Delhi District Court
Wazir Singh vs . Katha Singh on 16 March, 2009
1
IN THE COURT OF SH. SHAILENDER MALIK:
METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE (NORTH)
TIS HAZARI COURTS: DELHI
Wazir Singh Vs. Katha Singh
CC No : 458/01/00
U/s : 465 IPC
P.S. : Bara Hindu Rao
JUDGEMENT
S.N. Particulars Details
1 Serial number of the case : Not mentioned
2 Date of commission of offence : In the year 1982
3 Date of institution of the case : 21.01.82
4 Name of the complainant : Wazir Singh S/o Mool Singh
5 Name of accused, parentage & : 1. Katha Singh S/o Sunder Singh address
2. Labh Singh S/o Natha Singh
3. MCD 6 Offence complained or proved : 465 IPC 7 Plea of the accused : Pleaded not guilty 8 Final Order : Acquitted 9 Date of reserve for order : 16.03.09 10 Date of final order : 16.03.09 Judgment
1. By this judgment, I propose to dispose off the oldest possible case in this court which involved a minor question of law. At the very outset, I express the deep sorrow and anxiety for pendency of the matter for about 25 years or more for no reason. However, without expressing much, let us develve upon the factual matrix of the matter.
2As back as in year 1982 the present complaint was filed for offence under Section 181/182/463/464/120-B/34 IPC as well as for offence under Section 6 of Corruption Act. Complainant Wazir Singh has filed the present complaint as against three accused, namely, Katha Singh, Labha Singh and Municipal Corporation of Delhi with allegations that accused Katha Singh and Labha Singh in connivance with Municipal Corporate had obtained Licence as back as in year 1967 in respect of premises of complainant being Shop No. 30, Gokhle Market, Delhi. It is alleged that fraud was committed with the complainant when accused Katha Singh and Labha Singh in connivance with Municipal Corporation got issued licence No. 180076 for battery charging and General Repairing was obtained as well as licence no. 21770 for Industrial 5 Horse Power was obtained by committed fraud and forgery. It is alleged that Municipal Corporation of Delhi in connivance with abovesaid accused has violated its own rules as no permission of the complainant was taken before issuance of the licence in year 1967. Moreover, at that time, accused no. 1 and 2 did not produce any rent receipt which was also mandatory under rules.
2. It is further alleged that one affidavit dated 11.03.74 was filed by accused no. 1 and 2 and contents of that affidavit were forged and false It is further alleged that contents of those affidavit were forged and false as there was no partnership existed. On 21.12.81 complainant filed the photocopy of the said affidavit before court of Sh. H.P. Singh, the then Ld. ACMM (Delhi). It is further stated that the court of then Learned ACMM had verified the abovesaid photocopy contents from the record of Municipal Corporation and one Mr. B.N. Thakral, Factory Inspector of Municipal Corporation of Delhi admitted the fact on oath 3 in his statement recorded on 21.12.81 regarding the said affidavit. It is stated that in view of the aforesaid fact a cognizable offence has been committed. Hence, the present complaint was filed.
3. Upon that complaint, court called upon the complainant to lead pre-summoning evidence and in pre-summoning evidence complainant examined himself as CW-1 besides him other witnesses CW-2 Chander Pal, UDC from Department of Shop and Establishment, CW-3 Hansraj from the office of DESU, CW4 Pritam Singh from the Factory and Licence Department, CW-5 MP Sharma of Shop and Establishment Department (Delhi Administration), CW-6 Chiddamu Factory Inspector were examined and thereafter while considering the facts and the evidence on the record, Sh. K.C. Lohia, the then Ld. MM vide his order dated 02.03.85 summoned the accused persons only for offence under Section 465 IPC.
4. Upon the summoning of the accused, accused put their appearance and since the offence for which they were summoned was only for imprisonment of two years, therefore matter was being tried as summons triable. Thereafter, vide order dated 04.08.90 of Sh. J.R. Aryan, the then Ld. MM, Delhi, notice for offence under Section 465 IPC was framed. At that stage, the question of applicability of section 468 Cr. PC was raised and plea was raised that since the offence committed is in year 1967 and complaint has been filed in year 1982. As such, the complaint was barred and cognizance could not have been taken. However, at that time it was observed in order dated 04.08.90 that since the summoning order has already attained the finality and the question of applicability of Section 468 Cr PC will be considered 4 only after taking the evidence from the both sides. Once the cognizance has already been taken, thus the aforesaid question has left open to be considered at the final stage.
5. Contents of the Notice was sought to be amended. However, that application was dismissed vide order dated 30.03.91. In the meantime, order dated 04.08.90 was challanged by complainant in Criminal Revision before the court of Ld. ASJ and Smt. Kanwar Inder then Ld. ASJ vide her order dated 04.05.92, it was ordered that charge be re-drafted after adding some particulars. This order dated 04.05.97 was sought to be modified by complainant and vide order dated 16.02.93 was declined. In the meantime, accused challanged order dated 04.05.92 of Ld. ASJ in Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. Thereafter again an application was moved for amending the notice and said application was also dismissed vide order dated 26.04.96.
6. Subsequently another application was moved on 03.06.99, which was also dismissed vide order dated 13.07.99 on the ground that matter is subjudice before Hon'ble High Court.
7. Hon'ble High Court also disposed off the petition vide order dated 16.10.98. subsequently, complainant died on 04.03.00 and thereafter application was moved by LRs of complainant for substitution of his name in place of complainant. Said application was dismissed by Ld. MM vide order dated 09.06.00 and complaint was dismissed. Said order was challanged in criminal revision before Ld. ASJ and Ld. ASJ held that Revision is maintainable in view of provisions of Section 399 (2) r/w Section 401 (5) Cr. PC. Again order dated 09.06.00 was challenged by way of an application for reviewing the said order. The said application was moved by LRs' of the complainant.
5Even that application was dismissed vide order dated 07.08.00. Thereafter, the said order was challenged in Criminal Revision and Learned Additional Sessions Judge first of all held the revision is maintenable in view of the provisions of Section 399 (2) Read with Section 401 (5) Cr. PC and also set aside the order and LRs' of the complainant were allowed to bring on record to prosecute the pending complaint. The order of Learned Additonal Sessions Judge was of 01.11.00.
8. In Post Notice evidence on behalf of the complainant was led.
PW1 was Rishal Singh, Head Clerk of Shop and Establishment Office, who brought the summoned record dated 28.09.61. PW2 is K.S.Kadin, who was Assistant Grade from NDMC, who also brought the summoned record. PW2 stated that application form was filed by the name of Khalsha Electrical working at shop No. 13, Gokhle Market, which is Ex. PW2/A.PW2 also states in support of the said application in order to prove the authenticity the applicant had filed Indemnity Bond which is Ex. PW2/B. The form "C" issued under "Shop and Establishment Act, 1954" i.e. Registration Certificate is Ex.PW2/C and another notice is Ex. PW2/D.
9. PW3 is Raj Kumar Handa from MCD who was also brought summoned record. However, his evidence does not lead anywhere because he said that he had no personal knowledge about the accused nor he could give any information after seeing the record. PW4 is Rajesh Kumar, Clerk from "Factory Licence Department" who brought the summoned record regarding licence no. 21007 issued in the name of accused Labh Singh being partner of Khalsha Electrical and Mechanic Works. PW4 says that licence was valid up to 1973 and licence was granted on application dated 21.06.67 and at that time 6 accused Labh Singh had filed the documents like Key Plan, Site Plan, Receipt of Rs. 20/- and other receipt of Rs. 65/-, "C" Form. PW4 also says that there is some overwriting on point "A" of "C" Form Ex. PW4/A. PW4 also admits that Labh Singh had filed the affidavit, copy of which is Ex. PW4/B. The said copy has been proved after seeing the original record. PW4 further says that as per the original affidavit the father name of accused Labh Singh mentioned as Natha Singh. Copy of the application has been proved as Ex. PW4/D. Letter No. 586 signed by Assistant Commissioner of Factory dated 05.09.93 is Ex. PW4/3. Mechanical work diary dated 11.02.75 is Ex. PW4/F. Another application dated 10.07.74 for renewal of licence is Ex. PW4/G and application for filing affidavit by the name of Katha Singh dated 25.04.96 is Ex. PW4/H. Application for renewal of licence is Ex. PW4/I, affidavit is Ex. PW4/J and licence is Ex. PW4/K.
10. PW5 is Ram Niwas, Superintendent, who also brought the summoned record from his office. However, his evidence does not lead to anywhere. PW5 states that he cannot tell the number of documents placed on record and as per the the record the electricity connection in respect of shop in question, the relevant record in this regard are not available. An application-cum-Agreement written in Punjabi Language is Ex. PW5/A and the application of Gurdeep is Ex. PW5/B.
11. PW5 was again examined on 14.11.06 wherein he has testified that he had brought all the summoned file available with the department and prove notice 01.07.73 served upon the department by the complainant Wazir Singh under Section 80 Cr. PC which is Ex. PW5/C and the reply sent by the department is Ex. PW5/D. PW5 further said that after receiving the notice u/s 80 CPC report of SP Chopra inspector Main dated 28.08 is also on the record and the same has been 7 proved as Ex. PW5/E. PW5 also proved the certificate issued under "Delhi Shops and Establishment Act, 1954" dated 26.12.61 the same is ex. PW5/F, which is pertaining to Khalsha Mechanical and Electrical Works. The PW5 was allowed to be cross-examined on behalf of the complainant in which PW5 denied that the department connived with the accused and sanction the connection on fabricated documents. PW5 was also cross-examined on behalf of accused.
12. PW6 is Gurdeep Singh who is son of the complainant who has testified that complainant was his father and he owned one shop no. 30, Ghokle Market. PW6 further says that in 1960 he employed Katha singh and Kirpal singh as servant in the shop. PW6 further says after few month he dismissed Katha Singh in the service and employed one Rattan Lal for doing the job. PW6 further says his father used to go state of MP to show in daughter and lastly in 1960 when his father went to sttae of MP after entrusting the shop and the goods to his servants Kirpal Singh and Rattan Lal and after someday when he came back and went to the shop he saw that accused Kirpal Singh and Rattan Lal and deceased accused Labh Singh were working there and they did not allow his father (Wazir Singh) to enter in the shop. PW6 further says that they threatened his father not to visit the shop otherwise he will be killed. PW6 further says that all the accused Kirpal Singh, Rattan Lal and Labh Singh manipulated the record regarding which a complaint was filed for offence u/s 408/448/506/109/34 IPC, but no FIR was registered. PW6 says that accused Rattan Lal was declared PO in this case A/W were initiating subsequently Objection Petition was filed by accused Katha Singh and Lal Singh accompanied with certain annexure including certificate purported to have been issued by Inspector Shop and Establishment No. 1027/275/II dated 28.09.61. PW6 says that in 8 that case trial was carried out and accused was convicted. It is further stated that accused Katha Singh and Labh Singh applied for licence under Factory Act but with different document. These documents were forged as per the statement of MP Sharma appeared as PW5 on 06.08.83. PW6 says that accused obtained the electricity connection by producing forged certificate. PW6 further stated one another forged certificate was from Wiring Contractor Chawla and company dated 09.05.63.
13. Upon completion of evidence all the incriminating evidence were put to the accused Katha Singh in terms of provision of section 281/313 Cr. PC wherein accused denied the evidence and has taken the plea that he is innocent person and has been falsely implicated in this case. Accused Katha Singh further says that accused Labh Singh (since deceased) was his "Ustaad " (trainer) and complainant Wazir Singh was having some property dispute with Labh Singh and since he was assisting the accused Labh Singh, his name has been falsely mentioned in the complaint. He has no concern with the case or property. All the person of that time who knew about this fact has died already.
14. No evidence was led in defence.
15. I have heard Ld. Counsel for the accused and have also gone through the written arguments lying on the record. Complainant has not appeared and not a counsel for complainant had appeared for arguments despite giving two effective opportunities. Since the matter was oldest one and pertaining to year 1982. therefore this court proceed to dispose off the matter as per law.
16. Having heard the submissions at bar and having gone through the record. The first question which arises for consideration is that whether cognizance could have been taken in the present case because 9 present complaint was filed in year 1982 in respect of alleged forgery of documents pertaining to 1967. the question of section 468 Cr. PC was raised in the course of proceedings however this question was kept opened. Let us under stand the legal proposition in this regard.
17. Section 468 of the Code which reads as under :-
"468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation - (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court, shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be -
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not
exceeding three years.
(3) For the purpose of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment)".
18.As per Section 468(2)(c) Cr. P.C. the period of limitation for launching the prosecution is three years, where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for one year but not exceeding three years. It is worth pointing out that Chapter XXXVI of the Code, which prescribes various periods of limitation, was introduced, for the first time, in 1973. Before 10 the provisions, prescribing various periods of limitation, were incorporated in the Code, the delayed launching of prosecution was a relevant factor while adjudging the truth or veracity of the prosecution's version of the occurrence. The need to prescribe a period of limitation was considered advisable for several reasons. Lapse of time has the effect of weakening and, at times, obliterating the memory of the witnesses and, sometimes, the evidence itself may disappear. Larger interest of peace in the society too requires that even an offender be left to rest after a reasonable lapse of time. Deterrent and retributory punishments get denuded of their effect after a reasonable period of time. This apart, introduction of the period of limitation was considered necessary to put pressure on the prosecutors and/or complainants to expedite bringing of their grievances to the Court at the earliest. With these objects in view, S. 468 of the Code prescribes, six months, one year and three years limitation for offences punishable with fine, punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but not exceeding three years respectively.
19. In "T. Amudha Sidhanathan v. Union Territory, Chandigarh"
2008 CRI. L. J. 942 where for launching of prosecution for offence under S.9(b) and S.9(c) of Explosive Substances Act & S.286 IPC , for allegedly bursting of crackers damaged eyes of victim, occurrence took place as far back as in year 1995 & challan was presented in year 2006. It was held that prosecution had been launched against accused beyond period of limitation as prescribed under S. 468(2)(c) Cr. P.C. Proceedings were quashed. Apex Court in Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P. AIR 2003 SC 4560 : (2003) 8 SCC 559 : 2003 Cri LJ 4543, 11 while elaborately dealing with this aspect of law, observed thus :".........................a cumulative reading of various provisions of the said Chapter clearly indicates that the limitation prescribed therein is only for the filing of the complaint or initation of the prosecution and not for taking cognizance. It of course prohibits the Court from taking cognizance of an offence where the complaint is filed before the Court after the expiry of the period mentioned in the said chapter. This is clear from S. 469 of the Code found in the said Chapter which specifically says that the period of limitation in relation to an offence shall commence either from the date of the offence or from the date when the offence is detected. Section 471 indicates while computing the period of limitation, time taken during which the case was being diligently prosecuted in another Court or in appeal or in revision against the offender should be excluded. The said section also provides in the explanation that in computing the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority should be excluded. Similarly, the period during which the Court was closed will also have to be excluded. All these provisions indicate that the Court taking cognizance can take cognizance of an offence, the complaint of which is filed before it within the period of limitation prescribed and if need be after excluding such time which is legally excludable. This in our opinion clearly indicates that the limitation prescribed is not for taking cognizance within the period of limitation, but for taking cognizance of an offence in regard to which a complaint is filed or prosecution is initiated beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Code. Apart from the statutory indication of this view of ours, we find support for this view from the fact that taking of cognizance is an act of the Court over which the prosecuting agency or 12 the complainant has no control. Therefore a complaint filed within the period of limitation under the Code cannot be made infructious by an act of Court. The legal phrase 'acfus curiae neminem gravabit' which means an act of the Court shall prejudice no man, or by a delay on the part of the Court neither party should suffer, also supports the view that the legislature could not have intended to put a period of limitation on the act of the Court of taking cognizance of an offence so as to defeat the case of the complainant."
20. However, while making the special provisions as regards limitation, the Parliament has enacted S. 473 giving overriding effect overall earlier sections and vesting a discretionary jurisdiction in the Criminal Court empowering it to take cognizance of an offence despite expiry of the period of limitation if the Court is satisfied, in the facts and circumstances of a given case, that the delay has been properly explained or if it is satisfied that the interests of justice warrant taking of cognizance of the offence(s) even if the period of limitation stands expired. The legislature, in their wisdom, chose not to enumerate any circumstances or lay down concrete guidelines, which would enable the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under S. 473. Coupled with the above, it is also worth noticing that under the Limitation Act, which applies to civil proceedings, extension of the period of limitation or condonation of delay is possible only when the appellant or the applicants satisfies the Court, as embodied in S. 5, that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the period of limitation. As against this, S. 473 gives absolutely no indication that a formal application has to be made by the police or the complainant, as the case may be, for the purpose of enabling the Court to take cognizance of an offence by extending the period of 13 limitation. Far from this, S.473 merely requires that the Court shall be satisfied, on the facts and the circumstances of the case, that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice.
21. Noticing the underlying difference between the provisions of Ss. 468 and 473 of the Code, on the one hand, and S. 5 of the Limitation Act, on the other, the Apex Court, in Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.) v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, (1993) 3 SCC 4, observed :
"6. At times it has come to our notice that many Courts are treating the provisions of S. 468 and S. 473 of the Code as provisions parallel to the periods of limitation provided in the Limitation Act and the requirement of satisfying the Court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay under S. 5 of that Act. There is a basic difference between S. 5 of the Limitation Act and S.473 of the Code . For exercise of power under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, the onus is on the appellant or the applicant to satisfy the Court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, whereas S. 473 enjoins a duty on the Court to examine not only whether such delay has been explained but as to whether it is the requirement of the justice to condone or ignore such delay. As such, whenever the bar of S. 468 is applicable, the Court has to apply its mind on the question, whether it is necessary to condone such delay in the interests of justice. While examining the question as to whether it is necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice, the Court has to take note of the nature of offence, the class to which the victim belongs, including the background of the victim. If the power under S.473 of the Code is to be exercised in the interests of justice, then while considering the grievance by a lady, of torture, 14 cruelty and inhuman treatment, by the husband and the relatives of the husband, the interest of justice requires a deeper examination of such grievances, instead of applying the rule of limitation and saying that with lapse of time the cause of action itself has come to an end. The general rule of limitation is based on the Latin maxim vigilantibus, et non, dormientibus, jura subveniunt (the vigilant and not the sleepy, are assisted by the laws). That maxim cannot be applied in connection with offences relating to cruelty against women."
22.In "Wockhardt Hospital and Heart Institute v. G. R. Parthasarathi"
2008 CRI. L. J. 2198 where in case for offence u/S.406 of Penal Code, where cognizance was taken after 14 yean of alleged occurrence & complainant had not claimed exclusion of time in computing limitation period & trial Court has not passed any order u/S.473 regarding extension of period of limitation. It was held that taking cognizance for offence u/S.406 of IPC as against accused hospital is bad in law.
23. Thus, S. 473 does not contemplate making of any application by the prosecutor or a prayer being made to the Court. Section 473 is a discretionary jurisdiction, which the Court can exercise suo motu and without, in a given case, being asked for. The legislative intent is that it is for the Court, exercising criminal jurisdiction, to examine and ascertain if the delay has been properly explained or whether the interests of justice warrant extension of the period of limitation. However it is clear also that where there is delay in launching of a prosecution as per section 468, than taking of cognizance on such prosecution is bad in law unless there is specific order of court in terms Section 473 Cr.P.C for condoning delay in launch of prosecution upon 15 being satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of a case, delay has been properly explained or that the interests of justice warrant taking of cognizance of offence(s).
24. Coming now to complaint in question in the present case the complaint was filed after about 15 years of alleged commission of offence of forgery. It is to note that accused herein is facing teht trial for offence under section 465 IPC the punishment of which is 2 years. In such circumstance, in respect of an offence which is punishable for period of 2 years, the limitation for taking the cognizance of such offence is 3 years but the present complaint has been filed after 15 years of alleged forgery. Thus apparently the complaint was not entertainable being beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 468 Cr. PC. NO doubt u/s 473 Cr. PC the court can upon satisfaction of sufficient cause condoned the delay but there is requirement of specific order in this regard but that has never passed. As such to my mind the present complaint is also not protected by virtue of section 473 Cr. PC. Therefore, I find the present complaint to be barred by limitation and thus to be liable for dismissed on this count.
25. Even otherwise if we appreciated the fact and evidence on the record. I find that complainant has failed to establish the ingredient of offence under Section 465 IPC.
26. Section 463 of the Indian Penal Code defines the offence of `forgery' as:
"Whoever make any false document or part of a document with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with 16 property, or to enter into any express or implied contract or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery."
In order to constitute forgery, the first essential is that the accused should have made a false document. The false document must be made with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any class of public or to any community. The expression 'intent to defraud' implies conduct coupled with intention to deceive or thereby to cause injury. It may also be stated that Section 463 defines a forgery simpliciter, whereas Section 465 of I.P.C provides punishment for forgery to be imprisonment up to two or with fine or both.
27 In "Motty Philipose v. State of Kerala"2006 CRI. L. J. 2271 where accused alleged to have forged mark list for obtaining admission in medical college. In facts there was no direct evidence as to who had committed that forgery. Trial Court believed version given by approver in that regard. Official in University, who had allegedly made certain entries in said mark list were already acquitted by trial Court. Admittedly there was no expert evidence with regard to handwriting. It was held that by giving benefit of doubt to accused, conviction against them as regards act of forgery alleged under S.465, 466 or 468 cannot be confirmed.
27. In the facts of the case, the above ingredient for offence under Section 465 have not been proved because if we appreciate the evidence led after framing of notice Rishal Singh (PW1) has simply brought the summoned record issued under Shop and Establishment Act. Similarly, PW2 is a witness from NDMC, who also brought the 17 summoned record and proved the application form of Khalsha Electrical, which is Ex. PW2/A. He also states in support of the application, the affidavit and indemnity bond was filed and Form - C was also taken on record issued under "Shop and Establishment Act, 1954". Similarly, PW3 is a witness from MCD but had no personal knowledge about the facts and the documents brought by him. PW4 was witness from Factory Licencing Department, who proved the licence no. 21007 issued in the name of accused Labh Singh. He also testified that said licence was valid upto 1973 which was granted on application of Labh Singh being partner on 19.06.67, an application is also accompanied with key plan, site plan, Form-C and receipt as well as affidavit. Moreover, he proved on record Ex. PW4/D, letter No. 586 issued by Assistant Commissioner of Factory. PW5 is Ram Niwas who testified that complainant Wazir Singh has served upon a department notice under Section 80 CPC and the department has sent the reply which is Ex. PW5/D. He also states that upon receipt of notice report was called upon from Inspector S.B. Chopra, which is also on the record Ex. PW5/E. He also proved the certificate issued under "Delhi Shop and Establishment Act, 1954". Thus, from the abovesaid official witnesses being PW1 to PW5, complainant could not prove that licence in respect of Shop No. 30, Gokhle Market, was obtained by giving some false facts or on the basis of any incorrect affidavit. It is also to note that licence was granted by Authorities after verification as required under Rules. The allegations of the complainant was that there was affidavit dated 11.06.74 filed by accused no. 1 and 2, which was forged but forgery could not be proved from the summoned record. Thus, even on merits, I find that accused facing the trial cannot be fasten with criminal liability for offence under Section 468 IPC as forgery and 18 dishonest intention could not be proved on record. Thus, for the reasons discussed above, I find that complainant has even failed to established the case on merits. Hence, the present application stands dismissed and accused stands acquitted. His B/B stands cancelled and S/B stands discharged. File be consigned to record room.
Announced in open
court on 16.03.09 (Shailender Malik)
Metropolitan Magistrate (North)
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi