Kerala High Court
Ramachandran Panakam vs Union Of India on 20 October, 2021
Author: S. Manikumar
Bench: S.Manikumar, Shaji P.Chaly
WP(C). 28417/2017 -:1:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2021 / 28TH ASWINA, 1943
WP(C) NO. 28417 OF 2017
PETITIONERS:
1 RAMACHANDRAN PANAKAM
AGED 46 YEARS
S/O UNNIKRISHNAN NAIR, AGED 46 YEARS,RESIDING AT
PARANGODATH HOUSE,PERUVALLOOR PO, MULLASSERY
VILLAGE,CHAVAKKAD TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT.
PIN.680508.
2 SREENIVASAN
S/O AYYAPPAN, AGED 66 YEARS, RESIDING ATERAKKATHU
HOUSE, CHIRAYATHU HOMES,MACHINGAL LANE, M.G ROAD,
THRISSUR.1
3 DHEERAJ M.K.
S/O KRISHNAN, AGED 43 YEARS,RESIDING AT MUTTATHIL
HOUSE,ALAKAPPA NAGAR PO, AMBALLOOR
VILLAGE,MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK, THRISSUR DIST. PIN.
4 SAJITH
S/O SUBRAMANIAN, AGED 39 YEARS,VELLAMPARAMBIL
HOUSE, CHITHISSERY PO,NENMANIKKAA, MUKUNDAPURAM
TALUK,THRISSUR DIST.PIN. 680301.
BY ADVS.
SRIP.S.SUJETH
SMT.M.R.REENA
RESPONDENTS:
1 UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE
GOVERNMENT,MINISTRY OF ROAD TRANSPORT&
HIGHWAYS,NEW DELHI. 110001.
WP(C). 28417/2017 -:2:-
2 NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER,
(TECHNICAL) G-5 & 6, SECTOR 10,DWARAKA, NEW DELHI.
110075,
3 THE PROJECT DIRECTOR
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA,CHANDRA NAGAR,
PALAKKAD. 678001.
4 THE STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO
GOVERNMENT,DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS,
SECRETARIAT,THIRUVANANTHAPURAM. 695001.
5 THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR
THRISSUR DISTRICT, COLLECTORATE,AYYANTHOLE,
THRISSUR.3.
6 THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER R.D.O
THRISSUR DISTRICT, COLLECTORATE,AYYANTHOLE,
THRISSUR.3
7 THE SECRETARY
NENMANIKKARA GRAMA PANCHAYAT,AMBALLOOR PO,
THRISSUR DISTRICT. PIN.680308.
8 GURUVAYOOR INFRASTRUCTURE P LTD
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR,PROJECT OFFICE
AT PERAMBRA,CHALAKKUDY, THRISSUR DIST. 680307.
BY ADVS.
SMT.MINI GOPINATH, CGC
SRI. JAGADEESH LAKSHMAN, CGC FOR R1
SRI.B.G.BIDAN CHANDRAN, SC FRO R2 AND R3
SRI.M.V. KINI
SRI.C.HARIKUMAR
SRI.E.C.KURIAKOSE
SRI.RENJITH RAJAPPAN
SMT.NOVA SEN ABRAHAM
SRI. C. HARIKUMAR FOR R7
SRI. K. R. RANJITH, GOVERNMENT PLEADER FOR R4-R6
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 20.10.2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
WP(C). 28417/2017 -:3:-
"C.R"
JUDGMENT
S. Manikumar, CJ Instant writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:-
"i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus or appropriate writ, to declare the blockage of the Old National Highway Road near the Toll Plaza at Paliakkara in Thrissur District as unconstitutional, illegal and against the law.
ii) To call for the entire records leading to the issuance of the Ext-P4 and to set aside the same by way of a writ of certiorari.
iii) To declare that the 'illegal blockage of Old National Highway Road' with Iron Barricade near Toll Plaza at Paliakkara, Thrissur as violation of fundamental right of Movement guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India.
iv) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus or other appropriate writ, directing the respondents 4 & 5 to remove the iron barricade on the Old National Highway, parallel to the Toll Plaza Road at Paliakkara, in the interest of justice and equity.
v) Issue a writ, order or direction to the 5 th & 6th respondents to monitor the usage of the 'Old National Highway Road' at Paliakkara Thrissur and to consider the Ext-P1 & P3 representations submitted by the Petitioners, within a time limit stipulates by this Hon'ble Court."WP(C). 28417/2017 -:4:-
2. Short facts leading to the writ petition are as under:
Mr. Ramachandran Panakam, the 1st petitioner, is a social worker presently acting as the District Secretary to PUCL, Thrissur District (People's Union for Civil Liberties), a Human Rights Body founded in India in the year 1976, by the veteran leader Late Jeyaprekash Narayan.
Mr. Sreenivasan, the 2nd petitioner, is also a former Secretary to PUCL, and Mr. Dheeraj and Mr. Sajith, petitioners 3 & 4, are the local residents, where the subject matter of the writ petition is pertaining to.
Petitioners have contended that a parallel road to Mannuthi-Angamaly stretch of the National Highway had been blocked by Paliakkara Toll Plaza Company, with an intend to prevent skipping of Toll Plaza.
The question of law raised before this Court by the petitioners is whether the Toll Plaza Company can insist the people to use the road through which the Toll Plaza locates, by blocking a parallel road, in which the citizens of India have the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India, to move freely throughout the territory of India.WP(C). 28417/2017 -:5:-
Petitioners have further contended that a Private Toll Plaza Company cannot claim any benefit under the imposition of reasonable restrictions, since the blockage of the parallel old National Highway Road violates the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India.
Article 19 (5) permits the State Government to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of movement on its citizens only in two grounds, viz., (i) in the interest of general public, and (ii) for the protection of the interest of Scheduled Tribes.
In the present context, the restriction imposed by the executives, in collusion with a private company, will not come under the purview of Article 19(5). The blockage of the road is only intended to protect the interest of a private company. Reasonable restriction can only be imposed either by the Parliament and Legislatures, but in the present case, the decision has been taken by the executives, in collusion with the private company officials.
Petitioners have also contended that the mass petition submitted to both the District Collector and R.D.O has been discarded and no action WP(C). 28417/2017 -:6:- has been taken so far. There are incidents of fire on straw at paddy field, and even the Fire Engine could not reach the spot, on account of the illegally erected barricade, and ultimately suffered heavy loss. It was stated that even a patient died on the way to the hospital, due to heavy queue in the toll plaza.
Petitioners have also contended that they have no other efficacious remedy, other than to approach this Court, seeking to declare the blockage of the road, in furtherance of the decision, as held in Ext.
P4 minutes, to be unconstitutional.
3. Today, when the matter came up for hearing, Mr. Bidan Chandran B.G., learned counsel for the National Highways Authority of India, submitted that the issues raised in the instant writ petition have already been considered and decided by a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 40935 of 2016 and connected cases.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.
5. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment in W.P.(C) No. 40935 of 2016 and connected cases dated 12.10.2017, are reproduced:-
WP(C). 28417/2017 -:7:-"5. It may also be mentioned that for the benefit of neighbouring villagers, concessionaire had agreed to provide them with passes showing their residence, which would entitle them for exemption from paying toll. The amount lost by the concessionaire was to be paid by the State Government. Thus neighboring villagers though exempted from paying toll were nevertheless required to pass through the toll plaza for this verification and accounting. This, naturally created a problem because people may have to travel extra distance. Considering some of these inconvenience, the concessionaire agreed that to avoid inconvenience to the two wheelers and three wheelers, which vehicles are not liable to pay toll, the entry to the old National Highway would not be totally blocked. A passage of only 1.5 metre was agreed to be opened so that two wheelers and three wheelers who have no obligation to pay toll could pass through, but no other vehicle. This was considerate and reasonable. Pursuant to this, the District Collector also issued an order No.A11/77765/2014 dt. 3.10.2016 which has been produced as Ext.P9 in W.P.(C) No.29171 of 2017, which reads as follows:
"As it is necessary to erect a barricade to permanently close the intersecting point of the old highway so as to effectively implement the provisions of the State Support Agreement for the effective implementation of the order of the Hon'ble High Court vide W.P.(C) No.14492 of 2012 dated 16.7.2012, I hereby order to reconstruct the barricade leaving an WP(C). 28417/2017 -:8:- opening of 1.5 metres to allow the toll free traffic of two wheeler and three wheeler to move. The District Police Chief, Thrissur shall give necessary protection for such reconstruction of barricade. The police shall carry out frequent patrolling to keep a vigil in the area in order to avoid attempts to widen the 1.5 metre gap or illegal removal in future."
Inspite of such measures, little realising that if comforts are required, one has to pay, people insisted on breaking open the entire blockage. We have on record of what happened thereafter. Large vehicles including 16 wheeler trucks dangerously turned around on the Highway to take advantage of this diversion and to avoid toll and virtually the entire traffic was diverted through this unauthorised passage. The Concessionaire immediately protested. There was a meeting of various Ministers, District Administration, concessionaire and other people's representatives. Exhibit P10 is the record of those proceedings which is dated 18.5.2017. In Exhibit P10, the areas of dispute and the directions issued to rectify the same are clearly detailed under two separate heads. It clearly records that the barricading would be reinstalled as it was in the previous year. All parties agreed to it and pursuant thereto, as was ordered on 3.10.2016 by Exhibit P9 order of the District Collector, the position was to be restored ie., barricading after leaving an opening of 1.5 metres to allow toll free passage of two wheeler and three wheeler vehicles.
WP(C). 28417/2017 -:9:-9. We would accordingly direct the Highway Authority and its officers who are responsible, in so far as this Concessionaire Agreement is concerned, to ensure that not only roads are kept in good repaired condition but other civic amenities, which the concessionaire is required to provide are maintained. We would also direct the second respondent to ensure that effective barricading is restored in a manner to allow only a gap of 1.50 metres and to ensure that the same is maintained at all times. This should be executed within a week from today.
10. We may now refer to one serious objection that has been raised by the citizens. They have referred to notification No.GSR. No.838(E) dated 5.12.2008 issued by the Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways (Department of Road Transport and Highways) as published in the Gazette of India being the National Highway Fee (Determination of Rates and Collection) Rules, 2008. We may note that one of the contentions was that the Concessionaire or other authorities have no right to close any intersection. But when this other issue was being argued, with regard to various charges to be levied, we found that in these Rules, there is Rule 17, which is quoted hereunder :
"17. Bar for installation of additional barrier.- No barrier shall be installed at any place, other than at the toll plaza, except with the prior permission in writing of the Central Government or the executing authority, as the case may be, who after being satisfied that there is evasion of fee, may allow on such terms and conditions as it may WP(C). 28417/2017 -:10:- impose, the installation of such additional barrier by the Central Government, the executing authority or the concessionaire, as the case may be, within ten kilometers from the toll plaza, to check the evasion of fee:"
11. These Rules clearly authorises the Central Government or Executive Authorities (does not include the State) to authorise barricading where it thought necessary to check evasion of toll. This is a specific statutory right which can be invoked by the authorities if they find that by not erecting barrier payment of toll can be evaded. Thus, the authorities have a right and a duty to comply with such provision.
12. We would thus record that in view of Rule 17 quoted above, even if the authorities were to take a decision to completely barricade the intersection of the new Highway and the old Highway, it would not be wrong rather it would be in compliance of Rule 17 noted above. However, as the concessionaire had agreed to leave an opening of 1.50 metres to avoid inconvenience to non-toll paying vehicles like two wheelers and three wheelers, we would leave it that, but on an assurance that State at all times would ensure that this opening is not widened any further. So far as deficiencies are concerned, it is open to the citizens to represent the authorities of the National Highway with regard to any deficiency in service they had and the authorities would be obliged to take appropriate action to WP(C). 28417/2017 -:11:- ensure that the grievance of the citizens, if they are bonafide and genuine, are redressed. They have ample power to enforce the same. But that cannot be a reason to stop paying tolls. If the State wants good roads, then every citizen would be required to make some sacrifice. They would have to pay for the benefit of travelling on a good road. No service in any sphere is gratuitous. The sooner the people accepts this, the better it would be for the State."
(emphasis supplied)
6. We have gone through the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.40935 of 2016 and connected cases dated 12.10.2017, pertaining to the very same barricade. Inasmuch as a Hon'ble Division Bench in a public interest writ petition, based on the pleadings and material on record, and with reference to the statutory provisions, has directed the National Highways Authority of India, to ensure that effective barricading has to be restored, in a manner to allow only a gap of 1.50 metres, and also to ensure that the same is maintained at all times, the said decision is binding on all. It is a judgment in rem.
7. At this juncture, we deem it fit to consider a few decisions on judgment in rem as hereunder:
WP(C). 28417/2017 -:12:-(i) In Ganesh Singh v. Hari Singh and Ors. [2003 (1) WLC 379], the High Court of Rajasthan held as under:
"22. A judgment in rem means an adjudication pronounced upon the status of a person or thing, by a competent court to the word generally. But it is not conclusive proof of the facts constituting the reasons for the decision. In such circumstances, the order is conclusive only as regards the status but not as regards the grounds on which it is based."
(ii) In Satrucharla Vijaya Rama Raju v. Nimmaka Jaya Raju, [(2006) 1 SCC 212], a judgment in rem has been described by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under:
"10. ... A judgment in rem is defined in English law as "an adjudication pronounced (as its name indeed denotes) by the status, some particular subject-matter by a tribunal having competent authority for that purpose". Spencer Bower on Res Judicata defines the term as one which "declares, defines or otherwise determines the status of a person or of a thing, that is to say, the jural relation of the person or thing to the world generally"...
(iii) In C.L. Pasupathy v. Engineer in Chief (WRO) [2009 (2) MLJ 491], the Madras High Court has considered the expressions, "judgment 'in rem' or a judgment 'in personam'", as under:
"27. ....... Historically the term judgement "in rem"
was used in Roman law in connection with actio but not in connection with "jus actio in personam". The effect of "actio in rem" was to conclude against all mankind, but the effect of "actio in personam" was to conclude with regard to the individual only. After the Roman forms of procedure had passed away, the term "in rem" survived to express the effect of an action "in rem" and gradually, it came to import "generally".
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx WP(C). 28417/2017 -:13:-
29. Courts have held that, "Judgement in rem", operates on a thing or status rather than against the person and binds all persons to the extent of their interest in the thing, whether or not they were parties to the proceedings. The judgement "in rem", as distinguished from judgement "in personam" is an adjudication of some particular thing or subject matter, which is the subject of controversy, by a competent Tribunal, and having the binding effect of all persons having interests, whether or not joined as parties to the proceedings, in so far as their interests in the "res" are concerned. In determining whether a judgement is "in rem", the effect of the judgement is to be considered and it is tested by matters of substance, rather than by measure of any particular draft or form.
A final judgement on the merits in a particular proceeding, "in rem" is an absolute bar to subsequent proceedings founded on the same facts and a judgement "in rem" may be pleaded as a bar to another action of the same subject matter, if its effect is to merge a distinct cause of action, but not otherwise. The judgement "in rem" operates as a bar or estoppel only to the "res" or matter within the jurisdiction of the court and does not prevent a subsequent action for personal relief, which could not be obtained in the first action. Thus with respect to the "res or status", a "judgement in rem"
has to be conclusive and binding upon "all the world" that is, on all the persons, who may have or claim any right or interest in the subject matter of litigation, whether or not, they were parties to or participants in the action, atleast to the extent, that it adjudicates or establishes a status, title or res, constituting the subject matter of the action, a "judgement in rem" will operate as a estoppel, in a subsequent action in respect of the points or questions adjudicated."
(iv) In State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others [(2015) 1 SCC 347], the WP(C). 28417/2017 -:14:- Hon'ble Apex Court dealt with the issue as to the entitlement of benefit of 'judgment in rem', with an intention to benefit all similarly situated persons irrespective of whether they had approached the Court or not. It is held therein that when a particular set of employees is given relief by Court, all other identically situated persons should be treated alike by extending the same benefit, since not doing so would amount to discrimination and be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
8. It is also worthwhile to consider a few decisions, on the law of precedents and binding effect.
(i) In S.I. Rooplal and Ors. v. Lt. Governor Through Chief Secretary, Delhi and Ors. [(2000) 1 SCC 644], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"12. At the outset, we must express our serious dissatisfaction in regard to the manner in which a coordinate Bench of the tribunal has overruled, in effect, an earlier judgment of another coordinate Bench of the same tribunal. This is opposed to all principles of judicial discipline. If at all, the subsequent Bench of the tribunal was of the opinion that the earlier view taken by the coordinate Bench of the same tribunal was incorrect, it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench so that the difference of opinion between the two coordinate Benches on the same point could have been avoided. It is not as if the latter Bench was unaware of the judgment of the earlier Bench but knowingly it proceeded to disagree with the said judgment against all known rules of precedents. Precedents which enunciate rules of law from the foundation of administration of justice under our system. This is a fundamental WP(C). 28417/2017 -:15:- principle which every Presiding Officer of a Judicial Forum ought to know, for consistency in interpretation of law alone can lead to public confidence in our judicial system. This Court has laid down time and again precedent law must be followed by all concerned; deviation from the same should be only on a procedure known to law. A subordinate court is bounded by the enunciation of law made by the superior courts. A coordinate Bench of a Court cannot pronounce judgment contrary to declaration of law made by another Bench. It can only refer it to a larger Bench if it disagrees with the earlier pronouncement.
13. We are indeed sorry to note the attitude of the tribunal in this case which, after noticing the earlier judgment of a coordinate Bench and after noticing the judgment of this Court, has still thought it fit to proceed to take a view totally contrary to the view taken in the earlier judgment thereby creating a judicial uncertainty in regard to the declaration of law involved in this case. Because of this approach of the latter Bench of the tribunal in this case, a lot of valuable time of the Court is wasted and parties to this case have been put to considerable hardship.
14. In our opinion, the above error on the part of the tribunal in the normal course should have made us remand this case to the tribunal to be decided by a larger Bench of the tribunal to decide the issue involved in this case, but then taking into consideration the time already consumed by this case and cost and inconvenience suffered by the parties concerned because of the above referred indiscretion of the tribunal we think in the interest of justice we should put to rest the controversies involved in these appeals."
(ii) In Lily Thomas v. Union of India [(2000) 6 SCC 244], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reiterated the principle that rulings of Larger Bench should be followed and those of Coordinate Bench of equal strength not to be different from WP(C). 28417/2017 -:16:- and most be followed.
(iii) In Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Ors. v. Harish Kumar Purohit and Ors. [(2003) 5 SCC 480], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"13. Before parting with the case we would like to point out one disturbing feature which has been brought to our notice. On 13.12.2001 a Division Bench dismissed an application containing identical prayers. Even before the ink was dry on the judgment, by the impugned judgment, another division Bench took a diametrically opposite view. It is not that the earlier decision was not brought to the notice of the subsequent Division Bench hearing the subsequent applications. In fact, a reference has been made by the submissions made by the Commission where this decision was highlighted. Unfortunately, the Division Bench hearing the subsequent applications did not even refer to the conclusions arrived at by the earlier Division Bench. The earlier decision of the Division Bench is binding on a Bench of coordinate strength. If the Bench hearing matters subsequently entertains any doubt about the correctness of the earlier decision, the only course open to it is to refer the matter to a larger Bench.
14. The position was highlighted by this Court in a three-judge Bench decision in State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Association and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 1494), in the following words:
"We are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court which has delivered the impugned judgment being a coordinate Bench could not have taken a view different from that taken by the earlier Bench of the High Court in the case of Durgadas Purkayastha v. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court 1988 (1) Gau LR 6. If the latter Bench wanted to take a view WP(C). 28417/2017 -:17:- different than that taken by the earlier Bench, the proper course for them would have been to refer the matter to a larger Bench. We have perused the reasons given by the learned Judges for not referring the matter to a larger Bench. We are not satisfied that the said reasons justified their deciding the matter and not referring it to the larger Bench. In the circumstances, we are unable to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court insofar as it relates to the matter of inter se seniority of the Judicial Officers impleaded as respondents in the writ petition. The impugned judgment of the High Court insofar as it relates to the matter of seniority of the respondent- Judicial Officers is set aside. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs."
15. In the instant case, the position is still worse. The latter Bench did not even indicate as to why it was not following the earlier Bench judgment though brought to its notice. Judicial propriety and decorum warranted such a course indicated above to be adopted."
(iv) In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has criticized the decisions of Coordinate Benches, which have not followed the earlier judgments by another Coordinate Bench. In Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and others [(2008) 10 SCC 1], at paragraph Nos.90 and 91, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
"90. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even WP(C). 28417/2017 -:18:- larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country in the last six decades and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system inasmuch as the courts at the grass roots will not be able to decide as to which of the judgments lay down the correct law and which one should be followed. We may add that in our constitutional set-up every citizen is under a duty to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions. Those who have been entrusted with the task of administering the system and operating various constituents of the State and who take oath to act in accordance with the Constitution and uphold the same, have to set an example by exhibiting total commitment to the constitutional ideals. This principle is required to be observed with greater rigour by the members of judicial fraternity who have been bestowed with the power to adjudicate upon important constitutional and legal issues and protect and preserve rights of the individuals and society as a whole. Discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. If the courts command others to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and rule of law, it is not possible to countenance violation of the constitutional principle by those who are required to lay down the law."
(v) Judicial discipline envisages that a Coordinate Bench follow the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench. If a coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by another Bench, the matter may be referred WP(C). 28417/2017 -:19:- only to a larger Bench. [See Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 1; followed in Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, reported in (2002) 7 SCC 273]. But no decision can be arrived at contrary to or inconsistent with the law laid down by the Coordinate Bench. Kalyani Stores v. State of Orissa and Others reported in AIR 1966 SC 1686 and Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others reported in AIR 1967 SC 1368, both have been rendered by the Constitution Benches. The said decisions, therefore, cannot be thrown out for any purpose whatsoever; more so when both of them if applied collectively lead to a contrary decision proposed by the majority."
9. The decisions extracted above, on facts, law, and on law of precedents, squarely apply to the facts on hand.
10. Contention of the petitioners that there is a collusion between the private company and the respondents is rejected, for the reason that erection of the barricade has been done, for implementation of the decision of this Court.
11. In the light of the above discussion and decisions, the prayer sought for by the petitioners, to declare the barricade on the Old WP(C). 28417/2017 -:20:- National Highway road near the Toll Plaza at Paliakkara in Thrissur District, as unconstitutional and illegal, cannot be granted.
Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
S. MANIKUMAR CHIEF JUSTICE Sd/-
SHAJI P. CHALY JUDGE Eb ///TRUE COPY/// P. A. TO JUDGE WP(C). 28417/2017 -:21:- APPENDIX OF WP(C) 28417/2017 PETITIONER EXHIBITS EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR ,THRISSUR DATED 18.11.2015.
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE RECEIPT SHOWING THE ACCEPTANCE OF MEMORANDUM DATED 18.11.2015. EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE RDO, THRISSUR DATED 18.11.2015.
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING PRESIDED OVER BY THE MINISTER FOR PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT, DATED 14.1.2012 WHICH THE DECISION TAKEN TO BLOCK THE ROAD.
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF THE PAPER CUTTINGS RELATING TO THE REMOVAL OF THE BLOCKAGE OF THE ROAD DATED 3.10.2017 WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION. EXHIBIT P5(A) THE NEWS ITEM APPEARED IN THE TIMES OF INDIA NEWS PAPER DATED 3.10.2016 IN RESPECT OF THE BLOCKAGE OF THE ROAD, EXHIBIT P5(B) TRUE COPY OF THE NEWS ITEM APPEARED IN DESHABHIMANI NEWS PAPER DATED 3.10.2016 IN RESPECT OF THE OPENING OF BLOCKAGE OF THE ROAD.
EXHIBIT P5(C) TRUE COPY OF THE NEWS APPEARED IN THE DESHABHIMANI NEWS PAPER DATED 5.10.2016 IN RESPECT OF THE BLOCKAGE OF THE ROAD.
EXHIBIT P5(D) THE NEWS ITEM APPEARED IN THE MALAYALA MANORAMA NEWS PAPER DATED 5.10.2016 IN RESPECT OF THE OPENING UP AND BLOCKAGE OF THE ROAD.
EXHIBIT P5(E) THE NEWS ITEM APPEARED IN THE TIMES OF INDIA NEWS PAPER DATED 5.10.2016 IN RESPECT OF THE BLOCKAGE OF THE ROAD.
EXHIBIT P5(F) THE NEWS ITEM APPEARED IN THE MATHRUBHOOMI NEWS PAPER DATED 30.10.2016 IN RESPECT OF THE REPORT IN INITIATION OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS BY THE PANCHAYATH AUTHORITY, AGAINST THE BLOCKAGE OF THE ROAD.