Central Administrative Tribunal - Lucknow
Devendra Vikram Singh vs Union Of India on 30 April, 2024
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
LUCKNOW BENCH, LUCKNOW
Original Application No. 321 of 2013
This, the 30th day of April, 2024
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil Kumar Ojha, Member-J
Hon'ble Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Member-A
Devendra Vikram Singh, age-57 years old, son of Yuvraj Singh, resident of
Pratap Nagar Bahrana, District- Raebareli.
.....APPLICANT
By Advocate: Sri Dharmendra Awasthi.
VERSUS
1. UNION OF INDIA, through General Manager, Northern Railway,
Baroda House, New Delhi.
2. Divisional Mechanical Engineer-II, Northern Railway, Lucknow
Division, Lucknow.
3. Senior Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Northern Railway, Lucknow
Division, Lucknow.
4. Divisional Railway Manager, Northern Railway, Lucknow Division,
Lucknow.
5. Additional Divisional Railway Manager, Northern Railway, Lucknow
Division, Lucknow.
............ Respondents
Advocate: Shri Dhirendra Kumar Singh.
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil Kumar Ojha, Member (J) Heard learned counsel for the applicant, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the records.
2. Applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:
(i) to set aside the impugned order dated 20.10.1989 passed by the Divisional Railway Manager, Northern Railway and removal order dated 29.10.1986 passed by the Respondent No. 2, as contained in Annexure No. 3 & 6 respectively to this Original Application.
(ii) to direct the opposite parties to reinstate the services of the Applicant on the basis of seniority as per the order passed by Civil Court.
(iii) to pass such other which this Hon‟ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of the case.Page 1 of 8
(iv) award the cost of Original Application in favour of the Applicant.
3. It is the case of the applicant that applicant was the employee of the Respondent- Railway Department. Applicant joined the service on 1.1.1974. On 09.01.1986, disciplinary proceedings were instituted and chargesheet was served to the applicant. Applicant was removed from service on 29.10.1986. Applicant filed appeal against the order of removal from service. Appellate Authority without assigning any reason, dismissed the appeal illegally on 30.03.1987. Applicant filed review which also came to be rejected vide order dated 27.07.1987. Applicant filed an OA No. 1253 of 1987 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench which was allowed and impugned order dated 27.07.1987 was quashed. Tribunal directed the appellate authority to consider the case of the applicant in the light of observation made in the judgment passed in the aforesaid OA after giving opportunity of hearing to the applicant. On 20.10.1989, appellate authority again rejected the appeal.
Applicant filed a Writ Petition No. 2211 (M/S) of 2010, which was dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to move before CAT for redressal of his grievance with an application for condonation of delay, which shall be considered by the Tribunal.
Applicant has filed an MA for condonation of delay alongwith O.A.
4. Respondents by filing counter affidavit alongwith their objections against delay condonation application have, interalia, stated that OA is barred by limitation. It has been further pleaded that applicant has filed the present case challenging the orders dated 29.10.1986 and 20.10.1989, which is barred by limitation and no satisfactory explanation has been given. If the order dated 20.10.1989 was illegal then applicant was free to challenge the same at that point of time but he did nothing. He challenged the impugned order for the first time by filing the writ before the Hon‟ble High Court in the year 2010. The Hon‟ble High Court never condoned the delay and simply directed to prefer the application for condonation of delay which has been directed to be considered. Further pleaded that applicant did not explain the delay of about 21 years and he wants to get the delay condoned under the strength of the order passed by Hon‟ble High Court, hence, this OA is liable to be rejected at this stage with heavy cost.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that impugned order dated 20.10.1989 is erroneous and illegal, hence, deserves to be quashed.
Page 2 of 8Further submitted that alleged delay in filing of the OA is neither deliberate nor intentional; hence, delay should also be condoned.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents strongly opposed the aforesaid submissions and argued that matter is highly time barred and applicant has not explained about 20 years delay. This litigation needs to be nipped in the bud.
7. In the case of Chennai Metropolitan water supply and Sewerage Board and others Vs. T.T Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has held as under:
"15. In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc. etc.[9] the Court observed that it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice.
16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years‟ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others‟ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter „Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold."Page 3 of 8
8. In the case of Union of India Vs. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has stated that:
"9. The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application of respondent without examining the merits, and directing appellants to consider his representation has given rise to unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. The ill-effects of such directions have been considered by this Court in C. Jacob vs. Director of Geology and Mining & Anr. - 2009 (10) SCC 115 :
"The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any `decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex- employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored."
When a belated representation in regard to a `stale' or `dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the Court/Tribunal to do so, the date of such decision can not be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the `dead' issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches. A Court or Tribunal, before directing `consideration' of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a `live' issue or whether it is with reference to a `dead' or `stale' issue. If it is with reference to a `dead' or `state' issue or dispute, the court/Tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or Tribunal deciding to direct 'consideration' without itself examining of the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect".
9. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"12. .......... The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the Court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the Legislature. At the same time, the Courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. The expression sufficient cause used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic Page 4 of 8 enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serve the ends of justice. No hard and fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years this Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay.
13. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361, this Court while interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, laid down the following proposition:
In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act), it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired, the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree- holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown, discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.
14. ..........
15. ..........
22. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge of the High Court altogether ignored the gapping holes in the story concocted by the Corporation about misplacement of the papers and total absence of any explanation as to why nobody even bothered to file applications for issue of certified copies of judgment for more than 7 years. In our considered view, the cause shown by the Corporation for delayed filing of the appeals was, to say the least, wholly unsatisfactory and the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for condoning more than 7 years delay cannot but be treated as poor apology for the exercise of discretion by the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
10. Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Sabarmati Gas Ltd. Vs Shah Alloys Ltd. in Civil Appeal No. 1669 of 2020 [2023 LiveLaw (SC) 9] decided on 04.01.2023 has held that „Sufficient cause‟ is the cause for which party could not be blamed.
11. Recently, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy Through His LR in SLP (C) No. 21096 of 2019 [2024 INSC 262] decided on 03.04.2024, has held as under:
"33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649, this Court made the following observations:
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application Page 5 of 8 for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.Page 6 of 8
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
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35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party......"
12. Thus, law on the point of limitation is that doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A Court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons who compete with Kumbhakarna or for that matter Rip Van Winkle.
13. Applicant filed Misc. Single No. 2211 of 2010 [ Devendra V. Singh v. Union of India & Another] wherein the Hon‟ble High Court on 08.01.2013 made the following observations:
"Considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I hereby dismiss the writ petition. However, granting the liberty to the petitioner to move an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal for redressal of his grievance. I am informed that the appeal was dismissed on 29.10.1989. Accordingly, I am of the view that the application which has to be preferred before the Tribunal would be barred by time, therefore, the petitioner is granted liberty to move an application for condonation of delay, which shall be considered by the Tribunal."
14. From aforecited observation of the Hon‟ble High Court, it is manifest that applicant preferred writ petition only after 20 years before the Hon‟ble High Court which was dismissed with granting liberty to applicant to move delay condonation application before this Tribunal. Applicant slept over his rights for 20 years. He competed with Kumbhkarna or for that matter Rip Van Winkle. Thus the conduct of the applicant is nothing but sheer abuse the process of law.
15. Section 21 of Administrative Tribunal, Act 1985 deals with the aspect of limitation. It provides that an Application under Section 19 of the Act can be filed within one year from the date of cause of action, which can be extended by another six months if any statutory appeal or revision is pending. Beyond that an application for condonation of delay as provided under Section 21(3) of the Act is to be filed with sufficient cause.
Page 7 of 8In the present case, the applicant was dismissed from service on 29.10.1986 and his statutory appeal was rejected vide order dated 20.10.1989 by the Appellate Authority, therefore, the cause of action arose in the year 1989 and the applicant could have filed an application, within limitation, before 20.10.1990. However, he preferred to sleep over the matter for 20 long years, allegedly kept on waiting for a decision on his representations, and then wake up from his deep slumber in the year 2010 only. It is well settled that if a person is not vigilant about his right by not approaching the court against the adverse order then the court cannot help him by entertaining the petition after a long delay. In the case of Union of India versus Harnam Singh (1993(2) S.C.C. Page 162), the Hon‟ble Apex Court has held that "the Law of Limitation may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigour and the Courts or Tribunals cannot come to aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow the period of limitation to expire".
16. Moreover, the applicant has failed to explain the inordinate delay in filing the O.A, to the satisfaction of this Tribunal. Though an application has been moved for condonation of delay, but it does not contain any ground, whatsoever, to justify the delay in filing the O.A., and merely the Hon‟ble High Court has given liberty to move an application before Tribunal for condonation of delay which shall be considered by the Tribunal is no ground at all for condoning the delay.
17. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that delay of 20 years cannot be condoned in any case. Therefore, delay condonation application no. 1447 of 2013 is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.
18. Logical conclusion is that OA also stands dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Connected M.P(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
(Pankaj Kumar) (Justice Anil Kumar Ojha)
Member (A) Member (J)
Digitally signed by Jay Narayan
Jay Narayan Singh Singh
Date: 2024.05.03 15:37:11 +05'30'
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