Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Adusumalli Mohan Rao, vs State Of Andhra Pradesh, on 15 November, 2019
Author: M.Satyanarayana Murthy
Bench: M.Satyanarayana Murthy
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
WRIT PETITION Nos.17737, 17746, 17750, 17756, 17763, 11555,
11557 AND 11560 OF 2019
COMMON ORDER:
All these Petitions are filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India seeking a writ of Mandamus to declare the order of respondent No.3 passed in RC.No.277/2017/B1 dated 06.11.2019, RC.No.255/2017/B1 dated 06.11.2019, RC.No.211/2017/B1 dated 06.11.2019, RC.No.234/2017/B1 dated 06.11.2019, RC.No.371/2017/B1 dated 06.11.2019, RC.No.88/2017/B2 dated 09.08.2019, RC.No.424/2017/B2 dated 13.08.2019, and RC.No.430/2017/B2 dated 09.08.2019 respectively, as illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction; consequently direct the respondent No.3 to permit the petitioners to conduct the business.
All these petitions are filed claiming same relief by different petitioners. Therefore, I am of the view that it is appropriate to decide all the petitions by common order.
The petitioners are licensees of various Bars and Restaurants, being run at different places on obtaining licenses from the Superintendent, Prohibition and Excise and carrying business in the licensed premises. The details of license number, shop name and date of decoy operation are given in the table hereunder.
1 2 3 4 5 Sl.No. Case No. Name of Bar Date of Impugned order and decoy W.P. Restaurant operation No. / shop 1 17737 of M/s. Kohinoor 03.11.2019 RC.No.277/2017/B1 2019 Restaurant dated 06.11.2019 and Bar 2 17746 of M/s. Sri 03.11.2019 RC.No.255/2017/B1 dated 06.11.2019 2019 Kanaka Durga Restaurant and Bar MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 2 3 17750 of M/s. Natraj 03.11.2019 RC.No.211/2017/B1 dated 06.11.2019 2019 Restaurant and Bar 4 17756 of M/s. Sai 03.11.2019 RC.No.234/2017/B1 dated 06.11.2019 2019 Meghana Restaurant and Bar 5 17763 of M/s. Bar One 03.11.2019 RC.No.371/2017/B1 dated 06.11.2019 2019 Restaurant and Bar 6 11555 of M/s. Vijaya 30.07.2019 RC.No.88/2017/B2 dated 09.08.2019 2019 Lakshmi Restaurant and Bar 7 11557 of M/s. Eagle 30.07.2019 RC.No.424/2017/B2 dated 13.08.2019 2019 Restaurant and Bar 8 11560 of M/s. 30.07.2019 RC.No.430/2017/B2 dated 09.08.2019 2019 Vigneswara Restaurant and Bar
While the petitioners are carryon business in the licensed premises, respondents conducted decoy operation on the dates mentioned in column No.4 of the table, and found certain irregularities in conducting business, violating the terms and conditions of the license and passed impugned orders shown in column No.5 of the table (referred above), suspended the licenses of the Bar and Restaurant/shops exercising power under Section 31 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 (for short "the Act, 1968").
The main ground urged in all these petitions is that the orders impugned in the petitions are passed without compliance of proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968, which mandates issue of show- cause notice before passing any order. On this ground alone, the petitioners sought the relief to set aside the impugned orders shown in column No.5 of the table (referred above).
It is also contended that the petitioners never violated any terms and conditions of the license granted in their favour and that the respondents intentionally at the instance of political party in power, passed impugned orders and that the impugned orders are MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 3 passed in violation of principles of natural justice, since, the impugned orders are bereft of any reason and prayed to quash the orders shown in column No.5 of the table (referred above).
During hearing, Sri O.Manoher Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners, would contend that passing of impugned orders are contrary to the proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968, it is a serious illegality and the respondents -authority has to record reasons for passing such orders, but the orders impugned in the writ petitions are bereft of any reasons, much less sufficient reasons to suspend the license. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the judgment of High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in "M/s.Sree Devi Wines v. The Deputy Commissioner of Excise, Kakinada1" and another judgment of Apex Court in "Oryx Fisheries Private Limited v. Union of India2". On the strength of the law laid down in the above judgments, learned counsel for the petitioners requested to set aside the orders impugned in the writ petitions.
Learned Assistant Government Pleader for Prohibition and Excise contended that if the Court concludes that the concerned authority violated the proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968 while passing impugned orders, the order can be set aside giving liberty to the respondents to pass appropriate order strictly adhering to proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968 and placed reliance on the Division Bench Judgment of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in "Goka Bujjamma v. Prohibition and Excise Superintendent3" and another Full Bench judgment of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in 1 (1995) 1 ALD 164 2 (2010) 13 SCC 427 3 2003 (2) ALT 549 MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 4 "Tappers Co-operative Society, Maddur v. Superintendent of Excise, Mahaboobnagar4", requested to pass appropriate order in accordance with law.
Undisputedly, all these petitioners are licensees either for sale of liquor by shop or by Bar and Restaurant as per the rules known as the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Grant of Licence of Selling by Shop and Conditions of Licence) Rules, 2012 (for short "Shop Rules, 2012") or the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Grant of Licence of Selling by Bar and Conditions of Licence) Rules, 2005 (for short "Bar Rules, 2005"), the licenses were obtained under the said rules and certain conditions were incorporated in the licenses granted to the petitioners.
According to Rule 57 of Shop Rules, 2012, a license or permit may be suspended, cancelled or withdrawn in accordance with the provisions of Sections 31 or 32 of the Act, 1968. The shop may be re- allotted on cancellation or withdrawal by conducting fresh selection process.
Similarly, Rule 48 of the Bar Rules, 2005, a license may be suspended, cancelled or withdrawn in accordance with the provisions of Section 31 or 32 of the Act.
The only difference between these two rules is that re-allotment of shop on cancellation or withdrawal by conducting fresh selection as per the Shop Rules, 2012, whereas in Bar Rules, 2005, no such obligation is cast upon the respondents.
In view of rules referred above, license can be cancelled only either under Section 31 or 32 of the Act, 1968. Section 31 of the Act, 1968 is as follows:
4
1984 (2) APLJ (HC) 1 MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 5 "31. Power to cancel or suspend licence etc. -
(1) Subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed, the authority granting any licence or permit under this Act may cancel or suspend it irrespective of the period to which the licence or permit relates.
(a) if any duty or fee payable by the holder thereof is not duly paid; or
(b) in the event of any breach by the holder thereof, or by any of his servants or by any one acting on his behalf with his express or implied permission, of any of the terms and conditions thereof; or
(c) if the holder thereof or any of his servants or any one acting on his behalf with his express or implied permission, is convicted of any offence under this Act, or
(d) if the holder thereof is convicted of any cognizable and non-
bailable offence or of any offence under the the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 (Central Act 61 of 1985) or under the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955 or under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 or under Section 481, Section 482, Section 483, Section 484, Section 485, Section 486, Section 487, Section 488, Section 489 of the Indian Penal Code or of any offence punishable under Section 112 or Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962, irrespective of the fact whether such conviction relates to the period earlier or subsequent to the grant of licence or permit; or
(e) if the conditions of the licence or permit provide for such cancellation or suspension at will :
Provided that no licence or permit shall be cancelled or suspended unless the holder thereof is given an opportunity of making his representation against the action proposed. (2) Where a licence or permit held by any person is cancelled under clause (a), clause (b), clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1), the authority aforesaid may cancel any other licence granted or permit issued to such persons under this Act, or under the Opium Act, 1878.
(3) The holder of licence or permit shall not be entitled to any compensation for its cancellation or suspension nor to the refund of any fee paid or deposit made in respect thereof."
Proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968 mandates that an opportunity to be given to the licensee to make representation against the action proposed. Therefore, an 'opportunity' means a notice before cancellation or suspension of license shall be given to MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 6 the licensee to put forth his explanation for the alleged violation. In the absence of any such opportunity afforded to the licensee, suspension is vitiated by illegality. But this Court in "Ramesh v. Prohibition and Excise Superintendent5" took a different view while holding that suspension pending enquiry need not be preceded by a notice. If suspension referred to in proviso, relates to substantive punishment after enquiry, for inflicting punishment, opportunity of representation be given to licensee. The Court drawn distinction between suspension as substantive punishment or suspension during pendency of enquiry while specifically holding that for suspension pending enquiry, notice need not be issued in terms of proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968.
In the earlier judgment in "Toddy Co-operative Society, Lingannapet Village v. Superintendent of Prohibition and Excise, Karimnagar6", the Court expressed similar view.
In "Goka Bujjamma v. Prohibition and Excise Superintendent" (referred supra), the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held that suspension of license to run wine shop without giving opportunity to licensee to make representation against the proposed action is not legal and set aside the impugned order while permitting the appellant therein to run the shop pending enquiry.
In "K.Srinivasa Reddy v. Superintendent, Prohibition and Excise7" the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held that suspension of liquor license without notice and without affording opportunity to make representation against the proposed action is 5 2005 (1) ALT 401 6 2004 (6) ALT 205 7 2002 (1) ALT 108 MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 7 violation of principles of natural justice and contrary to the proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act and directed the concerned authority to decide the matter finally on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the appellants - licensees therein.
Learned Single Judge of High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in "M/s.Sree Devi Wines v. The Deputy Commissioner of Excise, Kakinada" (referred supra) adverting to Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968 and proviso thereto held that the order of suspension amounts to punishment and such order cannot be passed without giving notice or without giving opportunity to the petitioner and held as follows:
"When the 2nd respondent had already come to a conclusion that the petitioner violated the rules and conditions of the licence, I fail to understand what further investigation remains for initiating criminal prosecution, if at all. Andhra Pradesh Foreign Liquor and Indian Liquor Rules, 1970 do not provide for suspension pending investigation. Rule 66 of the said Rules which deals with suspension, withdrawal or cancellation of a licence or permit provides that "A licence or permit may be suspended, cancelled or withdrawn in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 31 or Section 32 of the Act". Section 32 deals with the power to withdraw licence. It is only Section 31 of the Act which deals with the power to cancel or suspend the licence etc. If suspension of a licence is to be effected in a substantive way under sub- section (1) of Section 31, the proviso to that sub-section requires that unless the holder of the licence or permit is given an opportunity of making his representation against the action proposed, no licence or permit shall be cancelled. This is in negative and emphatic terms. In the present case, as already pointed out, a reading of the impugned suspension order discloses that the 2nd respondent had already concluded that the petitioner "willfully violated licence conditions and the rules and indulged in malpractices" - that is a finding under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act, which is as follows:
(b) in the event of any breach by the holder thereof, or by any of his servants or by any one acting on his behalf with his express or implied permission, of any of the terms and conditions thereof"
In view of the law declared in the judgment (referred supra), the order of suspension is violative of proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act, MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 8 1968. But this principle is contrary to the judgment of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in "Ramesh v. Prohibition and Excise Superintendent" (referred supra) and in consonance with Division Bench Judgment in "K.Srinivasa Reddy v. Superintendent, Prohibition and Excise" (referred supra) Learned Assistant Government Pleader for Prohibition and Excise relied on another Division Bench Judgment in "Goka Bujjamma v. Prohibition and Excise Superintendent" (referred supra), the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad also took a view that the proviso appended to Section 31(1) of the Act clearly states that no licence or permit shall be cancelled or suspended unless the holder thereof is given an opportunity of making his representation against the action proposed. The respondents therein neither gave any notice to the appellant therein nor gave any opportunity to make representation against the action proposed. Therefore, set aside the suspension order, but retain the show-cause notice for cancellation of license and directed the authorities to decide the matter on merits.
The said principle laid down by the Division Bench of High Court at Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad is in consonance with the view expressed in "M/s.Sree Devi Wines v. The Deputy Commissioner of Excise, Kakinada" (referred supra).
Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that principles of audi alteram partem has to be complied while passing any order and when it is not complied with, the order is illegal and violative of principles of natural justice. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in "Oryx Fisheries Private Limited v. Union of India" (referred supra). In the said MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 9 judgment, the Apex Court held that it is obvious that in passing the impugned order of cancellation, the respondents were acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and also they were acting in exercise of their statutory powers. Indisputably, the third respondent while purporting to cancel the registration certificate was acting in exercise of his power under Rule 43 of the MPEDA Rules. The show cause notice dated 23.01.2008 was issued by the third respondent in exercise of this power. Finally concluded that "a reasonable opportunity of making objection" or "a reasonable opportunity of defence" is to be afforded to the licensees and a similar question was considered by the Constitutional Bench in "Khem Chand v. Union of India8", wherein Constitutional Bench unanimously expressed its opinion that concept of `reasonable opportunity' includes various safeguards and one of them, in the words of the learned Chief Justice, is:
"(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges leveled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based"
The Apex Court further held that it is no doubt true that at the stage of show cause, the person proceeded against must be told the charges against him so that he can take his defence and prove his innocence. However, show-cause notice cannot be read hypertechnically and it is well settled that it is to be read reasonably.
The entire exercise of the Apex Court in the said judgment is to the effect that a reasonable opportunity has to be afforded before passing any order.
In "Tappers Co-operative Society, Maddur v. Superintendent of Excise, Mahaboobnagar" (referred supra), Full 8 AIR 1958 SC 300 MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 10 Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad while deciding an identical question of cancellation of license, on reference by Division Bench, examined the question of audi alteram partem and requirement of prior notice or opportunity before passing order of suspension or cancellation of license, held as follows:
"The next question to be examined is whether the rule of audi alteram partem is excluded in the case of an order suspending a licence as a temporary measure but not as a penalty. This distinction was brought out clearly in Furnell vs. Whangarei High Schools Board 1973 Appeal Cases 660 where the complaint of a school teacher suspending him pending determination of the charges was negatived holding that the suspension cannot be classified as a penalty. In Lewis vs. Heffer 1978 (3) All E.R. 354 the Court of Appeal expressly held that the right to a hearing depends on the distinction between a suspension as a temporary measure or as a penalty. In that case Lord Denning, MR accepting the view of Megary, J. in (1969) 2 All E.R. 274 that an expulsion of a member pro tanto operates as a penalty and the rules of natural justice applies, observed that "Those words apply, no doubt, to suspensions which are inflicted by way of punishment, as for instance when a member of the Bar is suspended from practice for six months, or when a solicitor is suspended from practice. But they do not apply to suspensions which are made, as a holding operation, pending enquiries. Very often irregularities are disclosed in a government department or in a business house; and a man may be suspended on full pay pending enquiries. Suspicion may rest on him; and so he is suspended until he is cleared of it. No one, so far as I know, has ever questioned such a suspension on the ground that it could not be done unless he is given notice of the charge and an opportunity of defending himself, and so forth. The suspension in such a case is merely done by way of good administration. A situation has arisen in which something must be done at once. The work of the department or the office is being affected by rumours and suspicions. The others will not trust the man. In order to get back to proper work, the man is suspended. At that stage the rules of natural justice do not apply." This extract clearly shows the distinction between a suspension as a penalty and a suspension as a tentative measure pending final orders.
The rule of natural justice is similarly excluded where preliminary proceedings are taken for further enquiry. In Wiseman vs. Borneman 1971 Appeal Cases 297 Lord Reid observed "Every public officer who has to decide whether to prosecute or raise proceedings ought first to decide whether there is a prima facie case, but no one supposes that justice requires that he should first seek the comments of the accused or the defendant on the material before him. So there is nothing inherently unjust in reaching such a decision in the absence of the other party." No doubt the observation relates MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 11 to the initiation of the proceedings but not passing adverse orders. In Paarlberg vs. Varty (Inspector of Taxes) 1971 (1) WLR. 728 the same question was answered by Lord Denning in the following words: ''I would go so far with him as to say that, in reaching a prima facie decision, there is a duty on any tribunal to act fairly: but fairness depends on the task in hand. Take an' application to a court which by statute, or by the rules, or, as a matter of practice, is made ex parte. The Court itself is the custodian of fairness. If the matter is so urgent that an order should be made forthwith, before hearing the other side, as in the case of an interim injunction or a stay of execution, the court will make the order straight away. We do it every day. We are always ready, of course, to hear the other side if they apply to discharge the order. But still the order is made ex parte without hearing them. It is a prima facie decision." The above judgment was affirmed by House of Lords in 1972 (1) Weekly Law Reports 534 and Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L.C. described the provisional nature of the decision as a significant factor in deciding whether there was a right to a hearing, although, not, as stressed in Wiseman vs. Bornman, (Supra) the conclusive factor."
The Full Bench referring earlier judgments of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in "V. Manesham v. State of A.P.9" "K. Venkataratnam v. District Revenue Officer10"and also judgment of Apex Court in "M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar vs. State of Punjab11" observed that the power of suspension is a necessary concomitant of the power to grant a privilege or a licence and the power of suspension is a necessary adjunct of the power to grant a licence. The power of suspension which is concomitant or adjunct is no doubt restricted by the statutory provision under the proviso in question to pass final orders of suspension but that power cannot be said to have been taken away to pass an interim order of suspension not intended to be a penalty but only interim measure to pass effective orders.
The Apex Court in "M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar vs. State of Punjab" (referred supra) further held that when the Court is concerned with liquor licences in which the citizen has no right 9 AP 1974(2) APLJ 366 10 AIR 1975 AP 359 11 AIR 1982 SC 65 MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 12 guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India but only a privilege. No doubt once a licence is granted valuable right would accrue to him and that can be taken away as per the provisions of the Act. But as a rule of construction the proviso cannot have a larger affect than it intended to govern the final disciplinary proceedings of suspending or cancelling a licence or permit. Full Bench also referred Rule 18 of Andhra Pradesh Rectified Spirit Rules, 1971, which are almost identical to the present provisions, it is not necessary to extract those rules.
Finally, Full Bench concluded that the rule provides suspension pending an investigation and a proviso enjoins the authorities to give opportunity. The question is would this rule lend support to the petitioner. To the mind of the Court, it is not. If the proviso to Section 31(1) is sufficient and the authorities are bound to issue the notice even for suspension pending enquiry the sub-rule 2 with its proviso is unnecessary as the law presumes such power pending enquiry. The rule specially provided an opportunity even for suspension pending enquiry. It shall be noticed that under Rule 18 there is no suspension as a substantive punishment but provides only for cancellation and a suspension pending enquiry. Further it is not permissible rule of construction to construe the power under the statute with reference to the rule made by the Executive even though the rules have statutory powers. Hence we are clearly of the opinion that the licensing authority can suspend a licence or permit pending final orders.
However, the Court clarified that the incidental or ancillary powers cannot be exercised in a routine way or as a matter of course. The licensing authority is bound to exercise the discretion MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 13 reasonably, bona fide and, without negligence considering the circumstances of the case when such interim suspension is necessary. If it is possible to give an opportunity to the petitioner and the circumstances do not warrant such a drastic step, the licensing authority is bound to afford an opportunity and the power of suspension pending enquiry should not be exercised as an invariable rule or mode of making an enquiry. Further the suspension pending the enquiry should not be allowed to continue for an unduly long period. The authorities are bound to complete the enquiry as early as possible and any undue delay when it constitutes abuse of power makes the order liable to be set aside. Whether the suspension of license must be preceded by notice or opportunity must depend upon various factors such as, degree of urgency involved, the duration of suspension, the nature of the breach, public danger to be avoided, and other similar circumstances which warrant an immediate action where it is not feasible or possible or even advisable to give an opportunity to the holders of the licenses before passing interim orders of suspension.
Though, proviso to Rule 18 (1) of Andhra Pradesh Rectified Spirit Rules, 1971, is almost identical to Section 31 (1) of A.P.Excise Act. The only difference between Rule 18 (1) of Andhra Pradesh Rectified Spirit Rules, 1971 and Section 18 of the Excise Act, 1968 is that the authorities under the Andhra Pradesh Rectified Spirit Rules have no power to suspend the license, but Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968 conferred power on the authorities to suspend the license. But the Section is not clear whether suspension is a substantive punishment or a measure during pendency of enquiry to be conducted after serving notice.
MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 14 Various Division Benches in the judgments referred supra, took a specific view that if the suspension is substantive punishment, notice as specified in proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968 is mandatory, when it is an interim measure, during pendency of enquiry and not substantive punishment, prior notice is not mandatory.
The Full Bench elaborately considered the facts and circumstances of the Case and finally concluded that that the licensing authority has got ancillary and incidental powers of suspending a license or permit pending enquiry in a given case if the circumstances clearly warrant and taking into account the urgency in the case, dismissed the writ petitions where the interim order of suspension is challenged.
If this principle laid down by Full Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad is applied to the present facts of the case, suspension in all the case is only suspension during pendency of the enquiry for passing final order. At the end of the impugned orders, the licensees were instructed to show cause as to why their 2B bar licenses should not be cancelled for willful violation of the licensing condition.
In any view of the matter, in the present facts of the case, suspension is only an interim measure during pendency of the enquiry for imposing penalty under Section 31 of the Act, 1968. More so, suspension is not for a specific period, in such case, this Court can direct the authorities to complete the enquiry for imposing penalty, if any under Section 31 of the Act, 1968, within the fixed period and complete enquiry strictly adhering to the procedure contemplated under Section 31 of the Act, 1968, keeping in view the MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 15 law laid down by the Full Bench in "Tappers Co-operative Society, Maddur v. Superintendent of Excise, Mahaboobnagar" (referred supra).
Therefore, it is evident from the facts, the suspension is only as an interim measure based on the material, but not a substantive punishment. In such circumstances, no notice under the proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968 is mandatory in view of full bench judgment in "Tappers Co-operative Society, Maddur v. Superintendent of Excise, Mahaboobnagar" (referred supra), though Division Benches and Single Judges expressed conflicting opinions.
Learned counsel for the petitioners brought to the notice of this Court that in similar circumstances, this Court allowed the writ petitions based on the principle laid down in "M/s.Sree Devi Wines v. The Deputy Commissioner of Excise, Kakinada" (referred supra).
Since both the parties did not bring to my notice the judgment of Full Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in "Tappers Co- operative Society, Maddur v. Superintendent of Excise, Mahaboobnagar" (referred supra). In these petitions, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Prohibition and Excise brought to my notice the judgment of Full Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in "Tappers Co-operative Society, Maddur v. Superintendent of Excise, Mahaboobnagar" (referred supra), which is straight away applicable to the present facts of these cases. Hence, by applying the principle laid down in the said judgment, I hold that the suspension order passed by the Superintendent, Prohibition and Excise is only an interim measure, but not as a MSM,J W.Ps._17737 _2019 and batch 16 substantive punishment, if it is substantive punishment or penalty, proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968 is required to be complied with. Hence, I hold that the impugned orders under challenge are only interim suspension pending enquiry for cancellation of license, but not a substantive penalty. Therefore, non - compliance of proviso to Section 31 (1) of the Act, 1968 is not an illegality. Hence, I find no ground to set aside the interim suspension pending enquiry for imposing penalty. Consequently, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.
In the result, all the writ petitions are dismissed. However, respondent No.3 is directed to dispose of the pending proceedings, if any, under Section 31 of the Act, 1968 as expeditiously as possible, preferably within one week from the date of submission of explanation to the show cause notice. In case, the enquiry is not completed within one week from the date of explanation to the show cause notice, orders of suspensions, impugned in these writ petitions, deemed to have been cancelled automatically without reference to the Court. No costs.
Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any shall stand closed.
__________________________________________ JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY 15.11.2019 Ksp Note: Issue C.C. today.
B/o Ksp