Gujarat High Court
Deputy Executive Engineer vs Rashulbhai Mudubhai on 13 January, 2020
Author: Sonia Gokani
Bench: Sonia Gokani
C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19 of 2020
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 302 of 2020
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 314 of 2020
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 317 of 2020
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C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22838 of 2019
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 23124 of 2019
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DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
Versus
NASIBKHAN AADAMJI MALIK
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Appearance:
MR NIRZAR S DESAI(2117) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI
Date : 13/01/2020
COMMON ORAL ORDER
1. This group of petitions have been preferred by the petitioners - Deputy Executive Engineers, Saurastra Branch Canan Division, Surendranagar, challenging the award passed by the Labour Court, Surendranagar in Recovery Applications on Page 2 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER 29.05.2019, by way of present petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. The relevant facts of petitioners are drawn from Special Civil Application No. 19 of 2020 for the purpose of adjudication.
2.1. The petitioner is the original opponent and the respondent herein is the original applicant of Recovery Application (C-2) No. 50 of 2015 preferred before the Labour Court at Surendranagar.
2.2. The respondent had filed an application for recovery under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (herein after referred to as the 'ID Act') in the following factual background from paragraph 2.3 to 2.8.
2.3. It appears that the parties have a checkered litigation. The service of the respondent - workman had been terminated and on being aggrieved by the same, the workman approached the Labour Court by preferring Reference (LCS) No. 69 of 2001 which was adjudicated on 15.09.2006 and the same had been allowed by the Labour Court directing the present petitioner to reinstate the respondent in service. In view of the Award dated 15.06.2006 the respondent - workman had approached the present petitioner and submitted his report. However, the authority Page 3 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER refused to reinstate him on the ground that further legal course of action was required to be taken.
2.4. The petitioner approached this Court by way of Special Civil Application No. 5319 of 2007 and allied matters, which came to be rejected on 27.07.2010. The respondent thereafter, once again approached the petitioner and submitted the report and sought permission for reinstatement which was refused by the authority.
2.5. The petitioner therefore approached the Appellate Bench by preferring Letters Patent Appeal No. 437 of 2011 and allied appeals which were heard and argued at length before the Division Bench, who rejected the appeals and confirmed the order of the learned Single Judge.
2.6. The petitioner approached the Apex Court by preferring Special Leave Petition No. 13810 to 13843 of 2015, however, the Apex Court also remanded the matters to the Division Bench of this Court. Thereafter, the Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 437 to 453 of 2011 came to be adjudicated and on 20.12.2018, these appeals came to be rejected.
2.7. The respondent thereafter by way of Recovery Application No. 50 of 2015 prayed for the outstanding amount of Page 4 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER Rs.1,51,026.20 for the period from 01.09.2013 to 31.08.2015.
The Labour Court allowed the same which has aggrieved the present petitioner who has urged that in contravention of the settled principle of law, this order came to be passed.
2.8. The Presiding Officer allowed the recovery application and directed the petitioner to pay the amount of Rs. 1,51,026.20/-
within one month from the order, failing which, the present petitioner needs to pay 6% interest.
2.9. This has aggrieved the present petitioner who has challenged the same by way of present petition with the following prayers:-
"(A) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to admit this petition.
(B) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, or direction by quashing and setting aside the order dated 29/05/2019 passed by Learned Presiding Officer, Labor Court, Surendranagar Recovery Application No. 50 of 2015 in the interest of justice.
(C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the petition, YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to stay and suspend the execution, implementation, and operation of the order dated 29/05/2019 passed by Learned Presiding Officer, Labor Court, Surendranagar Recovery Application No. 50 of 2015 in the interest of justice.
(D) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to grant any other and further reliefs as may be deemed fit and Page 5 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER proper in the interest of justice."
3. This Court has heard learned advocate Mr. Nirjar Desai who has fervently made his submissions and argued along the line of the memo of this petition. According to him, the Presiding Officer failed to appreciate the principle of "No work No Pay" and as per the said principle, the workman is not entitled to get any amount for the period in which he/she has not worked. It is also urged that no such order of backwages has been ordered by any Court and therefore also, the grant of outstanding dues would not arise at all. Preference of the Recovery Application under Section 33(C)(2) of the ID Act was not desirable. Neither any calculation has been tendered nor outstanding details have been furnished. He has also further urged this Court not to permit the huge burden upon the petitioner by upholding the order of recovery passed by the Labour Court, more particularly, when there had been no work performed at all by the respondent.
3.1. He has, of course, fairly submitted that at every stage, the respondent has approached the petitioner authority seeking reinstatement and continuity and also approached the authority for the work, however, in wake of the pendency of the proceedings or because the petitioner was desirous to challenge the judgment and award of the Labour Court, so also the Page 6 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER confirmation of such award of this Court before the higher forum, petitioners had chosen not to permit respondent, the reinstatement. He also does not dispute the calculation of the amount in a recovery application under Section 33(C)(2) of the ID Act.
3.2. This Court has chosen to decide this group of petitions at the stage of admission where it has not found any requirement to issue notice to the respondents in wake of glaring facts.
Relevant would be to refer to the provisions of Section 33(C) of the ID Act at this stage.
"33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.-
(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of 4 Chapter VA or Chapter VB], the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period.Page 7 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government; 1 within a period not exceeding three months:] 2 Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.] (3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the commissioner and other circumstances of the case.
(4) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the appropriate Government and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided for in sub- section (1).
(5) Where workmen employed under the same employer are entitled to receive from him any money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, then, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, a single application for the recovery of the amount due may be made on behalf of or in respect of any number of such workmen.
Explanation.-- In this section" Labour Court"
includes any court constituted under any law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State.]]"
4. These proceedings under Section 33(C)(2) are in the nature Page 8 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER of execution proceedings. It is open for the Labour Court to proceed on the basis that the relationship of the master and servant exists and if there is an admission of the existing right of the employee by the employer with regard to the benefits which the workman is entitled to, this provision will come into play.
While entertaining such application under Section 33(C)(2) of the ID Act, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to go beyond the award passed by the Presiding Officer. It has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim in the proceedings but, shall have to execute a predetermined right. Once, the workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, any question if arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, it is for the Labour Court to decide the same. What is prerequisite is that the money is due to the workman from the employer either under the settlement or award or under the provisions of Chapter V(A) or V(B). It could be the workmen himself or his heirs who may make an application to the appropriate government for recovery of money due to him and if the appropriate government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate of that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as if it is the arrears of land revenue.
Page 9 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDERSuch application is to be made within one year from the date on which the money has become due and beyond one year, if the appropriate government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application earlier, the application could be entertained even on expiry of this stipulated period of one year.
5. In the instant case, on reverting to the factual matrix of the case, as could be noticed from the chronology of the events, the petitioner herein has lost at every stage of litigation when it went on challenging the judgment and award before the learned Single Judge and thereafter when the same has resulted against the petitioner. Challenge by way of Letters Patent Appeal also ended against the petitioner. Thereafter, the challenge was taken to the Apex Court by way of Special Leave Petition as referred to herein above and there was a remand once again to the Appellate Bench, which further availed the opportunity to the parties and held against the petitioner.
5.1. Thereafter, there had been no challenge before the Apex Court and thus, the judgment and order of the LPA Bench has attained the finality. In that view of the matter, it was on 20.12.2018, the Court after availing the fullest opportunity to the party has held that the learned counsel for the petitioner in Page 10 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER appeal had failed to make out any case and also failed to establish that either Labour Court or learned Single Judge committed any error. It also failed to point out any material from the record which would convince the Appellate Bench that the judgment and order of both the authorities either arbitrary or contrary to the evidence on record or perverse. No ground to interfere has been made out.
6. The Appellate Bench, therefore, did not accept the version of the petitioner and have dismissed the appeals being 437 of 2011 and allied appeals. The relevant paragraphs profitably reproduce hereunder:-
"20.1 The learned Counsel for petitioner could not show any material from the record either to assail said facts or to assail findings of fact or to convince us that the said requirements were complied.
20.2 Under the circumstances, even if it is assumed that the workmen had not worked for 240 days and that therefore the obligation to pay retrenchment compensation did not arise, then also present appellant cannot escape from the rigor of Section 25F more particularly its obligation to issue notice to the workmen or to pay salary in lieu of notice as well as its obligation to serve appropriate notice to appropriate government as contemplated under clause (c) of Section 25F of the Act. The said breach is established therefore, finding of labour Court about breach of Section 25-F cannot be faulted.
20.3 The employer did not terminate service of the claimants for either of three circumstances Page 11 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER contemplated under Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act. Undisputedly the claimants' service have not been terminated (a) for any misconduct or (b) upon submission of resignation by the claimants or (c) on the claimants attaining age of superannuation.
20.4 Since the termination of the claimants do not fall under any of the 3 exceptions mentioned under Section 2(oo) of I.D. Act the termination of the service of the claimants would fall within purview of "retrenchment" defined under Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act and would amount to "retrenchment"
(Punjab Land Development Corporation).
20.5 Therefore, the employer was obliged to comply condition prescribed under Section 25F.
20.6 Foregoing discussion has brought out that the employer did not comply the condition prescribed by Clause-A and Clause-C of Section 25F of the I.D. Act.
20.7 Now, so far as Section 25G and Section 25H are concerned, it is necessary to note that in case of Rajkot Municipal Corporation vs. Kishor Govind 1996 (2) GLR 246, learned Single Judge of this Court has held that:-
"On close scrutiny of Secs. 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act, it becomes abundantly clear that though they are part of the same scheme, of providing against arbitrary retrenchment of workman by the management and to curb the tendency of hire and fire and also to provide for re-employment of such retrenched workman in case same employer again employs new person so that retrenchment simplicitor is not used as a tool merely to make room for somebody else by removing person whose services are otherwise required. (sic.). Viewing in this light, it cannot be said that on plain reading of the language of the provisions of the statute and also keeping in view the object of various provisions of Chapter VA of the Act, that rule envisaged under Sec. 25G is also subject to same condition as are the provisions of Sec+25F. It may be noticed that Sec. 256 neccessarily has within it ingredients of Art. 14 which provides equality as fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens and Art. 16 which provides for equal opportunity in the matter of employment. Section 25G is meant to guard against arbitrarily motivated retrenchment. The provision curbs the tendency of conferring favour on one employee by Page 12 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER retaining his service while discharging the senior. Section 25G does not refer to "such workman falling under Sec. 25". Had Sec. 25G to be dependent upon Sec. 25F for its operation, terminology used by the legislature would have been different. In that event, instead of the words "any workman", the legislature would have used "such workman".
I am fortified in my aforesaid conclusions by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Bhanvarlal & Ors. v. Rajasthan State Road Transport, reported in 1984 Lab. IC 1794 and another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Navbharat Hindi Daily v. Navbharat Shramik Sangh, reported in 1984 Lab. IC 445 with which, I am in respectful agreement. In this connection, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the following passage from the decision in the case of Indian Air Lines v. Sebastin, reported in 1991(1) GLR 43 :
"It should be remembered that Secs. 25B, 25F and 25H are all inter-linked provisions and they all come under Chapter V-A. Section 25B deals with definition of "continuous service. Under Sec. 25B (2)(a)(ii), unless a person had worked for 240 days continuously in a year, he cannot be deemed to be in continuous service. Section 25F deals with "conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen" and it mentions that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year, shall be retrenched ...... Section 25G deals with procedure for retrenchment. Section 25H deals with re-employment of retrenched workmen. In View of the fact that these workmen were not in continuous service as contemplated under Sec. 25B and as they do not satisfy requirements of Sec. 25F, they are not entitled to the benefits of Sec. 25H"
Having carefully gone through the aforesaid decision, I am of the opinion that the aforesaid observation, in no way, helps the contention of the petitioner. It was not a case in which the provisions of Sec. 25G were at all involved and considered. It was a case in which person whose services were terminated had not completed one years continuous service and his case did not fall within the scope of Sec. 25F of the Act. The termination of the services of the workman was not held to be illegal for breach of Sec. 25G of the Act. Thereafter, when the question of giving appointment to fresh hands in the same establishment arose, whether benefit of Sec. 25H for giving preference to such persons can be extended or not was the only issue raised and decided that Sec. 25H can only operate in case where that is valid retrenchment. Nowhere the Court stated nor the Court was called upon to decide whether the termination which is though not attracting Sec. 25r; but is in breach of Sec. 25G could be sustained, nor was it an issue Page 13 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER before the Court nor the Court decided whether continuous service for a period of one year or more within the meaning of Sec. 25B. as is required for the purpose of Sec. 25F is also necessary for the purpose of invoking the provisions of Sec. 25G. In my opinion, therefore. the aforesaid decision does not help the petitioner."
21. Once it is established that the termination of employee amounts to retrenchment then Section 25G would be attracted. Section 25G prescribes that before terminating service of an employee principle of last come first go should be complied. Meaning thereby the employer should follow principle of seniority. Rule 81 of Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules 1968 prescribes procedure for preparing and displaying seniority list before effecting retrenchment. The said provision prescribes that seniority list should be prepared and displayed seven days before the date of retrenchment. Undisputedly the said procedure was not followed and was not complied by the employer.
22. Under the circumstances the conclusion by the labour Court that the employer committed breach of Section 25G cannot be faulted.
22.1 This leads us to the claimants case that after their services came to be terminated employer employed other persons.
22.2 Having regard to the evidence by the workmen learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion that the employer committed breach of Section 25H as well.
22.3 It is pertinent to note that the learned labour Court has specifically observed and recorded in the award that the claimants asserted, in their deposition that the work which they were performing was available even after their termination and other persons were engaged to execute said work.
22.4 It is pertinent to note that the petitioner did not dispute said assertion in the reply or during deposition of the witness and that therefore the assertion by the claimants remained uncontroverted.
Page 14 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDERLearned Single Judge has accepted said observation by the learned Labour Court.
22.5 Learned advocate for the appellant could not succeed in pointing out any material from record which would convince us to hold that learned Labour Court and learned Single Judge committed error in their conclusion on this count.
22.6 Besides this, as mentioned above, forgoing discussion has brought out that breach of Section 25F, Section 25G is undisputedly established and the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court on that cannot be faulted.
22.7 Any ground to interfere with the decision by the learned Single Judge whereby awards passed by the learned labour court is confirmed is not made out.
22.8 Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the learned Labour Court or learned Single Judge did not commit any error in holding that the termination of the claimants is in violation of statutory provision and the appellant failed to comply its statutory obligation before abruptly discontinuing claimants from service.
22.9 Any jurisdictional error or any error with regard to interpretation of any document and / or any provision and / or any evidence is not brought out from the award and established before us.
23. Besides this, it has emerged before us, during the course of proceeding that since 2016 the appellant has reinstated all 17 claimants and since last 2 years the claimants are working with the appellant.
24. As mentioned above, learned advocates for the appellants and respondents have also submitted and declared that in all reference cases, the claimants were similarly placed and they raised dispute and prosecuted the reference on similar facts and similar contentions and even both the awards passed by the Page 15 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER learned labour court are based on same facts and the decision is also based on same grounds.
25. We have independently examined the awards passed by learned labour court and we find that the findings recorded by learned labour court do not suffer any error of law or fact.
25.1 The learned Single Judge closely examined the findings of fact recorded by the labour court as well as the reasons and the learned Single Judge did not find any infirmity in the awards.
25.2 Moreover, we have considered the reasons and decision by the learned Single Judge. We are in agreement with the reasons and conclusion recorded by learned Single Judge.
25.3 Learned counsel for the appellants failed to make out any case and also failed to demonstrate that learned labour court and learned Single Judge has committed any error. Learned counsel for the appellants also failed to show any material from the record which would convince us that the decision by learned labour court or by learned Single Judge is incorrect or arbitrary or contrary to the evidence on record or perverse. Any ground to interfere with the judgment is not made out. The appeals deserve to be rejected.
26. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants do not have sufficient work to accommodate the concern workmen.
27. We are afraid, the said submission cannot be considered at this stage and on the said ground, the judgment by learned Single Judge or the awards passed by the labour court cannot be interfered with.
28. The submission by learned counsel for the appellants is in connection with fact or situation which is post - award / after the award(s) came to be passed whereas our jurisdiction and our consideration is restricted to the period covered under the awards i.e. the period before the date on Page 16 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER which award came to be passed.
29. If any fresh or new facts have occurred or new development has occurred after the date of awards i.e. post - awards, then it would be for the appellants to address the said development in accordance with the law. However, on the basis of the development which has occurred post - award, neither awards can be faulted nor the judgment of learned Single Judge can be faulted. Therefore, we are not accepting the appeals. Appeals deserve to be rejected and they are hereby dismissed. Rule discharged.
The appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
Orders accordingly."
6.1. Admittedly, no challenge is made to the said judgment of the Appellate Bench by either side and the same has attained finality.
7. Thus, in light of this finality, if the respondent approached the Labour Court by preferring an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the ID Act, the Labour Court has committed no error in allowing the application and issuing the recovery certificate.
The Court below has noticed that the matter having travelled right up to the Apex Court were remanded back to the LPA Bench which also once again held in favour of the respondents herein. The respondent - workman since has been held entitled to receive from the employer the benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Court was required to issue the certificate as is otherwise obligatory on its part.
Page 17 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER8. Before this Court, learned advocate for the petitioner is unable to point out any facts or any material which would warrant this Court to take any other view than taken by the Labour Court and deserve any interference. .
9. Exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by this Court under Article 227 read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India is permissible for keeping the Courts bellow "within the legal bounds" and the law in this respect is well laid down in case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil; reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387, where the Apex Court has held thus:-
"62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over Page 18 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.
(i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore Page 19 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article
227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality."
Page 20 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020 C/SCA/19/2020 ORDER10. All the petitions being devoid of merit, deserve no entertainment. Since the recovery certificates are already issued, it is being directed that without further delay in grant of amount to the respondents, let the same be paid in their respective bank accounts within 8 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
11. All petitions stand disposed of accordingly.
(SONIA GOKANI, J) Bhoomi Page 21 of 21 Downloaded on : Sun Feb 16 17:22:43 IST 2020