Madhya Pradesh High Court
P.S. Dhanwal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 30 August, 2024
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
WRIT PETITION NO. 21080/2024.
P.S. DHANWAL
VS.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS.
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Appearance:
Shri Anil Lala - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Kapil Duggal - Advocate for the respondents- caveator.
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(O R D E R) (30/08/2024) The present petition has been filed against the order annexure P-1 dated 22.7.2024 whereby the petitioner has been placed under suspension. The petitioner is working on the post of Cadre Officer Grade-I in the cadre of officers maintained by the Apex Bank, known as M.P. State Cooperative Bank.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner while assailing the order argued that the order is unsustainable because the order is issued by the incharge Managing Director who does not hold the substantive post and thus could not have discharged the statutory functions of Managing Director. It is also argued that there is no alternative remedy available for the petitioner because the order of suspension is not appealable as per the service rules of the Bank and that the appeal as per clause 59 of the M.P. Rajya Sahakari Bank Bhopal, Sewa Niyam, Achran Niyam Evam Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 2 Manav Sansadhan Neeti 2013 (for short, "Service Rules") lies only against the penalty order, and not against the suspension order. It is also contended that there is no alternative remedy even under the provisions of section-78 of the M.P. Cooperative Societies Act (for short, Act 1960) because the order has been passed under approval of the Cadre Committee and the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Madhya Pradesh is one of the members of the 3-member Cadre Committee. Appeal under section 7 lies before the Registrar or the Tribunal. Even the remedy cannot be availed before the Tribunal under section 78 or supervisory powers under section 77 (14) of the Act 1960 because at present there is no full quorum in the Tribunal and in absence of full quorum, the Tribunal can only consider interim relief and cannot take final decision.
3. On merits also, it was argued that the departmental enquiry has been continuing against the petitioner since the year 2014 by issuing the chargesheet and at this juncture, he could not be suspended for that enquiry that is continuing since last 10 years. The suspension order has not been issued owing to criminal trial, but owing to pendency of disciplinary enquiry. Even if it on account of pendency of criminal case, then also, there was no challan against the petitioner after sanction from the Bank and the trial court has directly taken cognizance against the petitioner without challan being filed, but on application under section 319 being filed by the complainant during pendency of trial. Thus, at this stage, there was no real necessity for the petitioner to be suspended because the matter is in knowledge of the Bank since last 10 years.
4. Per contra, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank that there is no defect in jurisdiction of the authority, because the order has been issued by the incharge Managing Director under orders of the Cadre Committee, which is a higher authority. Even otherwise, the incharge Managing Director will have the full powers of Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 3 Managing Director in the matter of disciplinary action, as the said powers are merely executive powers, and not statutory powers. It is further contended that the petitioner has a remedy to approach the Registrar under section 78 of the Act 1960 though he may be one of the members of the Cadre Committee, and in this regard reliance is placed on the Single Bench judgement of the Madras High Court in the case of K.N. Mutyala Rao Vs. Reviewing Authority, reported in 2020 SCC Online Mad 11089. It was submitted that one person may be part of collective decision making taken by majority, but it cannot be inferred that he will be prejudiced when he takes up the legality of that decision at quasi-judicial side. It was argued that even then the petitioner may approach before the State Cooperative Tribunal either under Section 78 or 77 (14) of the Act 1960.
5. On merits, it was contended that the suspension of the petitioner is not on basis of the Sessions Court arraying him as an accused in criminal case, but on account of pendency of Departmental enquiry, as per clause 52.1.1 of the Service Rules. It was also contended that even the Session Court has now prima-facie found ample material to proceed against the petitioner as an accused under section 319, hence, he has been rightly suspended.
6. Heard.
7. The petitioner has been placed under suspension in the year 2024 while being posted at Khargone while the allegations relate to his activities while posted at Raisen around the year 2013.
8. The objection as to competence of Incharge Managing Director. It is common ground for the rival parties that the competent authority in case of petitioner is the Managing Director. So far as the issue of incharge officer exercising disciplinary powers is concerned, the said issue has been settled by the the Division Bench of this Court in WA No.157/2017 (Gwalior). It was a case where the Superintending Engineer holding current charge of Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 4 Chief Engineer in another electricity distribution company of Madhya Pradesh, suspended an employee discharging the functions of disciplinary authority vested in Chief Engineer. The aforesaid matter ultimately went to the Division Bench and the Division Bench in WA No.157/2017, M.P. Madhyak Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Company Vs. Vikas Gupta and others decided on 06/04/2017 has held that a person holding the WP-4164- 2024 lower post was given current duty charge of the post of Chief General Manager by the competent authority. Thus, he was competent to act as Chief General Manager and pass an order of suspension. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gopalji Khanna Vs. Allahabad Bank and others (1996)3 SCC 538 has also held that a person holding lower post but having entrusted with regular charge of higher post can exercising powers of disciplinary authority. Thus, this Court finds itself bound by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as that of the Division Bench, and finds no error only on account of the order having been signed by the Incharge Managing Director.
9. However, that issue is now insignificant, as the Cadre Committee, which is the highest body in the society in absence of elected Board, has taken the decision, as evident from agenda item No.10 of Cadre Committee minutes placed on record as Annexure R-2. The elected Board of the Bank is presently under supersession, and thus looking to the plain language of Clause 14.5 of the Service Rules, Cadre Committee is the highest authority.
10. So far as the issue of alternative remedy is concerned, there is no remedy of appeal against suspension order under the Service Rules, as fairly admitted by both the parties. Even otherwise, the order being passed by highest authority as per own admission of Bank, there cannot be any in- house appeal under the Service Rules.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 511. The learned counsel for the Bank had heavily relied on the judgement of the Madras High Court in the case of K.N. Mutyala Rao (supra) to submit that the Registrar can very well hear the appeal under section 78 of the Act of 1960 because he was a member of the Cadre Committee and was part of the collective decision making. It cannot be inferred that he will have bias when hearing appeal against the decision of the Cadre Committee under his quasi-judicial powers. This Court disagrees with the judgement of the Madras High Court for exactly the same reasons that the Madras High Court considered to hold that the Chairman can hear challenge to the decision of which he was a part as collective decision making. Once it cannot be inferred that he was part of the collective decision taken by majority, then in the same breath it also cannot be inferred that he personally disagreed with the decision taken in the collective decision. Once there is possibility that on personal note the Chairman was agreeable to the majority decision, then this benefit of this likelihood of bias should go to the affceted party, and not against it. It is settled in law that not only bias, but also likelihhod of bias incapacitates an authority. The Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana reported in 1985 (4) SCC 417 has held as under :-
Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 6"16. We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is "in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting". The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact decides partially, but whether there is a real livelihood of bias. What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is actually tainted with bias but that the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has received wide recognition in several decisions of this Court. It is also important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power stricto sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair and just decision between the rival claims of parties. Justice is not the function of the courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict standards applied to authorities exercising judicial power are being increasingly applied to administrative bodies, for it is vital to the maintenance of the rule of law in a Welfare State where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions in a fair and just manner. This was the basis on which the applicability of this Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 7 rule was extended to the decision-making process of a selection committee constituted for selecting officers to the Indian Forest Service in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150 : (1970) 1 SCR 457] . What happened in this case was that one Naqishbund, the acting Chief Conservator of Forests, Jammu and Kashmir was a member of the Selection Board which had been set up to select officers to the Indian Forest Service from those serving in the Forest Department of Jammu and Kashmir. Naqishbund who was a member of the Selection Board was also one of the candidates for selection to the Indian Forest Service. He did not sit on the Selection Board at the time when his name was considered for selection but he did sit on the Selection Board and participated in the deliberations when the names of his rival officers were considered for selection and took part in the deliberations of the Selection Board while preparing the list of the selected candidates in order of preference. This Court held that the presence of Naqishbund vitiated the selection on the ground that there was reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the process of selection. Hegde, J. speaking on behalf of the Court countered the argument that Naqishbund did not take part in the deliberations of the Selection Board when his name was considered, by saying : (SCC p. 270, para 15) "But then the very fact that he was a member of the Selection Board must have had its own impact on the decision of the Selection Board. Further admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the Selection Board when the claims of his rivals ... was considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the Selection Board there was a conflict between his interest and duty.... The Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 8 real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased.... There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct."
This Court emphasised that it was not necessary to establish bias but it was sufficient to invalidate the selection process if it could be shown that there was reasonable likelihood of bias. The likelihood of bias may arise on account of proprietary interest or on account of personal reasons, such as, hostility to one party or personal friendship or family relationship with the other. Where reasonable likelihood of bias is alleged on the ground of relationship, the question would always be as to how close is the degree of relationship or in other words, is the nearness of relationship so great as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the authority making the selection."
12. The decision of Madras High Court does not take into account the aforesaid settled position of law, and thus, the said judgement is clearly distinguishable.
13. The learned counsel tried to justify it with the example of the same High Court having powers of judicial review on judicial side against administrative decisions taken by the committee or Full Court of the same High Court. Such analogy is entirely misplaced, as the High Court exercises its constitutional powers under Article 226 of the Constitution while carrying out judicial review of administrative decisions under limited scope of judicial review. It cannot be equated to a full fledged appeal, the scope of which is almost unlimited.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 914. Moreover, the High Court is the highest Court in the territory within its jurisdiction and appeal lies only to the Supreme Court. Thus, the challenge to the administrative orders of the High Court to the High Court at judicial side is also out of the "Doctrine of Necessity" because there is no other higher Court available within the State. In the case of Election Commission of India v. Dr Subramaniam Swamy, (1996) 4 SCC 104, the Supreme Court held as under :-
"16. ....................... It is often invoked in cases of bias where there is no other authority or Judge to decide the issue. If the doctrine of necessity is not allowed full play in certain unavoidable situations, it would impede the course of justice itself and the defaulting party would benefit therefrom. Take the case of a certain taxing statute which taxes certain perquisites allowed to Judges. If the validity of such a provision is challenged who but the members of the judiciary must decide it. If all the Judges are disqualified on the plea that striking down of such a legislation would benefit them, a stalemate situation may develop. In such cases the doctrine of necessity comes into play. If the choice is between allowing a biased person to act or to stifle the action altogether, the choice must fall in favour of the former as it is the only way to promote decision-making. In the present case also if the two Election Commissioners are able to reach a unanimous decision, there is no need for the Chief Election Commissioner to participate, if not the doctrine of necessity may have to be invoked."
15. Thus, this Court is not able to persuade itself to follow the judgment in case of K.N. Mutyala Rao (supra) to hold that notwithstanding the Registrar being member of the 3-member Cadre Committee, he can hear Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 10 appeal against the decision of the Committee in exercise of his quasi- judicial appellate powers. Once the appeal under section 78 lies to the Tribunal as well as to the Registrar, there is no "necessity" for the Registrar to hear the same despite there being a real likelihood of bias. In such eventuality, even writ petition can be maintained despite availability of alternative remedy because the said alternative remedy will not be efficacious.
16. It was also argued by the respondents that the petitioner can file appeal to the State Cooperative Tribunal against the decision of the Cadre Committee under Section 78 or in supervisory powers of the Tribunal under Section 77 (14) of the Act of 1960. It has been countered by petitioner with the argument that the Tribunal presently does not have full quorum and it cannot finally decide the appeal and can only pass interim orders. This was not disputed by the counsel for the State as well as the Bank.
17. In the opinion of this Court, this does not amount to an efficacious remedy inasmuch if the Tribunal does not grant interim relief, then there will be no option for the petitioner to get a final order.
18. Thus, this Court takes up the petition for hearing on merits.
19. By order annexure P-1, the petitioner has been placed under suspension in terms of clause 52.1.1 of the Service Rules, that relates to suspension on account of pendency of disciplinary proceedings. The provision for suspension in case of challan being presented in criminal case or being arrested for more than 48 hours, is in terms of clause 51.1. The said two provisions are as under :-
51.1 ;fn dksbZ lsok;qDr fdlh uSfrd v?kerk ds vijkf/kd vfHk;ksx ess fxjQrkj fd;k tkrk gS ,oa mls 48 ?k.Vs ls vf/kd vof/k ds fy, fu:) fd;k tkrk gS ;k mlds fo:) fdlh U;k;ky; esa cSad dh vuqefr ls pkyku izLrqr fd;k tkrk gS rks n.M vf/kjksfir djus ds Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 11 fy;s l{ke izkf/kdkjh] fxjQrkjh dh rkjh[k ls mlds fuyacu dk rFkk fuyacu dh dkykcf?k ds nkSjku bu fu;eksa ds v/khu fuyacu HkRrs ds Hkqxrku dk vkns'k ikfjr dj ldsxkA cSad dh vuqefr ds fcuk pkyku izzLrqr fd, tkus ij lsok;qDr ds fo:) dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugha dh tkosxh A vkijkf/kd eqdnes ds fu.kZ; ds i'pkr~ lsok;qDr ds ewyosru rFkk HkRrksa dk fu.kZ; ds vuqlkj fofu'p; ikfjr fu.kZ; ds vuqlkj fd;k tkosxk rFkk ;g Hkh fofu'p; fd;k tkosxk fd fuyacu dh dkykof/k ds nkSjku mls dRrZO; ij ;k vodk'k ij ekuk tk, A lsok;qDr dks mlds fo:) yxk;s x;s leLr vkjksiksa esa nks" "kh u ik;s tkus ij fuyacu dh dkykof/k ds fy;s vuqKs; laiw.kZ ewy csru rFkk HkRrksa ds Hkqxrku ,oa fuyacu dh dkykcf/k ds nkSjku drZO; ij ekus tkus ds lca/k esa fcpkj fd;k tk ldrk gS A 52.1.1 ,slk lsok;qDr tks cSad ds lsokfu;eksa ,oa cSad ds vkpj.k fu;eksa esa mYysf[kr fu;eksa das foijhr d`~R; djus vFkok vU; vfu;ferrk,a djus ds rF; cSad izca/ku ds laKku esa vkus ij izFken`"V;k nks""kh ik;k tkrk gS rks mls cSad izca/ku }kjk fuyafcr fd;k tk ldsxk A ,slk lsok;qDr ftlds fo:) izeq[k dnkpkj (Major misconduct) dh dk;Zokgh dh tk jgh gS] tkWp ds yafcr jgus ds nkSjku Hkh fuyacu das fy, mi;qDr vk/kkj ,oa dkj.k ik, tkus ij fuyafcr fd;k tk ldsxk A fuyacu dk ,slk vkns'k fyf[kr esa gksxk rFkk og lsok;qDr dks O;fDrxr :i ls ;k jftLVz~hd`r Mkd }kjk ;k bu fu;eksa esa fofgr fdlh vU;
rjhds ls ifjnRr fd;k tk;sxk A"
20. The suspension in the present case is under 52.1.1 as evident from the minutes of proceedings of Cadre Committee placed on record with reply as well as by the order Annexure P-1. Clause 52.1.1 relates to suspension in contemplation of enquiry. The petitioner is facing departmental enquiry right from the year 2014 i.e. since the last 10 years in the same matter. Suddenly after a period of 10 years of pendency of the enquiry, suspension of the petitioner seems to be totally illogical.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 1221. The counsel for the Bank also tried to justify the suspension on the ground that the Sessions Court has directed the petitioner to be arrayed as accused in criminal trial pending in the same matter. Upon perusal of the said order passed under section 319 CrPC on 15.9.2023, it is seen that the Court allowed the application of the complainant in the case initiated in the year 2014 and the trial also pending since year 2016.
22. Even looking to clause 51.1, it is clear that in the event of filing of challan, suspension is not mandatory or automatic, but discretionary. It is not analogous to Rule-9 of the M.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules 1966 that makes suspension automatic or mandatory. Even the said challan must be with sanction by the Bank. Clause 51.1 mentions in clear terms that if there is no sanction by the Bank, there would be no action for suspension. Thus, there is no provision akin to Rule 9 (1) of the M.P. Civil Services CCA Rules 1966.
23. It is well settled that mandatory sanction under Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 or under Section 197 CrPC cannot be nullified by the provisions of Section 319 CrPC. In the case of Surinderjit Singh Mand v. State of Punjab (2016) 8 SCC 722, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :-
30. The law declared by this Court emerging from the judgments referred to hereinabove, leaves no room for any doubt that under Section 197 of the Code and/or sanction mandated under a special statute (as postulated under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act) would be a necessary prerequisite before a court of competent jurisdiction takes cognizance of an offence (whether under the Penal Code, or under the special statutory enactment concerned).
The procedure for obtaining sanction would be governed by the provisions of the Code and/or as mandated under the special enactment. The words engaged in Section 197 of the Code are, "... no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with previous sanction...".
Likewise sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides--
Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 13"19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.--(1) No court shall take cognizance ... except with the previous sanction ...."
The mandate is clear and unambiguous that a court "shall not" take cognizance without sanction. The same needs no further elaboration. Therefore, a court just cannot take cognizance without sanction by the appropriate authority. Thus viewed, we find no merit in the second contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the respondents that where cognizance is taken under Section 319 of the Code, sanction either under Section 197 of the Code (or under the special enactment concerned) is not a mandatory prerequisite.
31. According to the learned counsel representing Respondent 2, the position concluded above would give the impression that the determination rendered by a court under Section 319 of the Code is subservient to the decision of the competent authority under Section
197. No, not at all. The grant of sanction under Section 197 can be assailed by the accused by taking recourse to judicial review. Likewise, the order declining sanction can similarly be assailed by the complainant or the prosecution."
24. Thus, it becomes clear that even in cases under section 319, requirement of sanction does not get wiped off, and the Bank could not argue that it can suspend the petitioner even without according sanction for prosecution.
25. Evidently, in absence of sanction, the Bank could not have placed the petitioner under suspension merely on account of the sessions Court having proceeded against him by exercising powers under section 319. So far as suspension on ground of disciplinary proceedings is concened, it is clear that the disciplinary enquiry is going on since the last 10 years and all of a sudden, there was no necessity to place the petitioner under suspension. In the case of Nahid Jahan Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2017 SCC Online MP 2173, the suspension syndrome has been highly deprecated and it has been held as under :-
Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 149. This is trite law that the purpose of placing an employee under suspension is mainly to keep her away from the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim measure in aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the delinquent may not gain custody or control of papers or take any advantage of her position. [Sec : (Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Agrawal ), (2013) 16 SCC 147].
10. In the the present case, the petitioner will not be in a position to tamper or influence any evidence. The suspension although is not a punishment, an employee cannot be placed under suspension without application of mind In (1994) 4 SCC 126 (State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty ), the Apex Court poignantly held that the Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf.
Suspension is not a punishment but is only one forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. Thus, suspension order can be tested on the anvil of arbitrariness/reasonableness.
11. In the case of Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel v. Anilbhai Nathubhai. Patel, (2006) 8 SCC 200, the Apex Court held that the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from the procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the Court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula, universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own facts depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society.
12. In the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679, it was held that an exercise of right to suspend an employee may be justified on a facts of a particular case. Instances, however, are not rare where officers have been found to be affilicted (sic : afflicted) by "suspension syndrome"and the employees have been found to be placed under suspension just for nothing. It is their irritability rather than an employee's trivial lapse which has often resulted in suspension.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 1519. After considering the aforesaid judgment, in (1998) 8 SCC 1(Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks), the Apex Court again held that where action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subjects a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Court will issue appropriate orders or direction to prevent such consequences. In no uncertain terms, it was laid down that a writ remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, inspite of alternative remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation.
20. In the light of this legal position, the availability of alternative remedy of appeal under the CCA Rules is not a bar to exercise jurisdiction by this Court in a case of this nature. As noticed, the learned Commissioner although had power to place the petitioner under suspension, exercised the said power without there being any justification. Thus, in the peculiar factual matrix of this case, I am not inclined to relegate the petitioner to avail alternative remedy.
26. In the present case, as noted above, the petitioner has been placed under suspension in the year 2024 while being posted at Khargone while the allegations relate to his activities while posted at Raisen around the year 2013. Departmental enquiry is going on since last 10 years and he has been arrayed as accused in the criminal case pending since 2016 under section 319 CrPC and there is no sanction for prosecution till date that is mandatory as per clause 51.1 of the service rules for placing the officer under suspension. Thus, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the suspension order Annexure P-1 is totally unjustified and unwarranted. It deserves to be and is hereby quashed. The petition is allowed.
(VIVEK JAIN) JUDGE Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM 16 MISHRA Signature Not Verified Signed by: 453 Signing time: 8/30/2024 6:02:03 PM