Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ramsingh And Anr. vs Shivaji Rao And Ors. on 29 March, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2006ACJ968
JUDGMENT Subhash Samvatsar, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the claimants challenging award dated 12.3.1997, passed by the Second Additional Member Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Shivpuri (for short, 'the Claims Tribunal') in Claim Case No. 46 of 1993.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellants-claimants are the parents of deceased Guddi who was 22 years of age at the time of accident. On 5.6.1993 she was travelling in a Matador bearing No. MP 08-2035. She was going from Badar-was to her house. When Matador reached the village Chitara on the Agra-Bombay Road, a truck bearing No. MBW 1418 came from the opposite side and dashed against the said Matador. Matador tumbled due to the impact of the dash and Guddi died in the accident. Guddi was the wife of Jagdish, respondent No. 7, but she was residing separately from Jagdish. She was residing with her parents. It is also alleged that Jagdish, respondent No. 7, was living separately with some other lady whom he has married. It is, however, admitted that there is no divorce between Jagdish and Guddi. The claimants, i.e., the parents of the deceased, filed the claim petition for compensation for the death of their daughter Guddi. The Claims Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 50,000 towards compensation. The Tribunal held respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 liable jointly as well as severally on the ground of contributory negligence and directed them to pay the said amount of compensation in equal shares. Claims Tribunal exonerated the respondent No. 6 from the liability to pay compensation.
3. The first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that once the Claims Tribunal has found that the accident has taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the drivers of the two vehicles, then the Claims Tribunal should have held all the 5 persons, i.e., respondent Nos. 1 to 5, jointly and severally liable to pay the amount of compensation and should not have issued the direction of apportioning the liability equally. For this purpose learned Counsel has relied upon a judgment of this court in Lakhan Singh v. Shivaji Rao decided on 8.2.2005 (MP). The said case arises out of the same accident from which the present appeal arises and the Division Bench in the said case has held that all the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 are liable to pay the amount of compensation. In view of this judgment I allow this appeal in part and direct that all the five respondents, i.e., respondent Nos. 1 to 5, shall be jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation.
4. Now, the next question is about enhancement of the quantum of compensation. The respondents in the present case have raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the present appellants who are the parents of the deceased, have no right to file the claim petition as respondent No. 7 who is the husband of the deceased, is alive and, therefore, in view of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, so long as the husband who is class I heir of a lady is alive, the parents who are class III heirs of the lady, are not entitled to get compensation. In reply to this argument, learned Counsel for the appellants relied on a judgment of the Apex Court in case of Gujarat State Road Trans, Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai 1987 ACJ 561 (SC) and submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 165 and Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act any person who is aggrieved or injured by the death of the deceased, is entitled to file an application for compensation. The Apex Court in that case after considering all the relevant laws has laid down in para 10 that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made by all or any of the legal representatives. The expression 'legal representative' is defined in Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure and defines that a legal representative is "a person who in law represents the estate of the deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of deceased...". The above dictum in terms does not apply to the case before the Claims Tribunal, but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, The Apex Court held in the said case that an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent and that such an application can be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such application can be made, are thus indicated in Section 110A of the old Motor Vehicles Act. This section in a way is a substitute to the extent indicated above for the provisions of Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. Under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 only a dependant was entitled to make an application for compensation. Thus, as held by the Apex Court, any legal representative can file an application for compensation.
5. Now, the question is whether the present appellants are the legal representatives of the deceased. The Division Bench of this court in case of Halkibai v. Managing Director, Rajasthan State Road Trans. Corpn. , has considered the matter at length and laid down that the brother of the deceased who is a class II heir of the deceased is not entitled to compensation for the death of the deceased when class I heir of the deceased is available. According to the Division Bench the question whether a person is a legal representative or not shall be decided in accordance with the personal law. Thus, in the present case, the respondent No. 7 was the only legal representative of the deceased to file the claim petition.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants has also relied on a judgment of this court in case of Anil Tiwari v. Saheb Singh . The said judgment is quite distinguishable, as in that case the deceased was unmarried who was adopted by his uncle and, therefore, this court in that case has held that the uncle is a legal representative, but this is not the situation in the present case. Another judgment relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant is the judgment in Lila Bai v. Atar Singh 1997 (II) MPWN 186. But that judgment is quite distinguishable. In that case it is nowhere laid down that the personal law shall not be applicable to Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Moreover, any observations made to that effect by the learned single Judge in that case are contrary to the Division Bench judgment of this court in Halki Bai's case . Another judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant is Vidya Dhar Dubey v. U.P. State Road Trans. Corpn. , where Allahabad High Court has laid down that personal law is not applicable to Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. However, as there is a direct Division Bench judgment of this court on the question, I need not rely on the judgment of Allahabad High Court.
7. In the result, I hold that the present appellants are not the legal representatives in view of the fact that the husband of the deceased is alive. In such circumstances the question of enhancement of compensation in the present case does not arise. As regards the compensation already awarded to the present appellants in absence of any cross-objections on behalf of respondents, no interference can be made to that part of the award.
8. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed. The award of Claims Tribunal is maintained. No order as to costs.