 408 (Guj.) wherein it has been held that Schedule III of the Act is mandatorily applicable to all the pending assessments.
10.3 We notice that the question raised before the courts was applicability of Schedule III in respect of the immovable properties and whether they were to be valued in accordance with the new valuation rules brought on statute book by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989 applying Schedule III, brought with effect from 1.4.1989 in the matters which were pending before the courts. In no uncertain terms, it has been laid down in all these authorities that rule 1BB inserted with effect from 1.4.79 being procedural must operate retrospectively from the date on which section 7(1) of the Wealth Tax Act was made subject to the rules and accordingly, to all pending proceedings, valuation of property is made obligatory applying schedule III of the WT Act. This Court in cases of Rajeshkumar Gandhi (supra) examined the said issue at Page 12 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT length followed the decision rendered in the case of Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Kasturbhai Mayabhai, 164 ITR 107 (Guj) which followed the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Sharvan Kumar Swamp (supra).
10.4 It is not controverted by the department that the Assessing Officer while accepting the report of the DVO has been categorical that the applicability of Schedule III has no connectivity with the properties. He had admittedly not given any effect to Schedule III. Both the CIT (Appeals) and the Tribunal have rightly held that Schedule III would be applicable in the case of both the properties, the same being mandatory on the part of the Revenue to give effect to the same in all pending proceedings, then were justified in the approach adopted by them. Therefore, in relation to properties of Operate House and the flat at Bombay, interference made by the CIT (Appeals) and the Tribunal in the acceptance of the report of the DVO on the part of the Assessing Officer, calls for no interference.
11. With regard to question B, issue is no longer res integra. This Court in the case of the very assessee decided the same. In the case of H.H.Maharaja Shri Jyotindrasinhji v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 326 ITR 594 (Guj) has concluded such issue in favour of the respondent assessee in the following manner:
"54.In light of the above legal and factual position, simply because the authorities below have erroneously Page 13 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT come to the conclusion that the facts are identical with the facts of earlier years, it cannot be believed on close verification and proper examination of those facts that the same were identical. The statement of income of all these years are on record. The notes which were placed in these statements of income are also taken into consideration. At the time when the returns were filed, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not available. The assessee was hopeful that he would succeed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hence, such note was put stating that it was subject to the outcome of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. As far as income from U.K. Trusts is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not given any specific finding in view of the fact that the assessee's father as well as the assessee have shown the income from U.K. Trusts in their income-tax returns. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has not gone into the aspect of the interpretation of Clause 3 & 4 of the Trust Deed. On the contrary, at more than one places, the issue was kept open. Simply because the Settlement Commission has interpreted the said clause, it would not be binding on the Tribunal nor on this Court. So far as the years under appeals are concerned, the assessee has been seriously challenging inclusion of income from U.K. Trusts in his hands stating therein that neither distribution has been taken place nor the same has been received by him. The assessee has also produced the accounts of the Trusts wherein it is specifically stated that the income has been retained by the Trustees and it was brought forward to the next years. It was also stated in such statement of accounts that the tax has been paid by the Trustees of the U.K. Trusts on the income so earned in U.K. It appears that any of the authorities below, including the Tribunal has not considered this vital aspect of the matter and proceeded on the footing that the facts are identical and that the notes are similar to the notes of earlier years. If the income were retained by the Trustees and it has not been distributed, nor it has been received by the assessee and no evidence has been brought by the department to show that the same has been received by the assessee in India, such income cannot be taxed in the hands of the assessee. Section 5 of the Act has also no application. When the income has neither accrued Page 14 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT nor received by the assessee, nor it has been received or accrued on his behalf either in India or outside India, such income cannot be taxed under Section 166 of the Act as it is not the income receivable. Section 166 of the Act can be invoked only when the income is received by the assessee. Unless and until the Trustees exercise the discretion and distribute the income in favour of any of the beneficiaries, i.e. the assessee, such income cannot be said to be received by the assessee. Taking any view of the matter, it cannot be said that the income has been either received by or accrued to the assessee.
55.So far as the interpretation of Clauses 3 & 4 of the U.K. Trusts is concerned, it is an admitted position that neither the Settlor nor the present appellant has appointed any additional Trustee. It is also an admitted position that the sole Trustee appointed under the Trust at the time of its creation, is competent enough to take decision with regard to distribution of the income of the Trusts. It is nobody's case that the sole Trustee has exercised such discretion and distributed the income in favour of the beneficiary. Merely on the basis of presumption, the interpretation of any Clause of Trust Deed cannot be made that under the Trust Deed, the Trustees are bound to exercise the discretion. Non- exercise of discretion is a matter of fact and an inference drawn by the possible interpretation of Clauses 3 & 4 of the Trust Deeds that the distribution has taken place and assessee received an income, is not sustainable. On the basis of such presumption, income cannot be taxed in the hands of the assessee. Clause 4 of the Trust Deed starts with the opening words "subject as aforesaid" meaning thereby its operation is subject to the conditions precedent enumerated therein or the eventualities envisaged therein. All the authorities have proceeded on the footing that Clause 4 had come into operation and that on that ground, income was taxed in the hands of the assessee irrespective of the fact whether such income was received by the assessee or not. We are, therefore, of the view that a close and combine reading of Clause 3 & 4 of the Trust Deed makes it abundantly clear that the sole Trustee has every power or authority to take decision with regard to the trust property and since it has been decided by the Page 15 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT Trustee to retain the income of the Trust, it cannot be said that such income is being received by the assessee. We are also of the view that the applicability of Clause 4 is subject to the conditions of Clause 3 (2) and since sole trustee is administering the trust property and income and neither the late Maharaja nor the present appellant made appointment of discretion exerciser and the specified period is still not over, there is no question of invoking Clause 4 of the Trust and thereby taxing the income in the hands of the assessee. It is also important to note that the Trustees have paid the tax on the income earned by them in U.K. and hence, the same cannot be taxed twice over.
56.In the above view of the matter, the questions formulated by this Court in all these appeals are decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. All these appeals are accordingly allowed without any order as to costs."
12. With regard to the question C concerning taxing of trusts at USA, the decision rendered by this Court in the case of the very assessee in Tax Appeal Nos.1462 to 1469 of 2005 covers this issue. The decision of this Court relevant for the purpose of addressing the issue in question is reproduced hereinafter.
"The short controversy involved and raised in these questions is, for the purpose of taxing the property of the trusts, which are in USA, whether the provisions of Section 21(4) of the Wealth Tax Act or Section 21(2) of the Wealth Tax Act will have application? The Tribunal has considered this aspect as under:
"14. In view of the above, we have no hesitation in holding that the taxability of the corpus of USA trusts in the hands of assessee beneficiary are to be guided by subs.( 4) of S.21 and according to which the wealth tax shall be levied upon and recovered from the court of wards, administrators general Page 16 of 18 O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT official trustee, receiver, manager or other person as aforesaid, as the case may be, in the like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from common individual who is a citizen of India and resident in India, for the purpose of this Act. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the ld. AR that the settlements in USA trusts were in the nature of discretionary trust, assessment of corpus of such trust under WT Act had to be framed in accordance with s.21(4). So far as the option to assess either the trustee or beneficiary as given u/s.21(2) is concerned, it can be exercised only when the share of beneficiary is known. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the orders of the CIT(A) for applying the provisions of s.21(4) in place of s.21(2) as applied by the Assessing Officer for levying wealth tax on the assessee in respect of corpus of USA trust."
The admitted facts are that in the case of this very assessee it has been held by the Supreme Court that the trust is discretionary trusts.
A plain reading of subsection (4) of Section 21 makes it clear that subsection (4) of Section 21 prevails over all the foregoing provisions of subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 21 and subsection (4) provides that where the shares of the persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit any such assets are held are indeterminate or unknown, the wealth tax shall be levied upon and recovered from the court of wards, administrator general, official trustee, receiver, manager, as the case may be.
We , therefore, see no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal. No substantial question of law does arise."
Following the decisions of this Court, both these questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. It is submitted by both the sides that both the issues 'B' & 'C' are pending before the Apex Court in several SLPs preferred by the Revenue which have been admitted.
Page 17 of 18O/TAXAP/1153/2008 JUDGMENT Resultantly, substantial questions of law framed are answered accordingly and these appeals are disposed of.
(AKIL KURESHI, J.) (MS SONIA GOKANI, J.) (vjn) Page 18 of 18