Allahabad High Court
Bimlendra Mohan Pratap Mishra And ... vs State Of U.P.Throu.Its ... on 14 February, 2017
Author: Sanjay Harkauli
Bench: Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, Sanjay Harkauli
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH A.F.R Reserved Court No. - 1 Case :- LAND ACQUISITION No. - 170 of 2014 Petitioner :- Bimlendra Mohan Pratap Mishra And Another Respondent :- State Of U.P.Throu.Its Prin.Secy.Urban Planning & Devp.& Ors Counsel for Petitioner :- Sidharth Dhaon,Abhishek Dhaon Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Amreshwar Pratap Sahi,J.
Hon'ble Sanjay Harkauli,J.
This petition raises another dimension in relation to the claim of benefits arising out of Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
On a preliminary hearing, the following order was passed by this Court on 8.12.2016:-
"Heard Sri Sidharth Dhaon, learned Counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel for the State.
The preliminary facts that are required to be seen for the purpose of hearing in this petition finally are, that admittedly, the land which was owned by the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners was acquired for the purpose of a playground of a Government Intermediate College at Gonda. Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were issued on 12.9.1975 and 5.1.1976 respectively. It appears that possession was taken and proceedings commenced for the declaration of an award. The award was passed on 31.3.1981. Aggrieved by the amount of compensation awarded, the then owners preferred a Reference and applied before the District Magistrate under Section 18 of the then Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The District Magistrate vide order dated 17.7.1984 recorded his satisfaction while forwarding the reference to the Court concerned. Accordingly, Reference No.1/1984 was registered before the learned District Judge, Gonda that proceeded and since the reference proceedings could not be concluded, the petitioners filed Writ Petition No.2213 (MB) of 2006 praying for an appropriate relief. They also alleged in the writ petition that the amount which had been awarded under the award of 1981 had neither been deposited nor the said amount had been paid to the petitioners. A counter affidavit was filed in the said writ petition, copy whereof has been filed on record of this writ petition as Annexure - 6. The counter affidavit clearly recites that the amount awarded had not been received from the acquiring body and the petitioners had not been paid over the compensation. The said writ petition was disposed of as infructuous on 28.8.2014. The reference proceedings terminated vide order dated 2.4.2010 before the learned District Judge against which the petitioners have filed First Appeal No.56 of 2010. The same is pending consideration before this Court. After the reference order was pronounced, the petitioners were offered two cheques dated 8.4.2011 thereby tendering the amount which had been enhanced during reference proceedings.
In this background, the petitioners have come up before this Court contending that in view of the provisions of Section 24 (2) read with Section 73 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, since the respondents admittedly had failed to either deposit the amount or pay the compensation awarded under Section 11 within the time as prescribed, and had not been paid prior to five years of the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act, therefore the proceedings should be deemed to have lapsed and the provisions of the 2013 Act should be applied with full force in the present facts and circumstances of the case. It is urged that this defect of non-deposit and non-payment of compensation as contemplated under the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act, therefore now entitles the appellants to seek benefit of the aforesaid provisions and the aforesaid defect would not stand cured by any subsequent tendering of the amount in 2011 as mentioned aforesaid. It is therefore urged that the writ petition be allowed and appropriate directions be issued.
Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand contends that the judicial intervention of the reference proceedings as well as the tendering of the amount awarded in the reference proceedings that has been accepted by the petitioners should be treated to be a voluntary act on their part and therefore, they, i.e., the petitioners are now estopped from raising any grievance under the 2013 Act.
We have considered the aforesaid submissions raised and prima facie, we find that this being a new dimension in the matter relating to consideration of a question that has cropped up after the reference proceedings have been decided has to be adjudicated keeping in view the pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and others [AIR 2016 SC 4275]. Further, what has to be seen is as to whether by virtue of accepting the amount after reference proceedings on 8.4.2011, the petitioners can be presumed to have waived their right to seek benefit of the provisions of Section 24 (2) keeping in view the fact that admittedly, the amount had not been deposited by the respondents within the time prescribed as contemplated under the 2013 Act.
Prima facie, there cannot be any estoppel against statute and secondly, so far as the conduct of the petitioners is concerned, they are entitled to plead that there is no estoppel by conduct as well, inasmuch as they have already assailed the reference order by way of a First Appeal before this Court which is pending consideration.
Learned Standing Counsel prays for time to study these aspects and then, assist the Court. Let a counter be filed within three weeks by the State.
List in the second week of January, 2017."
The learned Counsels had been called upon to file appropriate affidavits in order to supplement these submissions. Learned Standing Counsel for the State filed a supplementary counter affidavit in compliance of the said order dated 23.1.2017 to which a supplementary rejoinder has been filed by the petitioners on 27.1.2017. Upon exchange of these affidavits, the matter was again heard on 2.2.2017 and 6.2.2017. On 6.2.2017, on the request of the learned Additional Advocate General Sri V. K. Tiwari for the State, the following order was passed:-
"Heard Sri V.K.Tiwari, learned Additional Advocate General and the learned Standing Counsel for the State.
The submissions that have been advanced are to the effect that the facts of the present case clearly make the applicability of law in the case of Delhi Development Authority Vs. Sukhbir Singh and others [AIR 2016 Volume 8, Supreme Court, page 4275] distinguishable inasmuch as the petitioners have been extended the benefit of payment much prior to the enforcement of the 2013 Act in 2011. In this context an argument has been made that neither the provisions of Section 24(2) nor the decision in the case of Delhi Development Authority (supra) impedes either the tendering of such payment or receipt by the tenure-holder so as to attract the provisions of lapse as contained in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Their argument is that if the payment had already been made prior to 01.01.2014, the petitioners cannot claim any extension of such benefit inasmuch as neither the legislature nor the pronouncements do in any way create a embargo of not receiving payment within a period of five years and, therefore, the leeway period should be understood accordingly as indicated in Paragraph 14 of the judgment in the case of Delhi Development Authority (supra).
The arguments could not conclude. Learned Additional Advocate General prays that the matter be taken up tomorrow.
Put up tomorrow i.e. 07.02.2017."
The arguments concluded on 8.2.2017 whereupon judgment was reserved.
Apart from the facts that have already been narrated in the order dated 8.12.2016 and the issue as canvassed and recorded in the orders dated 2.2.2017 and 6.2.2017, two affidavits have been filed and referred to here-in-above also need to be referred to. Needless to repeat that the acquisition was made for a playground of a Government Intermediate College and notifications were issued under Sections 4 and 6 on 12.9.1975 and 5.1.1976. An award was made on 31.3.1981 and a Reference under Section 18 was made on 17.7.1984. The possession of the land had been taken over. The matter was being contested by the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. The reference was registered as Reference Case No.1/1984 that kept on pending. The fact remains that no compensation was paid or offered or deposited in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Writ Petition No.2213 (MB) of 2006 was filed by the petitioners praying for the release and deposit of the compensation alongwith interest and for a further direction for an expeditious disposal of the Reference. It is here that an interesting turn takes place on the facts of the present case when the respondents in the said Writ Petition, namely, the State filed a counter affidavit and even though the amount of award had been declared, the amount had not been received from the acquiring body for being deposited. This counter affidavit dated 27.6.2006 is undisputed in the present proceedings. Not only this, a letter was written by the District Magistrate, Gonda on 12.6.2006 demanding the amount from the Director of Secondary Education, U.P. for remitting the said amount so that the same may be disbursed to the tenure holders.
The Reference came to be decided on 2.4.2010 confirming the Award dated 31.3.1981. Aggrieved by the said order on the Reference, the petitioners filed First Appeal No.56 of 2010 which is pending consideration before this Court.
It is clear that the amount was not deposited or paid since 1981 for almost 30 years.
The petitioners filed Execution Case No.1 of 2010 before the learned Additional District Judge so that they may receive the fruits of the Award. On the filing of this execution application and during the pendency of Writ Petition No.2213 (MB) of 2006, the respondents tendered two cheques on 8.4.2011 as compensation for the land that had been acquired the area whereof was 3.39 acres. This receipt of cheques by the petitioners was obviously subject to the challenge raised to the compensation awarded which is still pending consideration in Appeal, and therefore, the payment received by the petitioners according to them was not to abandon any claim of their right to receive any such benefits in future and it was a receipt virtually under protest. The receipt of the cheques according to the petitioners did not amount to a voluntary act so as estopp them from raising any claim about compensation or any such benefits in future.
The present writ petition has been filed contending that by virtue of the proviso appended to Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the petitioners are entitled to the benefits thereof as even though the Award had been made and possession taken, the tendering of the cheques to the petitioners on 8.4.2011 would not amount to a deposit by the respondents before the Court as understood in the light of the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court in Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki and others [(2014) 3 SCC 183], Bharat Kumar v. State of Haryana and another [(2014) 6 SCC 586], Bimla Devi and others v. State of Haryana and others [(2014) 6 SCC 583], Union of India and others v. Shiv Raj and others [(2014) 6 SCC 564] and the latest judgment in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and others [AIR 2016 SC 4275].
The thrust of the arguments on behalf of the petitioners by Sri Sidharth Dhaon is that in view of the paragraphs 10 to 16 and paragraph - 27 of the decision in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and others (supra) particularly paragraph - 14 thereof, coupled with paragraphs 17 and 18 of the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) it is clearly established that in the present case, there was no valid payment in terms of Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ignoring the procedure of mode and manner of deposit as provided under Section 31 (2) of the 1894 Act. Sri Dhaon urges that receiving of the cheques in this desperate situation after more than 30 years is not an act of volition but receiving something under compulsion as the litigation still continues to persist and the petitioners were pursuing their claim bona fidely as indicated above. It was the respondents who failed to make deposit after the Award was made in 1981 and they did not even choose to tender or offer the amount even at the stage of Reference. The amount was not even admittedly deposited before the Reference Court where the Reference came to be decided finally on 2.4.2010. It was after the petitioners had filed an execution case and had already preferred an appeal against the Reference Order that the cheques were sent to the petitioners. The aforesaid facts remain undisputed. Thus, there was no payment for 30 years after the Award. It is also urged that for the purpose of attracting the provisions of Section 24 (2), the leeway period that has to be construed if understood in it's correct perspective has to be counted backwards from 1.1.2014 which is the date of enforcement of the 2014 Act. The amount was tendered only three years prior to the said date by way of cheques. Thus, it is not in accordance with the law laid down by the Apex Court and is not a valid tender of money as explained by the judgments of the Apex Court while interpreting Section 31 (2) of the 1894 Act read with the proviso to Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. The question in this case is therefore only in relation to the issue of the tendering of payment through cheques in the year 2011 and as to whether such tendering would amount to a valid deposit of compensation that may not attract the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act.
Thus, the gist of the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners Sri Dhaon is that in the light of the aforesaid submissions, it is clear that there was no valid payment or deposit to satisfy the compensatory claim of the petitioners for an inordinately long period and since 2013 Act is a beneficial piece of legislation the benefits arising therefrom have to be read as interpreted to the advantage of the petitioners-tenure holders.
Replying to the aforesaid submissions Sri V. K. Tiwari, learned Additional Advocate General and Sri Rai, learned Standing Counsel have urged that none of the judgments that have been relied upon by the petitioners apply on the facts of the present case, inasmuch as the Award had been made and the possession of the land had been taken. So far as the payment of compensation is concerned, the same has been tendered through cheques that has been voluntarily accepted by the petitioners as detailed in the supplementary counter affidavit filed by them and consequently, once the payment has been accepted none of the contingencies and exigencies as contained in Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act arise so as to attract the provision of deemed lapse. They submit that the leeway period of five years is only in respect of the date of pronouncement of Award and is not applicable as to the date of payment of compensation or possession and consequently, applying the limitation period of five years, the payment of compensation as urged on behalf of the petitioners is totally misplaced. They submit that the judgments which have been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in no away advance the proposition argued by them, and therefore the counting of the period of five years with regard to the payment of compensation is a completely misdirected argument. The same according to them cannot be made the basis of calculation of the leeway period and once the cheques have been accepted by the petitioners they cannot claim any further rights under the 2013 Act. According to the learned Counsel, the acquisition is complete in all respects, and therefore to open the issue under the garb of an interpretation as urged would not be a sound exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as it would not be in consonance with the ratio decidendi of the judgments that have been cited at the Bar. The following judgments have been cited on behalf of the State:-
(i) Balwant Rai Saluja v. AIR India and others [2014 (9) SCC 407 paras 22 to 26]
(ii) Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and others [AIR 2016 SC 4275]
(iii) Bimla Devi v. State of Haryana [(2014) 6 SCC 583]
(iv) Velaxan Kumar v. Union of India (UOI) [AIR 2015 SC 1462]
(v) Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and others [(2014) 3 SCC 183]
(vi) Union of India and others v. Shiv Raj and others [2014 (104) ALR 893]
(vii) State of Haryana and others v. Vinod Oil and General Mills and another [(2014) 15 SCC 410]
(viii) Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and others [(2015) 3 SCC 353]
(ix) Karnail Kaur and others v. State of Punjab and others [(2015) 3 SCC 206]
(x) Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others v. Jagjit Singh and others [AIR 2015 SC 2683]
(xi) Rajiv Chowdhrie HUF v. Union of India and others, I.A. No.4 of 2014 in Civil Appeal No.8785 of 2013
(xii) Bharat Kumar v. State of Haryana and another, Civil Appeal No.1971 of 2014
(xiii) Karan Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., Civil Appeal No.4254 of 2015
(xiv) Prem Nath Kapur & Anr. Etc. v. National Fertilizers Corporation [1996 (2) SCC 71]
(xv) Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes & Ors. v. Government of Goa & Anr., Civil Appeal No.7245 of 2003 (xvi) Shashi Gupta and another v. State of Haryana and others [2016 (117) ALR 455] (xvii) Sita Ram v. State of Haryana and another [(2015) 3 SCC 597] The question therefore that now arises and is the only issue involved in this petition is with regard to the payment of compensation which the petitioners allege to be not in accordance with the Act and secondly, the receiving of the cheques by the petitioners would not amount to abandoning their rights to question the action of the respondents as this is not a voluntary acceptance of the compensation but rather it is receipt of the cheques under compulsive circumstances narrated above created by the respondents themselves. The respondents on the other hand counter this by contending that the payment has been effected and the acquisition being complete, there is no occasion to apply the ratio of any of the judgments when the Statute itself does not permit any such interpretation.
Having considered the submissions raised, the issue is as to whether the payments tendered by cheques on 8.4.2011 would amount to payment of compensation thereby not attracting the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act.
From the decisions that have been cited at the Bar, it would be apt to refer to paragraphs 17 and 18 of the decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) that is extracted hereunder:-
17. While enacting Section 24 (2), Parliament definitely had in its view Section31 of the 1894 Act. From that one thing is clear that it did not intend to equate the word "paid" to "offered" or "tendered". But at the same time, we do not think that by use of the word "paid", Parliament intended receipt of compensation by the landowners/persons interested. In our view, it is not appropriate to give a literal construction to the expression "paid" used in this Sub-section (Sub-section (2) of Section 24). If a literal construction were to be given, then it would amount to ignoring procedure, mode and manner of deposit provided in Section 31 (2) of the 1894 Act in the event of happening of any of the contingencies contemplated therein which may prevent the Collector from making actual payment of compensation. We are of the view, therefore, that for the purposes of Section 24 (2), the compensation shall be regarded as "paid" if the compensation has been offered to the person interested and such compensation has been deposited in the Court where reference under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies contemplated under Section 31 (2) of the 1894 Act. In other words, the compensation may be said to have been "paid" within the meaning of Section 24 (2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in Court and made that amount available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33.
18. 1894 Act being an expropriatory legislation has to be strictly followed. The procedure, mode and manner for payment of compensation are prescribed in Part V. (Sections 31-34) of the 1894 Act. The Collector, with regard to the payment of compensation, can only act in the manner so provided. It is settled proposition of law (classic statement of Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor) that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden."
The aforesaid ratio has been further explained in paragraph - 14 of the decision in the case of Delhi Development Authority (supra) coupled with the view expressed by the Apex Court in paragraph - 27 thereof. The aforesaid two paragraphs are extracted hereunder for ready reference:-
"14. The picture that therefore emerges on a reading of Section 24 (2) is that the State has no business to expropriate from a citizen his property if an award has been made and the necessary steps to complete acquisition have not been taken for a period of five years or more. These steps include the taking of physical possession of land and payment of compensation. What the legislature is in effect telling the executive is that they ought to have put their house in order and completed the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time after pronouncement of award. Not having done so even after a leeway of five years is given, would cross the limits of legislative tolerance, after which the whole proceeding would be deemed to have lapsed. It is important to notice that the Section gets attracted if the acquisition proceeding is not completed within five years after pronouncement of the award. This may happen either because physical possession of the land has not been taken or because compensation has not been paid, within the said period of five years. A faint submission to the effect that 'or' should be read as 'and' must be turned down for two reasons. The plain natural meaning of the Sub-section does not lead to any absurdity for us to replace language advisedly used by the Legislature. Secondly, the object of the Act, and Section 24 in particular, is that in case an award has been made for five years or more, possession ought to have been taken within this period, or else it is statutorily presumed that the balance between the citizen's right to retain his own property and the right of the State to expropriate it for a public purpose gets so disturbed as to make the acquisition proceedings lapse. Alternatively, if compensation has not been paid within this period, it is also statutorily presumed that the aforesaid balance gets disturbed so as to free such property from acquisition."
27.Even going by paragraph 15 of the Satendra Prasad Jain's case, we find that the difference in phraseology between Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act really clinches the issue in favour of the land owners. The expression used in Section24 (2), namely, "deemed to have lapsed" is of great significance and differs from the use of the expression "lapsed" in Section11A. As is well settled, a deeming fiction is enacted so that a putative state of affairs must be imagined, the mind not being allowed to boggle at the logical consequence of such putative state of affairs. Even if we are to agree with Shri Sharan that, post vesting, acquisition proceedings cannot be said to lapse, yet we have to give effect to the deeming fiction contained in Section 24 (2). In fact, Section 24 (2) uses the expression "deemed to have lapsed" because the Legislature was cognizant of the fact that, in cases where compensation has not been paid, and physical possession handed over to the State, vesting has taken place, after which land acquisition proceedings could be said to have ended. For this reason also, we are of the view that Pune Municipal Corporation does not require to be revisited."
A perusal thereof leaves no room for doubt that either possession is not taken or compensation is not paid, then in that event the proceedings would lapse. On this issue, there is no dispute between the parties. The Apex Court has also reiterated it's view as to what would amount to payment of compensation. It is now settled under the decisions aforesaid that compensation can be regarded as paid if the compensation is literally paid to the person interested or after being offered to such person has been deposited in the Court. The aforesaid ratio is contained in paragraph - 14 of the decision in the case of Ratan Singh and others v. Union of India (UOI) and others [2015 (13) SCALE Page 594]. Further, in the case of Vijay Latka and others v. State of Haryana and others [AIR 2016 SC 2584], the Apex Court in paragraph - 6 has laid down that when a land is compulsorily acquired it is for the requisitioning authority to make the payment and it is not required of the land owner to come and receive the payment.
On the facts of the present case, it is undisputed that even the money that was required to be deposited by the body for whom the land was acquired had not been tendered till 2011. Not only this, it was only after the execution application was pressed into service and the appeal against the Reference Order had been filed that the respondents offered the compensation through the cheques dated 8.4.2011. The question therefore is as to whether tendering of such cheques in the year 2011 would amount to complying with the provisions of the Act and would not attract the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act.
The Court has been able to lay hands on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Reena Suri and others [2016 (4) SCALE page 611] and while explaining the aforesaid provision of Section 24 (2), the Apex Court in paragraph - 3 has ruled as under:-
"3. It may be seen that Under Section 24 (2) of the Act, the proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and culminating in award Under Section 11 of the said Act would lapse in case the possession after passing of the award has not been taken within five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act (9 of 2014). This Act came into force on 01.01.2014. Under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act, the proceedings would also lapse in case the compensation has not been paid to the owners of the land before 01.01.2014. However, it is made clear Under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act that despite such lapse, it will be open to the appropriate Government to initiate fresh proceedings for acquisition in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act."
The question therefore that has to be answered in this petition is as to whether there was any valid payment after the Award or deposit in accordance with the provisions of Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and secondly, whether the said payment did amount to a valid tender of the amount of compensation to the tenure holders or not. It has also to be seen as to whether this payment after 31 years would amount to a payment that would not attract the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act.
In order to attract the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act, the fiction provided for therein of a deemed lapse has to be pressed into service for which the necessary ingredient would be the existence of a fact which has to be contemplated in order to apply the fiction. Thus, the fact should be presumed to be in existence as on the date of the enforcement of the 2013 Act in order to invoke the fictional clause as contained in Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act.
The question is as to whether what should be the date of payment of compensation in order to attract the aforesaid fiction. It is here that we find that the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act require three conditions to be fulfilled, namely, that the award should have been made five years or more prior to the enforcement of the Act. The aforesaid condition is fulfilled in the present case and the possession was also taken. The payment has been made in 2011. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, the fact of payment of compensation did exist as prior to 1st of January, 2014. Thus, the existence of the said fact eliminates the possibility of invoking the fictional clause as contained in Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act as the payment had been tendered prior to 1.1.2014. Consequently, if the payment of compensation has been made prior to 1.1.2014 the same cannot be said to be an invalid payment unless the payment which has been made falls short of the requisite payment to which the tenure holder was entitled.
In our considered opinion, if the payment which has been tendered to the petitioners by way of cheques, which is a literal payment as against the amount calculated under the Award, is short of the amount which ought to have been paid to the petitioners under the Award, then in that event, the said payment cannot be said to be the full and complete payment as contemplated under the Award. If that be the situation, then the petitioners can claim the benefit of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act provided there is an evidence to the effect that the payment made to the petitioners falls short of the payment to which the petitioners were entitled under the Award.
In this view of the matter, the leeway period of five years as was urged on behalf of the petitioners would not come to the advantage of the petitioners because the said period of five years is to be calculated only for the purpose of computing the period of the date of Award five years prior to 1.1.2014. The said leeway period is not in relation to or is contemplated to apply for possession and payment of compensation that can be prior to 1.1.2014. If the payment or the possession has not taken place on or before 1.1.2014, then the provisions of Section 24 (2) will be clearly attracted provided the Award had been made five years prior to 1.1.2014. Consequently, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Reena Suri (supra) clearly puts a final seal on the matter as per the ratio of paragraph - 3 of the aforesaid decision which applies on the facts of the present case as it stands today.
Accordingly, the proceedings cannot lapse as the fiction of deemed lapse cannot be attracted as the possession has been taken and payment has been made prior to 1.1.2014.
However, this is subject to the condition as explained by us here-in-above that if the payment which has been tendered to the petitioners by way of cheques is not the full and complete payment as calculated under the Award, then it will be open to the petitioners to seek such benefit of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act in the light of the decisions of the Apex Court that have been cited at the Bar.
The writ petition therefore stands disposed off accordingly.
Order Date :- 14.2.2017 lakshman [Sanjay Harkauli, J.] [Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, J.]