Calcutta High Court
Dr. Subhash Chandra Pratihar vs Mrs. Leena Chakraborty And Ors. on 10 September, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1995CRILJ707
ORDER
1. This is an Application by the Petitioner under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against the Opposite-Parties for deliberate and intentional violation of the orders dated 25th March, 1991 and 10th January, 1992 passed by Mahitosh Majumdar, J., since deceased, as His Lordship then was, in CO. No. 3386 (W) of 1991, in the circumstances stated therein. On the said Application being filed before the Court on 3rd June, 1992, Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J., by his Order dated 1st September, 1992 had directed the Opposite-Party No. 1, Mrs. Leena Chakraborty, Secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of West Bengal, to be present in Court on 8th September, 1992 at 2 P.M. and explain as to why appropriate proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act should not be drawn up against her for not complying with the aforesaid orders passed by this Court. The Learned Judge did not feel inclined to proceed against other Opposite-parties in the Contempt Application. The Contempt Application is being opposed by the Opposite Party No. 1 by filing Affidavit-in-Opposition.
2. The facts, as are relevant for the present purpose, may shortly be set out as follows:--
The Petitioner, Dr. Subhash Chandra Pratihar, had passed the M.B.B.S. Examination from the Calcutta University with highest marks in the Final M.B.B.S. Examination in the year 1967. After a brief period of internship he had joined the Christian Medical College and Hospital, Vellore, as Senior House Surgeon in 1968; and had thereafter obtained M.S. from the Delhi University in the year 1972. His thesis covered the subject of urology. He had thereafter worked as Registrar (Basic Teaching) in Surgery for two years in Sardarjang Hospital and had occasion to work as Tutor at the All India Institution of Medical Science for one year and eights months. He had thus completed three years eight months of Basic Teaching, and with the said experience of Basic Teaching he had joined the West Bengal Health Services as Medical Officer in the year 1973. Even though the Petitioner was otherwise qualified to be appointed as Lecturer, he was not considered for the same for reasons best known to the Respondents. And, for such non-consideration of his case for appointment as Lecturer and subsequent promotion as Professor, he was superseded by persons who did not possess the qualifications and other attainments, which he had acquired.
3. Being aggrieved by the denial of opportunity of non-consideration of his candidature, resulting in severe discrimination against him, he had moved a Writ Application before this Court praying, inter alia, for a Writ of in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Respondents to appoint him to the post of Lecturer notionally with retrospective effect and to appoint him as Professor on and from the date Dr. B.P. Majhi and Dr. R.N. Basu had recommended for the post of Professors.
4. On the filing of the said Writ Application the Court had passed an interim order on 25th March, 1991 in presence of the learned Advocates for the Respondents therein, including the Opposite-Party herein, to the effect that no decision adverse to the right of the Writ Petitioner shall be taken without the leave of the Court; and the Writ Petitioner shall be allowed the library facilities of IPGMER. Liberty was also given to the Respondents to apply for variation and/or modification of the said interim order upon notice to the Petitioner. But the liberty so granted had not been availed of by the Respondents.
5. Even though the said Writ Petition was contested by the State-Respondent, they had failed and neglected to file any Affidavit-in-Opposition despite repeated directions of the Court, and the allegations of the Petitioner made in the Writ Application remained uncontroverted as such. On the failure of the Respondents to file any Affidavit-in-Opposition despite opportunities granted to them, the Court by order dated 10th January, 1992, after hearing the parties, had allowed the Writ Application of the Petitioner and directed the Respondents therein to determine the appointment of the Petitioner as a Lecturer on the basis of his application made as far back as 1976 after taking into consideration the cases of similarly circumstanced persons, namely, Dr. B.P. Majhi and Dr. R.N. Basu, who are not recommended for the post of Professor. It was further directed by the said order that the Writ Petitioner should be accorded benefits from the date of presentation of the Writ Application, i.e., from March 25, 1991. It was further directed by the said order that any appointment during the pendency of the application would abide by the result of the application and shall not affect the right of the Petitioner to be appointed to such post to which he had been appointed at the time of the appointment of Lecturer being made within a reasonable period from the date of submission of the application made in the 1976. The Respondents were further directed to consider the grant of benefits on such footings as was done in the case of Dr. B.P. Majhi and Dr. R.N. Basu. The Writ Application was accordingly disposed of.
5A. It is contended by the Petitioner in this Contempt Application that the Respondents have deliberately and intentionally violated the orders of the Hon'ble Court dated March 25, 1991 and January 10, 1992 and have committed Contempt of Courts Act by (i) refusing to issue necessary orders determining appointment of the Petitioner as Lecturer; (ii) refusing to implement the order in spite of communication made therefor; (iii) contumacious disregard of the order passed by this Hon'ble Court and wilful breach thereof. It is thus alleged that the Respondents are guilty of gross contempt of this Court; praying this Court to make an order for imprisonment of the Respondents and/or pass such orders as the Court may deem fit and proper.
6. Upon the aforesaid application for Contempt having been filed by the Petitioner on 3-6-92, Ajit Kumar Sengupta by his order dated 1st September, 1992, had directed the Opposite-Party No. 1, Mrs. Leena Chakraborty, Secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of West Bengal, to be present in Court on 8th September, 1992 at 2 P.M. and explain why appropriate proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act should not be drawn against her for not complying with the orders passed by this Court. In compliance with the said direction Mrs. Leena Chakraborty had appeared in person before this Court on 8th September, 1992 and her personal appearance was dispensed with for the time being on an undertaking to appear before this Court, as and when necessary in connection with the proceedings. She was also directed to file Affidavit-in-Opposition by 25th September, 1992. The learned Judge did not propose to proceed against other Opposite-Parties-Contemners in the matter.
7. No Affidavit-in-Opposition was filed by the aforesaid alleged Contemner in terms of the order dated 8th September, 1992, Ajit Sengupta, J., had heard the matter in part on 30th April, 1993. By subsequent order dated 3rd August, 1993, he had released the matter with the observation that the matter should not be treated as heard-in-part by him. In the circumstances, the Contempt Application was assigned to Susanta Chatterji, J., by order dated 11th August, 1993. By his Order dated 21st January, 1994 Susanta Chatterji, J., had observed, in the circumstances recorded therein, that it is not appreciated as to why in spite of the notice no one appeared on behalf of the Contemner, nor any Affidavit filed as per the directions given. Considering all aspects of the matter, he (the learned Judge) had directed issue of notice calling upon the said contemner-Opposite-Party to show cause why a Rule for Contempt should not be issued against her for not complying with the orders of this Court, in furtherance of the proceedings already taken notice whereof. The learned Judge, in the meantime, had directed the Contemner to take effective steps to comply with the judgment dated 10th January, 1992 and to file a report within three weeks from the date of service of the notice. But even thereafter the aforesaid order of the Court dated 21st January, 1994 has neither been complied with by the Contemner-Opposite-Party No. 1, Mrs. Leena Chakraborty.
8. A report, however, was subsequently filed by her which was held by the learned Judge to be thoroughly misconceived by his order dated 4th March, 1994. The said order would further make clear that the learned Advocate for the Contemner. Mrs. Leena Chakraborty, had also fairly submitted before the Court that he could neither support the contention raised in the report, and had prayed for leave to file comprehensive report, clearly exhibiting the conduct and attitude of the Contemner. An affidavit was eventually affirmed by the alleged Contemner on 18th March, 1994. The Court's order dated 31st March, 1994 would further make clear that Mr. Kanak Chatterjee, the learned Advocate for the alleged Contemnor, Mrs. Leena Chakraborty, in his usual fairness, had submitted before the Court that proper steps are being taken to implement the Courts' order in the proper perspective.
9. Susanta Chatterji, J., having since thereafter been transferred from this Court, the Contempt matter had eventually been assigned to me by the learned Chief Justice by order dated 28th April, 1994.
10. The matter had thereupon appeared before me on 5th May, 1994 when the parties were duly represented by their respective learned Advocates. In view of the assurance given by the learned Advocate for the alleged Contemner before the Court on 31st March, 1994 that steps are being taken to implement the Court's order in the proper perspective and on the submissions made by the learned Advocates for both sides, the matter was directed by my order dated 5th May, 1994 to come up one week after the Summer Vacation for necessary orders in view of the assurance given by Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Advocate for the alleged Contemner.
11. But despite the assurances so given to the Court, the same appears to have honoured in breach, not to be complied with. In the circumstances, the matter was added to my List by order dated 14th June, 1994.
12. Upon hearing the submissions of the learned Advocates for the Petitioner and the alleged Contemner-Opposite-Party No. 1. Mrs. Leena Chakraborty, on different dates and scanning the materials on record it would oddly appear that the conduct of the aforesaid Opposite-Party-Contemner appears to be contumacious from the very beginning for the reasons I shall presently indicate.
13. As already indicated at the outside, Mahitosh Majumdar, J., as His Lordship then was, had passed an Interim Order in the relevant Writ Application on 25th March, 1991 in presence of the learned Advocates for the Respondents therein, Mr. I. Sen and Mrs. Leena Chowdhuri, to the effect that no decision adverse to the rights of the Writ Petitioner shall be taken without the leave of the Court; and the Writ Petitioner shall be allowed library facilities of IPGMER. The learned Judge by the said order had also given liberty to the Respondents to apply for variation and/or modification of the said Interim Order upon notice to the Petitioner. But the liberty so granted had not been availed of by the Respondents therein. No step whatsoever was either taken to get the aforesaid Interim Order vacated. The aforesaid Interim Order had been allowed to remain unchallenged as such. The said Interim Order clearly, therefore, stood to the knowledge of the Respondents therein. But the said Interim Order appears to have been violated by the Respondents by appointing Dr. R.N. Basu and Dr. B.P. Majhi as Professors on 26th April, 1991 without the leave of the Court. Even though the Court by its subsequent Judgment and Order dated 10th January, 1992 had directed that appointments made during the pendency of the Application would abide by the result of the application without affecting the right of the Writ Petitioner, the aforesaid appointments of Dr. R.N. Basu and B.P. Majhi are stated to have been confirmed in violation of the aforesaid two orders of this Court.
14. The Respondents in the aforesaid Writ Application were directed by the orders dated 25th March, 1991 and 2nd August, 1991 to file Affidavit-in-Opposition in terms thereof. But the said directions do not either appear to have been complied with by them. The learned Judge by his subsequent order dated 25th September, 1991 had accordingly observed that it was indeed a very sorry state of affairs that the directions of the Court are departed from, and the hearing of the case stood off by reason of inaction of the Respondents in complying with the orders passed by the Court. The learned Judge had, accordingly, been constrained to adjourn the hearing of the case for the reasons recorded therein with the direction to communicate the said order to the Secretary, Judicial Department and Legal Remembrancer, Government of West Bengal. The learned Judge, Mahitosh Majumdar, J. as his Lordship then was, eventually constrained to take up the matter for hearing on 10th January, 1992 on the failure of the Respondents therein to file Affidavit-in-Opposition despite repeated directions and opportunities granted to them for the purpose. It would also oddly appear from the aforesaid order dated 10th January, 1992 that Mrs. Leela Chowdhuri, the Learned Advocate for the Respondents, has submitted before the Court, in her usual fairness, that she took all possible steps for obtaining necessary instructions in the matter for the purpose of filing Affidavit-in-Opposition; but despite her best efforts no instruction was obtained by her from the Department concerned, nor any paper or document, as also the records of the case, were furnished for the purpose of contesting the matter. The allegations made in the Writ Application remained unchallenged and uncontroverted as such; and the learned Judge was constrained to dispose of the application on the materials on record after hearing the submissions made before him. In his judgment and order dated 10th January, 1992 the learned Judge had observed, for the reasons recorded at length by him, that he had no hesitation to, hold that the Petitioner has acquired the right to be appointed as Lecturer by reason of the basic grievance, as engrafted in the Writ Application, which remained uncontroverted. The Writ Application was accordingly disposed of in the manner, as already indicated above.
15. The aforesaid Judgment and Order dated 10th January, 1992 in the relevant Writ Application has not been challenged by the Respondents. There was neither any prayer for review of the same. The said Judgment and Order had thus been allowed to stand, the way the Interim Order dated 25th March, 1991 had been allowed to stand, despite liberty granted to the Respondents to pray for variation/modification of the order. The said two orders dated 25-3-91 and 10-1-92 stand final and absolute as such. Even so, casting all restraint to the wind and with an unmistakable and incredible air of arrogance and defiance, the Respondents have pointedly failed, neglected and ignored to comply therewith, despite lapse of so long a period, in the meantime.
16. On the failure of the Respondents to comply with the aforesaid orders of this Court, the Petitioner had been constrained to file the instant Contempt Application on 3rd June, 1992, supported by Affidavit. The alleged Contemner-Opposite-Party No. 1, Mrs. Leena Chakraborty, had also appeared before this Court on 8th September, 1992 in terms of the direction of the Court dated 1st September, 1992, whereupon she was directed to file Affidavit-in-Opposition. But despite her due knowledge of the Contempt Application filed by the Petitioner, the aforesaid orders of this Court (dated 25th March, 1991 and 10th January, 1992) have neither been complied with as yet, exhibiting her lack of solicitude for the orders of the Court and the Rule of law. The assurances given to the Court on 31st March, 1994 and 5th May, 1994 by the learned Advocate for the alleged Contemner that steps are being taken to implement the Court's order in proper perspective have neither been honoured, further betraying her lack of regard for the sanctity of the orders of the Court, assurances given to Court, and the dignity, majesty and authority of the Court.
17. In Para 5 of her belated Affidavit-in-Opposition she sought to submit her highest regard and respect for the majesty and dignity of this Hon'ble Court, which clearly appears to be belied by her own conduct, as appearing from the discussions above. She has further added therein that if she has done anything according to her interpretation of the Court's order, and thereby unknowingly and inadvertently done anything which may amount to disregard and violation of the Court's orders, she tenders her sincere, unqualified and unconditional apology, with the prayer to accept the same. On the face of the overwhelming and cumulative materials on record, as already indicated above, the belated apology tendered by her could hardly be held sincere, honest and bona fide. It was not for her to interpret the orders of this Court in her own way. It was her duty to comply with the same, and not to interpret in the manner she liked to do to suit her purpose, the way she has sought to do. If there was any ambiguity in the Court's orders dated 25th March, 1991 and 10th January, 1992, it was open to the Contemner to seek for clarification from the Court; but it was incompetent for her to interpret the same in her own way, as she is stated to have done. However that may be, the aforesaid two orders being, what they are, do not at all appear to be anything unintelligible or ambiguous requiring any further interpretation and/or clarification. The Contemner's plea on the point could scarcely be entertained as such. The apology, the way tendered by her, could hardly be accepted as such.
18. By her aforesaid belated Affidavit-in-Opposition, the Contemner has sought to justify the non-compliance with the aforesaid orders of this Court for the reasons stated therein, which could hardly be considered at this stage, when the aforesaid relevant orders had been allowed to remain unchallenged and when the relevant Writ Application was allowed to be disposed of by the order dated 10th January, 1992 without filling any Affidavit-in-Opposition, despite repeated directions and opportunities given to the Respondents therein. The Court in this proceedings would not be interested in listening to the justification/excuses sought to be given for not complying with the aforesaid orders of the Court.
19. The alleged Contemner has further stated in Paragraph 32 of her belated Affidavit-in-Opposition that the matter is of vital interest, and the Court would be pleased to give an opportunity to the State of West Bengal to argue with the matter on merits. If she considered the matter to be of vital interest, it was for her to take all necessary steps to get the relevant Writ Application heard on merits at the appropriate stage. But, as already indicated above, no step whatsoever had been taken on behalf of the State to file Affidavit-in-Opposition therein to controvert the averments in the Writ Application, despite repeated directions and opportunities granted to them. The Court's aforesaid order dated 10th January, 1992 would further clearly indicate that Mrs. Leela Chowdhuri, the learned Advocate for the Respondents therein, had also submitted before the Court, in her usual fairness, that she took all possible steps for obtaining necessary instructions in the matter for the purpose of filing Affidavit. But despite her best efforts, no instruction was obtained by her from the Department concerned; nor, any paper and document and also the records of the case were furnished for the purpose of contesting the matter. The allegations made in the Writ Petition was accordingly allowed to remain unchallenged and uncontroverted. When the somnolence of the State could not be shaken in spite of repeated directions of the Court and despite so much of opportunities granted to them, it is now too late in the day for the Contemner to state that the matter is of vital interest and seek for an opportunity of being heard on merits, betraying her total lack of solicitude for rules and procedures for hearing of the matters before the Court. She seems to have taken the Court for granted, as if, whatever is sought for at whatever stage of the proceedings, the same shall be granted by the Court as a matter of course on mere asking:
20. In view of the discussions above, I cannot persuade myself to accept the pleas of the Opposite Party-Contemner in her Affidavit-in-Opposition and accept the apology belatedly tendered by her, in the facts and circumstances amply and appellingly discussed. There was no justification for not complying with the Court's relevant orders dated 25th March, 1991 and 10th January, 1992 in the relevant Writ Application. The justification sought to be issued by her in her Affidavit-in-Opposition do neither seem to me to be acceptable, in the facts and circumstances stated above, and in view of the statements made by the Petitioner in his Affidavit-in-Reply. The Opposite-Party-Contemner should, therefore, be held guilty of contempt of Court for not complying with the aforesaid two orders of this Court dated 25th March, 1991 and 10th January, 1992 in the relevant Writ Application.
21. The Petitioner in his Supplementary Affidavit, affirmed on 1st September, 1994, has submitted that during the pendency of the instant contempt proceedings an order, being No. Health/GA(Vig.)/549, 9A-126/94 dated 19th August, 1994, has been issued, the Opposite-Party-Contemner whereby he has been placed under suspension in contemplation of a Departmental Proceeding against him. It is contended therein that the submissions of his Counsel in the Contempt Application has been concluded on 11th August, 1994, and the matter had been fixed for further hearing on 19th August, 1994. By issuing the order of suspension on 19th August, 1994 in contemplation of a Departmental Proceeding, the Opposite-Party-Contemner is indirectly trying to coerce him and pressurise him so that he may not be able to prosecute the Contempt Proceedings or get the benefit of the order which was passed in the relevant Writ Application. An Affidavit-in-Opposition appears to have been filed against the aforesaid Supplementary Affidavit by one Subodh Kumar Sarkar, who is stated to be the officer on special duty, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of West Bengal, duly authorised by the Contemners to sign and swear the Affidavit on their behalf. It is sought to be contended therein that there are definite allegations of private practice against the Petitioner, and on verification of the allegations it is felt necesssary to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him, he being a non-practising Medical Officer, for which he has been placed under suspension, Even though it has been stated in paragraph 3 of the said Affidavit-in-opposition that on verification of the allegations it is felt necesssary to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner suggesting that a Disciplinary Proceedings has already been initiated against him, nothing could be shown before the Court to indicate that a Disciplinary/Departmental Proceedings has, in fact, been initiated against the Petitioner, and what is /are the article/s of charge against him. The learned Advocate for the Contemner had, however, been constrained to submit, on instruction, on my quarry during the hearing, that no Disciplinary/Departmental Proceedings has been initiated against the Petitioner as yet and that a C.B.I. enquiry is only being conducted on the basis of certain allegations of private practice against the Petitioner. The statement in paragraph 3 of the Affidavit-in-Opposition suggesting that Disciplinary Proceeding has already been initiated against the Petitioner on such allegations cannot, therefore, be said to represent the actual/real state of things:
The materials on record, per contra, would clearly indicate that the Petitioner has been placed under suspension by the aforesaid relevant order dated 19th August, 1994 in contemplation of a Departmental Proceeding against him on the basis of the aforesaid allegations. When no such Departmental Proceedings has yet been initiated against him, his (Petitioner's) contention that he has been suspended with a view to coerce him and pressurise him so that he may not be able to prosecute the contempt proceedings cannot clearly be lightly discarded. In the circumstances of the case, there could be little doubt that the conduct of the Contemner in suspending the Petitioner in contemplation of a Departmental Proceedings against him, in course of the hearing of the instant Contempt Application, is a calculated move to put pressure on him (Petitioner) not to proceed further with the same. Such conduct clearly amounts to a Contempt of Court. The suspension of the Petitioner in contemplation of a Departmental Proceedings at a time when the Contempt Application is being heard could clearly have one tendency, namely, the tendency to coerce the petitioner and force him to withdraw his application or otherwise not to press it. As held in the decision in Pratam Singh's case, , there may be many ways of obstructing the Court. Any conduct by which the course of justice is perverted either by a party or a stranger is a contempt. The use of threats, by letter or otherwise, to a party while his suit is pending, have been held to be contempt. The majority judgment in the aforesaid decision had further held "the question is not whether the action, in fact, interfered, but it has a tendency to interfere with the due course of justice." As is often said, the stream of justice must be allowed to flow free, and any obstruction to its passage has been held to be an act of contempt. That being so, an attempt to choke the stream at the source would as well amount to contempt. In view of the discussions above, the suspension of the Petitioner in contemplation of a Departmental Proceedings while the Contempt Proceedings is being heard clearly amounts to further act of contempt on the part of the Opposite-Party-Contemner. The said view would also find support from the decision in Dr. Hari Pada Poddar v. S.R. Das, Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Department of Health, 1974 Cal LJ 465: (1970 Lab IC 930).
22. It would also be pertinent to note in this context that the Affidavit-in-Opposition affirmed by Subodh Kumar Sarkar against the Supplementary Affidavit of the Petitioner could neither be taken into account as the Affidavit has not been personally filed by the Contemner. I am at one with decisions of this Court in Jiban Kumar Banerjee v. The State of West Bengal, (1993) 2 Cal HN 282, and Samarendra K. Mukherjee v. K.M. Lal, (1991) 1 Cal LT 8:1994 Cri LJ 246 (HC), that in contempt proceedings no Contemner can delegate the power to any other person to affirm the Affidavit-in-Opposition or any other application on his behalf. It is the Contemner who must personally file Affidavit in such proceedings. That being so, the allegation of the Petitioner in his Supplementary Affidavit must clearly be deemed to have remained uncontroverted in the absence of any Affidavit-in-Opposition by the Contemner himself.
23. Upon the premises above, there could clearly be no running away from the inescapable conclusion that the Opposite-Party-Contemner is guilty of Contempt of Court. Her first act of contempt is the violation of the order of this Court dated 25th March, 1991 in the relevant Writ Application, being CO. No. 3386 (W) of 1991. Her second act of contempt is non-compliance of the order of this Court dated 10th January, 1992 in the said Writ Application. Her third act of contempt is the violation of the order dated 21st January, 1994 passed by Susanta Chatterji, J., in the instant Contempt Proceedings directing the Contemners to take effective steps to comply with the Judgment dated 10th January, 1992, and to file a report within three weeks from the date of service of the notice. Her fourth act of contempt is the breach of the assurance given to the Court on 31st March, 1994 through her learned Advocate, Mr. Kanak Kumar Chatterjee, that proper steps are being taken to implement the Court's order in the proper perspective. And, her fifth act of contempt is the suspension of the Petitioner by the aforesaid order dated 19th August, 1994 in the midst of the hearing of the Contempt Proceedings.
24. In view of the contempt alleged, the Petitioner had prayed the Court, during the hearing, for passing appropriate direction upon the Contemner for compliance with the aforesaid relevant order dated 10th January, 1992 and for passing such necessary penal orders against her, as the Court may deem fit and proper. A question naturally arises as to whether in Contempt Proceedings the Contemner could only be punished or let off, and whether there is any other way out. The point may somewhat differently be posed as to whether any consequential relief could be given on a Contempt Application. A Division Bench of this Court in Dulal Chandra Bhar v. Sukumar Banerjee, , has held that in a civil contempt when the party in whose interest the order was made moved the Court for action to be taken in contempt against the Contemner with a view to enforcement of his right, the proceeding is only a form of execution. Another Division Bench of this Court in Saibal Kumar Gupta v. B.K. Sen, , has held that when an order made for the benefit of a party is disregarded or violated and the Court enforces the order by punishing the delinquent for contempt, it is said that such proceedings is a form of execution. The Supreme Court in Md. Idris v. Rustam Jehangir Bapuji, , has held that a single Judge of the High Court was justified in giving appropriate direction in addition to punishing the party for contempt of Court. The High Court can, accordingly, pass direction on Contempt Application for implementation of its order. The Supreme Court in Noorali Babul Thanewala v. Sh. K.M.M. Setty, , has clearly held that in a Contempt Application arising out of a civil proceeding the Court is competent to issue necessary further and consequential direction for enforcing the order. The aforesaid decisions had been followed by a learned single Judge of this Court in Hindustan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress v. Ashis Chakraborty, (1991) 1 Cal LJ 502: (1991 Cri LJ 2890). There is nothing to depart from the aforesaid decisions. That being so, there could clearly be no mistaking that in a Contempt Application the Court is competent to issue necessary further and consequential directions for enforcing its order. In the nature of the matter, I, accordingly, direct the Contemner Mrs. Leena Chakraborty to comply with the orders dated 25th March, 1991 and 10th January, 1992 passed in the relevant Writ Application, being CO. No. 3386 (W)of 1991, within two months from this date. I further direct her to cancel or withdraw the order of suspension dated 19th August, 1994 passed on the Petitioner to give effect to the aforesaid orders passed by the Court on the said Writ Application. This order shall not, however, debar the Contemner to initiate Departmental Proceedings against the Petitioner hereafter on specific article/s of charge, if there be any, and from suspending him during the pendency of the Departmental Proceedings, if so required for the purpose of proceeding with the same. But the Petitioner shall not be suspended without initiating any Departmental Proceedings against him on specific article/s of charge, and before complying with the aforesaid orders of this Court dated 25th March, 1991 and 10th January, 1992. If the Petitioner feels aggrieved against any such Departmental Proceedings, it would also be open to him to seek appropriate redress before the appropriate forum, as the law permits.
25. There now remains the question of sentence. The Affidavit filed by the Opposite-Party-Contemner does not contain any expression of regret. Nor did her learned Advocate convey anything in course of his submissions to indicate that the Contemner is repentant for not complying with the aforesaid orders of this Court. The plea all through has been one of justification for non-compliance with the said orders. Having regard to her contumacious conduct ail-throughout, as discussed above at length, I sentence her to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- only. The Contemner is directed to deposit the amount with the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, of this Court within one week of reopening of the Court after the long Vacation, i.e. by 14th November, 1994. In default, the fine would be realised in accordance with law.
The Contempt Application is, accordingly, disposed of.