Allahabad High Court
Rajesh Kumar Srivastava And Others vs State Of U.P. And Others on 28 January, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 ALL 201, (2020) 2 ADJ 409 (ALL)
Author: Ashwani Kumar Mishra
Bench: Ashwani Kumar Mishra
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Court No. - 39 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 29911 of 2012 Petitioner :- Rajesh Kumar Srivastava And Others Respondent :- State of U.P. and Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Satya Prakash Pandey,Naresh Chandra Tripahti,Vivek Srivastava Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,R.S. Prasad,Vikram Bahadur Singh Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra,J.
1. Petitioners, who are four in number, have filed the present writ petition challenging notice/orders dated 27.3.2012 and 31.3.2012, passed by respondent no.5, which are contained in Annexure-11 & 13 to 16 to the writ petition. The order dated 31.3.2012 notices that the petitioners had failed to appear in the screening test organized by the institution to assess the teaching ability and that they had failed to participate in such test previously also. An inference, therefore, has been drawn that petitioners have failed to provide qualitative teaching in the institution and by giving them a month's salary their services have been terminated. These orders have been passed by the Commandant, 12th Battalion, PAC, Fatehpur in his capacity as an office bearer of the Society running the educational institution in question.
2. The orders are assailed primarily on the ground that principles of natural justice have been breached inasmuch as no notice or opportunity of any kind was given to the petitioners before terminating their services. It is also urged that the petitioners were selected after undergoing a fair and transparent process, long back, and therefore, they cannot be compelled to appear in the screening test for which no provision otherwise exists in the rules of the Society that governs the institution. It is also urged that petitioners' act of not participating in the screening test cannot be construed as an act of misconduct, nor would it justify the order of termination against petitioners. The petitioners further claim that they were provided pay scale of Rs.1100-1550 vide letter dated 13.4.2000 and have been denied benefit of pay revision consequent upon introduction of Sixth Pay Commission Report.
3. The petition is opposed by the institution on the ground that a writ would not lie against it, which is purely a private body and is neither receiving any aid nor is regulated by any statutory provisions. It is sought to be contended that the police personnel for the welfare of their children have formed a Society known as Uttar Pradesh Police Shiksha Samiti, which is duly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The payment of salary to the employees/teachers is released from the funds generated by way of contribution made by the police personnel whose children are studying in the institution and/or from the fee collected from students and that no budgetary support or aid of any kind is provided by the State.
4. A supplementary counter affidavit has been filed in which it is asserted that merely because officials of the Police Department of the State of Uttar Pradesh are members of the Society, it would not change the nature of the Society itself, which is governed by its own bye-laws. The rules of the Society as also its registration etc. have been annexed alongwith the supplementary counter affidavit. Clause 11 of the bye-laws of Society provides that financial resources for the institution would be arranged from the fee received from the students or from the contributions made by the members. A sum of Rs.10 is contributed by each officer/employee posted in the Battalion and a separate fund in the name of PAC Shiksha Nidhi, 12th Battalion, Fatehpur is created. A member also contributes to the funds by voluntary contributions/donations etc. In para 2 of the supplementary counter affidavit it is asserted that the institution is purely a private unaided educational institution which is not receiving any grant-in-aid from the State and is not subject to any statutory regulations or control. A letter of the Central Board of Secondary Education dated 10.7.2012 addressed to the Principal, Police Modern School, 12th Battalion, Fatehpur is also annexed, as per which approval of middle class syllabus (I-VIII) has been provisionally approved for a period of three years i.e. 1.4.2012 to 31.3.2015. The letter of CBSE also provides that the school shall appoint only qualified and eligible staff as per the qualifications laid down in the rules.
5. The petitioners, however, contend that institution has been created for the benefit of children of state employees and the management vests exclusively in the officials of the State, and therefore, a writ would lie against the institution. According to them, the orders of termination are liable to be quashed for the reasons already noticed above.
6. From the respective submissions advanced following issues arise for consideration in the facts of the present case:-
(I) Whether the privately managed unaided educational institution is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and a writ petition would be maintainable against it?
(II) Whether any writ is liable to be issued for quashing the order of termination, and thereby allow the petitioners to continue in the employment of the institution, as is prayed for?
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a recent Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Roychan Abraham vs. State of U.P. and others, 2019 (3) ADJ 391 (FB). The reference to the Larger Bench was occasioned in view of the conflict of opinion on the issue, particularly after the judgment of the Apex Court in Ramesh Ahluwalia vs. State of Punjab and others, (2012) 12 SCC 331. The correctness of earlier Full Bench Judgment in M. K. Gandhi and others vs. Director of Education (Secondary) U.P. and others, 2006 (62) ALR 27 was doubted. The Full Bench has examined the issue in detail and following observations contained in paras 60 to 65 of the judgment in Roychan Abraham (supra) are reproduced hereinafter:-
"60. The question as to whether a private institution imparting education is amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, though not a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, was not an issue in M.K. Gandhi. The Full Bench decision is confined to the facts arising in the case and is not an authority on the question that we are called upon to answer. The Full Bench for the reasons stated in para 36 and 37 declined to entertain writ petition against the private educational institution.
''36. Is a writ petition maintainable for, violation of the bye-laws that do not have statutory force?
enforcement of a private contract between the school and the teacher?
We are afraid; our answer has to be in the negative. The Full Bench of our Court in Aley Ahmad Abidi v. District Inspector of Schools, AIR 1977 All 539, (The Aley Abidi Case) has held that:
''The Committee of Management of an Intermediate College is not a statutory body. Nevertheless, a writ petition filed against it is maintainable if such petition is for enforcement of performance of any legal obligations or duties imposed on such committee by a statute.''
37. The committee of management of the D.P.S. School is recognised by the Board but it is neither a statutory body nor a State within the meaning of Article 12. The legal obligation or duty on the D.P.S. School is neither imposed by any statute nor by any statutory provision : it has been imposed by the affiliation bye-laws and agreement which is a contract between the parties and non-statutory. In view of this the writ petition is not maintainable against the D.P.S. School for violation of the affiliation bye-laws.''
61. In Anjani Kumar Srivastava, the Division Bench though noticing Ramesh Ahluwalia declined to interfere for the reason that private contract of service between the master and servant was not enforceable in writ jurisdiction. The case is confined to the facts obtaining therein.
62. In Ms. Geeta Pushp v. Union of India and others, 2018(3) ADJ 98, the petitioner therein was a teacher in Army Public School managed by the Army Welfare Education Society, registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The question for determination in the facts of the case was whether a writ petition by an employee or teacher for enforcement of service contract against the private institution was maintainable. It was held that while retiring a teacher there was no public law element in the action of the private body. The Court, therefore, declined to enforce the service contract in writ jurisdiction. The cases herein above are not reflective of the position of law that private educational institution render public duty and are amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court in the given facts obtaining therein declined the relief to the petitioner as in the opinion of the Court there was no public law element in the offending act complained against the educational institution.
Conclusion:
63. We accordingly proceed to answer the reference in the following terms:
64. Question (i): Private Institutions imparting education to students from the age of six years onwards, including higher education, perform public duty primarily a State function, therefore are amenable to judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
65. Question (ii): The broad principle of law which has been formulated in the judgement of the Full Bench in M.K. Gandhi and Division Bench in Anjani Kr. Srivastava is confined to the facts obtaining therein and is not an authority on the proposition of law that private educational institutions do not render public function and, therefore, are not amenable to judicial review of the High Court. The judgements do not require to be revisited."
8. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the present writ petition would be maintainable against the respondent institution, even if it is a privately managed unaided institution, in view of the Full Bench Judgment in Roychan Abraham (supra) and as the impugned action is otherwise shown to be arbitrary, the orders impugned are liable to be quashed and the petitioners are entitled to continue in service.
9. Per contra, Sri N. C. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent institution has placed reliance upon an order dated 26.7.2016, passed by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.7030 of 2016 (Committee of Management LA Martiniere College, Lucknow through its Principal and another vs. Vatsal Gupta and others), which reads as under:-
"Leave granted.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
Appellant No.1 is an unaided minority private institution. We see no reason how a writ petition against that institution could be entertained. The High Court was clearly in error in entertaining the writ petition and passing subsequent directions.
Under the circumstances, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside."
10. The aforesaid appeal before the Apex Court was directed against a Division Bench Judgment in Special Appeal No.530 of 2015, whereby the appellant was allowed to pursue his educational career in 11th & 12th in the institution concerned, subject to restrictions noticed therein, notwithstanding the fact that the institution was a privately managed unaided institution.
11. Reliance is also placed upon judgments of the Apex Court in Ramakrishna Mission and another vs. Kago Kunya and others in Civil Appeal No.2394 of 2019 and K. K. Saksena vs. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage and others, (2015) 4 SCC 670 to submit that in essence the petitioners are seeking mandatory injunction to continue in employment of private employer which is impermissible in view of the law settled that contract of personal service cannot be enforced. The judgments are also relied upon for the proposition that the writ petition itself would not be maintainable against the privately managed unaided institution in question.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent institution also places reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College vs. Lakshmi Narain and others, (1976) 2 SCC 58 to submit that contract of personal service otherwise cannot be enforced and since the three exceptions laid down by the Apex Court, therein, are not attracted in the facts of the present, therefore, no writ or direction can be issued to enforce the contract of personal service.
13. Perusal of the materials brought on record would go to show that the Police Modern School, 12th Battalion, PAC, Fatehpur, is an educational institution established by the Uttar Pradesh Police Shiksha Samiti, a Society registered under the Act of 1860. The Society and the educational institution run by it is governed by the rules/bye-laws of the Society. The institution is not receiving any aid from the State and finances for its running are generated by way of collections received from fee and voluntary contributions made by the police officials of the 12th Battalion, PAC, Fatehpur. The association of police officers in managing the affairs of the Society and the institution is purely for private purposes inasmuch as exercise of power by them flows from the provisions of the bye-laws and not by any statute/law. The institution is, therefore, a private person having separate and distinct entity which is not shown to be 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
14. Much emphasis is laid by the petitioners to contend that this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable in view of the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Roychan Abraham (supra).
15. The question as to whether a writ petition would be maintainable against a privately managed unaided educational institution has already been considered by the Full Bench of this Court in Roychan Abraham (supra), notwithstanding the fact that such institution is not a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In view of what has been held by the Larger Bench in Roychan Abraham (supra) this writ petition would be maintainable. The first issue, therefore, does not pose much difficulty. However, what has to be seen is that even if a writ petition is held to be maintainable against privately managed unaided educational institution, yet a writ or direction is liable to be issued in favour of teachers concerned?
16. In the facts of the present case, it is admitted that service conditions of petitioners are not governed by any statutory service regulations. The employment offered to petitioners, therefore, would lie purely in the realm of private contract of service. The petitioners are, in essence, seeking enforcement of their private contract by grant of necessary directions/writ. The principle that contract of personal service cannot be enforced is a well recognized principle in law. This law, however, is subjected to three exceptions as have been noticed by the Apex Court in para 18 & 19 of the judgment in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College (supra), which are extracted hereinafter:-
"18. On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is, therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognised exceptions -- (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute.
19. In view of our finding that the Executive Committee of the college in the instant case was not a statutory body, the present case does not fall within any of the excepted categories mentioned above, and hence prima facie, the plaintiff/respondent is not entitled to any declaration or injunction. The learned Counsel for the respondent, however, placed great reliance on the decision of this Court in Sirsi Municipality case in order to contend that this decision had included within the fold of its exceptions a fourth category, namely, an institution which even though was a non-statutory body, but was a local or a public authority. Reliance was placed particularly on the following observations of Ray, J., as he then was, in that case : [SCC p. 413 : SCC (L&S) p. 210, paras 17, 18] "The third category of cases of master and servant arises in regard to the servant in the employment of the State or of other public or local authorities or bodies created under statute.
In the case of servant of the State or of local authorities or statutory bodies, courts have declared in appropriate cases the dismissal to be invalid if the dismissal is contrary to rules of natural justice or if the dismissal is in violation of the provisions of the statute."
17. The case in hand is not shown to be covered by any of the three exceptions to the proposition that contract of personal service cannot be enforced. Neither the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India would be available to petitioners nor they are entitled to any benefit/protection of the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioners would not fall in the third category also inasmuch as the employer herein is not a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India nor any violation of statutory rules or regulations is shown to exist in the facts of the present case.
18. In K. K. Saksena (supra) the Supreme Court had the occasion to extensively examine the issue of maintainability of the writ petition as also the question of issuance of a writ to specifically enforce contract of personal service of an employee of a private Society which allegedly was performing public function. The Court in K. K. Saksena (supra) after examining the earlier judgments of the Apex Court in Ajay Hasia and others vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others, (1981) 1 SCC 722, Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others vs. V. R. Rudani and others, (1989) 2 SCC 691, Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489, Pradeep Kumar Biswas and others vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and others, (2002) 5 SCC 111 and M/s Zee Telefilms Limited and another vs. Union of India and others, (2005) 4 SCC 649, on the issue, proceeded to observe as under in para 43 to 53:-
"43. What follows from a minute and careful reading of the aforesaid judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, admittedly a writ petition under Article 226 would lie against such a person or body. However, we may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law rights. There are a catena of judgments on this aspect and it is not necessary to refer to those judgments as that is the basic principle of judicial review of an action under the administrative law. The reason is obvious. A private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of common law that involves relationships between individuals, such as law of contract or torts. Therefore, even if writ petition would be maintainable against an authority, which is "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law.
44. Within a couple of years of the framing of the Constitution, this Court remarked in Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Rao [Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210] that administrative law in India has been shaped in the English mould. Power to issue writ or any order of direction for "any other purpose" has been held to be included in Article 226 of the Constitution with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in somewhat the same position as the Court of the King's Bench in England. It is for this reason ordinary "private law remedies" are not enforceable through extraordinary writ jurisdiction, even though brought against public authorities (see Administrative Law, 8th Edn., H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, p. 656). In a number of decisions, this Court has held that contractual and commercial obligations are enforceable only by ordinary action and not by judicial review.
45. On the other hand, even if a person or authority does not come within the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution, but is performing public duty, writ petition can lie and writ of mandamus or appropriate writ can be issued. However, as noted in Federal Bank Ltd. [Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733] , such a private body should either run substantially on State funding or discharge public duty/positive obligation of public nature or is under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.
46. In the present case, since ICID is not funded by the Government nor is it discharging any function under any statute, the only question is as to whether it is discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature.
47. It is clear from the reading of the impugned judgment that the High Court was fully conscious of the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments, cognizance whereof is duly taken by the High Court. Applying the test in the case at hand, namely, that of ICID, the High Court opined that it was not discharging any public function or public duty, which would make it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The discussion of the High Court is contained in paras 34 to 36 and we reproduce the same for the purpose of our appreciation: (K.K. Saksena case [K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 1894 : (2011) 180 DLT 204] , SCC OnLine Del) "34. On a perusal of the preamble and the objects, it is clear as crystal that the respondent has been established as a scientific, technical, professional and voluntary non-governmental international organisation, dedicated to enhance the worldwide supply of food and fibre for all people by improving water and land management and the productivity of irrigated and drained lands so that there is appropriate management of water, environment and the application of irrigation, drainage and flood control techniques. It is required to consider certain kind of objects which are basically a facilitation process. It cannot be said that the functions that are carried out by ICID are anyway similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. It is fundamentally in the realm of collection of data, research, holding of seminars and organising studies, promotion of the development and systematic management of sustained irrigation and drainage systems, publication of newsletter, pamphlets and bulletins and its role extends beyond the territorial boundaries of India. The memberships extend to participating countries and sometimes, as bye-law would reveal, ICID encourages the participation of interested national and non-member countries on certain conditions.
35. As has been held in Federal Bank Ltd. [Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733] solely because a private company carries on banking business, it cannot be said that it would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction. The Apex Court has opined that the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act and other statutes have the regulatory measure to play. The activities undertaken by the respondent Society, a non-governmental organisation, do not actually partake the nature of public duty or State actions. There is absence of public element as has been stated in V.R. Rudani [Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691] and Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engg. [K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engg., (1997) 3 SCC 571 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 841] It also does not discharge duties having a positive application of public nature. It carries on voluntary activities which many a non-governmental organisations perform. The said activities cannot be stated to be remotely connected with the activities of the State. On a scrutiny of the Constitution and bye-laws, it is difficult to hold that the respondent Society has obligation to discharge certain activities which are statutory or of public character. The concept of public duty cannot be construed in a vacuum. A private society, in certain cases, may be amenable to the writ jurisdiction if the writ court is satisfied that it is necessary to compel such society or association to enforce any statutory obligation or such obligations of public nature casting positive public obligation upon it.
36. As we perceive, the only object of ICID is for promoting the development and application of certain aspects, which have been voluntarily undertaken but the said activities cannot be said that ICID carries on public duties to make itself amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution."
48. We are in agreement with the aforesaid analysis by the High Court and it answers all the arguments raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. The learned counsel argued that once the society is registered in India it cannot be treated as international body. This argument is hardly of any relevance in determining the character of ICID. The focus has to be on the function discharged by ICID, namely, whether it is discharging any public duties. Though much mileage was sought to be drawn from the function incorporated in the MoA of ICID, namely, to encourage progress in design, construction, maintenance and operation of large and small irrigation works and canals, etc. that by itself would not make it a public duty cast on ICID. We cannot lose sight of the fact that ICID is a private body which has no State funding. Further, no liability under any statute is cast upon ICID to discharge the aforesaid function. The High Court is right in its observation that even when object of ICID is to promote the development and application of certain aspects, the same are voluntarily undertaken and there is no obligation to discharge certain activities which are statutory or of public character.
49. There is yet another very significant aspect which needs to be highlighted at this juncture. Even if a body performing public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction, all its decisions are not subject to judicial review, as already pointed out above. Only those decisions which have public element therein can be judicially reviewed under writ jurisdiction. In Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual [(1969) 1 SCC 585] , as already discussed above, this Court held that the action challenged did not have public element and writ of mandamus could not be issued as the action was essentially of a private character. That was a case where the employee concerned was seeking reinstatement to an office.
50. We have also pointed out above that in Saka Venkata Rao [Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210] this Court had observed that administrative law in India has been shaped on the lines of English law. There are a catena of judgments in English courts taking same view, namely, contractual and commercial obligations are enforceable only by ordinary action and not by judicial review. In R. (Hopley) v. Liverpool Health Authority [2002 EWHC 1723 (Admin) : 2002 Lloyd's Med Rep 494] (unreported)(30-7-2002), Justice Pitchford helpfully set out three things that had to be identified when considering whether a public body with statutory powers was exercising a public function amenable to judicial review or a private function. They are: (i) whether the defendant was a public body exercising statutory powers; (ii) whether the function being performed in the exercise of those powers was a public or a private one; and (iii) whether the defendant was performing a public duty owed to the claimant in the particular circumstances under consideration.
51. Even in Andi Mukta Sadguru [Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691] , which took a revolutionary turn and departure from the earlier views, this Court held that "any other authority" mentioned in Article 226 is not confined to statutory authorities or instrumentalities of the State defined under Article 12 of the Constitution, it also emphasised that if the rights are purely of a private character, no mandamus could issue.
52. It is trite that contract of personal service cannot be enforced. There are three exceptions to this rule, namely:
(i) when the employee is a public servant working under the Union of India or State;
(ii) when such an employee is employed by an authority/body which is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India; and
(iii) when such an employee is "workmen" within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and raises a dispute regarding his termination by invoking the machinery under the said Act.
In the first two cases, the employment ceases to have private law character and "status" to such an employment is attached. In the third category of cases, it is the Industrial Disputes Act which confers jurisdiction on the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to grant reinstatement in case termination is found to be illegal."
19. The judgment of the Apex Court in K. K. Saksena (supra) has recently been followed by the Apex Court in Ramakrishna Mission (supra), where their Lordships proceeded to observe as under in para 36 to 39:-
"36. For the reasons that we have adduced above, we hold that neither the Ramakrishna Mission, nor the hospital would constitute an authority within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution.
37. Before concluding, it would be necessary to also advert to the fact that while the learned Single Judge had come to the conclusion that the appellants are ''State' within the meaning of Article 12, the Division Bench has not accepted that finding. The Division Bench ruled, as we have noticed earlier, that the appellants do not fall within the description of ''State' under Article 12. This finding has not been challenged before this Court by the State of Arunachal Pradesh.
38. Even otherwise, we are clearly of the view that the tests which have been propounded in the line of authority of this Court in Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib Sehravardi9, Pradeep Kumar Biswas v Indian Institute of Chemical Biology 10 and Jatya Pal Singh v Union of India11 support the conclusion of the High Court that the appellants are not ''State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
39. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court dated 6 April 2018 in Writ Appeal No 25 (AP/2017). In consequence, the writ petition filed before the High Court namely W.P. (Civil) No 520 (AP/2015) shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 40 Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of."
20. From the discussions, aforesaid, it is apparent that petitioners in respect of their employment offered by the privately managed unaided educational institution are subject to contract of personal service as per the common law rights and are not covered by any of the three exceptions noticed by the Apex Court in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College (supra) which may justify a writ or direction by this Court to allow the petitioners to continue in the employment, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. No writ, order or direction, therefore, is liable to be issued in favour of petitioners for enforcement of contract of personal service against the privately managed unaided educational institution. Writ petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order is passed as to costs.
Order Date :- 28.1.2020 Ashok Kr.