Madras High Court
Dr.R.Sethu vs The Manonmaniam Sundaranar University on 2 March, 2018
Author: S.M.Subramaniam
Bench: S.M.Subramaniam
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT Dated: 02.03.2018 ORDER RESERVED :23.02.2018 ORDER PRONOUNCED :02.03.2018 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.M.SUBRAMANIAM W.P.(MD) No.2368 of 2012 and M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012 and M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2015 Dr.R.Sethu ...Petitioner Vs. The Manonmaniam Sundaranar University, represented by its Registrar, Abhisekapatti, Tirunelveli ? 627 012. ...Respondent PRAYER: Writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the respondent Manonmaniam Sundaranar University to allow the petitioner to continue in service in his present status as Assistant Professor / Lecturer in Chemistry up to the age of Superannuation viz., 60 years fixed for the teaching faculty of the University with all attendant benefits.
!For Petitioner :Mr.S.Xavier Rajini
For Respondent :Mr.Mahboob Athif for
Ajmal Associates
:Order
The relief sought for in this writ petition is for a direction to direct the respondent / The Manonmaniam Sundaranar University, Abhisekapatti, Tirunelveli ? 627 012 to allow the writ petitioner to continue in service in his present status as Assistant Professor / Lecturer in Chemistry upto the age of Superannuation viz., 60 years fixed for the teaching faculty of the University with all attendant benefits.
2.The facts in nutshell to be considered in this writ petition is that the writ petitioner had joined as Clerk ? cum ? Steno in the Madurai Kamaraj University on 02.01.1981. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of Assistant and on the consequent bifurcation of the Madurai Kamaraj University in the year 1990, the writ petitioner got transferred to the newly constituted University namely, Manonmaniam Sundaranar University with effect from 01.11.1990 and continued there in the post of Assistant. In the transferred University, the writ petitioner was promoted as Superintendent with effect from 01.04.1991 and thereafter, promoted to the post of Assistant Registrar (D) on 12.07.2007. The scale of pay fixed for the post of Assistant Registrar (D) during the relevant point of time was Rs.10,000-325- 15200.
3.The writ petitioner states that he was absorbed as Lecturer (now re- designated as Assistant Professor) in the Department of Chemistry in the respondent University and placed in the scale of pay of Rs.8,000-275-13500. The writ petitioner was absorbed through a Syndicate Resolution dated 08.09.2008. Accordingly, the writ petitioner joined duty as Lecturer on 25.09.2008. However, the absorption was made along with pay protection as to the post of Assistant Registrar. The writ petitioner had continuously received the salary as admissible for the post of Assistant Registrar (D) i.e., Rs.10,000-325-15200. The writ petitioner made a representation on 24.10.2008 to place him in the scale of pay Rs.12,600/-. The University Syndicate resolved on 31.10.2008 to absorb the writ petitioner against the existing vacancy in the regular post of Lecturer in Chemistry. Again the Syndicate on 11.03.2010 passed a resolution to regularize the service of the writ petitioner after conducting an interview by an interview Board. However, no interview was conducted and the writ petitioner continued in the post of Lecturer.
4.The writ petitioner subsequently, produced all his original certificates and the Registrar of the University placed an agenda before the Syndicate. The Syndicate had decided to retire the writ petitioner from service on attaining the age of 58 years, since the age of retirement for the post of Assistant Registrar is 58 years as per rules. The Syndicate has taken a decision on 29.02.2012, treating the writ petitioner as non-teaching staff and hence, the writ petitioner has preferred the present writ petition.
5.The claim of the writ petitioner is that he was allowed to continue in the post of Lecturer continuously. Therefore, he should be allowed to serve till he attaints the age of 60 years.
6.The respondent filed a counter affidavit. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent states that the writ petitioner was initially appointed as Clerk ? cum ? Steno and promoted to the level of Assistant Registrar. The Syndicate of the University absorbed the writ petitioner as Lecturer in the Department of Chemistry. The Syndicate passed the resolution without any agenda and without ascertaining the vacancies available in the Department of Chemistry, more so, in the cadre of Lecturer. In fact as on date of resolution there were no vacancies in the above cadre in the University.
7.However, the then Registrar of the University issued appointment order to the writ petitioner on 20.09.2008 absorbing him in the post of Lecturer in the Department of Chemistry in the scale of pay of Rs.8,000-275- 13500. The finance committee of the University in its meeting held on 20.02.2009 under Item No.4 considered to create one Lecturer post in the Department of Chemistry with retrospective effect from 08.09.2008 and resolved to revert the staff members to their original posts. However, the Syndicate of the University in its meeting held on 05.03.2009 modified the above finance committee resolution to the effect that to regularize the staff members appointed as Lecturer in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, History and Chemistry by adhering to due procedures. As per clause 44(1) of the University Act, there shall be a selection committee for making recommendation to the Syndicate for appointment to the post of Professors, Assistant Professor, Reader, Lecturer and Librarian of the Institutions maintained by the University. For these purposes, the vacant post should be notified in the leading newspaper inviting application from the eligible candidates.
8.However, no such advertisement was issued and the procedures contemplated were not adhered too. Thus, the appointment of the writ petitioner as Lecturer in the Department of Chemistry was not in accordance with the Act of the University. The Syndicate of the University in its resolution dated 11.03.2010 resolved to permit the writ petitioner to continue. Subsequently, it was found that the Scrutiny Committee of the University rejected his application on the ground that the post was earmarked for SC-Arunthatier and the writ petitioner belongs to BC category and therefore, the application of the writ petitioner was not forwarded through proper channel and he was not called for interview. Therefore, it is not as if the interview was not conducted and it was not conducted on the ground that the post was earmarked for SC-Arunthatier. Under these circumstances, the Syndicate in its meeting subsequently held on 20.04.2011 resolved to transfer the services of the writ petitioner to his original administrative cadre namely, Assistant Registrar. The resolution passed on 22.02.2012 are as under:
?Considered agenda item No.5 and it is unanimously resolved to affirm the resolution dated 20.04.2011 in respect of the services of Dr.D.Raju, Lecturer in History and Dr.R.Sethu, Lecturer in Chemistry transferring them to the respective administrative cadre. Considering the fact that the earlier re-designation to teaching cadre was done when there was no vacancies in the said Departments and also the said appointment was not done in accordance to the process known to the law adhering due procedure, they have to be treated as being in the administrative cadre only?
9.The resolution of the Syndicate was communicated to the writ petitioner on 28.02.2012. Therefore, the University has acted in accordance with the Act and rules and found that the absorption of the writ petitioner to the post of Lecturer was irregular and subsequently, transferred them to the original administrative cadre.
10.The learned counsel for the respondent states that the service of the writ petitioner was not regularized in the post of Lecturer and the salary admissible to the post of Lecturer also had not been paid. The writ petitioner was all along treated as non-teaching staff in respect of the service condition and payment of salary and he was allowed to retire on attaining the age of 58 years on 29.02.2012. The learned counsel for the respondent further states that mere possession of the qualification by the writ petitioner will not confer him any right to claim the post of Lecturer and therefore, there is no irregularity in respect of the actions initiated by the University against the writ petitioner.
11.Further, it was resolved to follow the existing regular procedure for appointment of teaching faculties as per the UGC norms in future. Thus, the contention of the writ petitioner that the resolution of the University dated 08.09.2008 was ratified by the subsequent resolution dated 31.10.2008 is not correct. The Finance Committee of the University in its meeting held on 20.02.2009 under Item No.4 considered to create one Lecturer post in the Department of History with effect from 08.09.2008 and resolved to revert the staff Members to their original posts. However, the syndicate of the University in its meeting held on 05.03.2009, modified the above Finance committee resolution by regularizing the staff Members appointed as Lecturers in the Department of Computer Science, Engineering, History and Chemistry by adhering to due procedures.
12.It is contended that due procedures should be followed for the appointment to the post of Lecturer in the University Departments. As per Section 44 (1) of the University Act, there shall be a selection committee for making recommendation to the syndicate for appointment to the post of Professor, Assistant Professor, Reader, Lecturer and Librarian of the institutions maintained by the University. Further, before making appointment, the vacant post shall be notified in leading newspapers inviting application from all the eligible candidates and such filled-in application shall be scrutinized by the Committee of the University.
13.However, no such advertisement was issued. As per the above Clause, the selection committee shall consist of such number of Members as prescribed therein and the meeting of the selection committee shall be presided over by the Vice ? Chancellor and if the syndicate of the University is unable to accept the recommendation made by the selection committee, it shall record its reasons and submit the case to the Chancellor of the University for final orders. Thus, the appointment of the writ petitioner as Lecturer in the Department of History is not in accordance with the Act of the University.
14.However, the syndicate of the University in its later resolution dated 11.03.2010, resolved to permit the writ petitioner to continue in his position in the Department with the existing scale of pay of non-teaching staff and further resolved to regularize the service after facing an interview Board to be constituted by the Vice ? Chancellor for the CAS / Regular selection and the same was intimated to the writ petitioner on 18.05.2010. Accordingly, an advertisement was issued on 31.08.2010.
15.However, the Scrutiny Committee of the University rejected his application. Accordingly, the syndicate in its subsequent meeting held on 20.04.2011, resolved to transfer the service of the writ petitioner to his original administrative cadre. Accordingly, the proposal for implementing the above resolution was submitted before the Convenor of the committee. Finally, the syndicate in its meeting held on 22.02.2012, passed the following resolution:
?Considered agenda item No.5 and it is unanimously resolved to affirm the resolution dated 20.04.2011 in respect of the services of Dr.D.Raju, Lecturer in History and Dr.R.Sethu, Lecturer in Chemistry transferring them to the respective administrative cadre. Considering the fact that the earlier re-designation to teaching cadre was done when there was no vacancies in the said Departments and also the said appointment was not done in accordance to the process known to the law adhering due procedure, they have to be treated as being in the administrative cadre only.?
16.The said resolution of the syndicate was communicated to the writ petitioner on 05.03.2012. Thus, the writ petitioner cannot say that the syndicate surprisingly decided the issues and retired the writ petitioner.
17.The learned counsel for the third respondent contended that mere possession of the required qualification by the writ petitioner to the post of Lecturer will not confer any right on him. Having regard to the fact that the writ petitioner was not appointed to the post of Lecturer in accordance with the Act of the University, this Court has to consider the fact that Section 44 of the Manonmaniam Sundaranar University Act 1990, speaks about the selection committee and the provision reads as under:
Selection Committee :
44 (1) There shall be selection committee for making recommendations to the syndicate for appointment to the posts of Professor, Assistant Professor, Reader, Lecturer and Librarian of institutions maintained by the University.
(2) The selection committee for appointment to the post specified in column (1) of the Table below shall consist of the Vice ? Chancellor, a nominee of the Chancellor, a nominee of the Government and the persons specified in the corresponding entry in column (2) of the said table and in the case of appointment of a Professor, Assistant Professor, Reader or Lecturer in a Department, where there is no Head of the Department, shall also consist of a person nominated by the standing committee on academic affairs from among its members:-
Professor Assistant
(i) The Head of the Department concerned, if he is a Professor.
Professor or Reader
(ii) One Director or a Dean or a Professor to be nominated by the Vice Chancellor.
(iii) Three persons not in the service of the University, nominated by the syndicate, from out of a panel of names recommended by the standing committee on academic affairs for their special knowledge of or interest in the subject with which the Professor, Assistant Professor or Reader will be concerned.
Lecturer
(i) The Head of the Department Concerned;
(ii) One Professor to be nominated by the Vice ?
Chancellor.
(iii) Two persons not in the service of the University nominated by the syndicate from out of a panel of names recommended by the standing committee on academic affairs for their special knowledge of or interest in the subject with which the Lecturer will be concerned.
Librarian
(i) Two persons not in the service of the University, who have special knowledge of the subject of Library Science or Library Administration, to be nominated by the syndicate.
(ii) One person, not in the service of the University, nominated by the syndicate.
Explanation I Where the appointments are being made for an interdisciplinary project, the Head of the project shall be deemed to be Head of the Department concerned.
Explanation II The Professor to be nominated shall be the Professor concerned with the speciality for which the selection is being made and that the Vice ? Chancellor shall consult the Head of the Department and the Dean of Faculty before nominating the Professor.
Explanation III Atleast three out of four or two out of three members, as the case may be, concerned with the speciality referred to under column (2) shall be present at the selection committee meeting.
(3) The Vice ? Chancellor shall preside at the meetings of a selection committee.
(4) The meetings of a selection committee shall be convened by the Vice ? Chancellor.
(5) The procedure to be followed by a selection committee in making recommendations shall be laid down in the ordinances.
(6)If the syndicate is unable to accept the recommendations made by a selection committee, if shall record its reasons and submit the case to the chancellor for final orders.
(7) Appointments to temporary posts shall be made in the manner indicated below:-
(i) If the temporary vacancy is for a duration longer than one academic session, it shall be filled on the advice of the selection committee in accordance with the procedure indicated in the foregoing provisions:
Provided that if the Vice ? Chancellor is satisfied that in the interest of work it is necessary to fill the vacancy, the appointment may be made on a temporary basis by a local selection committee referred to in sub- clause (ii) for a period not exceeding six months;
(ii) If the temporary vacancy is for a period less than a year, an appointment to such vacancy shall be made on the recommendation of a local selection committee consisting of the Dean on the Faculty concerned, the Head of the Department and a nominee of the Vice ? Chancellor.
Provided that if the same person holds the offices of the Dean and the Head of the Department, the selection committee may consist of two nominees of the Vice ? Chancellor;
Provided further that in case of sudden casual vacancies n teaching posts caused by death or any other reason, the Dean may, in consultation with the Head of the Department concerned, make a temporary appointment for a month and report to the Vice ? Chancellor and the Registrar about such appointment.
(iii) No teacher appointed temporarily shall if he is not recommended by a regular selection committee for appointment under this Act, be continued in service on such temporary employment unless he is subsequently selected by a local selection committee or a regular selection committee, for a temporary or permanent appointment, as the case may be.
18.Considering the entire factual scenario portrayed in the present writ petition, this Court is of an opinion that it is a classic case of favoritism and nepotism and further it is an extreme case, where there is a violation of the statutory provisions and the regulations. The third respondent / The Manonmaniam Sundaranar University, Abisekapatti, Tirunelveli, was constituted through the Manonmaniam Sundaranar University Act, 1990. The said University is bound to follow the UGC regulations and its instructions.
19.It is needless to state that all appointments to the post are to be made only by following the selection procedures contemplated under the Act and Rules. The posts cannot be filled at the whims and fancies of the authorities of the University. The University is not empowered to pick and choose the candidates of their own choice and grant appointment by passing some resolution in the senate of the University. Even the senate of the University is guided by the rule of law. The very spirt of the Constitution of India is to ensure that the authorities vested with the powers are exercising such powers within the ambit of law and within the parameters of the Constitution of India. The individualized exercise of powers by public authorities are to be condemned and those authorities are certainly to be prosecuted, as, such exercise of power is absolutely unconstitutional. Equal opportunity in public employment is the constitutional mandate. Even in case of granting promotions, the competent authorities are bound to consider the norms and the rules in force are to be followed scrupulously.
20.It is needless to state that selfish and personal motives cannot play any role in exercising administrative powers by the authorities. The authorities, while exercising the powers vested with them, have to exercise the same with neutral mind and in an unbiased manner.
21.In the present writ petition, the appointment of the writ petitioner itself was irregular. Any appointment made without following the selection procedures are certainly irregular and such appointment can never be regularized. The regularization of appointment would arise only if the initial recruitment was made in accordance with the procedures contemplated under law.
22.The legal principles in this regard are well settled by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of The Secretary, State of Karnataka and others .vs. Umadevi(3) and others reported in (2006) 4 Supreme Court Cases 1, wherein, at Paragraph 5,10,12,13,14,20 and 43 to 50, it is held as follows:
5.This Court has also on occasions issued directions which could not be said to be consistent with the Constitutional scheme of public employment. Such directions are issued presumably on the basis of equitable considerations or individualization of justice. The question arises, equity to whom? Equity for the handful of people who have approached the Court with a claim, or equity for the teeming millions of this country seeking employment and seeking a fair opportunity for competing for employment? When one side of the coin is considered, the other side of the coin, has also to be considered and the way open to any court of law or justice, is to adhere to the law as laid down by the Constitution and not to make directions, which at times,even if do not run counter to the Constitutional scheme, certainly tend to water down the Constitutional requirements. It is this conflict that is reflected in these cases referred to the Constitution Bench.
10. When these matters came up before a Bench of two Judges, the learned Judges referred the cases to a Bench of three Judges. The order of reference is reported in2003 (9) SCALE 187. This Court noticed that in the matter of regularization of ad hoc employees, there were conflicting decisions by three Judge Benches of this Court and by two Judge Benches and hence the question required to be considered by a larger Bench. When the matters came up before a three Judge Bench, the Bench in turn felt that the matter required consideration by a Constitution Bench in view of the conflict and in the light of the arguments raised by the Additional Solicitor General.
The order of reference is reported in 2003 (10) SCALE 388. It appears to be proper to quotethat order of reference at this stage. It reads:
1 . Apart from the conflicting opinions between the three Judges' Bench decisions in Ashwani Kumar and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors.reported in MANU/SC/0379/1997 : (1997)IILLJ856SC ,S tate of Haryana and Ors. v. Piara Singh and Ors. Reported in MANU/SC/0417/1992 :(1993)IILL J937SC and Dharwad Distt. P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors.Reported in MANU/SC/0164/1990 : (1990)IILL J318SC , on the one hand and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Suresh Kumar Verma and Anr.
Reported in MANU/SC/0406/1996 : [1996]1SCR972 ,S tate of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar and Ors. Reported in MANU/SC/0306/1992 : [1992]194ITR434(SC), and B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. Reported in MANU/SC/0450/1979 : (1979)IILL J209SC on the other, which has been brought out in one of the judgments under appeal of Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka v. H. Ganesh Rao decided on 1.6.2000, reported in2001 (4) KLJ 466, learned Additional Solicitor General urged that the scheme for regularization is repugnant to Articles 16(4), 309, 320 and 335 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, these cases are required to be heard by a Bench of Five learned Judges (Constitution Bench).
2. On the other hand, Mr. M.C. Bhandare, learned senior counsel, appearing for the employees urged that such a scheme for regularization is consistent with the provision of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
3.Mr. V. Lakshmi Narayan, learned Counsel, appearing in CC Nos. 109- 498of 2003, has filed the G.O. dated 19.7.2002 and submitted that orders have already been implemented.
4. After having found that there is conflict of opinion between three Judges Bench decisions of this Court, we are of the view that these cases are required to be heard by a Bench of five learned Judges.
5 . Let these matters be placed before Hon'ble the JChief Justice for appropriate orders.
We are, therefore, called upon to resolve this issue here. We have to lay down the law. We have to approach the question as a constitutional court should.
12.In spite of this scheme, there may be occasions when the sovereign State or itsinstrumentalities will have to employ persons, in posts which are temporary, on dailywages, as additional hands or taking them in without following the requiredprocedure, to discharge the duties in respect of the posts that are sanctioned and thatare required to be filled in terms of the relevant procedure established by theConstitution or for work in temporary posts or projects that are not needed permanently. This right of the Union or of the State Government cannot but berecognized and there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits such engaging of persons temporarily or on daily wages, to meet the needs of the situation. But the fact that such engagements are resorted to, cannot be used to defeat the very scheme of public employment. Nor can a court say that the Union or the State Governments do not have the right to engage persons in various capacities for a duration or until the work in a particular project is completed. Once this right of the Government is recognized and the mandate of the constitutional requirement for public employment is respected, there cannot be much difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it is ordinarily not proper for courts whether acting under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 of the Constitution, to direct absorption in permanent employment of those who have been engaged without following a due process of selection as envisaged by the constitutional scheme.
13.What is sought to be pitted against this approach, is the so called equity arising out of giving of temporary employment or engagement on daily wages and the continuance of such persons in the engaged work for a certain length of time. Such considerations can have only a limited role to play, when every qualified citizen has aright to apply for appointment, the adoption of the concept of rule of law and the scheme of the Constitution for appointment to posts. It cannot also be forgotten that it is not the role of courts to ignore, encourage or approve appointments made or engagements given outside the constitutional scheme. In effect, orders based on such sentiments or approach would result in perpetuating illegalities and in the jettisoning of the scheme of public employment adopted by us while adopting the Constitution. The approving of such acts also results in depriving many of their opportunity to compete for public employment. We have, therefore, to consider the question objectively and based on the constitutional and statutory provisions. In this context,we have also to bear in mind the exposition of law by a Constitution Bench in Stateof Punjab v. Jagdip Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/0273/1963 : (1966)ILL J749SC . It was held therein, "In our opinion, where a Government servant has no right to a pos tor to a particular status, though an authority under the Government acting beyond its competence had purported to give that person a status which it was not entitled to give, he will not in law be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status."
14.During the course of the arguments, various orders of courts either interim or final were brought to our notice. The purport of those orders more or less was the issue of directions for continuation or absorption without referring to the legal position obtaining. Learned counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted that chaos has been created by such orders without reference to legal principles and it is time that this Court settled the law once for all so that in case the court finds that such orders should not be made, the courts, especially, the High Courts would be precluded from issuing such directions or passing such orders. The submission of learned Counsel for the respondents based on the various orders passed by the High Court or by the Government pursuant to the directions of Court also highlights the need for settling the law by this Court. The bypassing of the constitutional scheme cannot be perpetuated by the passing of orders without dealing with and deciding the validity of such orders on the touchstone of constitutionality. While approaching the questions falling for our decision, it is necessary to bear this in mind and to bring about certainty in the matter of public employment. The argument on behalf of some of the respondents is that this Court having once directed regularization in the Dharwad case (supra), all those appointed temporarily at any point of time would be entitled to be regularized since otherwise it would be discrimination between those similarly situated and in that view, all appointments made on daily wages, temporarily or contractually, must be directed to be regularized. Acceptance of this argument would mean that appointments made otherwise than by a regular process of selection would become the order of the day completely jettisoning the constitutional scheme of appointment. This argument also highlights the need for this Court to formally lay down the law on the question and ensure certainty in dealings relating to public employment. The very divergence in approach in this Court, the socalled equitable approach made in some, as against those decisions which have insisted on the rules being followed, also justifies a firm decision by this Court one way or the other. It is necessary to put an end to uncertainty and clarify the legal position emerging from the constitutional scheme, leaving the High Courts to follow necessarily, the law thus laid down.
20.The Decision in Dharwad Distt. P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. MANU/SC/0164/1990 :(1990)IILL J318SC dealt with a scheme framed by the State of Karnataka, though at the instance of the court. The scheme was essentially relating to the application of the concept of equal pay for equal work but it also provided for making permanent,or what it called regularization, without keeping the distinction in mind, of employees who had been appointed ad hoc, casually, temporarily or on daily wage basis. In other words, employees who had been appointed without following the procedure established by law for such appointments. This Court, at the threshold, stated that it should individualize justice to suit a given situation. With respect, it is not possible to accept the statement, unqualified as it appears to be. This Court is not only the constitutional court, it is also the highest court in the country, the final court of appeal. By virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, what this Court lays down is the law of the land. Its decisions are binding on all the courts. Its main role is to interpret the constitutional and other statutory provisions bearing in mind the fundamental philosophy of the Constitution. We have given unto ourselves a system of governance by rule of law. The role of the Supreme Court is to render justice according to law. As one jurist put it, the Supreme Court is expected to decide questions of law for the country and not to decide individual cases without reference to such principles of law. Consistency is a virtue. Passing orders not consistent with its own decisions on law, is bound to send out confusing signals and usher in judicial chaos. Its role, therefore, is really to interpret the law and decide cases coming before it, according to law. Orders which are inconsistent with the legal conclusions arrived at by the court in the self same judgment not only create confusion but also tend to usher in arbitrariness highlighting the statement, that equity tends to vary with the Chancellor's foot.
43.Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment,he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent,merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.
44. The concept of 'equal pay for equal work' is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis,temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the Rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used forgiving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after the Dharwad decision, the Government had issue deprecated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employ mentor engagement be given. Some of the authorities and departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions and had continued to give employment,specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality.
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It maybe true that he is not in a position to bargain -- not at arms length -- since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
46. Learned Senior Counsel for some of the respondents argued that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the Commercial Taxes Department, should be directed to be regularized since the decisions in Dharwad (supra), Piara Singh (supra), Jacob, and Gujarat Agricultural University and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularized. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the Administrative Authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either
(i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn{See Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1985 Appeal Cases 374, National Buildings Construction Corporation v.S. Raghunathan MANU/SC/0550/1998 : AIR1998SC2779 and Dr. Chanchal Goyalv. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/0133/2003 : [2003]2SCR112 . There is no case that any assurance was given by the Government or the concerned department while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes Department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after the Dharwad decision. Though, there is a case that the State had made regularizations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularizations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some case by this Court. Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in certain cases the court had directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. The argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected.
47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.
48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the concerned department on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves,they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post,since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating un- equals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled.
49. It is contended that the State action in not regularizing the employees was not fair within the framework of the rule of law. The rule of law compels the State to make appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and in the manner we have indicated earlier. In most of these cases, no doubt, the employees had worked for some length of time but this has also been brought about by the pendency of proceedings in Tribunals and courts initiated at the instance of the employees. Moreover, accepting an argument of this nature would mean that the State would be permitted to perpetuate an illegality in the matter of public employment and that would be a negation of the constitutional scheme adopted by us, the people of India. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument that there must be a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily wages. When the court is approached for relief by way of a writ, the court has necessarily to ask itself whether the person before it had any legal right to be enforced. Considered in the light of the very clear constitutional scheme, it cannot be said that the employees have been able to establish a legal right to be made permanent even though they have never been appointed in terms of the relevant rules or in adherence of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
50. It is argued that in a country like India where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no equality of bargaining power, the action of the State in not making the employees permanent, would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. But the very argument indicates that there are so many waiting for employment and an equal opportunity for competing for employment and it is in that context that the Constitution as one of its basic features, has included Articles 14, 16and 309 so as to ensue that public employment is given only in a fair and equitable manner by giving all those who are qualified, an opportunity to seek employment. In the guise of upholding rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, a set of persons cannot be preferred over a vast majority of people waiting for an opportunity to compete for State employment. The acceptance of the argument on behalf of the respondents would really negate the rights of the others conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution, assuming that we are in a position to hold that the right to employment is also a right coming within the purview of Article 21 of the Constitution. The argument that Article 23 of the Constitution is breached because the employment on daily wages amounts to forced labour, cannot be accepted. After all,the employees accepted the employment at their own volition and with eyes open as to the nature of their employment. The Governments also revised the minimum wages payable from time to time in the light of all relevant circumstances. It also appears to us that importing of these theories to defeat the basic requirement of public employment would defeat the constitutional scheme and the constitutional goal of equality.
23.The legal principles laid down by the Constitution Bench has been retreated by the two Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Secretary to Government, School Education Department, Chennai Vs. R.Govindaswamy and others reported in (2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 769, para 8 is extracted here under:
8.This Court in State of Rajasthan V.Daya Lal has considered the scope of regularization of irregular or part-time appointments in all possible eventualities and laid down well-settled principles relating to regularization and parity in pay relevant in the context of the issues involved therein. The same are as under:(SCC p.435, para 12)
(i) The High Courts, in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution will not issue directions for regularization, absorption or permanent continuance, unless the employees claiming regularization had been appointed in pursuance of a regular recruitment in accordance with relevant rules in an open competitive process, against sanctioned vacant posts. The equality clause contained in Articles 14 and 16 should be scrupulously followed and Courts should not issue a direction for regularization of services of an employee which would be violative of the constitutional scheme. While something that is irregular for want of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the process, can be regularised, back door entries, appointments contrary to the constitutional scheme and / or appointment of ineligible candidates cannot be regularised.
(ii) Mere continuation of service by a temporary or ad hoc or daily- wage employee, under cover of some interim orders of the Court, would not confer upon him any right to be absorbed into service, as such service would be 'litigious employment'. Even temporary, ad hoc or daily-wage service for a long number of years, let alone service for one or two years, will not entitle such employee to claim regularisation, if he is not working against a sanctioned post. Sympathy and sentiment cannot be grounds for passing any order of regularisation in the absence of a legal right.
(iii) Even where a scheme is formulated for regularisation with a cut- off date (that is a scheme providing that persons who had put in a specified number of years of service and continuing in employment as on the cut-off date), it is not possible to others who were appointed subsequent to the cut- off date, to claim or contend that the scheme should be applied to them by extending the cut-off date or seek a direction for framing of fresh schemes providing for successive cut-off dates.
(iv) Part-time employees are not entitled to seek regularisation as they are not working against any sanctioned posts. There cannot be a direction for absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of part- time temporary employees.
(v) Part-time temporary employees in government-run institutions cannot claim parity in salary with regular employees of the Government on the principle of equal pay for equal work. Nor can employees in private employment, even if serving full time, seek parity in salary with government employees. The right to claim a particular salary against the State must arise under a contract or under a statute.?
24.This apart, the senate of the University, at the first instance, absorbed the writ petitioner as Lecturer without even including the agenda in the meeting. However, the subsequent senate found that the writ petitioner was not qualified and the writ petitioner had not undergone the selection process and even the application submitted by the writ petitioner to participate in the selection Board itself was rejected.
25.This Court is of an opinion that to regularize the appointment of writ petitioner, the senate of the University passed a resolution to constitute a selection Board. The very purpose is highly illegal. The University, having absorbed an administrative staff as Lecturer in the faculty in an irregular manner, had constituted a selection Board only for the purpose of ratifying the irregular absorption. Certainly such actions are illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Act itself. The manner in which the resolutions after resolutions are passed by the senate shows that the public authorities had not acted in accordance with law. This Court strongly place on record, the manner in which the syndicate passed resolutions, which are contrary to the provisions of the Act itself.
26.The University senate is an important body, the body must be neutral and unbiased. The body should always act in accordance with the provisions of law. The resolution passed by the senate are having wider implications. Thus, the responsibility, accountability and credibility are vital and they should be taken into consideration while passing a resolution. It is not as if they can pass a resolution and absorb certain unqualified staff as Lecturer in the University and thereafter, pass number of resolutions either for regularizing services or for reverting them to their original administrative cadre.
27.All such irregularities are made only on the basis of the killer principles of favoritism and nepotism. These principles are the greatest enemies of the noble equality principles enunciated under the Constitution. If such principles are followed, this Court is unable to visualize the adverse consequences in respect of the developmental activities of our great nation. It is for the competent authorities to think and realize that what they have done and they ought not to have been passed such irregular resolutions by simply absorbing these administrative cadre employees to the post of Lecturer without even adhering to the selection procedures contemplated under the provisions of law.
28.This Court would not stop with these observations. This Court is of a strong opinion that stern action to be taken against all the irregularities and illegalities caused because of certain ill acts of whims and fancies. The authorities who had involved in such activities are to be certainly prosecuted under law. In this regard, the competent higher authorities have to conduct a thorough investigation and find out the irregularities and illegalities and accordingly, initial appropriate action against all the officials, who had committed and are part of such irregularities and illegalities. If this action is not taken by the appropriate officials then the practice of such irregular and illegal appointments will continue in future also. A strong message in this regard to the University is also required that all appointments in future are to be made only by following the selection procedures and by providing equal opportunity to all the eligible citizens of our great nation.
29.After all, the young minds of our great country are working hard by burning midnight lamps, to secure public employment. This Court is unable to understand, why the great administrators are not even realizing the sense of feeling in the young minds of this great nation. They are the nation builders and the future of our nation lies on their hands. If these administrators are not taking care by providing equal opportunity of public employment then such young minds will end in frustration and the same is the root cause for all the illegal activities against the nation itself. Therefore, it is the duty of the public authorities to see that equal opportunity in public employment is ensured and the young people of this country should feel that they can work hard and secure employment. If any frustration is injected in their mind then it is dangerous for the developmental activities of our great nation.
30.This Court, with the said note, record that the manner in which the writ petitioner was absorbed as Lecturer is certainly illegal and further the continuous efforts taken by the University authorities to regularize the services are still fatel and the final decision alone seems to be a better one, atleast to cure the irregularities to some extent. Under these circumstances, this Court is of an opinion that the writ petitioner has not established any legal right for permanent absorption in the post of Lecturer or to continue in service beyond the age of 58 years.
31.Even at the time of filing the present writ petition, the writ petitioner was aged about 58 years old and now, he would be around 63 years old. Thus, his continuance in service cannot be considered in this writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
To The Manonmaniam Sundaranar University, represented by its Registrar, Abhisekapatti, Tirunelveli ? 627 012.
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