Kerala High Court
Motty Philipose And Anr. vs State Of Kerala on 22 November, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2006CRILJ2271
Author: K.A. Abdul Gafoor
Bench: K.A. Abdul Gafoor, R. Basant
JUDGMENT K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J.
1. This appeal is by accused 1 and 2, a student and his father, in S. C. No. 128/91 on the file of the 5th Additional Special Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram. They stand convicted for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 465, 466, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years each under Sections 420, 466, 468 and 471 with a direction that the sentences shall run concurrently. No separate sentence was ordered under Sections 465 and 120-B IPC. They faced trial with two others for the offences mentioned above. The 3rd accused was acquitted. The 4th accused is no more and the charge against him abated.
2. The prosecution case was that they, along with CW. 1, an accused turned approver, hatched a conspiracy in order to forge a mark list of the Pre Degree Examination held in March, 1977 in which the first accused had appeared and to make use of it to secure admission for M. B. B. S. Course in the merit quota for the 1st accused. Ext. P25 is the allegedly forged mark list, on the strength of which, the first accused obtained admission. The allegation was that he, after getting Ext. P25, knowing it to be a forged document, made use of it to obtain admission in the Medical College and deceived the public authorities.
3-4. While assailing the conviction, the prime contention urged by Sri. Surendra Mohan, the counsel for the appellants/accused is that Ext. P25 is not a forged document. It is the real and genuine mark list that the first accused had obtained from Mar Ivanios College, Thiruvananthapuram, where he had undergone the course of study for Pre Degree during 1975-77. The college was affiliated to the University of Kerala.
5. It is an admitted fact that he had obtained admission in the Medical College, Thiruvananthapuram on the strength of Ext. P25. Apart from the admission, this is a duly proved fact in issue as well. Ext. P12 is the application that he had submitted to PW 4 the Principal of the Medical College, who was, at the relevant point of time, heading the committee to select candidates for admission to M. B. B. S. Course. Along with Ext. P12 he had also produced Ext. P18 attested copy of the mark list. It was attested by PW. 22 an Assistant Engineer working under the second accused, the father of the first accused. He was, at the relevant point of time, an Executive Engineer in the Irrigation department. PW. 22 has deposed before the Court below that he had attested Ext. P18 as 'true copy' of the original which had been shown to him by none other than the second accused. The entries contained in Ext. P18 are the same as contained in Ext. P25. Therefore, Ext. P12 application was submitted by accused No. 1 obviously with the support of Ext. P25. Further, on selection, he had produced Ext. P25 before PW 5, an official in the Medical College, at the time of admission. He deposed that he had verified it and returned to the first accused. He later produced Ext. P25 before PW.6 another official in the Medical College, Thiruvanathapuram, who had forwarded it to the University for the purpose of registering him for 1st year M. B. B. S. Examination. Thus, it is a fact duly proved, apart from his admission, that the first accused had obtained admission to the M. B. B. S. Course in the Medical College, Thiruvanathapuram on the strength of Ext. P25 mark list.
6. The next consideration shall be whether Ext. P25 is a forged document. As already mentioned above, the contention of the first accused was that it was the mark list that he had obtained from Mar Ivanios College. It was given to him by PW 37, a clerk in that college, who was handling the issuance of mark list based on Ext. P61 register maintained by him. At that time, according to him, the mark list issued to the 1st accused did not conform to the entries as now contained in Ext. P61. PW. 37 has deposed that whenever mark lists for Pre Degree Examination were received in the college, he used to enter the marks of various candidates in Ext. P61 register and deliver the original mark lists after obtaining acknowledgment from the candidates concerned or from the person duly authorised by the candidate concerned. PW 37 has further deposed before the Court below that he had given the original mark list of the 1st accused, received from the University to the second accused, the father of the first accused after obtaining his due acknowledgment in Ext. P 61. The due acknowledgment and the relevant entry regarding the marks obtained by the candidate are marked as Ext.P61(a). Ext. P61 (a) contains corrections against five entries therein viz., those relating to the marks of optional subjects, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, total for the optional subjects and grand total. The initial entries in Ext. P61 before the corrections, according to PW.37, where as contained in the mark list issued to the second accused on his acknowledgment. According to him, later the first accused approached him with a new mark list, Ext. P25, stating that, it was one obtained by him on revaluation of his answer scripts and asking him to make appropriate corrections in Ext. P61. On production of Ext. P25, the aforesaid five corrections were made, based on the entries contained in Ext. P25. This, according to him, was after about 2/3 weeks of publication of the results of Pre Degree Examination. The results were published on 6-8-1977.
7. This version of PW. 37 is sought to be challenged by the accused, placing much reliance on the evidence of PW. 40, another student in that college, who had, according to him, noticed the correction when he acknowledged the mark list given to him. His name appeared in Ext. P61 just above the name of the first accused, where the second accused had acknowledged. This cannot be true because according to PW. 40 he had obtained the mark list almost within 3 or 4 days of the publication of the result. It can, therefore, be on or before to 10-8-1977. As already mentioned, PW. 37 had deposed very categorically that the first accused had approached, him with a revalued mark list after 3 or 4 weeks. Therefore, there was no occasion for PW. 40 to notice the alleged corrections in Ext. P61(a), when he received the mark list on or before 10-8-1977. Apart from that, the evidence regarding the correction that he had seen it in Ext. P61 is only a weak evidence and was not a definite opinion about it. On the other hand, PW. 37, the official who maintains Ext. P61, is to be believed. Therefore PW. 40 cannot be believed to support the contention of the accused.
8. The initial entries contained in Ext. P61(a) before the corrections, conform to the entries as exactly in Ext. P27(a). Ext. P27(a) is the relevant entry in the tabulation register, Ext. P27 duly kept by the University in discharge of its academic function. PW. 32 is the Controller of Examinations, He is the head of the Examination wing. He had deposed before the Court below that Ext. P27 tabulation register is the basic document for the purpose of preparation of mark lists. There is no reason to disbelieve him. But, it is contended by the accused/appellants that in Ext. P27 several columns contained many modifications and corrections. Therefore, it cannot be taken as the basic document for the purpose of preparing the mark list. It can only be either the mark book prepared by the examiners concerned or the answer sheets wherein the examiners put the marks or the counter foil taken out on false numbering wherein the marks from the answer books are copied down. This contention also cannot be accepted because marks are entered in the mark list not from the answer sheets or from the mark book because, PW. 8 Section Officer, who headed the Section handling tabulation work relating to Mar Ivanios College where the first accused was a student for the Pre Degree course, deposed that after entering the marks in the said tabulation register, there would be additions due to moderation, revaluation or improvement or even on scrutiny. It was in such situations, modifications and variations were made in the relevant entries. If mark lists are prepared based on the marks mentioned in answer books or mark books, these variations will not be reflected. Of course, such entries are riot attested by initials in Ext. P27. This is also explained by PW.8, the head of the Section, that in case every such modification is initialled, the tabulation book would look awkward. Therefore, modifications are not initialled. At the same time, PW 33 who had made the relevant entries in Ext. P27 had explained each of such modifications made in Ext. P27. Therefore, those modifications or variations are properly explained. At the same time, a closer scrutiny of Ext. P27 will reveal that there is no overwriting or interpolations, at least, against the entries in Ext. P27(a) concerning accused No. 1. The corrections wherever made are properly explained by PWs. 33 and 34, who had made and compared the entries, by PW.8 who had supervised their work and also by PW. 29, the Assistant Registrar, who had been, in overall supervision of the entire work of tabulation.
9. An attempt was made at the instance of the accused to substantiate that PW. 29 was not the concerned Assistant Registrar engaged for the supervision, but it was one Nayanar. PW. 32, the Controller of Examinations, had categorically deposed that he had detailed PW. 29 for that work. It has also come out in evidence that the said Nayanar who held the charge of the Assistant Registrar, became sick and could not attend the work during the tabulation season.
10. The procedure regarding the tabulation work is spoken to by PWs. 8, 29, 32, 33 and 34. Apart from that, on summons from the Court, Ext. XI was produced. Ext. XI reveals the procedure spoken to and followed by PWs. 8, 33 and 34, Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence given by these witnesses, regarding the veracity of the entries contained in Ext. P27, and Ex. P27 (a) concerning accused No. 1.
11. The further contention is that Ext. P27 entries could not be the basis for making entries in the mark list because mark lists were despatched to the college in advance to the date of declaration of the result viz., 6-8-1977; whereas Ext. P27 was finalised and completed only on 20-9-1977 as is revealed from page 31 of Ext, P27 register, where PWs. 8, 33 and 32 had affixed their signatures, having entered, compared and checked it. The signatures bear the date 20-9-1977. Therefore, Ext. P27 was finalised only on that date. It cannot be the basis for a mark list dated 6-8-1977.
12. In this regard, we have the evidence of PW. 8, who was directly supervising the tabulation work relating to all the candidates who appeared for the pre Degree Examination from Mar Ivanios College. She had said that she put the signature in Ext. P27, after the tabulation work was over. It has also come out in evidence through PWs. 33 and 34, apart from PW. 8, that even after declaration of the result, there would be further entries to be made in Ext. P27 tabulation register because of the revaluation, because of the scrutiny etc. It is after that they have made the final endorsement on page 31 after completing the work relating to tabulation. Therefore on the strength of the dated signature contained in page 31, the accused/appellants cannot contend that the entries contained in Ext. P27 were not the basis for entering marks as contained in the relevant mark lists including Ext. P25.
13. There is another fallacy also in the contention that the entries in mark book shall be the basis for preparing mark lists. The mark books are in respect each of the several papers concerning different subjects. Without such marks in different papers and subjects being tabulated in a particular format, there arises no question of deciding whether a student has failed or passed, secured first or second class. Moreover, there will be variations between the mark for a particular subject contained in the mark book and the mark list because of the moderation or scrutiny or revaluation, as the case may be, as already mentioned above. Therefore, the evidence given by PW. 32 that Ext. P27 forms the basis for entering the mark in the mark lists has sufficient force. We have to accept it.
14. In this regard, we have to compare the entries in the mark, list for optional subjects awarded to the first accused, as entered in Ext. P27(a) with uncorrected entries in Ext. P61(a). All the five initial entries, which are later corrected in Ext. P61(a) are exactly as the entries now available in Ext. P27(a). The former is kept in the University and the other is maintained in the college. It cannot be contended that there was some mistakes committed by Pw. 37 while entering the marks in Ext. P61 register, necessitating such corrections. There may be one or two occasions for exactly similar error. But, whatever mistakes committed by PW.37 cannot be the same as contained in Ext. P27(a) register kept very confidentially in the University Office. It is so unlikely. The entries in Ext. P27(a) tally in every respects with the initial entries as contained in Ext. P61(a). This conclusively reveals that the marks in the mark list of the first accused despatched from the University to Mar Ivanios College contained the same marks as entered in Ext. P27(a) and that those were initially entered in Ext. P61 by PW. 37. It was that mark list which was handed over by PW. 37 to accused No. 2 on his acknowledgment. Thus, there is no reason to disbelieve PW. 37 that he made the initial entries in Ext. P61 (a) from the mark list received from the University. When the entries tally with those in Ext. P27(a), PW. 37 has to be believed in toto. The corrected entries in Ext. P61(a) as conforming with those contained in Ext. P25 were made by him on production of Ext. P25 for appropriate correction before him by accused No. 1. It has also to be borne in mind that the marks available in Ext. P25 has been entered by accused No. 1 in ext. P6 application for admission to Degree Course in the Mar Ivanios college also. This is testified by PW. 2, the Principal of that college.
15. When PW. 37 says that the first accused had presented to him Ext. P25 to make correction in Ext. P61(a), no further explanation is coming either from the first accused or from the second accused how they did obtain Ext. P25. The first accused had no case of any revaluation. He had not applied for revaluation. In his statement under Section 313 Cr. P.C., the first accused stands by that position. Of course, there was an application for duplicate mark list, as revealed by Ext. P29(a). A duplicate mark list can only be one equivalent to that originally issued, which contained the same marks as in Ext. P27(a) and as in the uncorrected entries in Ext. P61(a), Ext. P25 did not, in any way, conform to those documents. Therefore, Ext. P25 cannot be a duplicate mark list. There is evidence from the mouth of PW. 8 that whenever duplicate mark lists are issued, the Controller of Examinations will affix his signature in ink, rather than facsimile. Ext. P25, on the other hand, contains only a facsimile and not the signature in ink of the Controller. Moreover, the evidence also reveals that whenever a duplicate mark list is issued, it will contain a red ink endorsement to the effect that it is a duplicate one. It is also absent in Ext. P25. Therefore, Ext. P25 cannot be treated as a duplicate one issued by the University.
16. It is further submitted that, going by the nature of Ext. P27(a), it has to be taken that it is not properly kept. The mark book and the answer sheets were not forthcoming in spite of the specific orders from the trial Court to produce whatever available documents. Therefore, as Ext. P27 contains several modifications and corrections, it cannot be taken as the basic document for preparation of the mark list. It has to be viewed with suspicion and the benefit of that doubt shall have to be given to the accused.
It is submitted that, as there are corrections in Ext. P27(a), which are not fully explained, there can be a doubt that, mistakes might have crept in while making entries either in Ext. P27(a) or in Ext. P25. The format of Ext. P25 is an official one. So, it cannot be conclusively found, on the basis of the available evidence, beyond doubt that Ext. P25 is a forged mark list.
17. In this regard, we have already discussed the evidence of PWs. 8, 29, 32, 33 and 34 and we have come to the conclusion that Ext. P27 had been kept in the normal office functioning of the University and whatever modifications or variations there, had been explained by these witnesses. We were reminded of the dictum laid down in Miller v. Minister of Pensions 1947 (2) All. E.R. 372 where Lord Denning, J. said :
that the degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt "is well settled". It need not reach high certainty, but it must reach a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean "proof beyond a shadow of doubt". The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence "of course it is possible, but not in the least probable," the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
All that the principle of benefit of doubt, as held by Lord Du Parag, J. "enjoins is a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence in disbelief. There is no reason to disbelieve PWs 8, 33 and 34 who had direct dealing in preparing Ext. P27 and the mark lists based on the entries therein and to cause a fanciful doubt. The entries originally made in Ext. P61(a) clear all doubts, if at all there is any, with respect to the entries contained in Ext. P. 27(a). Therefore, this is not a case where any benefit of doubt can be extended to the accused as regards the forgery of Ext. P25. The only conclusion, thus possible on the basis of the evidence discussed above, is that Ext. P25, as it does not conform to the entries contained in Ext. P27 (a) which forms the basis for the mark list, is a forged one. Therefore, we find that Ext. P25 is a forged one,
18. But, no direct evidence is forthcoming in this case as to who had committed that forgery. Of course the trial Court has in that regard believed the version given by CW. 1 the approver. Now, as a result of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court reported in Asokan v. State of Kerala , rendered in a reference arising in this case itself, we cannot rely on the evidence given by CW. 1, as he was not available for cross-examination at the trial stage. From the other available evidence, we cannot come to a conclusion, who really had committed this forgery. The third respondent, an official in the University, who had allegedly made certain entries in Ext. P25 had already been acquitted by the trial Court. No expert evidence with regard to the handwriting is also forthcoming. Of course, accused 1 and 2, being the beneficiaries of the forgery, either of them or both would have abetted the forgery. But, there is no direct evidence in this case. We cannot pinpoint whether it was either the first accused or the second accused; or both in the absence of direct cogent evidence. In such circumstances, giving the benefit of doubt, we may not be able to confirm the conviction against them as regards the act of forgery alleged under Sections 465, 466 or 468 IPC.
19. At the same time, as we have already found, the first accused had obtained admission in the Medical College, on the strength of Ext. P25. We have also found it to be forged mark list. Necessarily, the first accused had made use of Ext. P25 as a genuine document to render him admission in the Medical College, against merit quota. PW. 4 the Principal of the Medical College, who headed the selection committee deposed that the name of the first accused figured as item No. 38 in Ext. P1 minutes of the selection committee. According to him, the cut off mark for the general merit was 405/450 and for Travancore Cochin merit, it was 402 / 450. The original marks secured by the first accused, as reflected in Ext. P27(a) and in the uhcorrected entries in Ext.P61(a) was 398/450, whereas Ext. P25 was 415/450. If Ext. P25 was not produced for the purpose of admission, he would not have been selected for M. B. B. S. Course in the year 1977. Therefore, he had made use of Ext. P25, a forged mark list, for the purpose of obtaining admission to the Medical college.
20. The evidence of P.W. 37, as discussed I above, shows that the first accused had taken Ext. P25 to PW. 37 to make appropriate corrections in Ext. P61 (a) on the plea that he obtained the marks as contained in Ext. P25 on revaluation. At the same time, there was no application for revaluation and admittedly he had not applied for revaluation. Necessarily, he had absolute knowledge that Ext. P25 was not the real and genuine mark list supplied to him by the University on his passing Pre Degree Examination. It was thus knowing that Ext. P25 was not a genuine document that he made use of that forged document, to get admission for M. B. B. S. Course. Therefore, he has committed the offence punishable under Section 471 IPC. We therefore confirm his conviction on the said count.
21. Production of a fake mark list to obtain admission to a course in a Government College amounts to dishonestly inducing the college authorities. The 1st accused thus cheated and dishonestly induced the selection committee to make them believe that Ext. P25 was a true and genuine document. When the first accused had, with knowledge, thus, produced a fake document in order to deceive the selection committee headed by PW. 4 to obtain admission, he has committed the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC. Therefore, we confirm his conviction under that count as well.
22. Next, we will consider the complicity of the second accused, the father of the first accused. PW. 37 has deposed before the Court below that the original mark list of the 1st accused forwarded from the University to Mar Ivanios College had been handed over to the second accused on his acknowledgment. Therefore, the second accused had the knowledge about the marks really secured by the first accused. PW. 22, the subordinate of the second accused, has deposed that he had attested Ext. P18, true copy of the mark list which was enclosed with Ext. P12 application for admission to the Medical College. He also deposed that he had made attestation in Ext. P18 as a true copy after verifying the original which was handed over to him by none other than the second accused. Ext. P18, on verification, we find, is exactly a true copy of Ext. P25. Therefore, the original that the second accused had handed over to PW. 22 was nothing but Ext. P25. So the second accused was also aware of Ext. P25 and that it was being made use of for the purpose of getting admission for the first accused in the Medical College. It was for that purpose he got Ext. P18 attested. He has also signed Ext. P12 application for admission to the Medical College, wherein the first accused had represented about his marks as in the forged document Ext. P25 for obtaining such admission. In such circumstances, when the second accused had the knowledge that Ext. P25 was a forged mark list and that it was being made use of for admission in the Medical College, and was getting its copy duly attested by his subordinate official, he was abetting the offence committed by the first accused, punishable under Section 471 I.P.C. He was also thus abetting the first accused to commit, the offence under Section 420 IPC to deceive the selection committee. Therefore, the complicity of the second accused is also proved beyond doubt.
23. The further contention is that there was no reason at all to foist this allegation on the accused/appellants. It was only based on Ext.P1 communication from the D. I. G. Crime Branch that the crime was registered as per Ext. P65 FIR in Crime No. 298/CR/81 dated 29-12-1981. On the same day, a search was conducted in the house of the appellants by the police party led by PW. 1 and a mark list Ext. P3 was recovered. Ext. P3 was seized under Ext. P2 mahazar. There is also an endorsement on Ext. P3 from the hands of the second accused and P.W. 27 the daughter of the second accused and sister of the first accused, apart from the endorsement of another brother. Those are endorsements with date 28-12-1981. That is the date of seizure and search which is duly attested in Ext. P2 as well as made mention of in the remand report submitted to the Court on the next day. The attempt of the accused is to contend that Ext. P3 is the document obtained by PW. 1, who was in charge of other mark list scandal cases from the University officials on the basis of an application for a duplicate mark list Ext. P 29(a), which the 1st accused had earlier preferred. Therefore, this is case falsely foisted on the strength of that document. In this regard, the evidence of DW. 1, a retired Superintendent of Police is also relied on by the accused.
24. It cannot, be so, because, the application for duplicate mark list was made in the year 1977 itself. There was no reason for keeping the application in the University for years together. It would have been duly prepared and issued to the concerned candidate. Moreover, Ext. P3 also does not conform to a duplicate one, as already discussed by us while considering Ext. P25. It does not conform to Ext. P27(a) entries in the tabulation register. Therefore, Ext. P3 cannot be termed as a genuine document. It can be another fake document obtained by the accused themselves. Whether it is a fake document is not relevant now, because the complicity is duly proved on the basis of Ext. P25 and the corresponding entries in Exts. P27(a) and P61(a). Even in the absence of Ext. P3, the appellant cannot escape the accusation. No motive on the part of PW. 1 is attributed to foist false accusation on the appellants, who had the influence of a person like DW. 1. When a person like DW. 1 was to the aid of the accused, there was no reason for PW. 1 to produce Ext. P3, at a later stage with a predated endorsement. They would have been duly advised by DW. 1 not to do so. The said contention, even though is not material with respect to the guilt of the accused, shall also have to be, thus, brushed aside.
25. Relying on the decision reported in Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University , it is contended that Ext. P25 was with the University for about six months as forwarded by PW. 6 and it was resting with PW. 14. During this period the University could have verified the veracity of Ext. P25 with reference to the tabulation register Ext. P27, if necessary. But, it was not done. At that time, sufficient records including the mark sheets and answer book were available for cross-verification. Having not done so, nobody can dispute the veracity of Ext. P25, after the relevant documents like marks books and answer books are destroyed. The aforesaid decision is relied on in this regard. But the said decision is in respect of a candidate whose examination was cancelled for want of attendance, after he had written the examination. That was a case arising out of a writ petition where the University allowed him to appear for the examination though he did not have sufficient attendance. The candidate did not withhold any information in the application for examination. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the University should have taken into consideration the lack of attendance and could not have permitted the candidate to appear for the examination. Having allowed him to appear for the examination, it could not have been cancelled, the Supreme Court held. That decision cannot have any relevance here because PW. 14 had categorically deposed that his duty was to verify the mark list forwarded from the Medical College to satisfy whether the marks entered therein did qualify him for appearing for the 1st year M, B. B. S. Examination in accordance with the University regulations. He did not have any duty to cross check with the registers like Ext. P27, Practically, it would be impossible because even the mark lists so forwarded may relate to other Universities as well. This applied in respect of other course of Universities as well. Therefore, that contention also cannot hold good.
26. It is submitted that the first accused, at the time of commission of the offence, viz., while submitting Ext. P12 application along with Ext. P25 before PW. 5, was a minor, below the age of 18 years, his date of birth being 17-11-1959. He was thus a juvenile. Therefore, the provisions in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short "2000 Act") shall be applied in his case. Relying on the decision in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand , it is contended that the juvenility has to be ascertained with reference to the date of commission of the alleged offence. In such circumstances, he cannot be sent to jail. He shall be dealt within consultation with the Juvenile Board, as provided in Section 15 of 2000 Act. It is further submitted that even though he was not a juvenile in terms of the law prevailing viz., the Juvenile Justice Act (for short "1986 Act"), at the time of commission of offence or at the time of trial, he became a juvenile on enforcement of 2000 Act with effect from 1-4-2001, when this appeal was pending. In the eases of such persons, who were between 16 and 18 as on the date of commission of the offence, Section 20 of the 2000 Act shall have to be applied. At the time of conviction or its confirmation, deeming them as juvenile, the procedure as provided in Section 15 shall have to be followed. In such event, the first accused shall not be sent to Jail, it is contended. On appropriate report from the Probation Officer, an order under Section 15 shall be passed by this Court in this appeal, exercising the powers of the Juvenile Board as conferred under Section 6(2) of the 2000 Act. This contention is sought to be fortified citing the decision in Prathap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and specifically referring to para 37(a) which reads:
The net result is :-
(a) The reckoning date for the determination of the age of the juvenile is the date of an offence and not the date when he is produced before the authority or in the Court.
27. But the public prosecutor submits that even if the first accused/appellant is to be treated as a juvenile, going by the decision in Prathap case (2005 Cri LJ 3091) the provision that may apply to such person between the ages of 16 and 18 as on the date of commission of the offence is Section 20 of the 2000 Act. The benefit under Section 20 of Act can be rendered only to those who had not completed the age of 18 years as on 1-4-2001, when the 2000 Act came into force. He relies on para 37 (b) in the said decisions-which reads as under :
(b) The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in any Court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending when the 2000 Act came into force and the person had not completed the age of 18 years of age as on 1-4-2001.
The public prosecutor submits that when the offence was committed, when the trial was commenced, when the trial terminated in conviction of the 1st accused and when consequential orders of sentence was passed, 1986 Act was in force. He was above the age of 16 at the time of commission of the offence, and was not a juvenile going by the provisions in 1986 Act. Therefore, this is a case initiated while the 1986 Act was in force. In such circumstances, the benefit of the 2000 Act can be applied on the strength of Section 20 thereof, if the incumbent has not completed the age of 18 years as on 1-4-2001 as held by the Supreme Court.
28. In this regard, it is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that restriction of the benefits of Section 20 only to those who were below the age of juvenility as on 1 -4-2001 militates against the dictum contained in para 37(a). If para 37(b) is applied with reference to 1-4-2001, the juvenility attributed as per Section 20 of the 2000 Act in favour of those below the age of 18 years as on the date of occurrence, will be rendered ineffective denying totally the benefit of para 37(a) in Pratap Singh's case 2005 Cri LJ 3091. Therefore, paragraphs 37 (a) and (b) in Pratap Singh's case have to be read in conformity with each other and in tune with the prime and paramount dictum laid down in the decision and the statutory provision. As on the date of commission of the offence whatever benefit was available to a juvenile in terms of the 2000 Act shall be extended to him.
29. We are unable to accept this contention. Even if the provisions contained in the 2000 Act are applied to the case on hand, this case shall be dealt with only on the strength of the special provisions contained in Section 20 thereof. It reads:
20. Special provision in respect of pending cases:- Notwithstanding any thing contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that Court as if this Act had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had not been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence.
On this aspect, the appellants do not have any quarrel. They are also justified in their submission that this provision does not specify a particular date for the purpose of considering juvenility and that juvenility, going by the dictum contained in para 37(a), has to be determined based on the age as on the date of the commission of the offence.
30. Section 20 is now categorically interpreted in Prathap's case 2005 Cri LJ 3091 as follows:
31. Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the special provision in respect of pending cases and begins with non-obstante clause. The sentence "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court in any area on date of which this Act came into force : has great significance. The proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court referred to in Section 20 of the Act is relatable to proceeding initiated before the 2000 Act came into force and which are pending when the 2000 Act came into force. The term "any Court" would include even ordinary criminal Courts. If the person was a "juvenile" under the 1986 Act the proceedings would not be pending in criminal Courts. They would be pending in criminal Courts only if the boy had crossed 16 years or girl had crossed 18 years. This shows that Section 20 refers to cases where a person had ceased to be a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had not yet crossed the age of 18 years then the pending case shall continue in that Court as if the 2000 Act has not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile.
32. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that Section 16 of the 2000 Act is identical to Section 22 of the 1986 Act. Similarly Section 15 of the 2000 Act is in pari materia with Section 21 of the 1986 Act. Thus, such an interpretation does not offend Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India and the juvenile is not subjected to any penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted on him under the 1986 Act.
34. This Rule also indicates that the intention of the Legislature was that the provisions of the 2000 Act were to apply to pending cases provided on 1-4-2001 i.e. the date on which the 2000 Act came into force, the person was a "juvenile" within the meaning of the terms as defined in the 2000 Act i.e. he/she had not crossed 18 years of age".
In the light of this interpretation given by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court to Section 20 of the 2000 Act, the consideration shall be with reference the age as on 1-4-2001. As on l-4-2001, the first accused had crossed the limit of juvenility. This is not disputed. Necessarily, in the light of Prathap's case, Section 20 cannot have any application to his case. So, the benefit of dealing him under Section 5 does not arise at all in this case.
31. Faced with such a situation, it is contended that Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act shall be applied in the case, as the first accused was below the age of 21 years as on the date of commission of the offence. In support of this contention, several decisions have been cited before us, including Ramji Misser and Anr. v. State of Bihar , Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 444 : 1965 (1) Cri LJ 360, Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1972 SC 2434 : 1972 Cri LJ 1517, Mohammed Aziz Mohammed Masir v. State of Maharashtra . Musakhan and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra , Satyabhan Kishore and Anr. v. State of Bihar , Masarullah v. State of Tamil Nadu , Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of Punjab 1989 SCC (Crl) 123, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Dharam Pal , Mohammed Lias Biliya v. State of Rajasthan 2004 (10) SCC 486 (Sic), and four decisions of this Court reported in Johnson v. Kunjukunju 1975 KLT 565, State of Kerala v. Parmeswaran Nair Radhakrishnan Nair 1995 (1) ILR 124 : 1994 Cri LJ 237, Raveendran v. Food Inspector, Pinarayi Panchayat 1977 KLT 155 and Joy v. State of Kerala 1988 (1) KLT 815. Of course, in all these decisions, except the Kerala decisions and the Supreme court decision reported in Ramji Misser and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1972 SC 2434 : 1972 Cri LJ 1517), the view taken is that the age to be reckoned to apply Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act shall be that as on the date of occurrence or incident or the commission of the offence. But these decisions except that reported in Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab , do not refer to the other two decisions in Ramji Misser and Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 1963 SC 1038 : 1963 (2) Cri LJ 173 and Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1972 SC 2434 : 1972 Cri LJ 1517. We also see that those decisions were rendered by a Bench consisting of less number of Judges than that in Ramji Misser and Anr. v. State of Bihar . In that decision, the application of Section 6 had been discussed in detail and the Apex Court has come to the conclusion that the relevant date is the date of conviction and not the date of commission of the offence.
32. Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act reads as follows :-
Section 6 When any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the Court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under Section 3 or Section 4, and if the Court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so.
Dealing with the contention centered around Section 6, in Ramji Misser's case , the Supreme Court posed the question as follows :
It was urged before the High Court that the reasons assigned by the Assistant Sessions Judge for refusing to apply the provision of Section 6 of the Act to accused Ramji were not proper. This submission was, however, repelled since the learned Judge considered the section inapplicable to that accused because, though he might have been "under 21 years of age" on the date of the offence (October 17, 1960), "he was not a person under 21 years of age" on May, 24, 1961 when the Sessions Judge found him guilty and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment, holding that the crucial date on which the age had to be determined being not the date of the offence but the date on which as a result of a finding of guilty sentence had to be passed against the accused.
And laid down the law as under : (Para 6) Taking first the case of Ramji, the elder brother, we entirely agree with the High Court in their construction of Section 6. The question of the age of the person is relevant not for the purpose of determining his guilt but only for the purpose of the punishment which he could suffer for the offence of which he has been found, on the evidence, guilty. The object of the Act is to prevent the turning of youthful offenders into criminals by their association with hardened criminals of mature age within the walls of a prison. The method adopted is to attempt their possible reformation instead of inflicting on them the normal punishment for their crime. If this were borne in mind it would be clear that the age referred to by the opening words of Section 6(1) should be that when the Court is dealing with the offender, that being the point of time when the Court has to choose between the two alternatives which the Act in supersession of the normal penal law vests in its viz., sentence the offender to imprisonment or to apply to him the provisions of Section 6(1) of the Act. As the High Court has found that Ramji was not a person under the age of 21 on May 24, 1961 when the learned Sessions Judge found him guilty it is clear that Section 6(1) of the Act has no application to him.
Therefore, the relevant date for determining the age of the offender for applying Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, as held by the four Judge Bench in Ramji Misser's case , is the date of conviction. That alone can be the relevant date because the purpose of the provision is not to allow offenders of tender age to mingle with hardened criminals who are already behind the bars. So, it shall be with reference to the situation as on the date of conviction.
33. Ramji Misser's case 1963(2) Cri LJ 173 was again considered by the Supreme Court in Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1972 SC 2434 : 1972 Cri LJ 1517. The Apex Court in para 5(1) held as follows :
The age referred to in Section 6(1) of the Act is that when the Court is dealing with the offender, that being the point of time when the Court has to choose between the two alternatives, whether to sentence the offender to imprisonment or to apply to him, the provisions of Section 6(1) of the Act.
It is contended, placing reliance on the dictum in para 19 of Ramji Misser's case , that what the Supreme Court considered there was only the applicability of Section 6 with reference to the date of the judgment of the trial Court even in cases of reversal of acquittal by the appellate Court later. Therefore, Ramji Misser's case is not an authority for the purpose of considering the date of conviction as the basis for the applicability of Section 6 of the Act. We find that para 6 in Ramji Misser's case and Para 5(1) in Daulat' Ram's case AIR 1972 SC 2434 : 1972 Cri LJ 1517, as extracted above, are categoric that the relevant age to be reckoned shall be that on the date of conviction and not on the date of commission of the offence.
34. This Court had occasion to consider Ramji Misser's case in the decisions in Johnson v. Kunjukunju 1975 KLT 565 and State of Kerala v. Parameswaran Nair Radhakrishnan Nair 1995 (1) ILR 124 : 1994 Cri LJ 237. The decision in Johnson's case 1975 KLT 565 does not contain a discussion on this aspect because the accused in the said case was below the age of 20 even on the date of conviction. The decision in Joy v. State of Kerala 1988 (1) KLT 815 is not on the point as well,
35. Hence, the injunction contained in Section 6 not to impose sentence of imprisonment is confined to those who are below the age of 21 years on the date of conviction. The other decisions relied on by the appellants are rendered by Benches consisting of less number of Judges than in Ramji Misser's case . Going by the dicta in N.S. Giri v. Corporation of City of Mangalore and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka , we are obliged to follow the decision by the bench consisting of more number of judges. Therefore, as the first accused had crossed the age of 21 years as on the date of conviction as per the impugned judgment, we are of the view that Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be applied in his ease.
36. It was further contended before us that both the accused shall be rendered the benfit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. In this regard, the decision in Joy v. State of Kerala 1988 (1) KLT 815 is relied on.
37. Section 4 reads as under:
4. Power of Court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct:
(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
38. Therefore, the consideration should be having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and character of the offender. The Court has to decide taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect whether it is expedient to release the accused on probation. It is contended relying on Joy v. State of Kerala 1988 (1) KLT 815 that in an exactly similar matter, this Court had applied Section 4 to release similar offenders. True, the accused in the said case was released applying Section 4. But the allegation, there was only giving false information regarding the marks in an application for admission which was not pursued further by the accused. Therefore, that decision was rendered on the peculiar fact-situation of that case, where it was found expedient to release him in such circumstance. So that cannot be taken as a general law to be applied in every situation of mark scandal cases, regardless of the circumstances and the nature of the case.
39. On the other hand, an identical case has been decided by a learned single Judge in Nandakumar v. State of Kerala 1985 KLT 664. There also, this Court has considered the application of Section 4. That was a case where the accused had, on the strength of a fake mark list, presented for examination of a degree course. Even in that case the Court found that:
Offences of the type committed by the revision petitioner were being resorted to in our State in the dark in a large scale. Investigation in this line was focussed only by a direction given by this Court, there may be many such cases yet to be unfolded. Such crimes are being committed with ease. The result was that many deserving students were eliminated and those who are not deserving got admissions and appointments by malpractices. The action of the revision petitioner has no comparison with the immaturity of his age. It cannot be correct to say that they are instances of juvenile delinquency. He did not tamper his own marklist. He got the certificate of another boy and corrected the same. The fact that he did not attempt to get admission to the Medical College or Engineering College and that he only sought admission in a parallel college cannot be treated as mitigating circumstances. Probably admission to such a professional college was beyond his reach, So also, it may be possible that he might have thought that seeking admission to a parallel college will expose him only to a lesser risk of detection. This is not a case in which the offence was committed all of a sudden on the spur of the moment. The offence was not committed due to pressure of any circumstance or on account of aid or instigation from any other source. The character of the offender as evidenced from the report of the District Probation officer alone should not be the consideration in such cases. The nature of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed and impact of such offence on the future life of the society are also matters which will have to get serious attention from the Court. The impact of a leniency in the matter of punishment on the student world and the consequent damage to the society is also an important factor in determining the sentencing policy. Release of the revision petitioner on probation is likely to result in the student world taking such offences light-heartedly. That may tend to increase corn-mission of such offences in future. One of the justification of sentencing is protection of the interest of the society. Taking all these aspects into consideration, I think that it may not be desirable to deal with the revision petitioner under the probation of offenders Act as requested by the counsel. The learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State contended before me that the sessions Judge went wrong in exercising the sentencing discretion in order to reduce the rigorous imprisonment for one year awarded by the Magistrate to simple imprisonment for six months. It cannot be said that the argument of the Public Prosecutor is without basis. But the Sessions Judge has already exercised the sentencing discretion, having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. The State has not chosen to file an appeal against the sentence. It is true that this Court has taken up the matter of sentence in suo motu revision. The offence was committed in 1981 and it is now nearly four years. I do not think that it is necessary at this stage to set aside the judgment regarding sentence and remit the case back for fresh consideration on that question. Therefore, I do not feel inclined to interfere with the sentence in any way.
40. The Apex Court has also, recently considered invocation of Section 4 in a mark scandal case, in A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala AIR 2004 SC 3229 : 2004 Cri LJ 2833 and rejected the contention. It was held (Para 13) :
So far as the question of sentence is concerned, we find that the High Court has already taken a liberal view so far as A2 is concerned. In a case when students use forged mark sheets to obtain admission thereby depriving eligible candidates to get seats and that too to a medical course and a doctor is involved in the whole operation, uncalled-for leniency or undue sympathy will be misplaced and actually result in miscarriage of justice. Such types of crimes deserve as a matter of fact, deterrent punishment in the larger interest of society. If at all, the case calls for severe punishment. We find no substance in the plea relating to sentence or extending the benefits of the Probation Act.
Now, this forms the law on the issue. This being a case where the first accused had obtained admission to a medical college on the strength of Ext. P. 25 showing it as a genuine document and the second accused had abetted that offence to steal a seat for his son in a Medical College, that shall have to be taken as offences committed against the society in general depriving the legitimate entitlement of others who had worked hard and genuinely scored higher marks than the first accused. So, taking into consideration the principle and object germane in Section 4, the dictum of the Apex Court, the view taken by this Court, the circumstances of the case and the nature of the offence committed, we are of the view that, this is not a fit case where Section 4 shall be applied to release the accused on probation.
41. Relying on Common Cause A Registered Society v. Union of India , Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak , Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar and Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka , it is contended that the delay occurred in launching the prosecution and in terminating the trial, and the long pendency of this appeal and the trauma that the accused were facing during more than two decades, really curtailed their personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the right to speedy trial is a facet of the right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 and that any delay in trial shall be a deprivation of such right. In such circumstances, any inordinate delay shall vitiate proceedings to throw the case of, on board at the threshold itself. So there shall not be any sentence in this case, it is contended. Deprivation of the said solemn right forming part of the basic human right has been jeopardised to a great extent, it is submitted.
42-43. In Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka , the Supreme Court has held that the dictum in common cause's case and Raj Deo Sharma's case was not good in law, and reiterated the dictum in Antulay's case. It was pointed out in clear terms that any time limit for trial cannot be prescribed as a hard and fast rule. In conclusion, it was held in Ramachandra Rao, (200 Cri LJ 2547) as follows (Para 30):
(1) The dictum in A. R. Antulay case is correct and still holds the field.
(2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A. R. Antulay case adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold and reaffirm the said propositions.
(3) The guidelines laid down in A. R. Antulay case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard-and-fast rules or to be applied like a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made.
(4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common cause 1996 Cri LJ 2380 Raj Deo Sharma 1998 Cri LJ 4596 and Raj Deo Sharma 1999 Cri LJ 4541 could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal Courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case 1996 Cri LJ 2380, Raj Deo Sharma case 1998 Cri LJ 4596 and 1999 Cri LJ 4541. At the most the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the Courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant facts as pointed out in A. R. Antulay case and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to further continuance or the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the Court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused.
It was held in A. R. Antulay that:
(8) Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors - balancing test' or 'balancing process' - and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.
(9) Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order - including an order to conclude, the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded - as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.
(10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be a qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial.
(11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relied on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.
44. While applying this dectum, necessarily, it cannot be taken that on account of delay every case shall be thrown off the board. Every delay that had occurred in this case had not jeopardised the accused in any manner. Any delay inherent in the system cannot be detrimental to the prosecution to let off the accused. The FIR in this case Ext. P 65 was registered on 29-12-1981. In the nature of the offence committed, it could not have been detected immediately on its commission. It came to light when PW1, who was handing other mark scandal cases, smelt something against the appellants/accused. Therefore, the delay in lodging the FIR could not have been prevented by anyone. Even thereafter, and until termination of the trial, there occurred some delay. It was because of the nature of the offence and the evidence collected and due to certain controversies that had cropped up at the time of committal stage waiting for judicial pronouncement. Several documents and registers of the University had to be closely scrutinised. The procedure of conduct of examination and attendant work had to be studied by the Investigating Officers. The officials at the relevant point of time had to be questioned. Corresponding documents in the colleges and the universities had to be verified. One and the same document had to be relied on in several cases. The officials of the University were involved in the pivotal role in forging documents. Necessarily, the investigation consumed much time to draw up the final report in the peculiar circumstances of the case. Even the prosecution had to think of converting an accused into approver to gather tangible evidence. There were serious questions of law arising at every stage of committal, trial and the appeal. The approver's statement was recorded at the committal stage. Controversies sprang up to this Court as to whether the accused would have been given opportunity to cross examine the approver at the committal stage. The committal Court had to await pronouncement from this Court. After committal of several mark scandal cases, the ordinary criminal Courts could not deal with expeditiously. Because of involvement of an approver, the cases had to be tried by a Special Sessions Court and finally upon judicial verdict. Special Court had to be constituted. In the meantime, approver died. He could not be examined during trial. At the appellate stage also there were serious question as to whether the approver's evidence could have been, in the nature of events, accepted and acted upon to find the accused guilty. This had to be considered first by a Division Bench and later by a Full Bench. Therefore, the delay could not have been avoided in this case and other similar cases. By reason of that delay, no prejudice had really occurred to the accused, if not they were benefited by averting or postponing the final verdict. Therefore, even applying the dictum in Ramchandra Rao's case 2002 Cri LJ 2547 restating the principles in Antulay case 1992 Cri LJ 2717, it cannot be conceded that the appellants/accused can escape from any sentence, taking shelter under the cover of right to speedy trial in this case.
45. Anyhow, taking into account the aforesaid situation and the spirit of Antulay's case 1992 Cri LJ 2717, we are of the view that some leniency shall be shown to the appellants, in the matter of sentence. The Court below had sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of three years each on different counts. We have confirmed the conviction of the first accused for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 471, IPC and the conviction of the second accused for offences punishable under Sections 109, 420 and 471 read with Section 34, IPC. The first accused was a minor going by the Majority Act at the relevant point of time. The 2nd accused, his father and guardian did have a major role in obtaining admission in the Medical College on the basis of a fake mark list. Therefore, his complicity is more as compared to that of the first accused. We are told that the first accused is now aged 45 years and is leading a family life and that the 2nd accused is an octogenarian with acute ailments. Taking these aspects into consideration, we are inclined to show some leniency towards him in the matter of sentence of imprisonment. But, taking into the nature of the offence committed, any sentence ordered shall convey a message which shall percolate to the society, so that recurrence of such offence shall not take place. Therefore, the fine to be imposed shall be exemplarily heavy to carry a right message to the society.
46. Accordingly, we sentence the first accused under Section 471, IPC to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 2 lakhs, in default whereof, he shall undergo a further term of rigorous imprisonment for a period of 18 months. He shall also undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months for the offence punishable under Section 420, IPC. As regards the 2nd accused, we sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 3 lakhs, with a default sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 18 months for abetting the offence under Section 471, IPC or to commit such offence with common intention with accused No. 1, Both of them are also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of six months for committing and abetting the offence under Section 420, IPC, as the case may be. The substantive sentences ordered in respect of both the accused shall run concurrently.
Appeal is accordingly disposed of as above.