Delhi District Court
State vs Haider Raja And Ors on 29 October, 2025
1
IN THE COURT OF SH. JOGINDER PRAKASH NAHAR,
ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE (FTC)-01, CENTRAL,
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
CNR NO.DLCT01-010601-2016
SC No. 28817/2016
FIR No. 166/2016
U/s 394/395/397/411/506/34 IPC
P. S. Subzi Mandi
STATE VERSUS HAIDER RAJA AND ORS.
(i) SC No. of the case : 28817/2016
(ii) Date of commission of offence : 26.04.2016
(iii) Name, parentage and address
of accused : (i) Haider Raja s/o
Sh. Jahir, R/o H. no.
348, Hotel Wali Gali,
Kabir Basti, Malka
Ganj Subzi Mandi,
Delhi.
(ii) Manish s/o
Sh. Rajender, R/o H.
no. 328, Kabir Basti,
Malka Ganj, Subzi
Mandi, Delhi.
(iii) Naim
S/o Sh. Iqbal,
R/o H. no. 1818/38,
Anarkothi, Subzi Mandi,
Delhi.
(iv) Offences complained of : 394/395/397/411/506/34
IPC
SC No. 28817/2016
FIR No. 166/2016
P. S. Subzi Mandi
State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
2
(v) Plea of the accused : Not guilty
(vi) Final order : Acquittal
(vii) Date of such order : 29.10.2025
Date of Institution : 12.08.2016
Date of Judgment reserved on : 08.10.2025
Date of Judgment : 29.10.2025
JUDGMENT
BRIEF FACTS AND REASONS FOR DECISION :-
1. The complaint was filed by PW-2 Sh. Manish Sharma, Advocate vide complaint Ex. PW-2/A dated 26.04.2016. The complaint mentions that around 11:30 AM on 26.04.2016 outside court room no. 367, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, when the complainant / PW-2 was trying to enter the Court room then the way was obstructed due to crowd. PW-2 had asked accused person to give way on which, verbal altercation had occurred between PW-2 and those persons. PW-2 entered in the court and after sometime when he returned outside, then and that time 5 to 6 boys had obstructed his way. Those boys started pushing PW-2 and spoke that they will teach PW-2 a lesson as PW-2 SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 3 was claiming himself a big advocate. It was further claimed by those accused that PW-2 does not know about many cases on the accused person and accused will also make a file of PW-2.
When PW-2 tried to escape then one of the boys had caught hold of collar of PW-2. The other boy taken out a knife. All the said accused had started beating PW-2 while speaking that they will kill PW-2 on that day. The boy having knife had tried to hit PW-2 on neck on which PW-2 had saved himself by stepping back. One of the accused had put knife on the neck of PW-2 and the other accused snatched gold chain. Thereafter, the accused persons ran away from the spot while swirling knife in the air. One of the accused was caught by the advocate, who was later handed over by the same advocate at the Police Chowki. The accused at Police Chowki also threatened to kill the PW-2.
2. Police had investigated the case after registration of FIR Ex. PW-1/A and certificate under Section 65B is Ex. PW-1/C in respect of registration of FIR. The site plan is Ex. PW-2/B which was prepared by IO at the instance of PW-2. The MLC is Ex. PW-2/C. There is disclosure of accused no. 1 Haider Raja, where he had stated that on the said date the above three accused came at Tis Hazari Courts at court no. 367, Third Floor in one of the case in which all the above three accused were facing trial. He can get arrested accused no. 2 Manish and SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
4accused no. 3 Naim. In TIP proceeding Mark B, the accused Naim was correctly identified by PW-2 and in TIP proceeding Mark C, the accused Manish was correctly identified by PW-2. Accused no. 1 was arrested at the spot. Accused no. 2 Manish was arrested by police at Y point Sabzi Mandi, Delhi at the instance of accused no. 1 Haider Raja. Accused Naim was arrested outside his house from whose pocket a gold chain was recovered which was wrapped in a white paper.
3. The accused persons were summoned. The charge was given to all the accused under Section 397/394/34 IPC and they were also charged under Section 506 IPC. All the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed trial. Accused no. 3 Naim was also charged separately under Section 411 IPC from whose possession one gold chain was recovered, to which accused Naim had pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
4. The prosecution had led PW-1 to PW-12 as witness to substantiate their case against all the accused. The statement of accused no.1 Haider Raja was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 02.08.2025, the statement of accused no. 2 Manish was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 02.08.2025 and of accused no. 3 was recorded under Section 313 Cr. P. C. on 31.07.2025. All the accused had preferred not to lead evidence SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 5 in defence. The evidence in defence was closed and matter was listed for final argument.
5. Final arguments are heard on behalf of both the parties and record perused.
6. To prove the ingredients of Section 397/394 the prosecution has to prove the necessary ingredients. It was held in case titled State of Maharashtra vs. Joseph Mingel Koli (1997) 2 Crimes 228 (Bom) that when robbery is either committed or an attempt to commit it is made by five or more person than all such persons, who are present or aiding in its commission or in an attempt to commit it, would commit the offence of dacoity. The said definition is laid down u/Sec. 391 IPC. It is laid down in case titled Ganesan v. State represented by Station House Officer in Crl. Appeal no. 903/2021 from Hon'ble Supreme Court of India dated 29.10.2021 at para no. 12.3 that as per Section 397 IPC if at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous hurt to any person or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person, the imprisonment with which such offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven years. It was further held at para no. 12.4 that the only difference between robbery and dacoity would be number of persons SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
6involved in co-jointly committing or attempt to commit a robbery. It was further held that the word used u/Sec. 390, 392 to 395, 397 and 398 of IPC is 'offender'. It was further held that for the aforesaid act the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of constructive liability and only the 'offender' who 'uses any deadly weapon......' can be punished. However u/Sec. 391 IPC 'dacoity' and Section 396 IPC which is dacoity and murder then the accused can be convicted on the basis of constructive liability. The necessary ingredients of dacoity u/Sec. 397 IPC were laid down at para no. 12.6 of the above judgment titled Ganesan v. State (supra) and the relevant para is reproduced hereasunder:
12.2 To appreciate the aforesaid submissions the relevant provisions with respect to 'robbery' and 'dacoity' are required to be referred to. The relevant provisions would be Section 390 IPC to Section 398 IPC which read as under:
"390. Robbery.--In all robbery there is either theft or extortion. When theft is robbery.--Theft is "robbery" if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. When extortion is robbery.--Extortion is "robbery" if the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that person SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 7 or to some other person, and, by so putting in fear,induces the person so put in fear then and there to deliver up the thing extorted. Explanation.--The offender is said to be present if he is sufficiently near to put the other person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.
391. Dacoity.--When five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or where the whole number of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery, and persons present
1.Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, s. 117 and the Sch., for "transportation for life" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956). 99 and aiding such commission or attempt, amount to five or more, every person so committing, attempting or aiding, is said to commit "dacoity".
392. Punishment for robbery.--Whoever commits robbery shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if the robbery be committed on the highway between sunset and sunrise, the imprisonment may be extended to fourteen years.
393. Attempt to commit robbery.--Whoever attempts to commit robbery shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
394. Voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery.--If any person, in committing or in attempting to commit robbery, voluntarily causes hurt, such person, and any other person jointly concerned in committing or attempting to commit such robbery, shall be punished with 1 [imprisonment for life], or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
395. Punishment for dacoity.--Whoever commits dacoity shall be punished with 1 [imprisonment for life], or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
8years, and shall also be liable to fine.
396. Dacoity with murder.--If any one of five or more persons, who are conjointly committing dacoity, commits murder in so committing dacoity, every one of those persons shall be punished with death, or 1 [imprisonment for life], or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
397. Robbery, or dacoity, with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt.--If, at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous hurt to any person, or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person, the imprisonment with which such offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven years.
398. Attempt to commit robbery or dacoity when armed with deadly weapon.--If, at the time of attempting to commit robbery or dacoity, the offender is armed with any deadly weapon, the imprisonment with which such offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven years."
12.3 As per Section 390 IPC, for 'robbery' there is either theft or extortion. When in the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint the theft can be said to be 'robbery'. In similar situation the 'extortion' can be said to have committed 'robbery'. As per explanation to Section 390 IPC the offender is said to be present if he is sufficiently near to put the other person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.
Section 391 IPC defines 'dacoity'. When five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, the accused then can be said to have committed the 'dacoity'.
SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 9 As per Section 392 IPC whoever commits robbery shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. However, if the robbery is committed on the highway between sunset and sunrise, the imprisonment may be extended to fourteen years. As per Section 393 IPC even an attempt to commit robbery is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years with fine. As per Section 394 IPC if any person, in committing or in attempting to commit robbery, voluntarily causes hurt, such person, and any other person jointly concerned in committing or attempting to commit such robbery, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 395 IPC provides for punishment for 'dacoity'. Whoever commits dacoity shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. In case of dacoity with murder if any one of five or more persons, who are conjointly committing dacoity, commits murder in so committing dacoity, every one of those persons shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years with fine.
As per Section 397 IPC if at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous hurt to any person, or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person, the imprisonment with which such offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven years. Similarly, if, at the time of committing robbery or dacoity the offender is armed with any deadly weapon, the imprisonment with which such offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven years.
12.4 On conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, commission of 'robbery' is sine qua non. The 'dacoity' can be said to be an exaggerated version of robbery. If five or more persons SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
10conjointly commit or attempt to commit robbery it can be said to be committing the 'dacoity'. Therefore, the only difference between the 'robbery' and the 'dacoity' would be the number of persons involved in conjointly committing or attempt to commit a 'robbery'. The punishment for 'dacoity' and 'robbery' would be the same except that in the case of 'dacoity' the punishment can be with imprisonment for life. However, in the case of 'dacoity with murder' the punishment can be with death also. However, in a case where the offender uses any deadly weapon or causes grievous hurt to any person, or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person the imprisonment with which such offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven years. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants have rightly submitted that to bring the case within Section 397 IPC, the offender who uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous hurt to any person shall be liable for minimum punishment under Section 397 IPC. Section 392 and Section 390 IPC are couched in different words. In Sections 390, 394, 397 and 398 IPC the word used is 'offender'. Therefore, for the purpose of Sections 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398 IPC only the offender/person who committed robbery and/or voluntarily causes hurt or attempt to commit such robbery and who uses any deadly weapon or causes grievous hurt to any person, or commits to cause death or grievous death any person at the time of committing robbery or dacoity can be punished for the offences under Sections 390, 392, 393, 394, 395 and 397 and 398 IPC. For the aforesaid the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of constructive liability and only the 'offender' who 'uses any deadly weapon....' can be punished. However, so far as Section 391 IPC 'dacoity' and Section 396 IPC - 'dacoity with murder' is concerned an accused can be convicted on the basis of constructive liability, however the only requirement would be the involvement of five or more persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery - dacoity/dacoity with murder.
12.5 At this stage, the decision of this Court in Shri Phool Kumar (Supra) is required to be referred to. In the aforesaid decision this Court has observed and considered Sections 397 and 398 IPC and on interpretation of the aforesaid provisions, it is observed and held in paragraphs 5 to 7 as under:
SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 11 "5. Section 392 of the Penal Code provides: "Whoever commits robbery shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if the robbery be committed on the highway between sunset and sunrise, the imprisonment may be extended to fourteen years." The sentence of imprisonment to be awarded under Section 392 cannot be less than seven years if at the time of committing robbery the offender uses any deadly weapon or causes grievous hurt to any person or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person: vide Section 397. A difficulty arose in several High Courts as to the meaning of the word "uses" in Section 397. The term "offender" in that section, as rightly held by several High Courts, is confined to the offender who uses any deadly weapon. The use of a deadly weapon by one offender at the time of committing robbery cannot attract Section 397 for the imposition of the minimum punishment on another offender who had not used any deadly weapon. In that view of the matter use of the gun by one of the culprits whether he was accused Ram Kumar or somebody else, (surely one was there who had fired three shots) could not be and has not been the basis of sentencing the appellant with the aid of Section 397. So far as he is concerned he is said to be armed with a knife which is also a deadly weapon. To be more precise from the evidence of PW 16 "Phool Kumar had a knife in his hand". He was therefore carrying a deadly weapon open to the view of the victims sufficient to frighten or terrorize them. Any other overt act, such as, brandishing of the knife or causing of grievous hurt with it was not necessary to bring the offender within the ambit of Section 397 of the Penal Code.
6. Section 398 uses the expression "armed with any deadly weapon" and the minimum punishment provided therein is also seven years if at the time of attempting to commit robbery the offender is armed with any deadly weapon.
This has created an anomaly. It is unreasonable to think that if the offender who merely attempted to commit robbery but did not succeed in committing it attracts the minimum punishment of seven years under Section 398 if SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
12he is merely armed with any deadly weapon, while an offender so armed will not incur the liability of the minimum punishment under Section 397 if he succeeded in committing the robbery. But then, what was the purport behind the use of the different words by the Legislature in the two sections viz. "uses" in Section 397 and "is armed"
in Section 398. In our judgment the anomaly is resolved if the two terms are given the identical meaning. There seems to be a reasonable explanation for the use of the two different expressions in the sections. When the offence of robbery is committed by an offender being armed with a deadly weapon which was within the vision of the victim so as to be capable of creating a terror in his mind, the offender must be deemed to have used that deadly weapon in the commission of the robbery. On the other hand, if an offender was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of attempting to commit a robbery, then the weapon was not put to any fruitful use because it would have been of use only when the offender succeeded in committing the robbery.
7. If the deadly weapon is actually used by the offender in the commission of the robbery such as in causing grievous hurt, death or the like then it is clearly used. In the cases of Chandra Nath v. Emperor [AIR 1932 Oudh 103] ;Nagar Singh v. Emperor [AIR 1933 Lah 35] and Inder Singh v. Emperor [AIR 1934 Lah 522] some overt act such as brandishing the weapon against another person in order to overawe him or displaying the deadly weapon to frighten his victim have been held to attract the provisions of Section 397 of the Penal Code. J.C. Shah and Vyas, JJ. of the Bombay High Court have said in the case of Govind Dipaji More v. State [AIR 1956 Bom 353] that if the knife was used for the purpose of producing such an impression upon the mind of a person that he would be compelled to part with his property, that would amount to 'using' the weapon within the meaning of Section 397. In that case also the evidence against the appellant was that he carried a knife in his hand when he went to the shop of the victim. In our opinion this is the correct view of the law and the restricted meaning given to the word "uses" in the case of SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 13 Chand Singh [ILR (1970) 2 Punj and Har 108] is not correct."
12.6. The aforesaid view has been subsequently reiterated by this Court in the case of Dilawar Singh (Supra) and in paragraphs 19 to 21 it is observed and held as under:
"19. The essential ingredients of Section 397 IPC are as follows:
1. The accused committed robbery.
2. While committing robbery or dacoity
(i) the accused used deadly weapon
(ii) to cause grievous hurt to any person
(iii) attempted to cause death or grievous hurt to any person.
3. "Offender" refers to only culprit who actually used deadly weapon. When only one has used the deadly weapon, others cannot be awarded the minimum punishment. It only envisages the individual liability and not any constructive liability. Section 397 IPC is attracted only against the particular accused who uses the deadly weapon or does any of the acts mentioned in the provision.
But the other accused are not vicariously liable under that section for acts of the co-accused.
20. As noted by this Court in Phool Kumar v. Delhi Admn. [(1975) 1 SCC 797 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 336 : AIR 1975 SC 905] the term "offender" under Section 397 IPC is confined to the offender who uses any deadly weapon. Use of deadly weapon by one offender at the time of committing robbery cannot attract Section 397 IPC for the imposition of minimum punishment on another offender who had not used any deadly weapon. There is distinction between "uses" as used in Sections 397 IPC and 398 IPC.Section 397 IPC connotes something more than merely being armed with deadly weapon.
SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
1421. In the instant case admittedly no injury has been inflicted. The use of weapon by offender for creating terror in mind of victim is sufficient. It need not be further shown to have been actually used for cutting, stabbing or shooting, as the case may be. [See Ashfaq v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(2004) 3 SCC 116 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 687 : AIR 2004 SC 1253]."
8.The first ingredient the prosecution has to prove that the accused has committed robbery. Robbery is only an aggravated form of the offence of theft or extortion in the use of violation of death, hurt or restraint in the same process. Even the attempt to commit such violence is punishable as robbery. The robbery is defined u/Sec. 390 IPC and essential ingredients of which were laid down in citation titled Venu @ Venugopal & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2008) 3 SCC 94=AIR 2008 SC 1199 as under:
(i) Accused committed theft
(ii) Accused voluntarily caused or attempted to cause
(a) death, hurt or wrongful restraint
(b) Fear of instant death, hurt or wrongful restraint.
(iii) He did either act for the end
(a) to commit theft
(b) while committing theft
(c) In carrying away or in the attempt to carry away property obtained by theft.
The relevant para 8 to 13 are reproduced hereasunder:
8. Section 392 IPC provides for punishment for robbery. The essential ingredients are as follows:
1. Accused committed theft;
2. Accused voluntarily caused or attempted to cause.
(i) death, hurt or wrongful restraint.
SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 15
(ii) Fear of instant death, hurt or wrongful restraint.
3. He did either act for the end.
(i) to commit theft.
(ii) While committing theft.
(iii) In carrying away or in the attempt to carry away property obtained by theft.
9. It is to be noted that the Section 392 provides punishment for robbery. It is punishment for the offence defined in Section 390. Punishment is higher if it is committed on a highway and between sunset and sunrise.
Section 390 which defines "robbery" reads as follows:
390. Robbery.- In all robbery there is either theft or extortion.
When theft is robbery.-Theft is "robbery" if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by theft, the offender, for the end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.
When extortion is robbery.-Extortion is "robbery" if the offender at the time of committing the extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that person or to some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces the person so put in SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
16fear then, and there to deliver up the thing extorted.
Explanation.-The offender is said to be present if he is sufficiently near put the other person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint."
10. The provision defines robbery which is theft or extortion when caused with violence of death, hurt or wrongful restraint. When there is no theft committed, then as a natural corollary there cannot be robbery. Robbery is only an aggravated form of offence of theft or extortion. Aggravation is in the use of violence of death, hurt or restraint. Violence must be in course of theft and not subsequently. It is not necessary that violence actually should be committed but even attempt to commit it is enough.
11. The authors of the Code observed as follows:
"In one single class of cases, theft and extortion are in practice confounded together so inextricably, that no judge, however, sagacious, could discriminate between them. This class of cases, therefore, has, in all systems of jurisprudence ... been treated as a perfectly distinct class ... we have, therefore, made robbery a separate crime.
There can be no case of robbery which does not fall within the definition either of theft or of extortion; but in a practice it will perpetually be a matter of doubt whether a particular act of SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 17 robbery was a theft or an extortion. A large proportion of robberies will be half theft, half extortion. A seizes Z, threatens to murder him, unless he delivers all his property, and begins to pull off Z's ornaments. Z in terror begs that A will take all he has, and spare his life, assists in taking off his ornaments, and delivers them to A. Here, such ornaments as A took without Z's consent are taken by theft. Those which Z delivered up from fear of death are acquired by extortion. It is by no means improbable that Z's right arm bracelet may have been obtained by theft, and left-arm bracelet by extortion; that the rupees in Z's girdle may have been obtained by theft, and those in his turban by extortion. Probably in nine-tenths of the robberies which are committed, something like this actually takes place, and it is probable that a few minutes later neither the robber nor the person robbed would be able to recollect in what proportions theft and extortion were mixed in the crime; nor is it at all necessary for the ends of justice that this should be ascertained. For though, in general, the consent of a sufferer is a circumstance which very materially modifies the character of the offence, and which ought, therefore, to be made known to the Courts, yet the consent which a person gives to the taking of this property by a ruffian who holds a pistol to his breast is a circumstance altogether immaterial".
12. The words "for that end" in Section 390 clearly mean that the hurt caused must be with the object of facilitating the committing of the theft or must be caused while the offender is committing theft or is carrying away or is attempting to carry SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
18away property obtained by the theft.
13. As the provision itself provides when the highway robbery is committed, deterrent punishment is called for. xxxxxxx
7. The first ingredient the prosecution has to prove is that the accused have committed theft. In the present case on 26.04.2016 at about 11:30 AM all the accused in furtherance of their common intention have committed the robbery of gold chain of the complainant and the accused Haider Raja was armed with deadly weapon / knife. The complaint is Ex.PW2/A and the incident had allegedly occurred outside the Court room No.367.
GOLD CHAIN
8. Now it has to be seen that whether the prosecution has proved on record that the gold chain was snatched by the accused person from PW-2 Sh. Manish Sharma, Advocate. PW-2 in his cross examination by learned Addl. PP for the State dated 31.08.2019 has deposed that the gold chain was recovered by him at the spot itself whereas seizure memo Ex.PW3/F shows that the gold chain was recovered from accused Naim on 27.04.2016 in front of Subzi Mandi. Accused Naim was SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 19 arrested on the next day on 27.04.2016 vide Ex.PW3/G. Hence there is material contradiction in the evidence of the prosecution when the gold chain was already recovered by PW-2 the complainant on 26.04.2016 then how it could be recovered from accused Naim on 27.04.2016. Hence the snatching of gold chain by the accused person from the complainant has become doubtful benefit of which goes to the accused. The TIP of the case property which is gold chain was conducted vide Ex.PW12/B wherein PW-2 has correctly identified the gold chain Ex.P-1. PW-2 has deposed that during manhandling his gold chain weighing about 25 grams was broken which was found at the spot later on and the same is further reaffirmed during cross examination by learned Addl. PP of the State on 31.08.2019 that the gold chain of PW-2 was found at the spot. Hence the identification of gold chain in TIP does not advance the case of the prosecution any further in view of the contradictions pointed out above which goes to the root of the case of the prosecution. It is noted that accused No.2 Haider Raja was arrested from the spot on the day of incident vide memo Ex.PW2/B. IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED NO.2 AND 3
9. The case of the prosecution is that there were 5-6 accused SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
20persons outside the Court room No.367. In the present case the police had got on record only 3 accused. The sketch of all the accused were not prepared by the police who allegedly ran away from the spot on 26.04.2016. In TIP of accused No.2 Manish and accused No.3 Naim were correctly identified by the complainant. Now it has to be seen that whether such TIP serves any value. PW-2 in his examination in chief dated 21.12.2016 at second page has deposed that on 29.04.2016 he was called by ASI Nahar Singh at police post Tis Hazari who had shown 2 photographs of co-accused to him telling that they are accused Naim and accused Manish. It was further told to PW-2 that PW-2 has to identify the accused person in the judicial TIP. On the same day PW-2 joined the judicial TIP and identified the accused at Tihar Jail. Hence the identification of accused No.2 and 3 serves no value and prosecution has no evidence to connect the accused No.2 and 3 to the above incident. Another fact to be noted is that outside the Court room CCTV was installed. The CCTV footage got on record is Ex.PW4/A which is a DVD containing CCTV footage from 10:00 AM to 12:30 PM dated 26.04.2016 outside Court room No.363, Third Floor. Hence the CCTV footage of different Court room is produced before the Court and not of Court room No.367. Hence the relevant evidence though available is not produced by prosecution on record and therefore adverse SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 21 inference is drawn against the prosecution that had such evidence being produced on record then this evidence would have gone against the case of the prosecution. The prosecution has failed to observe the best evidence rule. Further, the prosecution has not got identified any of the accused persons in the CCTV footage. PW-10 has deposed that accused persons were present outside Court room No.369 for the reason that they had their case pending in the said Court. This shows that accused person had no reason to be present either outside Court room No.367 or outside Court room No.363. Hence the presence of accused persons outside the Court room No.367 has become doubtful. Hence prosecution has failed to prove presence of accused No.1, 2 and 3 outside Court room No.367.
10. Now it has to be seen that whether accused No.1 was caught at the spot by PW-2. PW-7 Rishabh Jain has deposed that fellow advocates including Sh. Jeetesh Khari and PW-7 who were present in the gallery of the Court No.367 had apprehended accused No.1 Haider Raja at the spot and took him to the Police Post Tis Hazari. PW-7 has further deposed that on 02.07.2018 PW-2 /Advocate Manish Sharma /the complainant had threatened PW-7 in not to depose true facts of the case before the Court. PW-2 had asked PW-7 to change his previous version given to police in order to save the accused. It is further SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
22stated by PW-2 to PW-7 that he had settled the dispute with the accused person having received Rs.2.5 lakh. Some money was also offered for not deposing true facts to PW-7 by PW-2 which was refused by PW-7. On 03.07.2018 PW-2 had further threatened to PW-7 with local goons for not deposing true facts in which respect a police complaint was also lodged by PW-7 dated 04.07.2018 and 06.07.2018 which are Mark-X1 and Mark-X2. On 06.08.2017 Advocate Jeetesh Khari threatened PW-7 on which a call at 100 number was made by PW-7 and complaint Mark-X3 and Mark-X4 was also lodged at police station on which no action was taken. On next date during cross examination dated 19.11.2018 PW-7 has deposed that he had noticed 3-4 advocates outside the Court namely Sh. Sanjay Malik, Sh. Vikas Bhardwaj and Sh. Kapil Vats. He had seen accused No.1 Haider Raja abusing PW-2 and giving slaps and fist blows. He does not recall abuses. He did not see any weapon in the hands of any of the accused. PW-7 has deposed at page 3 that he did not see accused No.2 Manish and accused No.3 Naim on the day of incident at the spot. Hence PW-7 has not identified accused No.2 and 3. PW-2 has also not identified accused No.2 and 3 by deposing that he was shown photographs of 2 accused by ASI Nahar Singh.
11. PW-11 Advocate Jeetesh Khari has deposed that 3-4 boys SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 23 were being taken to the police post at Tis Hazari by the crowd and he does not know the reason of the quarrel. Whereas only one boy / accused was arrested at the spot then how PW-11 could have seen 3-4 boys taken at the police post. PW-11 has deposed that PW-2 had told him about the incident and he does not remember the same. During cross examination by learned Addl.PP for the State PW-11 has deposed that he had never seen accused No.1 Haider Raja. Hence PW-11 has not identified any of the accused. PW-7 has identified accused No.1 but not for the alleged offence of robbery and not for threatening PW-2 with threat of grievous injuries. PW-2 has not identified any of the accused before the Court including accused No.1. Hence none of the accused are identified by public prosecution witness which are PW-2, PW-7 and PW-11 on record. PW-7 does not remember that who had apprehended the accused No.1 Haider Raja and took him to the Police Chowki and which creates doubt about the presence of PW-7 at the spot. Hence the prosecution has failed to prove the identity of all the accused. Further the deposition of PW-7 has shown that PW-2 and PW-11 are not deposing truthfully and the public prosecution witness are deposing contrary to each other. It has also become doubtful whether the accused person were standing outside the Court No.367 or standing outside the Court No. 363 or Court room No.369. There was no reason for the accused SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
24person to remain present outside Court room No.367 when they had pending case in Court room No.369 and this creates doubt about the presence of accused person outside the Court room No.367. The statement of 3-4 advocate named by PW-11 is relevant when they were available at the spot and they were not recorded by the police and nor they were brought in witness box. Further, learned counsel for the accused has submitted that PW-7 in his statement under Section 161 Cr.PC had not stated to the IO that accused No.1 Haider Raja had slapped PW-2 several times. Hence prosecution witness are improving their deposition and statements from time to time which creates serious doubt about truthfulness about the case of the prosecution. Further PW-11 has deposed that he was told about the incident by PW-2 only and his evidence is hearsay only in this regard. Hence identity of the any of the accused is not established if they were apprehended outside Court room No.367 and in this regard benefit of doubt is extended to all the accused.
RECOVERY OF KNIFE
12. As per the case of the prosecution in the chargesheet the accused who had used knife is different from the accused who had snatched the gold chain. The accused Haider Raja who was SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 25 apprehended on the spot had allegedly used the knife. The accused No.1 Haider Raja who caught by advocates at the spot while running away. However no knife was seized from the accused Haider Raja from the spot. This creates doubt in the case of the prosecution if the accused Haider Raja had used the knife on PW-2 the victim. PW-2 in his deposition has improved upon his complaint Ex.PW2/A where he had stated that he was attacked by knife. Whereas in his deposition dated 21.12.2016 at page No.1 it is deposed that a pointed object was used by the accused. The MLC of PW-2 is Ex.PW2/C records that an unknown object was used. PW-2 did not give statement to the Doctor that knife or pointed object was used by the accused Haider Raja. Hence use of any pointed object or knife by the accused Haider Raja has become doubtful. The nature of injury was recorded as simple. The Dr. Surender Kumar has deposed as PW-5 who had examined the PW-2. The 4 injuries reported are bruises and abrasions and none of the injuries are recorded as sharp injuries in the nature of caused by a pointed object or by knife. The nature of injury was simple. Hence the medical evidence also does not support that accused Haider Raja had used knife against PW-2. This also creates doubt in the case of the prosecution.
13. PW-7 Adv. Rishabh Jain had seen only manhandling by SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
26accused Haider Raja and there is no recovery of knife soon thereafter. It is not the case of the prosecution that the knife was handed over to any other co-accused by accused Haider Raja. Before starting running of the accused Haider Raja PW-7 had already reached at the spot. Hence it cannot be said that PW-7 could have missed the alleged use of knife by accused Haider Raja. In absence of such description of knife and its use by PW-7 is a contradiction to the deposition of PW-2 and also to the case of the prosecution. As the PW-7 at page 3 of cross examination dated 19.11.2018 has deposed that he had not seen any weapon in the hand of any of the accused. He had also not seen accused No.2 Manish and accused No.3 Naim at the spot of the incident. Hence the presence of accused No.2 and 3 has become doubtful. The use of knife by any of the accused has become doubtful which prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt. Hence the benefit of doubt in above respect is extended to all the accused.
14. The incident had occurred at 11:30 AM whereas MLC Ex.PW2/C was recorded at 4:00 PM. The statement of PW-2 must have been recorded vide Ex.PW2/A when he was fit for statement after preparation of MLC. Hence sufficient time was available with PW-2 to improve on his statement.
SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 27
15. Hence it is held that the prosecution has failed to prove that any of the accused had committed theft to gold chain of PW-2. The prosecution has further to failed prove that any of the accused had voluntarily caused or attempted to cause death, hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death, hurt or wrongful restraint on PW-2 by use of the alleged knife which is not recovered in this matter. When the first two ingredients fail then the third ingredient fails automatically that the act of the accused was for the end to commit theft or while committing theft or in attempt for such theft or carrying away. Use of knife was also not proved and necessary ingredients under Section 394 IPC are also not proved on record. The identity of accused No.2 and 3 regarding their presence at the spot of incident at outside Court room No.367 is also doubtful and the common intention or part of any of the accused is also not proved on record.
16. The relevant citation in respect of Section 506 IPC is reproduced as under:
It was laid down by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled State (NCT of Delhi) v. Jawahar Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4970 hereasunder:
37. The Respondent was also charged under Section 506 IPC for having threatened the Prosecutrix with a threat to kill her and the family members, in case she disclosed about the incident to any person. Section 506 IPC is reproduced as under:--
"Section 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.--SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016
P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.28
Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.-- And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."
"Section 503. Criminal intimidation.--
Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.-- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.
Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation."
38. A bare perusal of Section 506 IPC makes it clear that before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that an accused had an intention to cause alarm to the Prosecutrix. Mere threats given by the accused not with an intention to cause alarm, would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation.
39. In the case of Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423, the Apex Court had observed that simply using abusive or threatening language without any intent to cause alarm, does not come within the scope of Section 503 IPC. For a threat to qualify under this Section, it must be made with the intention to cause alarm to the person threatened or to coerce them into doing something they are not legally obligated to do, or to refrain from doing something they are legally permitted to do.
SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 29
40. Furthermore, the Apex Court in Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604 referred to Sharif Ahmed v. State of U.P., (2024) 14 SCC 122 wherein it was held that an offence of criminal intimidation arises when the accused intends to cause alarm to the victim, though it does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not.
41. In the present case, first and the foremost in every statement, the Prosecutrix had stated that she pushed the Respondent and ran out of the house and thereafter, had stated that she was threatened by the Respondent. If the Prosecutrix had left immediately on being allegedly sexually assaulted by pushing away the Respondent, where was the occasion for the Respondent to extend threat to the Prosecutrix. The sequence of events, as narrated by the prosecutrix, does not clearly establish that the alleged threat was made with the intention to cause alarm.
42. Mere threats given by the accused not with an intention to cause alarm, would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation. The Prosecution in the facts of the case has not been able to prove the offence under Section 506 IPC.
17. PW-2 has deposed that the said accused were not present in the Court and he had not identified any of the accused who has allegedly extended threat to him. PW-7 has not deposed that in his presence the accused person had threatened PW-2. PW-11 has again turned hostile to the case of the prosecution. Any of the ingredient of Section 506 IPC that the accused person had caused criminal intimidation or has caused threat to cause hurt or grievous hurt on PW-2 are absent in the evidence of the case of the prosecution. It is also settled law that merely because a person uttered some words in absence of intention to cause harm which may lead to execution of such threat then the SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
30alleged threat will not come in the four corners of Section 506 IPC. However even the threat itself is not proved by the prosecution in the present case and hence it is held that prosecution has failed to prove the commission of offence under Section 506/34 IPC by any of the accused or under Section 392/394/397 by accused No.1 Haider Raja. It is settled law that under Section 392, 394 and 397 IPC the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of constructive liability and they are liable to be convicted independently for their acts under the above provisions of law. The prosecution has also failed to prove that any of the accused had committed offence under Section 506 IPC against PW-2.
18. The accused No.3 Naim was further charged under Section 411 IPC. The necessary ingredients of which are detailed in the citation titled as Shiv Kumar vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh Criminal Appeal No.153 of 2022.
13. Section 411 IPC:
"411. Dishonestly receiving stolen property.- Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
The penal Section extracted above can be broken down into four segments namely: Whoever, I. Dishonestly; II. Receives or retains any stolen property; III. Knowing; or IV. Having reason to believe SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 31 the same to be stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
14. "Dishonestly" is defined under Section 24 of the IPC as, "Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing "dishonestly". The key ingredient for a crime is, of course, Mens Rea. This was nicely explained by Justice K. Subba Rao in the case of Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration4 in the following paragraphs: -
"9A. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court, in Kotamraju Venkatraadu v. Emperor [(1905)ILR 28 Mad 90, 96, 97] had to consider the case of a person obtaining admission to the matriculation examination of the Madras University as a private candidate producing to the Registrar a certificate purporting to have been signed by the headmaster of a recognized High School that he was of good character and had attained his 20th year. It was found in that case that the candidate had fabricated the signature of the headmaster. The court held that the accused was guilty of forgery. White, C.J., observed:
"Intending to defraud means, of course, something more than deceiving." He illustrated this by the following example: "A tells B a lie and B believes him. B is deceived but it does not follow that A intended to defraud B. But, as it seams to me, if A tells B a lie intending that B should do something which A conceives to be to his own benefit or advantage, and which, if done, would be to the loss or detriment of B, A intends to defraud B." The learned Chief Justice indicated his line of thought, which has some bearing on the question now raised, by the following observations:
"I may observe, however, in this connection that by Section 24 of the Code person does a thing dishonestly who does it with the intention of causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss. It is not necessary that there should be an intention to cause both. On the analogy of this definition, it might be said that either an intention to secure a benefit or advantage on the one hand, or to cause loss or detriment on the other, by means of deceit is an intent to defraud."SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016
P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
32But, he found in that case that both the elements were present. Benson, J. pointed out at p. 114:
"I am of opinion that the act was fraudulent not merely by reason of the advantage which the accused intended to secure for himself by means of his deceit, but also by reason of the injury which must necessarily result to the University, and through it to the public from such acts if unrepressed. The University is injured, if through the evasion of its bye-laws, it is induced to declare that certain persons have fulfilled the conditions prescribed for Matriculation and are entitled to the benefits of Matriculation, when in fact, they have not fulfilled those conditions for the value of its examinations is depreciated in the eyes of the public if it is found that the certificate of the University that they have passed its examinations is no longer a guarantee that they have in truth fulfilled the conditions on which alone the University professes to certify them as passed, and to admit them to the benefits of Matriculation."
Boddam, J., agreed with the learned Chief Justice and Benson, J. This decision accepts the principle laid down by Stephen, namely, that the intention to defraud is made up of two elements, first an intention to deceive and second the intention to expose some person either to actual injury or risk of possible injury; but the learned Judges were also inclined to hold on the analogy of the definition of "dishonestly" in Section 24 of the Code that intention to secure a benefit or advantage to the deceiver satisfies the second condition."
15. To establish that a person is dealing with stolen property, the "believe" factor of the person is of stellar import. For successful prosecution, it is not enough to prove that the accused was either negligent or that he had a cause to think that the property was stolen, or that he failed to make enough inquiries to comprehend the nature of the goods procured by him. The initial possession of the goods in question may not be illegal but retaining those with the knowledge that it was stolen property, makes it culpable.
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21. In Trimbak vs. State of Madhya Pradesh5, this Court discussed the essential ingredients for conviction under Section 411 of the SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 33 IPC. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, in his erudite opinion rightly observed that in order to bring home the guilt under Section 411 IPC, the prosecution must prove, "5. (1) that the stolen property was in the possession of the accused, (2) that some person other than the accused had possession of the property before the accused got possession of it, and (3) that the accused had knowledge that the property was stolen property...."
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23. That apart, the disclosure statement of one accused cannot be accepted as a proof of the appellant having knowledge of utensils being stolen goods. The prosecution has also failed to establish any basis for the appellant to believe that the utensils seized from him were stolen articles. The factum of selling utensils at a lower price cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was aware of the theft of those articles. The essential ingredient of mens Rea is clearly not established for the charge under Section 411 of IPC. The Prosecution's evidence on this aspect, as they would speak of the character Gratiano in Merchant of Venice, can be appropriately described as, "you speak an infinite deal of nothing."6
24. In a case like this, where the fundamental evidence is not available and the law leans in appellant's favour, notwithstanding the concurrent finding, the Court has to exercise corrective jurisdiction as the circumstances justify. As such, taking a cue from Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation vs. Cork Manufacturing Co7., the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 is found to be merited to do justice to the appellant who was held to be guilty, without the requisite evidence to establish his mens rea in the crime.
19. Accused No.3 Naim is further acquitted under Section 411 IPC as the stolen gold chain was already recovered by PW-2 at the spot itself and there is material contradiction to this effect in the case of the prosecution that alleged gold chain was SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.
34recovered later on by the police from the custody fo accused No.3 Naim. The above story of prosecution cannot be believed. The ownership of gold chain is also not proved by the prosecution with relevant evidence on record. Hence it is held that the prosecution has failed to prove the offence under Section 411 IPC against all the accused Naim and he is therefore stands acquitted under Section 411 IPC.
20. In such view of the matter there is absence of sufficient material/ evidence on record by way of proof to satisfy any ingredient of any of the offence against which all the accused are charged with. Hence it is held that the prosecution has failed to prove the charged offences against all the accused.
21. In view of above, it is held that prosecution has failed to discharge burden of proof that all the accused had committed offence under Section 394/397/506/34 IPC and further that accused No.3 Naim had committed offence under Section 411 IPC. Hence the accused No.1 Haider Raja, accused No.2 Manish and accused No.3 Naim are acquitted of the offence charged under Section 394/397/506/34 IPC against them. Further accused No.3 Naim is also acquitted of the offence charged under Section 411 IPC against him. Accordingly, accused No.1 Haider Raja, accused No.2 Manish and accused SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja Etc. 35 No.3 Naim stand acquitted. Their earlier personal bond are cancelled and surety are discharged and documents, if any, be returned to the surety and endorsement on security documents is allowed to be de-endorsed. In terms of Section 481 of BNSS /437A Cr. PC, accused have furnished their bail bonds as directed which will be in force for period of six months from the date of this judgment. Case property be confiscated to the State.
File be consigned to Record Room.
Digitally signed JOGINDER by JOGINDER Announced in the open court PRAKASH PRAKASH NAHAR on dated 29.10.2025 NAHAR Date: 2025.10.29 15:39:19 +0530 (JOGINDER PRAKASH NAHAR) Additional Sessions Judge (FTC-I) Tis Hazari Court/Delhi/29.10.2025 SC No. 28817/2016 FIR No. 166/2016 P. S. Subzi Mandi State vs. Haider Raja and Ors.