Karnataka High Court
Pavankumar vs The State Of Karnataka on 28 April, 2026
Author: Suraj Govindaraj
Bench: Suraj Govindaraj
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R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
AT KALABURAGI
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
AND
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA
WRIT APPEAL NO. 200101 OF 2026 (LB-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. PAVANKUMAR
S/O M VEERANNA,
AGE : 40 YEARS,
OCC : COUNCILOR,
R/O: WARD NO.12,
RAICHUR - 584 101.
2. SRINIVAS REDDY
S/O SRISHAILAPPA,
AGE : 57 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.24,
Digitally signed by CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
VARSHA N
RASALKAR
Location: HIGH
COURT OF 3. SANNA NARASAREDDY
KARNATAKA
S/O YELLAPPA,
AGE : 45 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.33,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
4. SRI TIMMAPPA
S/O NAGINDRAPPA,
AGE : 53 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.34,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 102.
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5. SRI JINDAPPA
S/O NARASAPPA,
AGE : 64 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.22,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
6. V.NAGARAJ
S/O SANNA BALAPPA,
AGE : 47 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.03,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
7. DARUR BASAVARAJ PATIL
S/O SIDDANNAGOUDA,
AGE : 64 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.10,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
8. SMT. SHAINAZ BEGUM
W/O G.H. HAJIBABU,
AGE : 45 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.26,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
9. SRI N.K. NAGARAJ
S/O K NAGAPPA,
AGE : 37 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.21,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
10. B.RAMESH
S/O BADESAB,
AGE : 45 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.04,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
11. P. NAVANEETA
W/O P.SRINIVASREDDY,
AGE : 37 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
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WARD NO.27,
CMC MEMBER,
RAICHUR - 584 101.
12. SMT. ANJANAMMA
W/O SHAMASUNDAR,
AGE : 40 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.31,
CMC MEMBER,
RAICHUR - 584 101.
13. SMT. REKHA
W/O MAHENDRA REDDY,
AGE : 35 YEARS,
OCC : COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.25,
CMC MEMBER,
RAICHUR - 584 101.
14. SMT. BUJJAMMA
W/O SHANKAREPPA,
AGE : 35 YEARS,
OCC : COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.06,
CMC MEMBER,
RAICHUR - 584 101.
15. SMT. SWATI
W/O HARIBABU,
AGE : 35 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.35,
CMC MEMBER,
RAICHUR - 584 101.
16. SMT. SAMEENA
W/O MUKRAM,
AGE : 50 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.32,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
17. SRI. NOOR PASHA S.,
S/O ASHIMODDIN,
AGE : 64 YEARS,
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OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.14,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
18. SMT. KHURSHIDA BANU
W/O WAHID,
AGE : 37 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.9,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
19. SRI SHAJID SAMEER
S/O MASAR ALIF,
AGE : 50 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.15,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
20. SMT. UMA JANDAR
W/O RAVINDRA JANDAR,
AGE : 48 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.13,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
21. SMT. HEMALATHA
W/O P.BODEPPA,
AGE : 40 YEARS,
OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.19,
CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
22. JAYANNA
S/O SWAMIDAS,
AGE : 65 YEARS, OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.2, CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
23. SMT. NARASAMMA
W/O NARASIMHALU MADAGIRI,
AGE : 45 YEARS, OCC: COUNCILOR,
WARD NO.20, CMC, RAICHUR - 584 101.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. JAYAKUMAR S.PATIL, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. RAVI B.PATIL, ADVOCATE)
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AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
THROUGH ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. THE DIRECTOR OF
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION,
V.V.TOWER, DR.B. R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
D.C. OFFICE, LINGASUGURU ROAD,
RAICHUR - 585 201.
4. THE COMMISSIONER,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
RAICHUR, TQ: AND DIST : RAICHUR.
5. THE UNDER SECRETARY,
KARNATAKA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION,
NO.16, 2ND AND 3RD FLOOR,
BELLARY ROAD, SADASHIVA NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 080.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. MAYA T.R., HCGP FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. GOURISH S.KHASHAMPUR, ADVOCATE FOR R4;
SRI. SUDARSHAN M., ADVOCATE FOR R5)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 26.02.2026 DISMISSING THE WRIT
PETITION NO.202910/2025 WITH A DIRECTION TO THE 5TH
RESPONDENT TO HOLD ELECTIONS WITHIN SIX MONTHS FROM THE
DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR BY THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE AND CONSEQUENTIALLY TO ALLOW THE WRIT
PETITION AS PRAYED FOR.
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 27.03.2026, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED
THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
and
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA
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CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
1. The petitioners are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
"i) Call for the records in Writ Petition No.202910/2025 on the file of the learned Single Judge of this Hon'ble Court.
ii) To set aside the impugned order dated 26.02.2026 dismissing the Writ Petition No.202910/2025 with a direction to the 5th respondent to hold elections within six months from the date of appointment of Administrator by the learned Single Judge and consequentially to allow the Writ Petition as prayed for, in the interest of justice.
iii) Pass any Order/s, direction as this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the circumstances of the case including an order as to the costs of the present proceedings."
2. The petitioners had filed W.P.No.202910/2025 seeking for the following reliefs:
"a) Issue a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned communication dated 27.01.2025 issued by the 5th respondent authority bearing No.SECK/ULB/OTHR/1/2025-ULB as at Annexure-
G and consequential order dated 26.03.2025 bearing No.NAAAE UDA 39 MLR 2025(E) as at Annexure-H issued by the 1st respondent authority determining the date of completion of tenure of councilors and consequentially the committee insofar as relates to at Sl.No.174, as contrary to Sec.3, 4 and 503 of Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act and also contrary to Sec.18 and Sec.315 of Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964.
-7-NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR aa) Issue a writ of certiorari to quash the Notification dated 15.11.2025 bearing No.UDD- 293 MLR 2025(e) duly published in the official Gazatte on 17.11.2025 as Annexure-L issued by the 1st respondent authority as in violation of section 503 of Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act and Article 243-U of the Constitution in the interest of justice. ab) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent state to permit the petitioner and the body in administration of municipal area to continue their tenure till formation of new body under Section 503(3)(a) of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, in the interest of justice and equity. (Amendment carried out as per order dated 26.02.2026)
b) Declare that the duration of the tenure of the order dated 08.05.2023 appointing Administrator to Raichur Municipal Council from 11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024 shall not usurp the total five years of the tenure of the Councilors.
c) Issue writ of mandamus, directing the respondents No.1 and 5 to calculate the five years term of the council excluding the period from 11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024 and further be directed that term of Raichur City Municipal Council would continue until completion of 30 months tenure by considering the grievance of the petitioners vide representation dated 22.09.2025 as at Annexure-J, in the interest of justice and equity.
d) Issue any writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the fact and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice."
3. The learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 26.02.2026 has dismissed W.P.No.202910/ 2025 by passing the following order:
"i. The Writ petition is dismissed.
ii. The respondent No.5/Election Commissioner shall proceed further by conducting elections in -8- NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR accordance to law expeditiously within a period of six months from the date of appointment of administrator.
Ordered accordingly."
4. It is challenging the above order, the petitioners are before this Court.
5. Parties are described as in the writ petition for convenience.
6. Petitioners claim to be elected Councilors to City Municipal Council, Raichur (CMC) during the general elections held on 03.09.2018. The declaration by the Returning Officer being issued on 13.09.2019. The first meeting of the CMC was held on 02.11.2020, wherein the elections were held for the posts of President and Vice President for the initial tenure of thirty months, which came to an end on 11.05.2023.
7. There was a delay in publishing the reservation for the post of President and Vice President for the second tenure, which came to be published only on 28.08.2024. During the intervening period of 11.05.2023 to 28.08.2024, an Administrator had been appointed by the State Government since the reservation notification had been challenged before the Courts, and as such, no elections could be held for the said posts. The tenure of the Administrator -9- NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR came to an end on 27.08.2024, elections having been held on 28.08.2024.
8. On 04.12.2024, the first respondent/ Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development, issued a notification declaring the City Municipal area of Raichur District as an Urban Area and Raichur City Municipality was declared as Raichur Municipal Corporation.
9. The Karnataka State Election Commission (hereinafter referred as 'Election Commission' for brevity) had issued a communication to the Urban Development Department prescribing the last date of the tenure of the Council to be 02.11.2025, and consequently, the Urban Development Department issued a direction to the Deputy Commissioner, Raichur, to hold elections for the post of Councillors on or before 02.11.2025.
10. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioners had submitted a representation on 22.09.2025 requesting the Urban Development Department to permit the committee to complete its tenure, which it was deprived of in view of the appointment of an Administrator for a period of fifteen months due to pending litigation challenging the roster reservation to the post of President and Vice President.
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11. It is in that background that an Administrator was appointed on 15.11.2025. The petitioners had initially been aggrieved by the communication dated 27.01.2025 and 26.03.2025 supra had filed W.P.No.202910/2025 and sought a stay of those communications, for which an interim order was granted by the learned Single Judge on 25.09.2025.
12. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Urban Development Department issued notification dated 15.11.2025 invoking Section 509 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred as 'KMC Act' for brevity,) and sought to appoint the Regional Commissioner, Kalaburagi, as the Administrator with effect from 03.11.2025 which notification was also challenged in the pending writ petition by way of an amendment. The writ petition having been dismissed by way of the impugned order dated 26.02.2026, the petitioners have preferred the above writ appeal seeking for the reliefs indicated supra.
13. Sri Jayakumar S.Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Ravi B. Patil, for the petitioners would submit that, 13.1. The order passed by the learned Single Judge is without considering the material facts available
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR on record and without appreciating the provisions of Section 503 of the KMC Act. Section 503 of the KMC Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
"503. Declaration of [city municipal area as a larger urban area] under this Act - [(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 3, the Governon may declare by Notification that any municipal area for which a city municipal council is constituted under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (Karnataka Act 22 of 1964) shall with effect from the date to be specified in such Notification to be a larger urban area specified under Section 3 of this Act].
(2) The provisions of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 applicable to such 1[city municipal area] shall not apply to any local area declared as a 2[larger urban area] under sub-
section (1) with effect from the date specified in the declaration:
Provided that any appointment, notification, notice, tax, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, bye-law or form made or issued or imposed under the said Act in respect of such [city municipal area] which were in force as applicable immediately before the date specified under sub-section (1) shall continue in force and be deemed to have been made, issued or imposed under the provisions of this Act unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, notification, notice, tax, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, bye-law or form made or issued or imposed under this Act.
(3) With effect from the date of declaration of any area as a [larger urban area] under sub- section (1), the following consequences shall ensure, namely.-
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(a) the body functioning as a city Municipal Council under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 immediately before the date of the said declaration in respect of the said area shall become a body competent to exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of the Act on a Corporation in respect of the said area until a Corporation is duly constituted for the area within the jurisdiction of such body under the provisions of this Act;
(b) the Councillors of the city Municipal Council holding office as such immediately before the said date shall become Councillors of the Corporation;
(c) the president of the said city Municipal Council shall become the Mayor of the Corporation and discharge duties and perform functions of the Mayor under this Act and the vice-president of the said city Municipal Council shall become the Deputy Mayor of the said Corporation under this Act;
[(cc) where, under the provisions of Section 315 or Section 316 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 either an administrator or an officer has been appointed, to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the municipal council, then, such administrator or officer shall be deemed to be an administrator appointed under Section 99 2[x x x x x]. 3[x x x x x]. The Advisory council, if any, appointed to advise and assist the Administrator appointed under Section 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 shall be deemed to be an Advisory Committee appointed under sub-section (6) of Section
99.]
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(d) the unexpended balance of the municipal fund and the property (including arrears of rates, taxes and fees), belonging to the said city municipal council and all rights and powers which prior to the said declaration vested in the city municipal council shall, subject to all charges and liabilities affecting the same, vest in the Corporation as Corporation fund;
(e) any appointment, notification, notice, tax, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, bye-law or form, made or issued under any other law in respect of such municipality shall continue in force and be deemed to have been made, issued or imposed under the provisions of this Act, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, notification, notice, tax, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, bye-law or form, made or issued or imposed under this Act;
(f) all budget estimates, assessment lists, valuation or measurements made or authenticated under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 immediately before the said date shall be deemed to have been made or authenticated under this Act;
(g) all debts and obligations incurred and all contracts made by or on behalf of the city municipal council immediately before the said date and subsisting on the said date shall be deemed to have been incurred and made by the Corporation in exercise of the powers conferred on it by or under the Act;
(h) all proceedings pending prior to the said declaration before the city municipal council shall be continued by the Corporation;
(i) all appeals pending before any authority shall so far as may be practicable,
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR be disposed of as if the said area had been included in the Corporation when they were filed;
(j) all prosecutions instituted by or on behalf of the city municipal council and all suits or other legal proceedings instituted by or against the city municipal council or any officer of the city municipal council pending at the said date shall be continued by or against the Corporation as if such area had been included in the Corporation when such prosecutions, suits or proceedings were instituted;
(k) all officers and servants in the employ of the city municipal council immediately before the said date shall become officers and servants of the Corporation under this Act and shall, and until other provision is made in accordance with the provisions of this Act, receive salaries and allowances and be subject to the conditions of service to which they were entitled immediately before such date:
Provided that it shall be competent to the Corporation, subject to the previous sanction of the Government, to discontinue the services of any officer or servant who, in its opinion, is not necessary or suitable for the requirements of the service under the Corporation after giving such officer or servant such notice as is required to be given by the terms of his employment and every officer or servant whose services are dispensed with shall be entitled to such leave, pension, provident fund and gratuity as he would have been entitled to take or receive on being invalidated out of service, as if the city municipal council in the employ of which he was, had not ceased to exist.1
[(4) A Corporation shall be duly constituted for the larger urban area under this Act within a period of six months from the date of declaration
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR referred to in sub-section (1) and from the date of first meeting of the Corporation as so constituted the body exercising the powers and performing the duties of the Corporation shall stand dissolved:
[Provided that where the larger urban area so constituted does not have any newly added area and the election to such smaller urban area was held within one year before the date of declaration of larger urban area, the election to such larger urban area for constitution of a Corporation need not to be held till the completion of the term of members of smaller urban area so elected (irrespective of whether City Municipal Council was constituted or not) and the members of smaller urban area shall continue to be members of the larger urban area Corporation to be constituted till the completion of their term so elected and a Corporation shall be constituted by treating the said elected members as Councillors of the Corporation under Section 7.] (5) The properties, rights and liabilities of the city municipal council of a municipal area declared as larger urban area under sub-section (1) shall vest in the Corporation of the said larger urban area with effect from the date of such declaration]."
13.2. By referring to Section 503 of the KMC Act, he submits that the said provision deals with the consequences of the declaration of a City Municipal Area as a Larger Urban Area, and it is this provision which was required to be considered by the learned Single Judge in the proper perspective, which has not been done.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 13.3. His submission by referring to the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act is that, in terms thereof, the Council which was looking after the administration and the management shall be carried out by the Members of the Smaller Urban Area until the Larger Urban Corporation is constituted or till the completion of their term by treating the said elected members as the Councilors of the Corporation under Section 7 of the KMC Act.
13.4. His submission therefore is that the management of the newly constituted Corporation would continue to vest with and be exercised by the Councilors of the CMC, Raichur, until elections are held to the Corporation and as such, no Administrator could have been appointed by the Corporation and such appointment is completely arbitrary, illegal and as such, is required to be interfered with by this Court. There being an elected Council to the CMC, Raichur, replacement of the elected council by an Administrator disturbs the democratic rights of a legally elected Council. It was for the Council to serve the full term.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 13.5. The election to the second term of the CMC, Raichur having occurred on 28.08.2024, the said Council was required to be in office for a period of thirty months thereafter i.e., till February, 2027. The appointment of an Administrator before the expiry of the said term interferes with the tenure of the Councilors which is not permissible.
13.6. He relies upon Article 243-U of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as 'Constitution' for brevity,) which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
"243U. Duration of Municipalities, etc-
(1) Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer:
Provided that a municipality shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before its dissolution.
(2) No amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Municipality at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in clause(1).
(3) An election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed,
(a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause(1);
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(b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution;
Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for constituting the Municipality for such period.
(4) A Municipality constituted upon the dissolution of Municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued under clause(1) had it not been so dissolved."
13.7. By referring to Article 243-U of the Constitution, he submits that the said Article guarantees a five-year tenure to elected municipal bodies, which cannot be cut short under any circumstances. If done otherwise, it would violate the constitutional mandate requiring interference at the hands of this Court.
13.8. The appointment of an Administrator by respondent No.3 is without giving an opportunity of hearing to the elected members. The appointment of an Administrator, amounting to the removal of elected members, violates the principles of natural justice. He refers to Section 3 of the KMC Act, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
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3. 1[Specifying larger urban area and establishment] of Corporation, etc.- 1[(1) The Governor may, having regard to,-
a. the population of any area;
b. the density of population of such area;
c. the revenue generated for the local administration of such area;
d. the percentage of employment in non- agricultural activities in such area;
e. the economic importance of such area; and f. such other factors as may be prescribed;
specify by notification such area to be larger urban area;
Provided that no such area shall be so specified as a larger urban area unless.-
a. such area contains a population of not less than three lakhs;
b. the density of population in such area is not less than three thousand inhabitants to one square kilometer of area;
c. the revenue generated from such area for the local administration in the year of the last preceding census is not less than rupees six crores per annum or an amount calculated at the rate of rupees two hundred per capita per annum, whichever is higher;
d. the percentage of employment in non- agricultural activities is not less than fifty percent of the total employment:
Provided further that no such notification shall be issued except after consulting the local authority, if any, concerned.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR (1A) Any area specified as larger urban area under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be a city and a Corporation shall be established for the said city.
(1B) The name of the city shall, where the local area having two or more local authorities form the city, be as determined by the Governor.] (2)The Corporation shall be a body corporate by the name "the Corporation of the city of ...." and shall have perpetual succession and common seal with power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to contract and may, by the said name, sue and be sued.
1[Provided that the "Corporation of City of Bangalore" shall be called the ―Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike".] 13.9. By referring to Section 3 of the KMC Act he submits that the notification issued thereunder declaring the Raichur Municipal Corporation on 04.12.2024 would imply that the Municipal Council functioning under the Karnataka Municipalities Act would continue to be a body competent to exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred under the KMC Act, until the Corporation is duly constituted under the provisions of the KMC Act. His submission is that all Councilors of the CMC become Councilors of the Corporation and in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act,
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR the Corporation is required to be constituted within a period of six months from the date of declaration and is only from the date of the first meeting of the Corporation so constituted that the body exercising the powers and performing the duties of the Corporation shall stand dissolved.
13.10.There is obligation which has been cast on the authorities to constitute the Corporation within six months of the notification and the Legislature in its wisdom has though it fit to fill the lacuna or cater to the inaction on the part of the authorities in not constituting the Corporation by mandating that the Councilors of CMC shall continue to be Councilors of the Corporation until the first meeting of the Corporation.
13.11.His submission is also that sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act is an exception to Article 243-U of the Constitution. The continuance as a Councilor is not on the basis of being elected as a Councilor of CMC but is for the reason of a Smaller Urban Area being declared as a Larger Urban Area and in that background, he submits that there is a deeming
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR fiction under the statute namely, sub-section (4) of Section 503 that such Councilor shall hold the office until the first meeting of the Corporation and on that basis, he submits that the learned Single Judge has erred in considering Article 243-U of the Constitution when what was required be considered was sub-section (4) of Section 503 of KMC Act which is an independent provision.
13.12.The first meeting, which has been referred to under sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act, being that of the Municipal Corporation, he submits that the learned Single Judge has erred in taking into consideration the first meeting to be 02.11.2020, when the first meeting of the CMC post elections was held. He again reiterates that the election to the CMC and the period of five years as Councillor of CMC stands on a distinct and different footing than that of the Councillor of the Municipal Corporation. His submission is that on account of the actions or inactions of the official respondents, the people of Raichur have been denied governance by their chosen representatives. It is the elected representatives who are required to govern the Council and subsequently, the Corporation.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 13.13.On account of the delay on the part of the respondents in properly notifying the reservation roster, the elected Councillors of CMC were deprived of exercising their rights for a period of eighteen months since an Administrator had been appointed. Subsequently, the elected representatives were not permitted to discharge their obligations on account of a Smaller Urban Area being declared as a Larger Urban Area, in pursuance of which an Administrator was appointed. Thus, he submits that the authorities have conspired to deprive the Councillors of their entitlement under the respective Acts to function democratically. His submission is that these aspects not having been considered by the learned Single Judge, this Court ought to come to the rescue of the petitioners to preserve democracy and permit the petitioners to discharge their role as Councilors of the Corporation until elections are held to the Corporation since there is deeming fiction under sub-section(4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act that until such elections and the first meeting, the Councilors of CMC would continue to
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR operate as Councilors of the newly created Corporation.
14. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondent-State, would support the impugned order of the learned Single Judge by contending that 14.1. There is neither illegality nor perversity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge, nor in regard to the orders passed by the Officers of the State.
14.2. She submits that the elections to the CMC was held on 03.09.2018, first meeting was held on 02.11.2020, the term of five years came to an end on 01.11.2025. She refers to Section 8 of the KMC Act which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
"8. Term of office of Councillors - [(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the term of office of Councillors.-
(i) directly elected at a general election shall be five years;
(ii) nominated by the Government under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 7 shall, subject to the pleasure of the Government, be five years.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR (2) The term of office of the Councillors shall commence on the date appointed for the first meeting of the Corporation.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where two-thirds of the total number of Councillors required to be elected have been elected, the Corporation shall be deemed to have been duly constituted under this Act].
(4) If any casual vacancy occurs it shall be filled, as soon as may be, by the election of a person thereto. The person so elected shall hold office only so long as the person in whose place he is elected would have held had the vacancy not occurred:
Provided that no election to fill a casual vacancy shall be held if the vacancy occurs within four months before the expiry by efflux of time of the term of office of the Councillors.
(5) A Councillor may resign his office at any time by notice in writing addressed to the Mayor and delivered to him and such resignation shall take effect from the date on which it is delivered."
14.3. By referring to the above provision she contends that term of the office of the Councilors would be five years commencing from the date appointed in the first meeting of the Corporation and on that basis, she submits that the first meeting having been held on 02.11.2020, the term came to an end on 01.11.2025.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 14.4. Her submission is that the said term shall continue to hold the floor irrespective of a notification under Section 503 of the KMC Act. Merely because, a Smaller Urban Area is declared as a Larger Urban Area, the term of the office of the Councilors would not stand extended is her submission. She also refers to Section 509 of the KMC Act which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
"509. Removal of difficulties,- If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette as the occasion may requite do anything with appears to it to be necessary to remove the difficulty."
14.5. By referring to Section 509 of the KMC Act, she submits that the same deals with a power vested with the authorities to remove any difficulties. Even if there is difficulty which has arisen on account of the declaration of a Smaller Urban Area into a Larger Urban Area, the same could be removed by publishing the notification by the concerned authorities which is so done by way of notification dated 04.12.2024.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 14.6. She also relies on Article 243-U of the Constitution to contend that the time limit fixed and specified for every municipality shall be no longer than five years, and under no circumstances shall the same be extended. If the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is accepted, she submits that a mandate under Article 243-U of the Constitution would be violated. In the absence of a challenge to Article 243-U of the Constitution, the said provision would have to be applied with full rigour, requiring the upholding of the notification that has been issued and dismissal of the above appeal as done by the learned Single Judge.
14.7. She relies upon the judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in G.Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of Karnataka and another [1995(5) Kar. 618(DB)] more particularly, paragraphs - 4, 17, 20 and 21 thereof which is reproduced for easy reference:
"4. The Constitution was amended by the 74th Amendment Act inserting Part IX-A containing Articles 243-P to 243-ZG into the Constitution. Article 243-U of the Constitution refers to duration of the Municipality and Article 243-ZF of the Constitution refers to continuance of the existing laws and Municipalities. Under
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR Article 243-ZF of the Constitution, the existing Municipality was continued till the expiration of their term unless sooner dissolved by a resolution passed to that effect by the Legislative Assembly of the State or in the case of a State having a Legislative Council by each House of the Legislature of the State. The existing laws relating to Municipalities inconsistent with Part IX-A of the Constitution would continue to be in force until amended or repealed or one year whichever is earlier. The provisions relating to appointment of an Administrator under Section 100(1)(c) of the K.M.C. Act is omitted by the Karnataka Act 35 of 1994. Section 47 of the said Act 35 of 1994 and Section 54 of Act 36 of 1994 provide that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the respective Acts, the Government may by order published in the official Gazette as the occasion may require do something which appears to it to be necessary to remove the difficulty.
17. In substance, the contention of the petitioners is that the appointment of Administrators is void as no provision is made under the relevant statute in the circumstances arising under the various Municipal enactments. The contention is that during the interregnum between the expiry of the period of office to which the Councillors are elected and the next election, Administrators cannot be appointed as there is no provision made under the Act, inasmuch as the provisions in that regard had been deleted from the statute. It is clear from the provisions of the Constitution that none of the petitioners who had been elected as Councillors either to Municipal Council or Municipal Corporation, could continue in office on the expiry of the period mentioned in Article 243-ZF. In each of these cases, the period either reckoned from the date of issue of Gazette Notification declaring the elections to various Municipalities or the date of first meeting, has already elapsed on the expiry of 31st May, 1995 and in some cases during June/July, 1995. In the circumstances, such Councillors cannot continue in office under any circumstance unless any specific provision had been made in the statute.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR There is no provision in the statute to enable them to continue in office until their successors are elected. Thus, there is a clear vacuum arising on account of the absence of a relevant provision in the statute. Whatever may be the reasons for not holding elections to Municipalities, the fact remains that elections have not been held prior to the expiry of the term of the concerned Municipal body. The administration of the Municipal body has got to be carried on and in the absence of a provision under the statute, the only way to remove the difficulty is to appoint Administrators or enable any other person or body of persons to discharge the functions of the Municipal Council or Corporation. Such a course can certainly fall within the category of removing a difficulty arising in the statute and it cannot be said that such difficulty is dehors the statute. Hence, we do not agree with the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the difficulty arising in the present case is outside the scope of the statute. Thus adopting the very test provided in the decision of the Supreme Court in Madeva Upendra Sinai's case, supra, it must be held that the respondents have power to appoint Administrators to remove difficulties of a vacuum arising on account of absence of a provision in the matter of appointment of Administrator to the Municipal body elections thereto not having been held prior to the expiry of the term of such Municipal body.
20. Now the question that arises for consideration is whether contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or the scheme thereof. A perusal of the various provisions of the Constitution in unless sooner dissolved and in case of dissolution, an Administrator could be appointed after following the due procedure prescribed thereto. It is not as though Municipal bodies could not be dissolved and an Administrator could discharge the function of the Municipal bodies. If that is permissible in the case of the circumstances calling for such dissolution, we fail to understand that when the Municipal body is not in existence on account of various circumstances set forth earlier in the course of
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR this order as to how the appointment of Administrator to discharge the functions of a Municipality in the absence of an elected body being available is opposed to the scheme of the Constitution surpasses our comprehension. After the first Municipal Body is constituted as provided under Article 243-Q, provisions of Article 243-U is attracted and thereafter it will be the bounden duty of the State Election Commission and the Government to conduct the elections from time to time. For the first time when the Municipal Body is being constituted, various problems have arisen as to delimitation, territorial limits of different municipalities and the jurisdiction thereof and reservation. Such problems once settled, further restructuring would only be a consequential affair thereafter and there would be no impediment to the elections being held to the different Municipal bodies in time and in which event it will not be permissible for the Government to appoint Administrators on the ground that elections could not be held to the Municipal body. Article 243-U would come into play on the constitution of a Municipal body under Article 243-Q and not before. Therefore, on the facts and circumstances of this case, we must hold that the exercise of power for appointing Administrators by the State either under the provisions of the removal of difficulties clause or under the executive power of the State under Article 162 of the Constitution, is justified.
21. Sri H.B. Datar, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioners, contended that the order appointing the Administrators is an exercise in futility inasmuch as the provisions of the K.M.C. Act or the Municipalities Act do not enable the Administrators to function in the circumstances in which they are appointed. A careful perusal of the order itself will disclose that the purpose of appointment of Administrator is clearly set out and to enable carrying out all such purposes they are appointed. In the dissolution of Municipality, if Administrators could discharge the functions of the Municipality, same powers and functions could
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR be exercised by the Administrators. Hence the difficulty felt by the learned Counsel is unfounded and not tenable in law."
14.8. By relying on Kuppuswamy's case, she submits that Article 243-U of the Constitution would come into play on the constitution of a municipal body and the period would start running from the date of the first meeting, irrespective of the appointment of an Administrator during the term of the Council.
14.9. She relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad [(2006)8 SCC 352] more particularly, paragraph-21 thereof, which is reproduced for easy reference:
"21. It is true that there may be certain man-made calamities, such as rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities which could distract the authorities from holding elections to the municipality, but they are exceptional circumstances and under no (sic other) circumstance would the Election Commission be justified in delaying the process of election after consulting the State Government and other authorities. But that should be an exceptional circumstance and shall not be a regular feature to extend the duration of the municipality. Going by the provisions contained in Article 243-U, it is clear that the period of five years fixed thereunder to constitute the municipality is mandatory in nature and has to be followed in all respects. It is only when the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR municipality is dissolved for any other reason and the remainder of the period for which the dissolved municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any elections for constituting the municipality for such period."
14.10.By relying upon Kishansing Tomar's case, her submission is that even if there is an interference due to man-made calamities, rioting or breakdown of land and order or natural calamities, there are no circumstances which are available for the Election Commission to delay the holding of elections. On that basis, she submits that there is artificial extension of term of office sought to be achieved by the petitioners which is not permissible and as such, she submits that the writ appeal is required to be dismissed by upholding the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
15. Heard Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri. Ravi B. patil, for the petitioners, Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 3, Sri.Gourish S.Khashampur, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 and Sri Sudarshan M., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5. Perused the papers.
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16. The points that would arise for our consideration are:
i. Whether on the upgradation of a Smaller Urban Area to a Larger Urban Area, the Councillors of the Smaller Urban Area (in this case CMC) can continue to function as the Larger Urban Area (in this case Corporation) until the first meeting of the elected representatives of the Larger Urban Area?
ii. Whether sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act constitutes an exception to the term of office mandated under Article 243-U of the Constitution?
iii. Whether the petitioners are entitled to an extended period on account of the interruption caused by the appointment of an Administrator in the second term of CMC?
iv. Whether the term of five years would exclude the period during which the Administrator was in office?
v. Whether the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from any infirmities requiring interference at the hands of this Court?
vi. What order?
17. We answer the above points as under:
18. This writ appeal raises a question of fundamental constitutional importance concerning the mandatory
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR tenure of elected municipal bodies under Part IX-A of the Constitution of India and its interaction with the transitional provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (hereinafter "KMC Act"). At its core, the question is whether elected Councillors of a City Municipal Council ("CMC") which has been upgraded to a Municipal Corporation can lawfully continue to hold office beyond the five-year period mandated by Article 243-U of the Constitution, by relying upon the deeming fiction and transitional provisions contained in Section 503 of the KMC Act.
19. The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 inserted Part IX-A, comprising Articles 243-P to 243-ZG, into the Constitution of India. This amendment was a watershed moment in the history of Indian local self-governance. Its animating purpose was to strengthen and revitalise local bodies by giving them constitutional recognition, ensuring their democratic character, regularising the cycle of elections, and preventing the prolonged supersession of elected local governments. Prior to the 74th Amendment, the governance of urban local bodies was left largely to state legislation, and elected bodies were frequently dissolved or superseded by state governments for extended periods without constitutional constraint. The 74th Amendment
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR placed the period of tenure, the conduct of elections, and the protection of local bodies from arbitrary dissolution under constitutional guarantee.
20. Article 243-U is the centrepiece of Part IX-A so far as the duration of Municipalities is concerned. Sub- clause (1) thereof mandates that every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. The phrase "no longer" is an absolute constitutional brake, it admits of no exception, no extension, no exclusion. Sub-clause (3) further mandates that an election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed before the expiry of its duration or within six months from the date of its dissolution, thereby placing a positive constitutional obligation on the State Election Commission and the State Government to ensure timely elections.
21. Article 243-K of the Constitution establishes the State Election Commission, an independent constitutional authority, which superintends, directs, and controls the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, elections to Municipalities. The Karnataka State Election Commission ("KSEC"), established in pursuance of Article 243-K,
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR accordingly discharges its constitutional obligation to ensure that elections are held at the constitutionally prescribed intervals. The communications issued by the KSEC calculating the tenure of the Raichur CMC Councillors as ending on 01.11.2025 were issued in direct discharge of this constitutional function.
22. The Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976, enacted by the Karnataka State Legislature, governs the constitution, powers, and administration of Municipal Corporations in the State of Karnataka. Section 8 of the KMC Act provides that the term of office of directly elected Councillors shall be five years from the date appointed for the first meeting of the Corporation. This is the statutory reflection of the constitutional mandate of Article 243-U.
23. Section 503 of the KMC Act contains a special set of provisions governing the transition from a City Municipal Area (governed under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, or "KM Act") to a Larger Urban Area (governed under the KMC Act). Upon the issuance of a declaration by the Governor under Section 503(1) of the KMC Act, the CMC transitions to a Corporation in law. Section 503(3) lays down the immediate consequences of such a declaration, including the deeming of CMC Councillors as
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR Corporation Councillors. Section 503(4) prescribes the timeline for the formal constitution of the Corporation through fresh elections, and contains a proviso which defers such elections in certain specified circumstances.
24. In the present case, the Councillors of the City Municipal Council, Raichur, were elected in the general elections held on 03.09.2018. The election results were declared on 13.09.2019. The first meeting of the CMC was held on 02.11.2020. By operation of Article 243-U and Section 8 of the KMC Act, the five-year term of the Councillors commenced on 02.11.2020 and was scheduled to expire on 01.11.2025.
25. During the currency of this five-year term, two significant events occurred.
26. First, on account of disputes regarding the reservation roster for the posts of President and Vice President for the second thirty-month term of the CMC, an Administrator was appointed for a limited purpose, to manage the CMC's executive functions in the absence of an elected President/VP from 11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024. It is critical to note that the Councillors themselves were not removed from office during this period.
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27. Second, on 04.12.2024, the State Government issued a notification under Section 503(1) of the KMC Act declaring the Raichur City Municipal area as a Larger Urban Area and Raichur City Municipality as Raichur Municipal Corporation. This notification came approximately eleven months before the expiry of the Councillors' five-year term.
28. The Karnataka State Election Commission issued a communication on 27.01.2025 prescribing the last date of the tenure of the Council as 02.11.2025, and the Urban Development Department consequentially issued a direction on 26.03.2025 to the Deputy Commissioner, Raichur, directing that elections to the Corporation Councillors be held on or before 02.11.2025. The petitioner Councillors submitted a representation dated 22.09.2025 requesting that the committee be permitted to complete its tenure, contending that the period of the Administrator's appointment (15 months) should be excluded from the five-year term. The representation was not accepted. Administrator was appointed on 15.11.2025 under Section 509 of the KMC Act.
29. The petitioners filed Writ Petition No.202910/2025 challenging, inter alia, the communications dated 27.01.2025 and 26.03.2025, and subsequently also
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR challenged the notification dated 15.11.2025 appointing the Administrator by way of amendment. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 26.02.2026, holding that the Councillors' term ended on 01.11.2025 and directing the Election Commission to hold elections within six months from the date of appointment of the Administrator. It is against this order that the present writ appeal has been preferred.
30. The legal questions that arise for our determination may be broadly categorised under two heads: (i) the transitional effect of Section 503 of the KMC Act on the tenure of elected Councillors; and (ii) whether the administrative interregnum caused by the appointment of an Administrator for presidential posts has any effect on the computation of the five- year term under Article 243-U. it is in tht background that we have formulated the six points for determination.
31. Before embarking on the analysis, it is useful to set out the hierarchy of norms applicable in this case. At the apex stands the Constitution, in particular, Part IX-A inserted by the 74th Constitutional Amendment. Below it stands the KMC Act, a State Legislature enactment. In the event of any conflict between the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR two, the Constitution must prevail. This is not merely the principle of constitutional supremacy, it is the explicit mandate of Article 13(1) and (2) read with Article 245 and the federal distribution of powers. No State statute can, by any device, override a mandatory constitutional provision. We keep this hierarchy constantly in mind in our analysis.
32. It is also relevant to note the legislative history of Section 503 of the KMC Act in the context of the 74th Constitutional Amendment. The KMC Act was enacted in 1976 and Section 503 was a part of the original enactment, dealing with the transition from CMC to Corporation. The 74th Constitutional Amendment was enacted in 1992 and came into force on 01.06.1993. After the Amendment, the State of Karnataka amended its municipal laws to bring them in conformity with Part IX-A. The proviso to Section 503(4), which is the central provision in this case, was introduced by way of an amendment to the KMC Act. This proviso must be read in the light of the constitutional framework introduced by the 74th Amendment, and any interpretation that makes the proviso inconsistent with Part IX-A must be rejected.
33. The legislative intent behind the proviso to Section 503(4) is apparent from its text. It addresses a
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR specific incongruity if a CMC has very recently held general elections (within the past year) and is then upgraded to a Corporation, requiring fresh Corporation elections immediately would be highly inconvenient and wasteful. The electorate would be asked to vote again within a very short period. To address this incongruity, the proviso defers fresh Corporation elections to the end of the existing five- year term, during which the recently-elected CMC Councillors continue as Corporation Councillors. This is a sensible, practical, and constitutionally compliant provision, it neither extends the five-year term nor violates Article 243-U.
34. In the present case, however, the Councillor elections were held in September 2018, more than six years before the declaration of the Corporation in December 2024. The proviso's rationale (avoiding a fresh election shortly after a recent one) has no application to these facts. The electorate of Raichur had not been called upon to exercise its franchise for Councillors since 2018. By the time of the declaration in December 2024, the existing Councillors had already been in office for six years. In these circumstances, holding Corporation elections as soon as possible is not an inconvenience, it is a constitutional mandate and necessity.
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35. We also note the broader pattern of urban local governance in Karnataka. The upgrading of City Municipal Councils to Municipal Corporations is a process that occurs periodically as urban areas grow in population, economic activity, and administrative complexity. Section 503 of the KMC Act has been invoked in several instances in the past to upgrade CMCs to Corporations. In each such case, the constitutional framework of Article 243-U and the statutory framework of Section 8 of the KMC Act operate with equal force, ensuring that the transition does not become an occasion for the extension of the tenure of incumbents beyond the constitutional limit.
36. Before addressing the Points for Determination, it is useful to set out in detail the relevant provisions of law which fall for consideration, along with their inter-relationships, so as to provide a clear analytical framework for the subsequent discussion.
37. Article 243-P(e) of the Constitution defines "Municipality" to mean an institution of self- government constituted under Article 243-Q. Article 243-Q(1) provides that there shall be constituted in every State (i) a Nagar Panchayat for a transitional area, (ii) a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area, and (iii) a Municipal Corporation for a larger
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR urban area. A Municipal Corporation is therefore a Municipality within the meaning of Article 243-P(e) and is subject to all the constitutional provisions in Part IX-A, including Article 243-U.
38. Article 243-U(1) mandates a five-year term for every Municipality. The text reads:
"Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer."
39. Three features of this provision deserve careful note.
First, the operative trigger for the start of the five- year period is the "date appointed for its first meeting", not the date of election, not the date of declaration of results, not any other date. Second, the period is five years, not "approximately five years" or "five years subject to exclusion of any period." Third, the period ends "no longer", there is no provision for extension whatsoever.
40. The sole exception to the five-year mandatory term provided by Article 243-U itself is "unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force." This exception permits a shorter term (through dissolution) but expressly does not permit a longer term.
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41. Article 243-U(4) provides that where a Municipality is dissolved before the expiry of its duration, a Municipality constituted upon such dissolution shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued.
42. Reading Articles 243-U(1) and 243-U(4) together, the constitutional scheme is clear, the maximum life of any Municipality is five years; dissolution can shorten this, but nothing can lengthen it.
43. Article 243-U(3) imposes a positive obligation on the election machinery, an election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed (a) before the expiry of its duration specified in sub-clause (1), i.e., before the end of five years, and (b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution. This provision makes plain that the election must precede or at most coincide with the expiry of the five-year term. The Constitution envisages a seamless transition, the old Municipality ends, elections are held (ideally before the old term ends), and the new Municipality begins. If elections cannot be held before the term ends, they must be held within six months of the term ending.
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44. Article 243-K establishes the State Election Commission and vests in it the superintendence, direction, and control of elections to Municipalities. The State Election Commission acts as an independent constitutional body, not subject to the control of the Executive. Its function is to ensure that elections are held at the times mandated by the Constitution and the applicable laws. The Karnataka State Election Commission's calculation of the tenure end as 02.11.2025, and its communication to that effect dated 27.01.2025, were issued in the direct exercise of its constitutional functions.
45. Section 8 of the KMC Act is the State law provision giving effect to Article 243-U in the context of Municipal Corporations in Karnataka. Section 8(1)(i) provides that the term of office of directly elected Councillors at a general election shall be five years. Section 8(2) provides that this term commences from "the date appointed for the first meeting of the Corporation." This is the statutory reflection of the constitutional provision that the term starts from the date of the first meeting. There is no provision in Section 8 for any exclusion or extension of the five- year term.
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46. Section 503 of the KMC Act deals with the transition from CMC to Corporation. As explained supra, this provision governs the consequences of the declaration of a CMC as a Larger Urban Area, including the deeming of CMC Councillors as Corporation Councillors and the prescription of a timeline for fresh Corporation elections. The interplay of Section 503 with Article 243-U and Section 8 is the central legal question in this case.
47. Section 509 of the KMC Act empowers the Government to remove difficulties arising in giving effect to the provisions of the KMC Act. This provision has been used to appoint the Administrator in the present case. The Co-ordinate Bench in G. Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of Karnataka and another has upheld the validity of such Administratorships under removal of difficulties clauses as being consistent with the constitutional scheme.
48. We also note, for completeness, the following provisions of the KM Act which were in force in relation to the CMC, Raichur, prior to the declaration:
49. Section 18 (term of the City Municipal Council, five years from the first meeting); Section 315 (appointment of Administrator in specified
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR circumstances); Section 316 (power to dissolve and appoint an Administrator). None of these provisions contain any mechanism for extending the five-year term, and all are consistent with Article 243-U.
50. With this legal framework in place, we now proceed to examine each of the six Points for Determination in detail.
51. Answer to Point No.(i): Whether on the upgradation of a Smaller Urban Area to a Larger Urban Area, the Councillors of the Smaller Urban Area (in this case CMC) can continue to function as the Larger Urban Area (in this case Corporation) until the first meeting of the elected representatives of the Larger Urban Area?
51.1. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Ravi B. Patil for the petitioners/appellants, submits that on the upgradation of the City Municipal Council, Raichur ("CMC") as a Smaller Urban Area to the Raichur Municipal Corporation ("Corporation") as a Larger Urban Area, by notification dated 04.12.2024 issued by the first respondent/Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development, under Section 503(1) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 ("KMC Act"), the Councillors of the CMC
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR automatically and by operation of law became the Councillors of the Corporation and they can lawfully continue to function as the Councillors of the Corporation until the first meeting of the elected representatives of the Corporation is held. Their continuation is mandated by the deeming fiction created by sub-sections (3)(a), (3)(b) and (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act.
51.2. Section 503(3)(a) of the KMC Act provides that with effect from the date of declaration of a City Municipal Area as a Larger Urban Area, the body functioning as a City Municipal Council under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 immediately before the date of the said declaration shall become a body competent to exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of the KMC Act on a Corporation in respect of the said area "until a Corporation is duly constituted for the area within the jurisdiction of such body under the provisions of the KMC Act." He submits that the words "until a Corporation is duly constituted"
are of pivotal importance and mean that until fresh elections are held to the Corporation and the Corporation is constituted by elected
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR representatives, the CMC Councillors shall continue.
51.3. Section 503(3)(b) of the KMC Act provides that the Councillors of the City Municipal Council holding office as such immediately before the said date shall become Councillors of the Corporation. He submits that this provision effects a seamless automatic transformation, the Councillors of CMC become Councillors of the Corporation by an act of the Legislature without any further requirement of election, notification, or other action on the part of the Councillors or the Government.
51.4. He relies upon the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act and submits that this proviso creates a special exception, that where the larger urban area so constituted does not have any newly added area and the election to such smaller urban area was held within one year before the date of declaration of the larger urban area, the election to such larger urban area for constitution of a Corporation need not be held till the completion of the term of the members of the smaller urban area so elected. He submits that the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR members of the smaller urban area shall continue to be members of the larger urban area Corporation to be constituted till the completion of their term so elected and a Corporation shall be constituted by treating the said elected members as Councillors of the Corporation under Section 7 of the KMC Act.
51.5. The expression "first meeting" used in the main body of sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act is the first meeting of the Municipal Corporation duly constituted by elections, and NOT the first meeting of the CMC held on 02.11.2020. The Corporation has not yet been constituted by elections. Therefore, the elected CMC Councillors continue to function as Corporation Councillors until such first meeting of the elected Corporation is held.
51.6. Sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act is an independent self-contained provision which operates as a deeming fiction creating a distinct legal status for the CMC Councillors as Corporation Councillors. This deeming fiction is independent of and operates separately from Article 243-U of the Constitution. The learned Senior Counsel thus submits that the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR continuation of CMC Councillors as Corporation Councillors is not a continuation of their term as CMC Councillors, it is a distinct and new capacity created by the statute, to which the 5- year clock of Article 243-U does not apply with the same start date.
51.7. On account of the delay on the part of the respondents in properly notifying the reservation roster for the posts of President and Vice President of the second term, the elected Councillors of the CMC were deprived of exercising the full extent of their rights for a period of approximately fifteen months from 11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024, since an Administrator had been appointed for managing the presidential functions. Consequently, the democratic rights of the people of Raichur to be governed by their chosen representatives have been subverted. He therefore submits that the Councillors are entitled to continue until a Corporation is duly constituted with elected members.
51.8. The replacement of the elected Council by an Administrator disturbs the democratic rights of a legally elected Council. There was no
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR opportunity of hearing given to the elected members before the appointment of the Administrator by notification dated 15.11.2025. The appointment of an Administrator, amounting effectively to the removal of elected members from governance, violates the principles of natural justice as well as Article 243-U of the Constitution.
51.9. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the State/Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, submits that the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is correct in law and does not suffer from any illegality or perversity. She submits that there is neither illegality nor perversity in the order passed by the respondent authorities and she fully supports the impugned order.
51.10. While Section 503(3)(a) and (b) of the KMC Act do provide for the CMC Councillors becoming Corporation Councillors by deeming fiction upon the declaration, this deeming fiction does not create a fresh or new term of office for the Councillors. The Councillors can only continue as Corporation Councillors to the extent of the remainder of their original 5-year term. Since
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR the 5-year term commenced on 02.11.2020 (the date of the first meeting of the CMC) and ended on 01.11.2025, the Councillors cannot continue in office beyond 01.11.2025.
51.11. Section 8 of the KMC Act clearly provides that the term of office of directly elected Councillors shall be five years, commencing from the date appointed for the first meeting of the Corporation. Reading Section 8 harmoniously with Section 503, the "first meeting of the Corporation" referred to in Section 8(2) is the first meeting of the CMC, which is now deemed to be a Corporation under Section 503. Thus, the term commenced on 02.11.2020 and ended on 01.11.2025.
51.12. Section 509 of the KMC Act empowers the Government to remove difficulties arising in giving effect to the provisions of the Act by publishing a notification in the Official Gazette. The notification dated 04.12.2024 declaring the Raichur Municipal Corporation was issued in exercise of this power and the subsequent appointment of an Administrator on 15.11.2025 was also made in exercise of this power, both of which are valid and lawful.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 51.13. Article 243-U of the Constitution of India mandates that every Municipality shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. This is a constitutional mandate which cannot be overridden by any statutory provision. She therefore submits that even if Section 503(4) is construed as the petitioners claim, it would be in conflict with Article 243-U of the Constitution and would have to yield to the constitutional mandate.
51.14. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government Pleader relies upon the judgment of the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in G.Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of Karnataka and another and submits that it has been held that Article 243-U comes into play on the constitution of a municipal body and the period starts running from the date of the first meeting, and that once the term has expired, Councillors cannot continue in office under any circumstance unless a specific provision has been made in the statute enabling such continuation. She submits that there is no such specific provision enabling Councillors to continue beyond the 5-year term.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 51.15. She relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad and submits that the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the period of five years fixed under Article 243-U for constituting the municipality is mandatory in nature and has to be followed in all respects. She submits that even man-made calamities, rioting, breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities do not justify extending the duration of the municipality. Therefore, the argument that the Councillors can continue beyond 5 years by virtue of Section 503(4) is contrary to the constitutional mandate.
51.16. Sri. Gourish S. Khashampur, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No. 4, the Commissioner of the Raichur Municipal Corporation, submits that the Administrator has been validly appointed and is lawfully discharging the functions of the Corporation. He submits that Section 503(3)(cc) specifically deals with a situation where an Administrator has been appointed under Section 315 or Section 316 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, either before or at the time of the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR declaration of the larger urban area, and provides that such Administrator shall be deemed to be an Administrator appointed under Section 99 of the KMC Act. He submits that the Administrator in office is lawfully holding office.
51.17. There is no infirmity in the appointment of an Administrator after the expiry of the 5-year term on 01.11.2025. The Corporation is required to be governed and administered on a day-to-day basis and since the Councillors' term has ended, the appointment of an Administrator is the only lawful mechanism available to ensure that the Corporation does not fall into administrative vacuum pending fresh elections.
51.18. The argument of the petitioners that the CMC Councillors should continue until the first meeting of the elected Corporation Councillors, without any time limit, would lead to an indefinite extension of their term. This would be contrary to the spirit and mandatory character of Article 243-U of the Constitution.
51.19. Sri. Sudarshan M., learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No. 5, the Karnataka State
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR Election Commission, submits that the Election Commission has correctly calculated the term of the Councillors as ending on 01.11.2025 (five years from the first meeting on 02.11.2020), strictly in accordance with Article 243-U of the Constitution and Section 8 of the KMC Act.
51.20. The Karnataka State Election Commission is a constitutional body established under Article 243-K of the Constitution and has an independent, superintending, and directing role with respect to the conduct of elections to municipalities. The communication issued by the Election Commission on 27.01.2025 calculating the tenure end and directing that elections be held on or before that date is a valid and lawful communication in the discharge of its constitutional and statutory functions.
51.21. Article 243-U(3) casts a positive obligation on the authorities to complete elections before the expiry of the 5-year duration. The Election Commission is in fact fulfilling its constitutional mandate by directing elections to be held, and the petitioners cannot be permitted to obstruct
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR this constitutionally mandated electoral process.
51.22. The continuation of the CMC Councillors as Corporation Councillors beyond 01.11.2025 is not permissible and that the argument of the petitioners is essentially one seeking perpetuation of their term without a fresh mandate from the electorate, which is unconstitutional.
51.23. The central question raised in this Point for Determination is whether, upon the upgradation of the CMC, Raichur, as a Smaller Urban Area to the Corporation as a Larger Urban Area by notification dated 04.12.2024, the Councillors of the CMC can continue to function as the Corporation until the first meeting of the elected representatives of the Corporation.
51.24. To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of law in detail. Section 503 of the KMC Act, which has been set out in extenso earlier, is the pivotal provision.
51.25. Section 503(1) of the KMC Act empowers the Governor to declare, by notification, that any
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR municipal area for which a City Municipal Council is constituted under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 shall, with effect from the date specified in the notification, be a Larger Urban Area. In exercise of this power, a notification was issued on 04.12.2024 declaring Raichur City Municipality as Raichur Municipal Corporation. Section 3(1A) of the KMC Act provides that any area specified as a larger urban area shall be deemed to be a city and a Corporation shall be established for the said city. The declaration thus has both the effect of specifying the larger urban area and establishing a Corporation for it.
51.26. Section 503(2) provides that the provisions of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 applicable to such City Municipal Area shall not apply to the local area declared as a Larger Urban Area, with effect from the date of declaration, subject to the proviso that existing appointments, notifications, taxes, orders, etc., shall continue in force unless superseded under the KMC Act.
51.27. Section 503(3) lays down the consequences of the declaration. Sub-clause (a) provides that
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR the body functioning as a City Municipal Council immediately before the date of the declaration shall become a body competent to exercise the powers and perform the duties of a Corporation "until a Corporation is duly constituted for the area within the jurisdiction of such body under the provisions of this Act." Sub-clause (b) provides that the Councillors of the City Municipal Council holding office as such immediately before the said date "shall become Councillors of the Corporation."
51.28. Reading sub-clauses (a) and (b) together, it is clear that: (i) the body (CMC) becomes competent to exercise the powers of the Corporation until the Corporation is duly constituted; and (ii) the Councillors of the CMC become Councillors of the Corporation. This transformation happens automatically and by operation of law, no further action by any authority or individual is required.
51.29. Sub-clause (cc) of Section 503(3) is also material. It provides that where, under Section 315 or Section 316 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, either an Administrator or an Officer has been appointed
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the municipal council, such Administrator or Officer shall be deemed to be an Administrator appointed under Section 99 of the KMC Act. This sub-clause shows that the Legislature specifically contemplated the possibility of an Administrator being in place at the time of the declaration and provided for continuity of such administration.
51.30. We now examine the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act, which is the provision most heavily relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. The main body of sub-section (4) provides that a Corporation shall be duly constituted within a period of six months from the date of declaration, and from the date of the first meeting of the Corporation so constituted, the body exercising the powers and performing the duties of the Corporation shall stand dissolved. The proviso to sub-section (4) reads:
"Provided that where the larger urban area so constituted does not have any newly added area and the election to such smaller urban area was held within one year before the date of declaration of larger urban area, the election to such larger urban area for constitution of a Corporation need not to be held till the completion of the term of
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR members of smaller urban area so elected (irrespective of whether City Municipal Council was constituted or not) and the members of smaller urban area shall continue to be members of the larger urban area Corporation to be constituted till the completion of their term so elected and a Corporation shall be constituted by treating the said elected members as Councillors of the Corporation under Section 7."
51.31. For the proviso to sub-section (4) to apply, TWO cumulative conditions must be satisfied:
(i) the larger urban area so constituted must not have any newly added area; and (ii) the election to such smaller urban area (CMC) must have been held within ONE YEAR before the date of declaration of the larger urban area.
Both conditions must co-exist for the proviso to be triggered. The word "and" between the two conditions is conjunctive, not disjunctive.
51.32. Turning to the facts, the general elections to the CMC, Raichur, for election of Councillors were held on 03.09.2018. The date of declaration of the Raichur Municipal Corporation as a Larger Urban Area is 04.12.2024. One year before 04.12.2024 is 04.12.2023. The Councillor elections were held in September 2018, more than six years before the declaration. Condition (ii) is therefore clearly
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR NOT satisfied on the basis of the Councillor elections of 2018.
51.33. The petitioners contended that the election to the second term of the President and Vice President held on 28.08.2024 should be treated as an "election to the smaller urban area"
within one year of the declaration. We reject this contention for the following reasons:
51.34. The elections of the President and Vice President of the CMC are internal elections conducted by the elected Councillors from among themselves under the provisions of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. They are NOT elections to the smaller urban area within the meaning of the proviso. The proviso speaks of "election to such smaller urban area", this unmistakably refers to the general election of the Councillors to constitute the body, not to the internal elections for executive posts within the already-constituted body.
51.35. The election for the posts of President and Vice President does not result in the constitution of the CMC or the election of Councillors. It only results in the selection of executive heads from within the already-constituted Council. The
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR body of Councillors was constituted by the general election in 2018, not by the presidential election in 2024. Therefore, the election of 28.08.2024 is not an "election to the smaller urban area."
51.36. This interpretation is consistent with the purpose and legislative intent of the proviso. The proviso was intended to address a situation where fresh Councillor elections were recently held (within one year) before the area was upgraded, so as to avoid the incongruity of requiring yet another election so soon after the fresh general election. This rationale applies only to Councillor elections, not to presidential elections.
51.37. Since condition (ii) is not satisfied, the proviso to Section 503(4) does NOT apply to the present case. The deeming fiction created by the proviso (that the members shall continue till completion of their term without requiring fresh Corporation elections) is therefore not attracted.
51.38. Even if the proviso were applied (assuming, for argument's sake, that it applies), the critical words in the proviso are "till the completion of
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR the term of members of smaller urban area so elected." The term of the CMC Councillors is governed by Section 8 of the KMC Act read with Article 243-U of the Constitution, five years from the date of the first meeting. Section 8(1)(i) provides that the term of office of Councillors directly elected at a general election shall be five years. Section 8(2) provides that the term of office shall commence on the date appointed for the first meeting of the Corporation.
51.39. The first meeting of the CMC was held on 02.11.2020. The five-year term therefore commenced on 02.11.2020 and ended on 01.11.2025. Even under the proviso to Section 503(4) (assuming it applies), the deeming fiction would only have allowed the CMC Councillors to continue as Corporation Councillors until 01.11.2025, when their original 5-year term ended. The proviso does not extend the term beyond 5 years; it merely defers the holding of fresh Corporation elections until the completion of the 5-year term. Therefore, as of 01.11.2025, even under the most liberal reading of the proviso, the Councillors ceased to hold office.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 51.40. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners that the "first meeting" in Section 503(4) refers to the first meeting of the newly elected Corporation (not the CMC's first meeting in 2020) requires further examination. The main body of Section 503(4) uses the phrase "from the date of first meeting of the Corporation as so constituted", which indeed refers to the first meeting of the newly constituted Corporation. However, this provision deals with the timeline for the dissolution of the existing body upon the constitution of the new Corporation. It does not govern the term of office of the Councillors, that is separately and expressly governed by Section 8 and Article 243-U. 51.41. A principle of statutory interpretation well settled in law is that a deeming fiction must be taken to its logical limit but NOT beyond its purpose. The purpose of the deeming fiction in Section 503(3)(b) is to ensure continuity of governance, by treating CMC Councillors as Corporation Councillors, during the transition period. The deeming fiction does not purport to restart the clock for the 5-year term. To accept
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR the petitioners' argument would be to extend the deeming fiction far beyond its purpose.
51.42. Section 8(2) of the KMC Act states that the term of the Councillors shall commence on "the date appointed for the first meeting of the Corporation." For the purpose of computing the 5-year term, this "first meeting of the Corporation" must be read as the first meeting of the CMC (which is now deemed to be the Corporation under Section 503). To hold otherwise would mean the 5-year term starts afresh from 04.12.2024, which would be absurd and contrary to Article 243-U of the Constitution.
51.43. We also address the argument regarding natural justice. The appointment of an Administrator after the expiry of the 5-year term on 01.11.2025 is not a "removal" of the Councillors, they ceased to hold office by operation of the constitutional provision (Article 243-U). Where rights and status expire by the efflux of time as mandated by the Constitution itself, there is no occasion for the principles of natural justice to be invoked. Natural justice is required where a right or status is being taken
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR away by an authority, not where the right has expired by the passage of time. Reference to Section 503(cc) further supports this, as it specifically provides for the continuity of an Administrator who was already in place at the time of the declaration, which implies that the administration must be maintained even when elected representatives are not in place.
51.44. Having interpreted the statutory text, we now examine the constitutional backdrop against which it operates. Article 243-U(1) speaks of "every Municipality." Article 243-P(e) of the Constitution defines "Municipality" to mean an institution of self-government constituted under Article 243-Q. Article 243-Q(1) contemplates the constitution of three types of municipal bodies: a Nagar Panchayat, a Municipal Council, and a Municipal Corporation. All three are Municipalities within Article 243-U. A Municipal Corporation is therefore squarely and incontestably a Municipality to which the mandatory five-year term of Article 243-U applies. There is no category of "transitional Corporation" or "deemed Corporation" to which Article 243-U applies differently or with a different starting date. Once the CMC became a
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR Corporation by virtue of Section 503, it became subject to Article 243-U as a Corporation, with the first meeting of the CMC (02.11.2020) as the relevant starting date.
51.45. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has placed great reliance on the words "until a Corporation is duly constituted" in Section 503(3)(a) of the KMC Act, arguing that these words extend the tenure of the CMC Councillors (as Corporation Councillors) until the formal constitution of a Corporation through fresh elections. We have difficulty in accepting this submission. Section 503(3)(a) deals with the competence of the body (the CMC) to exercise the powers of a Corporation, it answers the question "what body governs the area." It does not deal with the tenure of the individual Councillors. The tenure of the Councillors is separately and expressly governed by Section 8 of the KMC Act and Article 243-U of the Constitution. These are distinct legal questions, the existence of a governing body on the one hand, and the tenure of its individual members on the other. Section 503(3)(a) cannot be read to override the express tenure provision contained in Article 243-U and Section 8,
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR because it deals with a different subject matter entirely.
51.46. This reading is reinforced by Section 503(4) itself. The main body of Section 503(4) provides that "a Corporation shall be duly constituted... within a period of six months from the date of declaration." This provision mandates fresh elections within six months. If the petitioners' reading of Section 503(3)(a) were correct, that the CMC Councillors continue as Corporation Councillors indefinitely until the Corporation is freshly constituted, Section 503(4)'s mandate to hold elections within six months would be rendered meaningless, since the Councillors would have no incentive to facilitate such elections. The only reading that gives meaningful effect to both Section 503(3)(a) and Section 503(4) is that Section 503(3)(a) provides for interim governance by the existing Councillors for a transitional period (subject to the constitutional term limit), while Section 503(4) mandates that this transitional period culminate in fresh elections within six months. The two provisions are complementary, not contradictory.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 51.47. We further address the submission regarding the "first meeting" referred to in the main body of Section 503(4). The provision reads: "from the date of first meeting of the Corporation as so constituted the body exercising the powers and performing the duties of the Corporation shall stand dissolved." This "first meeting" is the first meeting of the freshly elected Corporation, the meeting that signals the formal commencement of the new Corporation's functioning. It is the trigger for the dissolution of the existing body (the CMC- turned-Corporation). This provision operates independently of the question of the Councillors' five-year term. It means: the old body continues to exercise Corporation powers UNTIL the new body holds its first meeting. But the old body's authority to continue exercising those powers is conditional on its individual Councillors still holding office. Once the Councillors' five-year term expires on 01.11.2025, there are no Councillors left to constitute the old body, and the old body effectively ceases to exist. The "first meeting"
trigger for dissolution is therefore rendered academic, the body has already been
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR extinguished by the expiry of the constitutional term.
51.48. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad was dealing with a question closely analogous to the one before us, whether the period of five years fixed under Article 243-U for constituting the municipality is mandatory. The Hon'ble Supreme Court answered emphatically in the affirmative and held that the period of five years is mandatory in nature and has to be followed in all respects. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that even man-made calamities, rioting, breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities do not justify extending the duration of the Municipality. If such catastrophic events do not justify an extension, the administrative inconvenience of a contested reservation roster for presidential posts certainly cannot do so.
51.49. We are also mindful that the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, taken to its logical end, would result in a constitutionally untenable situation. If the CMC Councillors can continue as Corporation
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR Councillors until the Corporation is freshly constituted, and if the Government is under no time-bound obligation to hold Corporation elections (or if such elections are delayed for any reason), the Councillors elected in 2018 could theoretically continue to hold office for 8, 10, or even more years. This would directly violate the mandatory five-year cycle of Article 243-U. Every Municipality, and a Corporation is a Municipality, must face the electorate at least once in five years. No statutory provision can interpose itself between the Constitution and this obligation.
51.50. In G. Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of Karnataka and another, the Co-ordinate Bench was dealing with the situation immediately following the introduction of the 74th Constitutional Amendment in 1992. Several municipal bodies in Karnataka had their constitutional terms expire and the question was whether elected Councillors could continue in office beyond their constitutional term and whether Administrators could be appointed to fill the vacuum. The Co-ordinate Bench answered both questions decisively: the Councillors cannot continue beyond the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR constitutional term, and the appointment of Administrators is valid to maintain administrative continuity pending fresh elections.
51.51. Paragraph 17 of G. Kuppuswamy holds, inter alia:
"It is clear from the provisions of the Constitution that none of the petitioners who had been elected as Councillors either to Municipal Council or Municipal Corporation, could continue in office on the expiry of the period mentioned in Article 243- ZF."
51.52. The Co-ordinate Bench added:
"There is no provision in the statute to enable them to continue in office until their successors are elected."
51.53. These holdings are fully applicable to the present case. In this case too, there is no provision, neither in Article 243-U nor in Section 8 nor in Section 503, that enables the Councillors to continue in office after the expiry of the five-year term until their successors are elected.
51.54. Paragraph 20 of G. Kuppuswamy further holds:
"Article 243-U would come into play on the constitution of a Municipal body under Article 243- Q and not before. Therefore, on the facts and circumstances of this case, we must hold that the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR exercise of power for appointing Administrators by the State either under the provisions of the removal of difficulties clause or under the executive power of the State under Article 162 of the Constitution, is justified."
51.55. This holding confirms two important propositions: (a) once Article 243-U is attracted (as it is here, since the CMC was constituted under Article 243-Q), it operates with full force; and (b) the appointment of Administrators under removal of difficulties provisions (such as Section 509 of the KMC Act) is a valid exercise of State power.
51.56. In Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering whether the obligation of the State Election Commission to hold elections within the time prescribed by Article 243-U is mandatory. The Court held emphatically in the affirmative. Paragraph 21 of the judgment holds that "the period of five years fixed thereunder to constitute the municipality is mandatory in nature and has to be followed in all respects."
51.57. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that even man-made calamities such as rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities, do not justify any extension. The
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR Court's enumeration of such extreme circumstances, which still do not justify extension, makes it clear that ordinary administrative difficulties (such as the appointment of an Administrator for presidential posts) certainly cannot justify any extension.
51.58. Sub-clause (b), "the Councillors of the city Municipal Council holding office as such immediately before the said date shall become Councillors of the Corporation", must be read in this context of continuity. It carries forward the Councillors' status and tenure into the new framework. It does not create a new tenure or extend the existing tenure. The Councillors become Corporation Councillors with the same tenure as they had as CMC Councillors, a tenure that ends on 01.11.2025.
51.59. The phrase "holding office as such immediately before the said date" in sub-clause (b) is also instructive. It confirms that only those Councillors who are in office at the time of the declaration (04.12.2024) become Corporation Councillors. A Councillor whose term has expired before the declaration does not become
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR a Corporation Councillor. By analogy and by necessary implication, a Councillor who was in office at the time of the declaration (and who therefore became a Corporation Councillor) ceases to hold that office when his/her constitutional term expires. The declaration gave them a new designation but not a new term.
51.60. The proviso to Section 503(4) refers to the treating of elected members of the smaller urban area as "Councillors of the Corporation under Section 7" of the KMC Act. Section 7 of the KMC Act deals with the constitution of the Corporation and the election of Councillors to wards. Section 7(1) provides for the division of the city into wards and Section 7(2) provides for the election of one Councillor for each ward at a general election.
51.61. The reference to Section 7 in the proviso to Section 503(4) means that the CMC Councillors are to be treated as if they were elected Councillors of the Corporation under Section 7. They are to be treated as the legitimately elected Council of the Corporation. However, this treatment is "till the completion of their
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR term", and "their term" is the five-year term that commenced on 02.11.2020. The Section 7 reference does not create a new election or a new term, it merely validates the status of the existing Councillors as Corporation Councillors for the remainder of their existing term.
51.62. For all the foregoing reasons, we answer point no.(i) by holding that:
51.63. Upon the declaration of Raichur Municipal Corporation on 04.12.2024 under Section 503(1) of the KMC Act, by operation of Section 503(3)(a) and (b), the CMC Councillors did indeed become Councillors of the Corporation;
51.64. However, their continuation as Corporation Councillors was subject to the limit of their 5-
year term, reckoned from 02.11.2020 (date of first meeting of CMC/Corporation), which expired on 01.11.2025;
51.65. The proviso to Section 503(4) does NOT apply, since the Councillor elections to CMC were not held within one year before 04.12.2024;
51.66. Even if the proviso had applied, the term of the CMC Councillors as Corporation Councillors would have expired on 01.11.2025;
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 51.67. The CMC Councillors cannot lawfully continue beyond 01.11.2025 as Corporation Councillors, irrespective of the Corporation not yet being constituted by fresh elections.
51.68. The Councillors of the CMC could continue to function as Corporation Councillors after 04.12.2024 by virtue of Section 503(3)(a) and
(b), but only until the expiry of their original 5- year term on 01.11.2025. They CANNOT continue thereafter.
52. Answer to Point No.(ii): Whether sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act constitutes an exception to the term of office mandated under Article 243-U of the Constitution?
52.1. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submits that sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act is an independent provision which creates a special statutory regime for the transition from a Smaller Urban Area to a Larger Urban Area, and that this provision operates as an exception to Article 243-U of the Constitution.
52.2. His argument is that the concept of "term of office" under Article 243-U of the Constitution is fixed at 5 years for the Municipality as an
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR institution (the CMC as CMC). However, once the CMC is transformed into a Corporation under Section 503, the Councillors transition to a new capacity as Corporation Councillors. In this new capacity, their term is governed by Section 503(4) read with Section 7 of the KMC Act, and not by Article 243-U with the same start date as was applicable to the CMC.
52.3. Sub-section (4) of Section 503 is a specific provision dealing with the specific situation of transition, while Article 243-U is a general provision dealing with all municipalities in general. The principle of statutory interpretation, namely generalia specialibus non derogant, dictates that the specific provision (Section 503(4)) must prevail over the general provision (Article 243-U) in the context of transition from CMC to Corporation.
52.4. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has thought it fit to fill the lacuna and cater to the inaction on the part of the authorities in not constituting the Corporation within six months by mandating that the Councillors of CMC shall continue to operate as Councillors of the newly created Corporation until the first meeting. This
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR shows legislative intent to create an exception to the 5-year rule in the specific context of transition, and such exception cannot be said to be unconstitutional.
52.5. There is a deeming fiction under sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act, the Councillors are deemed to be Councillors of the Corporation. This deeming fiction creates a distinct and new legal status. In this new legal status, Article 243-U's 5-year clock does not restart from the same date (02.11.2020), but rather the Councillors continue until the first meeting of the Corporation, which is the trigger for dissolution under Section 503(4).
52.6. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government Pleader submits that Article 243-U of the Constitution was inserted by the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 for the specific purpose of ensuring regular democratic governance in municipalities. It mandates a fixed term of 5 years from the date of the first meeting. This constitutional provision cannot be overridden by a State Legislature by means of a statutory provision.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 52.7. She submits that the principle generalia specialibus non derogant can apply only when both the general provision and the specific provision are at the same legislative level, i.e., both are statutes or both are constitutional provisions. A State Act cannot override a provision of the Constitution by claiming to be a specific provision. The Constitution is supreme.
52.8. She submits that the principle of constitutional supremacy is enshrined in Articles 13, 245, and 246 of the Constitution. Under Article 13(2), the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges rights conferred by Part III. While Article 243-U is in Part IX-A and not Part III, the same principle of constitutional supremacy applies, a State Legislature cannot enact a law which is in derogation of or inconsistent with the constitutional provisions.
52.9. She relies upon Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad and submits that the Hon'ble Apex Court has held categorically that the period of five years is mandatory in nature, and any provision seeking to extend the term
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR beyond 5 years would be contrary to Article 243-U. 52.10. She relies upon G. Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of Karnataka and another and submits that the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held that none of the petitioners who had been elected as Councillors to any Municipal body could continue in office on the expiry of the period specified in Article 243-ZF. She submits that the same principle applies with full force under Article 243-U. 52.11. Sri. Gourish S. Khashampur, learned counsel submits that Section 503(4) of the KMC Act cannot be construed as an exception to Article 243-U. A correct reading of Section 503(4) shows that it is not seeking to extend the term beyond 5 years. The main body of Section 503(4) says the Corporation shall be constituted within 6 months of the declaration. The proviso merely defers the fresh elections to the end of the existing term. In neither case does the provision extend the term beyond the constitutionally mandated 5 years.
52.12. He submits that a provision must be read harmoniously with the Constitution. Any
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR reading of Section 503(4) that seeks to override Article 243-U must be rejected in favour of a harmonious reading which keeps both provisions alive and consistent with each other.
52.13. Sri. Sudarshan M., learned counsel submits that Article 243-U is a mandatory provision of the Constitution. The Election Commission has the constitutional duty to ensure elections are completed within 5 years as mandated by Article 243-U(3). The Election Commission cannot be compelled to defer elections on the ground that a State statute creates an exception to the constitutionally mandated term.
52.14. He submits that the independence of the State Election Commission under Article 243-K ensures that it functions free from executive interference. The Election Commission's calculation of the term as ending on 01.11.2025 is correct, and any attempt to compel it to defer elections beyond that date would interfere with its constitutional independence.
52.15. The question whether sub-section (4) of Section 503 of the KMC Act constitutes an exception to
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR the term of office mandated under Article 243- U of the Constitution requires an analysis of the constitutional scheme, the legislative provisions, and the principles of constitutional interpretation.
52.16. Article 243-U(1) reads: "Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer." The words "no longer" are absolute and categorical. The Constitution permits no exception to the 5-year rule except dissolution (which results in a shorter term under Article 243-U(4), not a longer one).
52.17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad has declared, in paragraph 21 thereof, that "the period of five years fixed thereunder to constitute the municipality is mandatory in nature and has to be followed in all respects." This is a binding declaration of the law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. This Court is bound by this declaration.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 52.18. A careful and harmonious reading of Section 503(4) and its proviso demonstrates that the provision is NOT seeking to extend the Councillors' term beyond 5 years:
52.19. The main body of Section 503(4) directs the Corporation to be duly constituted within 6 months of the declaration. This is consistent with Article 243-U(3)(a), which requires elections to be completed before the expiry of the 5-year duration.
52.20. The proviso to Section 503(4) provides that where the specified conditions are met, Corporation elections need not be held "till the completion of the term of members of smaller urban area so elected." The expression "completion of the term" refers to the 5-year term prescribed by Article 243-U and Section 8.
The proviso therefore defers the fresh election to the end of the existing 5-year term, it does NOT create a new term or extend the existing term beyond 5 years.
52.21. The principle of generalisa specialibus non derogant invoked by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is inapplicable to the present situation. This principle applies in the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR interpretation of statutes inter se, where a general statute and a specific statute deal with the same subject matter, the specific statute prevails. It does NOT apply to the relationship between a constitutional provision and a State statute. The Constitution is supreme and a State statute cannot override the Constitution by claiming to be a specific provision. This principle of constitutional supremacy is well settled and cannot be dislodged.
52.22. The deeming fiction argument, that once the CMC Councillors become Corporation Councillors under Section 503(3)(b), they are in a new capacity to which Article 243-U applies with a new starting date, is also untenable. Article 243-U applies to every Municipality, and a Corporation is a Municipality within the meaning of Article 243-P(e) of the Constitution. The deeming fiction in Section 503 does not create a new constitutional entity to which Article 243-U applies afresh; it merely changes the character of the existing body from a City Municipal Council to a Corporation. The same elected body, with the same elected members, exercising a different set of statutory powers,
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR cannot claim that its term restarts merely because of the change in designation.
52.23. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in G. Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of Karnataka and another has held in paragraph 20 that "it is not as though Municipal bodies could not be dissolved and an Administrator could discharge the function of the Municipal bodies." The Co-ordinate Bench further held in paragraph 17 that "none of the petitioners who had been elected as Councillors either to Municipal Council or Municipal Corporation, could continue in office on the expiry of the period." These findings reflect the absolute constitutional mandate under Article 243-U that the 5-year term is non-negotiable.
52.24. The constitutional supremacy argument admits of no doubt. Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution confer legislative power on Parliament and the State Legislatures respectively. However, Article 245(1) opens with the words "subject to the provisions of this Constitution", which means that all legislative power, whether of Parliament or of a State Legislature, is exercised subject to and in
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR conformity with the Constitution. Part IX-A of the Constitution, dealing with Municipalities, is a part of the Constitution that all State Legislatures must respect and comply with. A State Legislature cannot enact any provision which is inconsistent with Part IX-A. 52.25. A constitutional provision is not merely a law among laws, it is the grundnorm from which all other legal norms derive their validity. The celebrated observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala [AIR 1973 SC 1461] established the basic structure of the Constitution as inviolable.
52.26. The periodic election of local bodies and the fixed five-year term under Part IX-A reflect the basic democratic structure of the Constitution. A statutory provision cannot chip away at this democratic bedrock, however well-intentioned the Legislature may have been in enacting it.
52.27. The argument of the petitioners that Section 503(4) creates a deeming fiction which operates to give the CMC Councillors a new constitutional identity as Corporation Councillors, to which Article 243-U applies with a different start date, is a creative argument,
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR but it cannot withstand scrutiny. Deeming fictions are well-known legislative devices used to produce a legal consequence which would not otherwise follow. The rule as to deeming fictions would necessarily entail that it cannot have the effect of enlarging the meaning of a particular word or to include matters which otherwise would not be included therein. A deeming fiction must be taken to its logical and reasonable limits and NOT beyond them, and that a deeming fiction cannot override an express constitutional provision.
52.28. The argument that Section 503(4) creates a special exception to Article 243-U fundamentally misunderstands the constitutional structure. Part IX-A was inserted into the Constitution with the specific aim of removing the matter of local body governance from the realm of ordinary State legislation and placing it under constitutional protection. Before Part IX-A, the duration of municipal bodies, the timing of elections, and the appointment of Administrators were all governed by State laws alone, with the result that elected local bodies were frequently superseded for extended periods. Part IX-A was
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR intended to put an end to this. If a State Legislature can enact a law which, in effect, extends the tenure of elected local body members beyond five years by calling it a "deeming fiction" or a "transitional provision,"
the entire purpose of the 74th Amendment would be defeated. Every State Government wishing to extend the tenure of a municipal council could simply declare the area a "larger urban area" and invoke the transitional provisions. This Court will not permit such a constitutional evasion.
52.29. The "first meeting of the Corporation as so constituted" refers to the first meeting of the newly elected Corporation, i.e., the meeting convened under Section 8 of the KMC Act after the fresh Corporation elections are completed. Until this first meeting, the old body (CMC- turned-Corporation) continues to function. But, and this is the critical point, the old body can only continue to function if its individual Councillors are still in office. Once the Councillors' five-year term expires on 01.11.2025, there are no Councillors to constitute the old body. The old body therefore effectively ceases to function. An Administrator
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR must then step in until the fresh Corporation is elected and holds its first meeting.
52.30. We therefore answer point No.(ii) by holding that Section 503(4) of the KMC Act does NOT constitute an exception to the term of office mandated under Article 243-U of the Constitution. On the contrary, Section 503(4) is to be read harmoniously with Article 243-U, and when so read, both provisions lead to the same conclusion: the Councillors' term expires on the completion of the 5-year period from the date of the first meeting (01.11.2025). The argument of the petitioners that Section 503(4) creates an extended term beyond Article 243-U is rejected.
53. Answer to Point No.(iii): Whether the petitioners are entitled to an extended period on account of the interruption caused by the appointment of an Administrator in the second term of CMC?
53.1. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submits that during the 5- year tenure of the Councillors, there was a significant interruption caused by the appointment of an Administrator for a period of approximately fifteen months from 11.05.2023
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR to 27.08.2024. He submits that this interruption was caused by the delay of the respondents in properly notifying the reservation roster for the posts of President and Vice President for the second term, which led to litigation and ultimately to the appointment of an Administrator.
53.2. His submission is that the Councillors were deprived of their right to exercise their democratic mandate during this period of fifteen months. The democratic rights of the elected Councillors and of the people of Raichur to be governed by their chosen representatives were subverted for fifteen months due entirely to the fault and default of the respondents.
53.3. He submits that equity and constitutional justice demand that the period of deprivation must be compensated by extending the tenure of the Councillors commensurately. If the Councillors were deprived of approximately fifteen months of governance due to no fault of their own, justice requires that this period be added to their term. The 5-year term should therefore be computed by excluding the period of the Administrator's appointment.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 53.4. He further submits that the authorities have, by their own actions and inactions, deprived the Councillors of the opportunity to discharge their democratic obligations, and the Court must come to the rescue of the petitioners to preserve democracy and permit the petitioners to discharge their role as Councillors for the full period to which they are entitled.
53.5. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government Pleader submits that the Administrator was appointed not as an Administrator of the CMC in its entirety, but only to discharge the functions of the President and Vice President of the CMC during the period when fresh elections for those posts could not be held owing to pending litigation before the Courts. The Councillors themselves were never removed from office; they continued to hold and exercise their office throughout the period 11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024. Therefore, the Councillors' 5-year term was never interrupted.
53.6. She further submits that even if the Administrator's appointment could be regarded as an interruption (which she disputes), there is no provision in Article 243-U or Section 8 of the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR KMC Act which provides for the exclusion of any period from the 5-year term. The 5-year term is mandatory and runs from the date of first meeting without any pause or deduction, whatever be the reason.
53.7. She relies upon the binding decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad in which it has been categorically held that the 5-year period is mandatory. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that not even man-made calamities or natural disasters justify an extension. Surely, the appointment of an Administrator for presidential posts (which is a far lesser event) cannot justify an extension of the constitutional term.
53.8. She relies upon G. Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of Karnataka and another, particularly paragraph 17, and submits that the Co-ordinate Bench held that "whatever may be the reasons for not holding elections to municipalities, the fact remains that elections have not been held prior to the expiry of the term of the concerned Municipal body." By
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR analogy, whatever may be the reasons for the appointment of the Administrator, the 5-year term runs its course.
53.9. Sri. Gourish S. Khashampur, learned counsel submits that the appointment of the Administrator was for a specific limited purpose, to manage the CMC during the period when the President/VP posts could not be filled by elections due to pending litigation. This is not an "interruption" in the Councillors' tenure. The Councillors continued to hold office throughout and their rights as Councillors were never extinguished.
53.10. Sri. Sudarshan M., learned counsel submits that Article 243-U does not contemplate any exclusion from the 5-year term. The Election Commission has correctly calculated the term from the first meeting (02.11.2020) to the expiry of 5 years (01.11.2025). Any extension of the term beyond 5 years would violate Article 243-U and the Election Commission has a constitutional duty to prevent such extension.
53.11. The factual background necessary for answering this Point is as follows. The first meeting of the CMC, Raichur, was held on 02.11.2020, and the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 5-year term of Councillors commenced from that date. The President and Vice President are elected from among the Councillors for a term of 30 months each. The first 30-month term of the President and VP commenced on 02.11.2020 and expired on 11.05.2023.
53.12. Owing to disputes regarding the reservation roster for the posts of President and Vice President for the second term of 30 months, elections for those posts could not be held immediately upon the expiry of the first term on 11.05.2023. During this period of uncertainty, an Administrator was appointed by the State Government to manage the CMC. The Administrator functioned from 11.05.2023 until 27.08.2024, when elections for President and VP for the second term were held.
53.13. The crucial factual point, which goes to the root of the petitioners' submission, is this: The Administrator was appointed in connection with the vacant presidential/VP posts, NOT in connection with the Councillors. The Councillors themselves were NOT removed from office during this period. They continued to hold and exercise their office throughout as Councillors
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR of the CMC. The Administrator was appointed to exercise the executive functions of the President and Vice President, not to supersede the Councillors or to take over the Council as a whole.
53.14. This distinction is fundamental. Under Section 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, an Administrator may be appointed where a City Municipal Council fails to function, or where it is dissolved. In the present case, the CMC was not dissolved, nor did it as a body fail to function. The Councillors continued to exercise their rights and functions. The Administrator was appointed specifically to fill the executive vacuum in the Presidential posts pending resolution of the reservation dispute. The Councillors were neither removed nor suspended.
53.15. Given this factual position, the submission that the Councillors' tenure was "interrupted" by the appointment of an Administrator lacks factual foundation. There was no interruption in the tenure of the Councillors. Their 5-year term ran continuously from 02.11.2020 to 01.11.2025,
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR throughout which period they continued to hold office as Councillors.
53.16. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that there was some form of interruption in the effective exercise of the Councillors' rights (which we do not accept as a matter of fact), the legal position is equally clear against the petitioners:
53.17. Article 243-U(1) of the Constitution mandates that every Municipality "shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer." There is no provision in Article 243-U for any exclusion of any period from the 5-year term, howsoever caused, whether by natural calamity, man-made calamity, administrative failure, or judicial intervention.
53.18. Section 8 of the KMC Act similarly contains no provision for exclusion of any period from the 5-year term.
53.19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad has held that "it is only when the municipality is dissolved for any other
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR reason and the remainder of the period for which the dissolved municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any elections for constituting the municipality for such period." Beyond this single exception (dissolution with remainder less than 6 months), no other exception is recognised. Certainly, no exception for exclusion of the Administrator period is recognised.
53.20. The argument based on equity cannot override a constitutional mandate. Courts of equity supplement law; they do not override the Constitution. If the Constitution mandates a 5- year term running from the date of the first meeting, no court can extend it on grounds of equity. Equity follows the law, and in this case the law is the Constitution.
53.21. We also note the argument that the respondents caused the interruption by their default in publishing the reservation roster. Even assuming this is correct, the remedy for such default lies elsewhere, for instance, in appropriate writ proceedings to compel the authorities to expedite the reservation
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR notification. The remedy does not lie in extending the constitutional term. Constitutional remedies must be consistent with the Constitution. A remedy that violates Article 243-U in order to correct an administrative wrong is not a constitutionally permissible remedy. Courts cannot achieve constitutionally impermissible results, even with the best of intentions and even in the interest of equity.
53.22. We also address the submission that the President's 30-month second term would have continued until approximately February 2027 and that the Councillors should correspondingly continue. This submission conflates the term of the President/Vice-President with the term of the Councillors. These are two constitutionally and statutorily separate tenures. Under the KM Act, the President and Vice-President of a CMC hold office for 30 months each in a five-year term, the first 30-month term and the second 30-month term. However, the Councillors hold office for the entire five-year term, irrespective of the presidential tenures. It is perfectly possible, and indeed it happens, that the Councillors' five-year term ends while the President/VP are still serving their 30-month
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR term. In such an event, the Councillors' term ends at five years by constitutional mandate, and fresh elections of Councillors must be held. The second 30-month term of the President/VP does not and cannot extend the Councillors' five-year term.
53.23. We observe that accepting the petitioners' argument on this issue would lead to an absurd result. Suppose the Councillors' first meeting was held in Month 1. Their five-year term ends in Month 61. Now suppose the presidential elections for the second 30-month term were held in Month 50 (for some reason delayed). The President/VP would then have a 30-month term ending in Month 80. If the petitioners' argument is accepted, the Councillors would also continue until Month 80, i.e., their five- year term (60 months) would be extended to 80 months. This is a 20-month extension of the constitutional term, achieved entirely through the administrative accident of a delayed presidential election. Such a result would make the five-year constitutional term meaningless in transitional or administratively complex situations, precisely the situations where the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR Constitution's firm guarantee of a fixed term is most needed.
53.24. We note, in conclusion on this Point, that the constitutional system deliberately separates the tenure of elected Councillors (five years) from the tenure of the executive heads (President/Mayor, Vice-President/Deputy Mayor) who are elected from among the Councillors for shorter terms within the five- year period. This separation ensures that the administrative leadership of the municipal body is periodically renewed (every 30 months for the President/VP in the CMC system, every two- and-a-half years for the Mayor/Deputy Mayor under the Corporation system) even as the elected Council as a whole serves for the full five-year constitutional term. An interruption in the President/VP tenure, however caused, does not and cannot affect the running of the five- year Councillors' term.
53.25. A further conceptual clarification is necessary.
The petitioners argue that the appointment of an Administrator from 11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024 was an "interruption" in the Councillors' tenure akin to a dissolution. This
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR argument must be carefully examined. Article 243-U distinguishes between (a) the expiry of the five-year term (clause (1)) and (b) dissolution before the expiry of the term (provisos to clause (1) and clause (4)). In the case of dissolution, the dissolved Municipality is replaced by a fresh Municipality (constituted upon dissolution) which continues only for the remainder of the period. In the case of expiry by efflux of time, the Municipality simply ceases to exist and fresh elections must be held.
53.26. The appointment of an Administrator for presidential posts, without the dissolutionon of the CMC as a body, does not fall into either category. It is neither a dissolution nor an expiry of the term. The CMC continued to exist as a body, with its Councillors in office. Only the executive leadership (President/VP) was temporarily replaced by an Administrator. This is an intermediate situation which the Constitution does not treat as a dissolution or an interruption of the term. The five-year term runs continuously through such intermediate situations.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 53.27. We therefore answer point No.(iii) by holding that the petitioners are NOT entitled to any extended period on account of the interruption caused by the appointment of an Administrator in connection with the second term presidential elections of the CMC. The Councillors' 5-year term ran from 02.11.2020 to 01.11.2025 without any deduction.
54. Answer to Point No.(iv): Whether the term of five years would exclude the period during which the Administrator was in office?
54.1. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submits that the five-year term prescribed by Article 243-U and Section 8 of the KMC Act must be computed by excluding the period during which the Administrator was in office, namely from 11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024, a period of approximately fifteen months. If this period is excluded, the 5-year term would extend to approximately February 2027.
54.2. He submits that the appointment of the Administrator was due entirely to the fault of the respondents in not properly notifying the reservation roster. The Councillors cannot be penalised for the default of the authorities. The
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR legal principle that no person shall suffer for the act or default of another requires that the period of the Administrator's appointment, which was caused by the State's default, be excluded from the 5-year term of the Councillors.
54.3. He submits that the purpose of Article 243-U is to ensure that elected representatives govern for a full 5-year term, so that the electorate's mandate is given its full expression. If a portion of those 5 years is effectively denied to the elected representatives due to administrative interference (the appointment of an Administrator), the constitutional purpose is frustrated. The provision must be interpreted purposively so as to ensure 5 full years of actual democratic governance.
54.4. He submits that the election to the second term of President and Vice President having occurred on 28.08.2024, the said council was required to be in office for a period of thirty months thereafter, i.e., till approximately February 2027. The appointment of an Administrator before the expiry of the said term interferes
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR with the tenure of the Councillors which is not permissible in law or in constitutional principle.
54.5. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government Pleader submits that the period of the Administrator's appointment cannot be excluded from the computation of the 5-year term. There is no provision in Article 243-U or Section 8 of the KMC Act for any such exclusion. The 5-year term runs from the date of the first meeting without pause or deduction.
54.6. She submits that the argument of the petitioners conflates two different things: the 5- year term of the Councillors (which was never interrupted) and the tenure of the President/VP (which was temporarily managed by an Administrator). The Councillors' term was at no point suspended or interrupted.
54.7. She relies upon the binding decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad to reiterate that the 5-year period is mandatory and admits of no exceptions for exclusion of any period, howsoever caused.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 54.8. She relies upon G. Kuppuswamy and others vs. State of Karnataka and another to reinforce the proposition that Article 243-U runs its course without interruption.
54.9. Sri. Gourish S. Khashampur, learned counsel submits that the Administrator was appointed for a specific limited purpose. The Councillors' tenure was not affected. There is no basis for deducting any period from the 5-year term.
54.10. Sri. Sudarshan M., learned counsel submits that the Election Commission correctly calculated the term from 02.11.2020 to 01.11.2025, strictly in conformity with Article 243-U. The argument that the Administrator period should be excluded would, if accepted, render the mandatory character of Article 243-U illusory and would be contrary to the binding decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court.
54.11. This Point for Determination is closely related to Point No.3 and both arise from the same factual premise, the appointment of an Administrator from 11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024 during the 5- year term of the Councillors. Having already held in Point No.3 that the Councillors' 5-year term was NOT interrupted by the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR Administrator's appointment (since the Administrator was appointed only for presidential/VP posts and the Councillors themselves continued in office), the factual basis for the argument in this Point does not exist.
54.12. Nevertheless, we shall also examine the legal position independently on the question whether the 5-year term under Article 243-U excludes the period of the Administrator's appointment.
54.13. The text of Article 243-U(1) is clear and admits of no ambiguity: "Every Municipality ... shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer." The five- year period runs from the date of the first meeting. There is no proviso, exception, or qualification that permits any exclusion from this period. The Constitution speaks clearly and there is nothing to interpret.
54.14. The principles of constitutional interpretation do not permit the reading of words into the Constitution that are not there. If the framers of the 74th Constitutional Amendment had intended to provide for exclusion of any period from the 5-year term, for any reason
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR whatsoever, they would have expressly provided for it. No such provision has been made. Courts cannot supply words that the framers deliberately chose not to include.
54.15. The argument of "purposive interpretation", that the purpose of Article 243-U is to ensure 5 full years of democratic governance and therefore any period of interruption should be excluded, is also untenable. The constitutional purpose of Article 243-U is to ensure regular and periodic democratic elections to local bodies. It achieves this purpose by fixing a mandatory 5-year term computed from a fixed date (the first meeting). It does NOT guarantee 5 years of uninterrupted governance or 5 years of having an elected President/VP. The mandatory 5-year term ensures that elections are held at regular intervals; it does not guarantee any particular quality or configuration of governance during that period.
54.16. The submission that the Administrator's appointment for presidential posts amounts to an "interruption" of the Councillors' tenure is further flawed for the reason that even if the Councillors' access to presidential functions was
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR limited during the Administrator's tenure, the Councillors themselves never ceased to be Councillors. They continued to hold all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of Councillors throughout. The 5-year term is the term of office as Councillors, not the term during which the Councillors can exercise every conceivable function of local governance.
54.17. The legal maxim invoked by the petitioners, that a person should not suffer for the default of another, is a principle of equity applicable in private law. It cannot operate to override a constitutional provision. The Constitution itself is the supreme law of the land and no equitable principle can contradict it.
54.18. Even if, contrary to what we have held, the Councillors' tenure was "interrupted" by the Administrator for 15 months, the constitutional remedy is not the extension of the term beyond 5 years. The remedy, if any, would be a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to rectify the irregularity, but such remedy cannot result in a term longer than 5 years, since that would directly violate Article 243-U(1).
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 54.19. We are also cognisant of the public interest dimension. The people of Raichur, who elected these Councillors in 2018, have a constitutional right to elect new representatives every five years. This right is guaranteed by Article 243-U. The State Election Commission has a constitutional duty to ensure that elections are held on time. The petitioners' submission, if accepted, would deprive the electorate of Raichur of its constitutional right to fresh elections for approximately an additional 15 months beyond the five-year term. The constitutional rights of the electorate, the people, must prevail over the personal interest of incumbent Councillors in prolonging their tenure.
54.20. We therefore confirm that the five-year term runs from 02.11.2020 to 01.11.2025 in its entirety, without any exclusion. The period from 11.05.2023 to 27.08.2024 during which the Administrator was in office for presidential purposes forms part of, and is counted within, the five-year term. The Councillors' term expired on 01.11.2025 and they ceased to hold office from that date by operation of Article 243-U(1) of the Constitution.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 54.21. A duly elected body does not retain a democratic mandate after the expiry of its constitutional term. The right to contest elections is a statutory right, and by analogy, the right to hold office as an elected representative is a statutory right circumscribed by the Constitution and the applicable statutes. Once the constitutional and statutory term expires, the holder of the office has no further legal right to continue. The claim to continue beyond the term on the basis of equity alone cannot be countenanced.
54.22. We also note that the interpretation of a mandatory constitutional provision cannot be influenced by practical hardship or inconvenience. The Constitution mandates a five-year term and mandates elections within that period. If the authorities failed to hold elections on time, as appears to have happened in the present case, the constitutional remedy is to hold elections immediately upon the expiry of the term (i.e., within six months as directed by Article 243-U(3)(b)), not to extend the term of the incumbents. The Extension of the term would reward the failure to hold elections on time, which would create a perverse incentive
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR against timely elections. The Constitution instead places a positive obligation on the State Election Commission to hold elections in time, and where elections are not held before the expiry of the term, directs that they be held as soon as possible thereafter (within six months).
54.23. We therefore also reject the alternative prayer of the petitioners that the term be computed from 28.08.2024 (the date of the second presidential election), treating that as a fresh start date. As we have held in Points (i) and
(ii), the second presidential election does not constitute the CMC or the Corporation afresh, it is an internal election within an already- constituted body. The start date for the five- year term is fixed by Article 243-U and Section 8 of the KMC Act as the date of the first meeting of the Corporation/CMC, which in this case is 02.11.2020. No subsequent event, whether an administrator's appointment, a presidential election, or an area upgradation, can reset this constitutional start date.
54.24. It is trite that equity follows the law and that courts cannot create new remedies or new rights that are not provided for by the law. The
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR petitioners are seeking a remedy, extension of the five-year term, that is not provided for anywhere in the Constitution or the KMC Act. This Court cannot create such a remedy by judicial fiat. If the Constitution does not provide for it, this Court cannot provide it.
54.25. This Court must also address whether, even assuming the petitioners' factual premisese were accepted (i.e., that the Councillors were somehow deprived of effective governance for fifteen months), this Court has the constitutional power to extend the five-year term by judicial order. The answer is emphatically in the negative.
54.26. Article 243-U(1) is addressed to the Municipality as an institutionon, it prescribes the maximum duration of the Municipality's existence. Courts exercise judicial review of executive and legislative action. They do not have the power to alter constitutional provisions. If Article 243- U says the Municipality shall continue for five years and no longer, no court can direct that it continue for six years or seven years or until elections are held. Such a direction would be itself unconstitutional.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 54.27. The relief sought by the petitioners, in substance a direction that the Councillors continue until the Corporation is freshly constituted, amounts to a direction to override Article 243-U. This Court cannot grant such relief even if it were sympathetic to the petitioners' predicament. The Constitution is supreme, and the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is exercised subject to and in conformity with the Constitution. A writ court cannot issue a writ that violates the Constitution.
54.28. The present case is not one where the petitioners are asking the Court to enforce the Constitution, they are asking the Court to override the mandatory five-year term in Article 243-U. That is a request to violate the Constitution, and it must be declined.
54.29. We, therefore answer Point No.(iv) by holding that the term of five years does NOT exclude the period during which the Administrator was in office. The 5-year term of the Councillors ran from 02.11.2020 to 01.11.2025, without any deduction, in strict conformity with Article 243-
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR U(1) of the Constitution and Section 8(1) of the KMC Act.
55. Answer to Point No.(v): Whether the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from any infirmities requiring interference at the hands of this Court?
55.1. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submits that the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is vitiated by several infirmities and errors apparent on the face of the record, which require interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act.
55.2. His first submission is that the learned Single Judge has failed to properly consider and apply Section 503 of the KMC Act, particularly sub- section (4) thereof and the proviso thereto. He submits that the impugned order does not discuss Section 503(4) in adequate detail and has proceeded to dismiss the writ petition without fully addressing the central legal argument of the petitioners based on Section
503. 55.3. His second submission is that the learned Single Judge has mechanically applied Article 243-U of
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR the Constitution and Section 8 of the KMC Act without considering that Section 503(4) of the KMC Act constitutes the governing specific provision in the context of transition from a Smaller Urban Area to a Larger Urban Area.
55.4. His third submission is that the learned Single Judge has not dealt with the petitioners' argument that the Administrator's appointment was made without opportunity of hearing to the elected members. The appointment of an Administrator, which amounts to the removal of elected members from governance, violates the principles of natural justice, and this argument has not been addressed in the impugned order.
55.5. His fourth submission is that the impugned order is contrary to the democratic principle enshrined in the Constitution. The order, which upholds the replacement of an elected council by an Administrator, strikes at the root of democratic governance. The learned Single Judge has failed to consider the larger democratic implications of the order.
55.6. His fifth submission is that the direction given by the learned Single Judge that elections be held within 6 months "from the date of
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR appointment of administrator" is erroneous, since the appointment of the Administrator itself is under challenge, and if the appointment is set aside, the direction becomes otiose and meaningless.
55.7. Smt.Maya T.R., learned High Court Government Pleader submits that the scope of a writ appeal under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act is limited. The Appellate Court will not interfere with the findings of the learned Single Judge unless there is perversity, illegality, or gross injustice. None of these infirmities are present in the impugned order.
55.8. She submits that the learned Single Judge's conclusion that the 5-year term ended on 01.11.2025 is factually correct and legally sound. The learned Single Judge correctly applied Article 243-U and Section 8 of the KMC Act.
55.9. She submits that the direction to hold elections within 6 months from the appointment of the Administrator is correct and is in consonance with Article 243-U(3)(b), which requires elections to be completed within 6 months of dissolution. The direction ensures that
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR democratic governance is restored expeditiously.
55.10. Sri. Gourish S. Khashampur, learned counsel submits that there is no infirmity in the impugned order. The learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition. The argument that the Administrator's appointment is without opportunity of hearing is legally misconceived since the appointment comes after the expiry of the term, there is no "removal" attracting principles of natural justice.
55.11. Sri. Sudarshan M., learned counsel submits that the Karnataka State Election Commission has been directed to hold elections expeditiously within 6 months from the date of the appointment of the Administrator. This is a direction which the Election Commission is duty-bound to comply with and which is in full accordance with Article 243-U. The impugned order is correct and does not suffer from any infirmity.
55.12. In a writ appeal under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, the jurisdiction of the Division Bench is to examine whether the
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the facts and law, and whether the order is vitiated by any illegality, perversity, or error apparent on the face of the record. The Division Bench does not re-examine the matter as a court of first appeal in the strict sense; it examines whether the learned Single Judge has correctly exercised writ jurisdiction.
55.13. Having considered the arguments and having held on Points (i) to (iv) above that: (i) the CMC Councillors can continue as Corporation Councillors only until the expiry of their 5-year term on 01.11.2025; (ii) Section 503(4) does not constitute an exception to Article 243-U;
(iii) the petitioners are not entitled to any extended period on account of the Administrator's appointment; and (iv) the 5- year term does not exclude the period of the Administrator's appointment, it follows that the learned Single Judge's conclusion that the 5- year term expired on 01.11.2025 and that elections must be held, is correct in law and in fact.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR 55.14. We shall now examine each specific infirmity alleged by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners:
55.15. Failure to consider Section 503(4): We have independently examined Section 503(4) and the proviso thereto at considerable length in Points (i) and (ii) of this judgment. Even upon such thorough examination, we have unanimously held that Section 503(4) does not assist the petitioners and does not extend the 5-year term. The learned Single Judge though has not elaborated upon Section 503(4), it does not lead to a different legal conclusion. It is settled law that an Appellate Court can confirm the conclusion of the lower court even if the reasoning of the lower court was inadequate or wrong, provided the conclusion is correct in law. We find the conclusion correct.
55.16. Violation of natural justice: The submission that the Administrator was appointed without opportunity of hearing to the Councillors is misconceived. The appointment of an Administrator after the expiry of the Councillors' 5-year term on 01.11.2025 is NOT a "removal" of the Councillors, they ceased to
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR hold office by operation of the constitutional provision (Article 243-U). The term expired by efflux of time as mandated by the Constitution, not by any executive action. Natural justice is required where a right or status is being taken away by an authority; it does NOT apply where the right has expired by the passage of time as mandated by the Constitution. Once the constitutional term expired, there was no "right" to be heard before appointing an Administrator.
55.17. Violation of democratic principles: The argument that the impugned order violates democratic principles is unfounded. Article 243- U itself is a constitutional expression of democratic values, it mandates regular elections every 5 years to ensure that local governance is periodically remanded back to the people. It is the petitioners' argument, which seeks to perpetuate the term of elected representatives beyond 5 years without a fresh mandate, that is contrary to democratic principles. Regular and timely elections are the foundation of democracy; allowing elected representatives to hold office indefinitely
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR beyond their constitutional term would undermine democracy, not protect it.
55.18. Direction regarding elections: The direction given by the learned Single Judge that elections be held within 6 months from the date of the appointment of the Administrator is a practical and lawful direction consistent with Article 243- U(3)(b). Even if the Administrator's appointment were to be challenged and set aside (which has not happened), the constitutional obligation to hold elections within the prescribed time remains. The direction is therefore not erroneous; it is, in fact, a salutary direction ensuring constitutional compliance.
55.19. In the exercise of writ jurisdiction, the scope of interference by the writ court is also circumscribed, the court will not substitute its discretion for that of the statutory or constitutional authority except in cases of illegality, perversity, or manifest unreasonableness. The learned Single Judge has exercised jurisdiction correctly; the order is neither illegal nor perverse nor unreasonable.
55.20. Since this judgment is delivered in the last week of April 2026. The six-month period is
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR therefore nearly expired. We accordingly direct that the Karnataka State Election Commission take immediate steps to complete the election process to the Raichur Municipal Corporation without any further delay and complete the same within a period of further 3 months from the date of the order, there having been no stay of the order of the learned single judge, the election commission ought to have gone ahead with preparation for such election in the interregnum.
55.21. For all the above reasons, we answer point no.(v) by holding that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge does NOT suffer from any infirmities requiring interference at the hands of this Court.
56. Answer to Point No.(vi): What order?
56.1. For the reasons elaborated under Points (i) to
(v) above, we pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The Writ Appeal No.200101 of 2026 (LB-RES) is hereby DISMISSED.
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NC: 2026:KHC-K:3774-DB WA No. 200101 of 2026 HC-KAR
(ii) The impugned order dated 26.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.202910/2025 is hereby CONFIRMED.
(iii) The Karnataka State Election Commission (Respondent No.5) shall proceed to hold elections to the Raichur Municipal Corporation expeditiously and shall complete the election process within a period of three months from the date of passing of this order.
Sd/-
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE Sd/-
(DR.CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA) JUDGE NB List No.: 2 Sl No.: 31 Ct;VK