Punjab-Haryana High Court
Smt. Sumitra Devi And Ors. vs Danesh Kumar And Ors. on 17 December, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1997ACJ981, (1997)115PLR403
Author: Sarojnei Saksena
Bench: Sarojnei Saksena
JUDGMENT Sarojnei Saksena, J.
1. Mr. Malik submits that in the impugned order the learned claims Tribunal has admitted that Gulshan Kumar died on December 3, 1991, in a vehicular accident. Respondent No. 1 - Dinesli Kumar was driving the offending scooter. He has admitted the accident. The Oriental Insurance Company Limited has also admitted that the said offending vehicle was insured with it. Hence the claimants are entitled to compensation under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, on account of 'no fault liability'. The claim petition was dismissed Gulshan Kumar was negligent in driving his vehicle.
2. Mr. Malik relied on Smt. Kailash Kumari v. Bhola, (1988-1)93 P.L.R. 116; Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Beasa Devi, (1985-1)87 P.L.R. 59 and Rawat Singh v. Sube Singh, (1995-1)100 P.L.R. 539.
3. In Smt, Kailash Kumari's case (supra) it is held that when such a application is filed in appeal, since appeal is re-hearing of the claim, such an application can be allowed. In that case also application filed under section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, was allowed in appeal.
4. In Smt. Beasa Devi's case (supra) a Division Bench of the High Court has held that under section 92-A of the old Act, the Insurance Company is liable if the accident of the vehicle of the owner is admitted or proved and the Tribunal comes to a further prima facie conclusion that the vehicle was insured.
5. In this case it is admitted that the offending vehicle was insured with respondent No. 3. The accident is also admitted by respondent No. 1. Hence in my considered view the claimants are entitled to get compensation under 'no fault liability'.
6. The last point for consideration is whether the provisions of amended section 140(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, can be made applicable in this case, because deceased Gulshan Kumar died in this vehicular accident on December 3, 1991, and section 140 of the new Act is amended with effect from November 14, 1994, whereby the figure "40" is substituted by "50" in sub-section (2) of section 140 of the new Act.
7. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, (1987)3 SCC 234, the Apex Court has observed that latter specific statute if provides for broader new right of action, then it would prevail over the former one.
8. In M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutt, (1987-2)92 P.L.R. 689 (S.C.) the Supreme Court lamented and suggested that the amount under section 92-A of 1939 Act is unrealistic to inflationary pressures and consequent loss of purchasing power of rupee. These figures are inadequate and should be increased in an appropriate manner. The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, came into force on Objects and Reasons of this Amendment Bill it becomes apparent that the Parliament took into consideration the observations made by the Apex Court in M.K Kunhimohammed's case (supra). It is mentioned in the Bill that the Supreme Court in this Judgment "has made certain suggestions to raise the limit of compensation payable as a result of motor accidents in respect of death and permanent disablement in the event of there being no proof of fault on the part of the person involved in the accident and also in hit and run motor accidents and to remote certain disparities in the liability of the insurer to pay compensation depending upon the class or type of vehicles involved in the accident. The above suggestions made by the Supreme Court have, been incorporated in the Bill". In the Bill it is further mentioned that important provisions are provided in the matters enumerated therein. Its clause (i) reads as under:-
"(i) provisions for enhanced compensation in case of "no fault liability" and in "hit and run" motor accidents;"
9. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Anjali Mallick and Ors., 1993 ACJ 934 (Cal.) a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court held that section 140 of the Act is beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of a limited amount of compensation to victim. The approach of the Courts is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficent purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose.
10. In Smt. Mosmi and Anr. v. Ram Kumar and Ors., (1991-2)100 P.L.R. 349 a Division Bench of this High Court considered the unamended provisions of section 140 of the Act. 1939 Act was repealed and was replaced by 1988 Act with effect from July 1, 1989. In that case the Accident took place on May 16, 1989. Considering the overriding effect provided in section 144 of the 1988 Act, the Division Bench held that this section provided that all other provisions of 1939 Act and any other law must yield to provisions contained in Chapter X of 1988 Act (section 140 falls in this Chapter) and thus compensation on account of 'no fault liability' was granted to the claimants under section 140 of the new Act. The Division Bench relied on United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Padamavathy and others, 1990 ACJ 751 (Ker.).
11. In Padmavathy's case (supra) a Division Bench of Kerala High Court considered the claim case wherein the accident took place on November 20, 1988. The Division bench relied on the overriding provisions of section 144 of 1988 Act and held that provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not impede the enforcement of section 140 of relation to accidents occured before 1988 Act. parliament has only retained the same right which was conferred under 1939 Act. The difference in quantum of compensation is only intended to make the right realistic and at par with the earlier fixed amount. The Division Bench of Kerala High Court also referred to the observations made by the Apex Court in M.IK. Kunhimohammed's case (supra).
12. Subsequently in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Murugan, 1995 A.C.J. 164 (Ker.) another Division Bench of Kerala High Court considered the accident case which occurred before July 1, 1989, and it held that provisions of section 140 are not retrospective. But in this judgment Division Bench of Kerala High Court has not considered the judgment of Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Padamavathy's case (supra). Also in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Azizunnisa Begum and Ors., 1995 ACJ 40 (Ker.) a Single Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that provisions of Section 140 are not retrospective. In that case also the accident took place on April 30, 1988.
13. In Anjali Mallick and others' case (supra) (1993 ACJ 934) as Division bench of Calcutta High Court also considered the provisions of section 140 of 1988 Act. In that judgment the date of accident is not mentioned, but the Claims Tribunal's award was dated September 16, 1991. The Division Bench held that section 140 is beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of a limited amount of compensation to victim. The approach of the Court is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficent purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose.
14. Surinder Kaur v. Lakhbir Singh and Ors., (1995-3)111 P.L.R. 512 a Single Bench of this High Court has held that -section 140 is not applicable to cases before coming into force of the amendment. But this was again considered by another Single Bench of this High Court in Rawat Singh's case (supra). Relying on judgments of this High Court, Rajasthan High Court and Calcutta High Court it was held that the provisions of Section 140(2) of the new Act are retrospective and they apply irrespective of the fact that the accident took place before coming into force of 1988 Act.
In this case the accident took place on December 3, 1991, after coming into force of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but before section 140(2) was amended. As is obvious from the aforementioned Statements of Objects and Reasons the amount of compensation to be granted in cases of 'no fault liability' is enhanced keeping in view the observations made by the Apex Court in M.K. Kunhimohammed's case (supra). Nor doubt, section 140(2), as amended by the Amending Act of 1994, is not made retrospective, but the intention of the legislature is obvious.
Considering the inflationary pressures and consequent loss of purchasing power of rupee the amount of compensation to be paid under the head of 'no fault liability' is enhanced in death cases from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- This amendment has come into force in November 14, 1994. Hence it is obvious that today this amount of Rs. 25,000/- is really unrealistic. This is beneficient legislation and should be interpreted in favour of those persons for whose benefit this amendment is made. The claimants are hapless and helpless dependents of the deceased. Admittedly, this amended provision is ameliorating one.
Hence, in my considered view, the claimants are entitled to recover Rs. 50,000/- from the Insurance Company-respondent No. 3 under Section 140(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The petition is accordingly allowed.