The General Manager vs Sr. K .Eshappa on 16 February, 2026

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Supreme Court - Daily Orders

The General Manager vs Sr. K .Eshappa on 16 February, 2026

2. The present appeal has been preferred by the Appellant- Corporation challenging the Order dated 19.02.2024 (hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Order”) passed in Writ Petition No. 104032 of 2022 (L-RES) by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench (hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”) wherein the High Court partly allowed the writ petition, and while setting aside the Order dated 10.02.2009 passed by the Disciplinary Authority (hereinafter referred to as “Removal Order”); Order dated 14.05.2009 passed by the Appellate Authority (hereinafter referred to as “Appellate Order”); Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by NISHA KHULBEY Date: 2026.02.21 and Order dated 19.01.2021 passed by the Central Government 13:50:44 IST Reason:

Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (hereinafter referred to as “CGIT”), directed the Disciplinary Authority to impose any other punishment on the proved charges of misconduct other than punishment of removal, dismissal or compulsory retirement from service. The High Court also held that the Respondent would be entitled for reinstatement in service without backwages and continuity of service.

3. The essential facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that on 24.07.1993, the Respondent joined the Appellant-Corporation as a Class-IV employee. On 15.03.2008, the Respondent was issued a charge memo, wherein charges were framed against the Respondent on account of misconduct, misbehaviour and using filthy language against his senior officials, and subsequently, enquiry was initiated against him. The relevant portions from the memorandum of charge are reproduced herein below:

“Article of Charge I Sri K Eshappa TCO, UEC No.D2285 physically assaulted Sri Jawaharlal, Manager (per) on 29/02/2008 at about 4.15 P.M while the later was discharging duty 1 his office situated in the Administrative office Building, DIOM.

The above act on the part of Sri.K Eshappa, TCO is a misconduct under clause No.28(2)(vii) of the certified standing orders applicable to all workmen of NMDC Ltd, which reads as under;

28(2)(vii): Drunkenness, fighting, riotous, disorderly or indecent behavior within the premises of Management.

Articles of charge-II Sri. K Eshappa TCO, UEC No.D2285 along with Sri.M Khadar Basha, MCQ Gr.II, UEC No.D1593, Plant, entered into the office of Sri.K Jawahar Lai, Manager (P) on 29/02/2008 at about 4.15 PM to enquire about the tender related Toranagallu, Railway Station pickup vehicle. Sri K Eshappa abused Sri K Jawaharlal, Manager (P) in filthy language, became violent and slapped Sri. Jawaharlal, Manager (P) with his chappal in presence of other Executives.

The above act on the part of Sri K Eshappa, TCO is a misconduct under clause 28(2)(xii) of the certified standing orders applicable to all Workmen of NMDC Ltd, which reads as under;

28(2)(xii)- Assaulting, threatening or intimidating any workman or officers of the Management within the Mine/Feasibility/Promises/boundaries.

Article of Charge III Shri K Eshappa, TCO, UEC No.D2285 physically assaulted and abused Sri K Jawaharlal at about 4.15 PM on 29-02-2008 while he was discharging his duties in his office.

The above acc on the part of Sr. K Eshappa is a misconduct under clause No.28(2)(xxv) of the certified standing orders applicable to all workmen of NMDC Ltd which reads as under;

28(2)(xxv)- An act of subversive discipline.”

4. On 10.02.2009, the Removal Order was passed by the Disciplinary Authority wherein the Respondent was given the punishment of “removal from service which does not disqualify from future employment”. Aggrieved by the said Removal Order, the Respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which vide Order dated 14.05.2009 confirmed the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. Aggrieved, the Respondent made a reference before the CGIT.

5. In the meanwhile, criminal proceedings were also initiated against the Respondent for the same incident in the Court of Civil Judge and JMFC., Sandur, bearing CC No. 666 of 2008. In the said criminal proceedings, the Respondent was acquitted vide Order dated 30.07.2011.

6. The CGIT vide Order dated 01.03.2019, held that the enquiry conducted by the Appellant-Corporation was fair and proper. On 19.01.2021, the CGIT passed the Award rejecting the reference. The CGIT concluded that the charges levelled against the Respondent were successfully proved and it affirmed the Removal Order passed against the Respondent.

7. Aggrieved, the Respondent filed Writ Petition No. 104032 of 2022 (L-RES) before the High Court. The High Court, vide the impugned order, while discussing the scope of judicial review in the disciplinary proceedings, has opined that the management had examined 4 witnesses to prove the charges against the Respondent and he was also granted an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses but nothing in favour of the Respondent was elicited in the cross- examination. The High Court had further observed that it would not go into the sufficiency of evidence and reappreciate the evidence but would only examine as to whether there was evidence and also whether the management was able to prove the charge on preponderance of probabilities. Having observed that, the High Court, after going through the evidence on record, held that the charges against the Respondent with regard to using filthy language and assaulting his superior official were proved and therefore, there was no ground or material to interfere with the finding of the CGIT that the charges stood proved. However, on the aspect of punishment awarded, the High Court held that the punishment of removal from service was disproportionate and hence, it set aside the orders of removal with a direction to the Appellant-Corporation to impose any other punishment other than the removal or dismissal or compulsory retirement.

8. Learned Counsel for the Appellant-Corporation vehemently submitted that the Respondent has committed serious misconduct by assaulting a senior official and abusing him in a filthy language and slapping him on his face with his chappal/shoe. The Respondent was involved in acts of misconduct earlier as well and for one such instance wherein the Respondent went on unauthorized leave for 331 days, he was terminated from service on 22.12.2006, but was later reinstated on 13.08.2007 (on medical grounds). Even apart from this, the Respondent was involved in serious misconduct such as suppression about his training, and assaulting and abusing another officer, for which he was also put under suspension vide order dated 04.10.2004.

9. Learned counsel also contended that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot sit in appeal over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and the CGIT. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant-Corporation that the High Court had erred in setting aside the punishment when it itself held that the charges of misconduct against the Respondent stood proven. The High Court also failed to take note of the fact that the act of the Respondent classifies as a grave misconduct as per the Standing Orders for Workmen of All Projects & Feasibilities of National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Certified Standing Order”) and such grave acts of misconduct should be treated strictly so as to ensure that the same are not repeated in the future.

10. Learned counsel for the Appellant-Corporation relied upon the judgments of this Court in Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra Sharma, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 401 and Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.N. Narawade, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 134.

11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the High Court had considered all the relevant factors before coming to the finding that the punishment of removal from service is shockingly disproportionate to the nature and gravity of charges against the Respondent. It was further contended that the High Court while exercising its power under Article 226 has not exonerated the Respondent or ignored his conduct, rather, it has confined its scrutiny to examining the legality and proportionality of the punishment imposed.

12. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the Respondent that since the Respondent has been acquitted in the criminal case, therefore, the Respondent is entitled for exoneration in the enquiry proceedings as well since the allegations against him were not proven.

13. Having heard the learned counsel for both parties and having gone through the materials on record, the sole question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the Removal Order, the Appellate Order and the Award of the CGIT which had upheld the Removal Order.

14. It is clear from the findings recorded and the material available before us that the charges framed against the Respondent in respect of misbehaviour and using filthy language against his superior officials were duly proved and amounted to “major misconduct” in terms of Clause 28(2)(vii), 28(2)(xii), and 28(2)(xxv) of the Certified Standing Order.

15. We are therefore, in the present appeal, only concerned with the question of whether in the face of the charges proved, it was proper for the High Court to interfere with the punishment imposed upon the Respondent by the Disciplinary Authority. While the High Court found the punishment of removal from service to be shockingly disproportionate to the proved charges, learned counsel for the Appellant-Corporation has vehemently contended that the punishment was proportionate, having regard to the gravity of the misconduct and the Respondent’s past record.

16. It is settled law that the High Court can only interfere with the quantum of punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when it finds that the punishment imposed by the employer is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. In this regard, reference can be made to the judgment of this Court in M.P. Electricity Board (supra), wherein it was held that interference by the Labour Court and the High Court with the punishment of termination for charges of assaulting a superior officer and subsequent unauthorized absence was unjustified. This Court categorically observed that the physical assault of a superior official constituted a clear breach of discipline within the organisation, and therefore, the punishment of termination was justified and could not be regarded as harsh or disproportionate. The relevant portion of M.P. Electricity Board (supra) is extracted hereinbelow:

“8. Similarly, the High Court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution only when it finds that the punishment imposed, is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. These aspects are well settled. In U.P. SRTC v. Subhash Chandra Sharma [(2000) 3 SCC 324 :

2000 SCC (L&S) 349] this Court, after referring to the scope of interference with punishment under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, held that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the order of removal from service when the charge against the employee stood proved. It was also held that the jurisdiction vested with the Labour Court to interfere with punishment was not to be exercised capriciously and arbitrarily. It was necessary, in a case where the Labour Court finds the charge proved, for a conclusion to be arrived at that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the nature of the charge found proved, before it could interfere to reduce the punishment. In Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh [(2004) 8 SCC 200 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1067 : (2004) 7 Scale 608] this Court after referring to the decision in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena [(1996) 6 SCC 417 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1455] also pointed out the difference between the approaches to be made in a criminal proceeding and a disciplinary proceeding. This Court also pointed out that when charges proved were grave, vis-à-vis the establishment, interference with punishment of dismissal could not be justified. In Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate [(2005) 2 SCC 489 : (2005) 1 Scale 345] this Court again reiterated that the jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment should be exercised only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate and that each case had to be decided on its facts. This Court also indicated that the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act, had to act within the four corners thereof. It could not sit in appeal over the decision of the employer unless there existed a statutory provision in that behalf. The Tribunal or the Labour Court could not interfere with the quantum of punishment based on irrational or extraneous factors and certainly not on what it considers a compassionate ground. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this question, since the matter has been dealt with in detail in a recent decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.B. Narawade [(2005) 3 SCC 134 : (2005) 2 Scale 302] . This Court summed up the position thus: (SCC p. 141, para 20) “20. It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11- A in the Industrial Disputes Act, certain amount of discretion is vested with the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the management where the workman concerned is found guilty of misconduct. The said area of discretion has been very well defined by the various judgments of this Court referred to hereinabove and it is certainly not unlimited as has been observed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The discretion which can be exercised under Section 11-A is available only on the existence of certain factors like punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of the court, or the existence of any mitigating circumstances which require the reduction of the sentence, or the past conduct of the workman which may persuade the Labour Court to reduce the punishment.” It may also be noticed that in Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Adikanda Sahu [(1960) 1 LLJ 518 (SC)] and in New Shorrock Mills v. Maheshbhai T. Rao [(1996) 6 SCC 590 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1484] this Court held that use of abusive language against a superior, justified punishment of dismissal. This Court stated “punishment of dismissal for using abusive language cannot be held to be disproportionate”. If that be the position regarding verbal assault, we think that the position regarding dismissal for physical assault, must be found all the more justifiable. Recently, in Muriadih Colliery BCC Ltd. v. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union [(2005) 3 SCC 331 : JT (2005) 2 SC 444] this Court after referring to and quoting the relevant passages from Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh [(2004) 8 SCC 200 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1067 : (2004) 7 Scale 608] and Tournamulla Estate v. Workmen [(1973) 2 SCC 502 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 510] held: (SCC p. 336, para 17) “The courts below by condoning an act of physical violence have undermined the discipline in the organisation, hence, in the above factual backdrop, it can never be said that the Industrial Tribunal could have exercised its authority under Section 11-A of the Act to interfere with the punishment of dismissal.”

9. In the case on hand, the employee has been found guilty of hitting and injuring his superior officer at the workplace, obviously in the presence of other employees. This clearly amounted to breach of discipline in the organisation. Discipline at the workplace in an organisation like the employer herein, is the sine qua non for the efficient working of the organisation. When an employee breaches such discipline and the employer terminates his services, it is not open to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal to take the view that the punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. We have already referred to the views of this Court. To quote Jack Chan, “discipline is a form of civilly responsible behaviour which helps maintain social order and contributes to the preservation, if not advancement, of collective interests of society at large”.

Obviously this idea is more relevant in considering the working of an organisation like the employer herein or an industrial undertaking. Obedience to authority in a workplace is not slavery. It is not violative of one's natural rights. It is essential for the prosperity of the organisation as well as that of its employees. When in such a situation, a punishment of termination is awarded for hitting and injuring a superior officer supervising the work of the employee, with no extenuating circumstance established, it cannot be said to be not justified. It cannot certainly be termed unduly harsh or disproportionate. [...]” (Emphasis supplied)

17. Learned counsel for the Appellant-Corporation has further drawn the attention of this Court to the Respondent’s past record of misconduct, emphasizing that on one occasion, he was terminated for unauthorized absence, and on another, he was placed under suspension for abusing and assaulting a senior official. Past misconduct is a relevant factor to be considered while weighing the proportionality of the punishment awarded. In Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate, reported in (2005) 2 SCC 489, this Court has held that past service record is a relevant factor for considering whether the punishment awarded to the delinquent was shockingly proportionate or not. The relevant portions of the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:

“26. [...] The past record of service, therefore, is a relevant factor for considering as to whether the punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee is shockingly disproportionate or not. As has been noticed hereinbefore, before the learned Single Judge an attempt on the part of the respondent to take recourse to clause (b) of Item 1 of Schedule IV failed. In the absence of any plea of factual victimisation and furthermore in the absence of any foundational fact having been laid down for arriving at a conclusion of legal victimisation, in our opinion, the Division Bench committed a manifest error in invoking clause (a) thereof.

xxx

32. In Regional Manager, Rajasthan SRTC v. Sohan Lal [(2004) 8 SCC 218 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1078] it has been held that it is not the normal jurisdiction of the superior courts to interfere with the quantum of sentence unless it is wholly disproportionate to the misconduct proved.

Such is not the case herein. In the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the past conduct of the respondent as also his conduct during the domestic enquiry proceedings, we cannot say that the quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent was wholly disproportionate to his act of misconduct or otherwise arbitrary.” (Emphasis supplied)

18. Similarly, in the case of T.N. State Transport Corpn. v. P. Thirunavukkarasu, reported in (2022) 15 SCC 320, wherein the respondent-driver’s rash and negligent driving led to the death of three persons and he was also found to be involved in similar instances in the past, having already been awarded eighteen punishments, this Court held that the punishment of dismissal was not disproportionate and interference with the same was unsustainable and unwarranted.

19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the firm view that the punishment of removal was by no means disproportionate, particularly when assessed in light of the Respondent’s past record and repeated delinquencies. The Respondent’s conduct indicated a proclivity for abusing and assaulting his superiors, which reflects extreme insubordination and disrespect, adversely affecting the decorum and sanctity of the organisation. It is also to be noted that removal from service is one of the prescribed punishments for “major misconduct” as per Clause 29(2) of the Certified Standing Order.

20. Learned counsel for the Respondent has contended that, in view of the Respondent’s acquittal in the criminal case, he is entitled to exoneration in the disciplinary proceedings as well. This submission, however, is wholly untenable and contrary to settled law. It is well established that where departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings are instituted on the same charge against the same delinquent, acquittal in the criminal case does not automatically conclude or nullify the departmental proceedings in respect of that charge. On this aspect, reference may be made to SBI v. P. Zadenga, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 675, wherein this Court held that:

“31. As a principle of law, we have already observed that a departmental proceeding pending criminal trial would not warrant an automatic stay unless, of course, a complicated question of law is involved. Also, acquittal in a criminal case ipso facto would not be tantamount to closure or culmination of proceedings in favour of a delinquent employee.” (Emphasis supplied)

21. The High Court’s reliance on Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 569, to hold that the punishment of removal was shockingly disproportionate, is misplaced. The said case concerned only the use of filthy language against a worker or officer of the management, whereas the present case involves physical assault of a superior official in addition to verbal abuse. Further, in Ved Prakash Gupta (supra), this Court specifically noted the absence of any previous adverse remark or past record of misconduct against the delinquent employee. Similarly, the judgment in Ram Kishan v. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 157, which has also been relied upon by the High Court, is factually distinguishable, as it too dealt solely with a charge of abuse.

22. The High Court could not reasonably justify how the punishment of removal was shockingly disproportionate to the proved charges and committed an error while setting aside the Removal Order, as well as the Appellate Order and the Award of the CGIT. Consequently, the Impugned Order cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside as the punishment awarded required no interference by the High Court.

23. As a result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The Impugned Order is set aside and the Removal Order, the Appellate Order, along with the Award passed by the CGIT are thus affirmed.

24. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

………………………., J.

(RAJESH BINDAL) ………………………., J.

(VIJAY BISHNOI) NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 16, 2026.

ITEM NO.38                      COURT NO.14                    SECTION IV-A

                   S U P R E M E C O U R T O F      I N D I A
                           RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.13308/2024 [Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 19-02-2024 in WP No. 104032/2022 passed by the High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad] THE GENERAL MANAGER, M/s. NMDC LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS SR. K .ESHAPPA Respondent(s) FOR ADMISSION and I.R. IA No. 139644/2024 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES Date : 16-02-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today. CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BINDAL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAY BISHNOI For Petitioner(s) :Ms. Aastha Mehta, Adv.

Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, AOR Ms. Prerana Mohapatra, Adv.

Ms. Prina Sharma, Adv.

For Respondent(s) :Mr. Sarim Naved, Adv.

Ms. Sugandha Anand, AOR UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Leave granted, The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.

Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

(KRITIKA TIWARI)                                        (AKSHAY KUMAR BHORIA)
SENIOR PERSONAL ASSISTANT                                 COURT MASTER (NSH)
                       {Signed order is placed on file}

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