Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
M/S Gem Builders Devlopers Pvt vs State And Ors on 8 August, 2019
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.253/1997
M/s Gem Builders And Developers Pvt. Ltd. Jaipur through its
Director Shri Ram Dass Sonkia, son of, Shri Gopal Dass Sonkia,
aged 54 years, resident of Sonkia Bhawan, Chaura Rasta, Jaipur
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan through its Secretary, Urban
Development and Housing Department, Secretariat,
Jaipur
2. The Municipal Corporation of Jaipur, through its Chairman
3. The Collector, Jaipur
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Shivangshu Naval, Adv. with Mr. Akash Srivastava, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.P. Singh, AAG with Mr. Harsh Vardhan Bhati, Adv.
Mr. Shyam Arya, Adv.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA Judgment Reserved on 16/05/2019 Pronounced on 08/08/2019
1. This case was remanded back by the Division Bench vide order dated 15.09.2008 after setting aside the order dated 03.12.2001 passed by the Single Bench of this Court, whereby the writ petition was dismissed, with directions that the Single Bench shall examine the facts, as stated in the petition and reply filed, to decide the case.
2. Brief facts, which require to be considered for disposal of the petition, are that a piece of plots No.15 and 16 was situated in Nehru Bazar, Jaipur originally owned by one Bhagwat Singh, (D.B. SAW/72/2002 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 29/08/2019 at 11:19:42 PM) (2 of 16) [CW-253/1997] which was of residential nature. The same was sold to brothers, Govind Singh Mehta and Gopal Singh Mehta vide registered sale deed dated 13.08.1959, who applied before the District Magistrate, Jaipur for permission to construct a Cinema Hall. Permission was granted by District Magistrate on 12.11.1959 and a Trust was formed. On 23.01.1960, the said brothers who were given the right to construct Cinema Hall and the right was also transferred in favour of the Trust. The Trust thereafter entered into an agreement with one Roop Narain Shah for construction of the Cinema Hall. Roop Narain Shah constructed the Cinema Hall and was thereafter granted license on 01.04.1970 for exhibiting films for 984 persons per show, which was renewed from time to time. No Objection Certificate from Chief Electrical Inspector was issued.
3. The Cinema Hall continued to operate till 31.03.1992, whereafter the petitioner purchased the said property vide registered sale deed dated 25.01.1994 from the owners and the petitioner submitted building plans to the Municipal Corporation for construction of commercial complex. The Building Plan Committee approved the plans and raised a demand for conversion charges by letter dated 08.12.1995, which was objected by the petitioner on the ground that the plot was already commercial. The petitioner submitted representation thereafter for granting facility of depositing conversion charges in installments, but later on deposited the conversion charges of Rs.33,62,609/- vide cheque dated 26.12.1995 under protest reserving his legal rights to challenge the levy of conversion charges. The approved plans were thereafter released on 12.01.1996 and the petitioner whereafter preferred this writ petition assailing the letter dated 08.12.1995 demanding conversion charges.
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4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that as the land purchased by the petitioner alongwith Cinema Hall was a commercial property, there was no occasion for further conversion of land and the demand raised against conversion charges was illegal and unjustified. He submitted that the Rajasthan Improvement (Change of Use of Residential Land of Premises for Commercial Purposes) Rules, 1974 (hereafter referred as 'Conversion Rules of 1974') have come into force with effect from 14.10.1974 and the same could not have been applied on a property which was already converted and put to commercial use by the order of District Magistrate dated 12.11.1959.
5. It is submitted that till the petitioner submitted application for approving building plans for commercial complex, no demand had been raised for conversion charges by the respondents, and therefore, the demand now raised was unjustified.
6. It is submitted that even the plans were approved on 18.10.1995 and the demand was raised subsequently on 08.12.1995.
7. Learned counsel relied on the judgments rendered in Jaipur Cinema Karmchari Union & Anr. Vs. Jaipur Development Authority & Anr., reported in 1993(1) WLC (Raj.) 332; Jawahar Sons Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State and Ors., reported in 2002(2) WLC 627; Municipal Corporation, Rajasthan Vs. Sanjeev Sachdeva, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 562; Sanjeev Sachdeva Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2016 SCC Online Raj 4389 and; K. Thangavel, Proprietor, Murugan Arul Lorry Body Labour Works Vs. The Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, (D.B. SAW/72/2002 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 29/08/2019 at 11:19:42 PM) (4 of 16) [CW-253/1997] Salem & Ors. Reported in 2006 (130) ECR 0012, in support of his submissions.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that first Master Plan for Jaipur had come into force in May, 1976, while the sanction for construction of the Cinema Hall was granted in 1969 and the Cinema Hall was already working since 1970.
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that while permission was granted for construction of Cinema Hall, it would not mean that the land was converted. The conversion charges were demanded as per law prevailing at the time of giving permission for construction of commercial complex. After having completed the construction, the present writ petition has been preferred and principle of approbation and reprobation would be applicable. It is further submitted that the Conversion Rules of 1974 would have an application retrospectively also, as it is apparent from Rule 7, which deals with matters relating to the existing residential land wherein already the Collector has granted sanction, the Rules of 1974 would apply.
10. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the coming into force of Master Plan from 1976 would not deter the respondents from demanding the amount as the Master Plan is only an enabling clause, as held by the Apex Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Dev Raj Gupta & Ors., reported in (1991) 1 SCC 63.
11. Learned Additional Advocate General also relied on the Directorate, Local Bodies, Rajasthan, Jaipur circular dated 16.12.1991, which has been made the basis for demand of conversion charges.
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12. I have considered the submissions and reflected on the submissions and the judgments which have been cited at the Bar.
13. Before dealing with the factual aspect, it would be worth to refer to the judgments relied upon by counsel for both the parties.
14. In M/s. Narinder Chand Hem Raj and others Vs. Lt. Governor, Administrator, Union Territory, Himachal Pradesh and others reported in (1971) 2 SCC 747, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where a demand was raised for enforcing levy of sales tax on sales of Indian made foreign liquor and beer at Shimla. Adverting to Article 265 of the Constitution, it is held that "the power to impose tax is undoubtedly a legislative power. That power can be exercised by the Legislature directly or subject to certain conditions the Legislature may delegate that power to some other authority. But the exercise of that power, whether by the Legislature or its delegate is an exercise of a legislative power. The fact that the power was delegated to the executive does not convert that power into an executive or administrative power. No Court can issue a mandate to a Legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly no Court can direct a subordinate legislative body to enact or not to enact a law which it may be competent to enact. The relief as framed by the appellant in his writ petition does not bring out the real issue calling for determination. In reality he wants this Court to direct the Government to delete the entry in question from Schedule A and include the same in Schedule B. Article 265 of the Constitution lays down that no tax can be levied and collected except by authority of law. Hence the levy of a tax can only be done by the authority of law and not by any executive order. Unless the executive is specifically empowered by law to give any (D.B. SAW/72/2002 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 29/08/2019 at 11:19:42 PM) (6 of 16) [CW-253/1997] exemption, it cannot say that it will not enforce the law as against a particular person. No Court can give a direction to a Government to refrain from enforcing a provision of law. Under these circumstances, we must hold that the relief asked for by the appellant cannot be granted."
15. In Jhunjhunwala and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 196, it was held as under:-
"10. It was, therefore, necessary to be established that the seller was a manufacturer-dealer. Commissioner's circular could not have created a liability by drawing inference that the purchases from farmers who have grown, cut or sawn timbers, ballis, bamboos will brings them within the umbrella of expression 'manufacturer'. The view that tax liability has been prescribed at the manufacturers and importers points and therefore after the amendment traders who purchase the timber from unregistered dealers fall within the category of manufacturer is indefensible. There is no logic for such a conclusion, where the statutory definition does not say so. It needs no emphasis that the circular cannot create tax liability. That is precisely what has been done which the High Court has failed to notice. Therefore, to that extent the circular cannot be of any assistance for levying tax. The crucial words in the definition of "Manufacturer" is the sale of goods "after their manufacture". As noted above, the expression "manufacture" cannot cover types of transactions referred to in the commissioner's circular Whether an activity amounts to manufacture has to be factually determined. There cannot be a direction to treat a particular type of transaction to be a manufacturing activity without examining the (D.B. SAW/72/2002 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 29/08/2019 at 11:19:42 PM) (7 of 16) [CW-253/1997] factual scenario. There cannot be a generalization in such matters."
16. In State of Rajasthan & ors. Vs. Pareshar Soni, reported in 2007 DNJ (SC) 1063, the Apex Court held as under:-
"18. We, therefore, have to accept the conclusion of the Division Bench that the property had neither been allotted by the Municipal Corporation or by the State Government or that any restriction had been placed on its user. Consequently, the question of demanding conversion charges for change of user would also not arise and the amended provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 173-A would also have no application to the facts of the case, since it is controlled by the very opening words that no person shall use or permit the use of any land situated in any municipal area, for the purpose other than that for which such land was originally allotted or sold to any person by the State Government. If the basis on which sub-section (4) of Section 173-A could be applied, is not available to the petitioner the demand raised by it towards conversion charges also is not maintainable."
17. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Hilton Estate Pvt. Ltd. and ors. : MANU/RH/0120/2016, while considering the provisions of Section 173-A of the Act unamended, relying upon the aforesaid judgment in the case of State of Rajasthan & ors. Vs. Pareshar Soni (supra), it was held as under:-
"8. We further make it clear that we have examined the scope of unamended Sec. 173-A of the Act and in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court, referred to supra and in the given facts and (D.B. SAW/72/2002 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 29/08/2019 at 11:19:42 PM) (8 of 16) [CW-253/1997] circumstances, the controversy is no more res integra for consideration to be examined by this Court.
9. Counsel for appellant has placed reliance on the latest judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation Rajasthan v. Sanjeev Sachdeva and others reported in MANU/SC/0051/2013: 2013(1) Supreme 349."
18. In Municipal Corporation, Rajasthan Vs. Sanjeev Sachdeva and others (supra), while considering the aforesaid judgments, a coordinate Bench of this Court, considering the provisions of Section 173 of the Act, held as under:-
"14. In the present case, admittedly, the land in question has not been allotted by the State Government, municipality or any local authority and is part of a Patta issued in the year 1902, therefore, sub-section (1) has no application and it is only if the intended use falls foul of the Master Plan that sub- section (2) could be invoked for the purpose of demanding conversion charges under sub-section (3) read with sub-section (5) of the Act and not otherwise.
15. As already noticed more than once that the land use as indicated in the Mater Plan is 'Commercial' and the petitioners are seeking to use the land in question for commercial purpose, apparently, the provisions of sub-section (2), which provides for restriction does not come into picture at all and consequently, there is no question of invoking sub- section (3) for the purpose of demanding conversion charges.
20. The source for ensuring planned and regulated development is the Master Plan which provides for the designated land use of particular area and once (D.B. SAW/72/2002 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 29/08/2019 at 11:19:42 PM) (9 of 16) [CW-253/1997] the land use of the area has been marked as 'Commercial', it cannot be said that if within that area a residential building or a vacant plot is put to commercial use, the same would be against the planned and regulated development of the said urban area and, therefore, the plea raised in this regard has no substance."
19. In Municipal Corporation, Rajasthan Vs. Sanjeev Sachdeva and others (supra), while dealing with the original Section 173 of the Municipal Act and the amended Section 173-A in 1999, it was held as under:-
"13. We may, in this respect, also indicate that, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 297 read with Section 173-A of the 1959 Act, 2000 Rules were promulgated. It is under the above-mentioned Rules that the respondents filed an application on 16.7.2003 for change of land use from residential to commercial. Following those Rules, the Corporation issued public notice inviting objections. Later, the Land Use Committee met and approved the conversion for which a demand notice of Rs.5,70,300/- was raised by the Corporation on 2.4.2004. We are of the view that the demand is legal and valid and in accordance with the provisions of Section 173-A, as inserted by Amendment Act 19 of 1999 read with 2000 Rules. We are also of the view that the Rajasthan High Court has committed an error in applying the Judgment of this Court in Pareshar Soni's case (supra) which was dealing with the un-amended provision of Section 173-A.
14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, however, submitted that the area in question is notified as commercial area under the Master Plan and, therefore, there is no question of any (D.B. SAW/72/2002 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 29/08/2019 at 11:19:42 PM) (10 of 16) [CW-253/1997] conversion of the residential property to commercial. We notice that this point was not raised before the High Court and we are, therefore, not called upon to decide that question. However, the respondents, if so advised, may take up this issue before the Corporation and it is for the Corporation to consider that issue in accordance with law. Appeals are accordingly allowed and the judgments of the High Court are set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs."
20. In Union of India and others Vs. Dev Raj Gupta and others (supra), the High Court of Delhi held that there was an automatic and statutory conversion of the use of the land from residential to commercial purposes and hence there was no question of either payment of conversion charges or misuse charges which was set aside by the Supreme Court. The land involved was leased by the Governor General in Council to one Rama Bai and the interest devolved further to one Hans Raj Gupta and when the master plan of New Delhi was enforced, treating it as a commercial land, the concerned respondent claimed exemption from the conversion charges. However, proper application for conversion was moved only on 27/02/1981 and the Apex Court held as under:-
"17. The High Court is further not right in holding that there was an automatic or a statutory conversion of the user of the land because in the Master Plan the land in question fell in the area reserved for commercial use. The High Court failed to appreciate that the charge of user of the land permitted by the Plan was only enabling in nature. It lifted the restriction which was otherwise there for using the land for commercial purpose. The (D.B. SAW/72/2002 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 29/08/2019 at 11:19:42 PM) (11 of 16) [CW-253/1997] land has to be used as per the agreement between the contracting parties, and no change of the user can be made contrary to the agreement even if the Plan permits such user. The Plan helps the parties to change the user, if the parties mutually agree to do so. It does not permit the occupant to change the user unilaterally. It is not, therefore, correct to say that no permission of the landlord was needed to change the user of the land.
18. In the view we have taken, we direct that the additional premium should be calculated by the appellants on the basis of the rate which was prevalent as on February 27, 1981 which is the date of the application made for the change of the user. The interest should be charged on such additional premium w.e.f. 12th April, 1984 since a period of three months from the date of notice, viz., January 12, 1984 was available to the respondent-lessees to make the payment of the additional premium. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellants should be given the facility to make the payment in three equal annual installments and the interest should be charged on such deferred payment at not more than 14 per cent per annum. The respondent-lessees would, however, not be entitled to convert the present user of the land into the commercial user until and unless the last of the amount of the additional premium together with the interest thereon is paid."
21. In the aforesaid backdrop, if the facts as noted above are examined, this Court finds that an application had been moved to the Collector for construction of Cinema Hall in the residential property and the District Magistrate vide its order dated 31.03.1961 on the application moved by Roop Narain Shah dated 29.03.1961 granted no objection, if the cinema hall building is constructed on plots No.15 and 16 in Dooni-Ka-Gher, Nehru Bazar, Jaipur.
22. Thereafter, it is also noted that license under Form-C was issued by the Additional District Magistrate, Jaipur City, Jaipur (D.B. SAW/72/2002 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 29/08/2019 at 11:19:42 PM) (12 of 16) [CW-253/1997] for using the property for commercial purposes and for carrying out shows for 984 persons. The same has been renewed from time to time by the District Magistrate upto 31.03.1992. Conditions of license for exhibiting cinema, as mentioned in the license, show that the same were of commercial character and issued under the provisions of the Rajasthan Cinema (Regulation) Act, 1952. Thus, the property was being used for commercial purposes.
23. In Union of India & Ors. Vs. Dev Raj Gupta & Ors., as above, the Apex Court was dealing with a case where a plot situated at Barakhamba Road, New Delhi was being used for commercial purposes prior to coming into force of the Master Plan of New Delhi. A demand was raised for conversion charges against which the concerned person took the matter upto the Apex Court. The Supreme Court, after examining the facts of the case, came to the conclusion that there can be no automatic and statutory conversion of the use of land from residential to commercial purposes. However, there must be a proper application moved at the relevant time to show that the sanction was given for using the property for commercial purposes. Taking into consideration that there was no application moved by the concerned persons before construction of multi-storeyed building for being used for commercial purposes, the Apex Court held that the relevant date would be the date on which the application was moved. As the date of application in the said case was 27.02.1981, demand for conversion charges was found to be in order and the conversion charges as well as misuse charges were also directed to be paid from the date.
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24. In the present case however, this Court finds that the application for conversion was made on 29.03.1961, whereas the Master Plan has come into force in the year 1976, and in the Master Plan of 1976, the area in the Master Plan, which has come into force from 1976, it mentions the commercial activity, central business area as under:
"For various historical, traditional and economic reasons, the existing central Business Area comprising Johari Bazar, Chaura Rasta, Kishanpole Bazar, Tripolia and Mirza Ismail Road shall continue to function as the most important centre for trade and commerce. There is however not much room for its major expansion within the walled city. Some pockets may become available by shifting the congested and undesirable wholesale trade. A number of new area shall therefore be developed outside the walled city as extensions to the Central Business Area. These are Sanganeri Gate Commercial Complex facing Ramniwas Garden, Shopping Centre on government garage site on M.I. Road, Kalwar Shopping centre near main railway station, New Fruit and Vegetable Market near Ghat gate, New Grain mandi outside Suraj Pale, Truck terminus on Agra Road etc. Two new retail shopping bazars, west of Ajmeri Gate and east of Sanganeri Gate along the City wall, on either side and in continuation of the existing Nehru and Bapu Bazar respectively shall also be developed. These shall be planned as "Pedestrian Malls" with fountains, sitting areas, green squares etc. In fact work on development of such a bazar west of Ajmeri gate has already been taken in hand. In due course Nehru Bazar and Bapu Bazar shall also be converted into pedestrian malls. Adequate parking facilities for all types of vehicles shall however be provided on the fringe areas of these bazars."
25. Thus, the area in question is shown as commercial area in the master plan. Hence, the plot cannot be said to be residential on the date when the master plan came into force.
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26. The Conversion Rules of 1974 have come into force 14.10.1974. This Court finds that Rule 7 of the Rules of 1974 deals with cases where a residential land has been used for construction of hotel or cinema after taking no objection from the Collector, UIT, Municipal Board etc., and in such matters, power has been given to allow change of use of land for commercial purposes on payment of conversion charges as prescribed under Rule 5. But a look at the demand letter shows that the conversion charges have not been demanded in terms of Rule 5, but have been demanded in terms of circular dated 16.12.1991 which deals with cases where some persons use residential property for commercial purposes, and in such cases, for conversion the method of demand of penalty has been laid down as under.
" Lok;r 'kklu foHkkx dzekad% ,Q 16 ¼46½ LFkk- fu@91@4220&4411 fnukad 16-12-1991 vk;qDr@ vf/k'kk"kh vf/kdkjh] leLr uxj ifj"kn@ikfydk,sa] jktLFkkuA fo"k; & fjgk;'kh Hkwfe dk O;olkf;d mi;ksx djus ij :ikUrj.k 'kqYd ysus ds lac/k esaA fofHkUu uxjifj"kn@ikfydkvksa ls izLrko izkIr gks jgs gS fd ftu O;fDr;ksa us fjgk;'kh Hkwfe O;olkf;d mi;ksx dj fy;k gS] muds ekeys fdl rjg ls fu;fer fd;s tkosa bl lUnHkZ esa ys[k gS fd fjgk;'kh Hkwfe dk O;olkf;d mi;ksx djus ij :ikUrj.k 'kqYd fu/kkZfjr djus dk ekeyk jkT; ljdkj ds fopkjk/khu gSaA bl lUnHkZ esa vfUre funsZ'k tkjh gksus rd ,sls izdj.kksa esa fuEu izdkj :ikUrj.k 'kfqYd ys fy;k tk;s& "ml {ks= dh cktkjh vkoklh; nj ,oa cktkjh O;olkf;d nj dk tks vUrj vkos] mldh 20 izfr'kr jkf'k :ikUrj.k 'kqYd ds :i esa ys fy;k tk;sA ;fn dksbZ O;fDr jkf'k fd'rksa esa tek djkuk pkgrk gSa rks mDr jkf'k 25 izfr'kr dh nj ls pkj leku okf"kZd fd'rksa esa olwy dh tk;s ,oa bl ij 15 izfr'kr okf"kZd C;kt olwy fy;k tkosA"
(D.B. SAW/72/2002 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 29/08/2019 at 11:19:42 PM) (15 of 16) [CW-253/1997] lEcaf/kr O;fDr;ksa ls bl vk'k; dh v.MjVsfdax ys yh tkos fd jkT; ljdkj }kjk tks Hkh :ikUrj.k 'kqYd fu/kkZfjr fd;k tkosxk] mijksDr izdkj ls olwyh dh xbZ jkf'k rFkk jkT; ljdkj }kjk ckn esa fu/kkZfjr jkf'k ds vUrj dh jkf'k mUgsa nsuh gksxhA 'kklu mi lfpo "
27. From reading of the aforesaid circular, it is apparent that the same would not apply to the present case and the demand raised under the said circular, therefore, is liable to be set aside.
28. This Court finds that the view taken by this Court is also supported by law laid down by Apex Court in M/s. Narinder Chand Hem Raj and others Vs. Lt. Governor, Administrator, Union Territory, Himachal Pradesh and others (supra), wherein Apex Court held as under:
"7. . . . . . . . . Article 265 of the Constitution lays down that no tax can be levied and collected except by authority of law. Hence the levy of a tax can only be done by the authority of law and not by any executive order. . . . . ."
29. The same view has been reiterated in Jhunjhunwala and others Vs. State of U.P. and others (supra).
30. In view of this Court, method of regularization adopted by the department is also not proper as it would allow people to use residential premises for commercial purposes and later on pay the amount difference under the property regulation. Thus, in view of this Court, only the conversion rules could have the force of law for the purpose of conversion of residential land for commercial purposes.
31. The question however, arises whether the said rule would apply in the facts of the case. In the considered opinion of (D.B. SAW/72/2002 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Downloaded on 29/08/2019 at 11:19:42 PM) (16 of 16) [CW-253/1997] this Court, the said Rule would have no application, as it is not retrospective in nature. The authority could have however demanded and claimed conversion charges in the year 1974 for the conversion and no objection granted in 1961 and calculated the conversion charges under Rule 5. If such a demand, as on 1974 is calculated, the same can be claimed as against the petitioner by a separate letter.
32. I am also not impressed by the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the principle of approbation and reprobation will apply to the present facts of the case. This Court finds that the amount paid by the petitioner was paid for conversion i.e. 25,02,214/- (remaining amount being for other purposes), was under protest and the letter dated 14.12.1995 of the petitioner mentions that the petitioner is depositing the amount subject to his legal rights to take up the matter. Thus, it is a conditional deposit and the petitioner cannot be treated to have waived his legal rights for challenge and recovery of the demand.
33. In view of the above provisions and in light of the judgments as noted above, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned letter dated 08.12.1995 is quashed and set aside. The respondents shall return the amount deposited by the petitioner as against conversion charges alongwith simple interest @ 9% per annum till the date of payment. The compliance shall be made within a period of three months from today.
(SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),J Raghu-Skant/-
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