Madras High Court
M.Abdul Hasan vs A.Maimoonamal on 20 December, 2013
Author: R.S.Ramanathan
Bench: R.S.Ramanathan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 20.12.2013
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.S.RAMANATHAN
APPEAL SUIT No.845 of 1994
M.Abdul Hasan .. Appellant
vs.
1.A.Maimoonamal
2.S.Raviya Gani (Deceased)
3.A.Nabisa Ammal
4.M.Abdul Majeed
5.M.Zubedha Ammal
6.M.Sultan Gani (Deceased)
7.Sithi Yedathi Zohara
8.Mohamed Gazali
9.N.Packirisamy Vandayar
10.N.S.Manian
11.D.Uthirapathi
12.M.Abdul Haq
13.A.Bazheer Ahamed
14.Mohamed Zakaria
15.Junaitha Begum
(RR 14 & 15 brought on
record as LRs of the deceased
R6 vide order of Court dt.15.2.2005
made in CMP Nos.9203 to 9205 of 2005
16.Aiysha Nachial
17.Salma Nachial .. Respondents
(R8 recorded as LR of deceased R2 and
RR 16 and 17 are brought on
record as LRs of deceased R2 vide
order of Court dated 20.12.2013
made in CMP No.35 of 2010)
Appeal Suit filed under Order 41, Rule 1 read with Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code against the Judgment and Decree dated 31.03.1994 in O.S.No.46 of 1990 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Pondicherry at Karaikal.
For appellant : Mrs.N.Mala
For 1st respondent : Mr.R.Natarajan
For 18th respondent : Mr.R.Thirugnanam
For respondents -
2 to 4, 6 to 11,
13 & 14 : No appearance
(Not ready in notice
regarding R5 & R12)
JUDGMENT
The plaintiff in O.S.No.46 of 1990 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Pondicherry at Karaikal is the appellant. He filed the suit for partition of his 2/6th share in "A" to "D" schedule properties and the suit was partly decreed and preliminary decree was passed declaring 2/6th share in the Schedule "B" to "D" in favour of the plaintiff and in respect of "A" schedule property, the suit claim was rejected and aggrieved by the same, this appeal is filed.
2. The case of the plaintiff is as follows:-
(a) Late Mohamed Zackaria and Fathima Ammal were the parents of the plaintiff. Apart from defendants 1, 2 and 3, they have another daughter, namely, Jameela Ummal, who died in the year 1987. The 9th defendant is the husband of the 1st defendant. The 8th defendant is the son of the second defendant and the 4th defendant is the husband of the deceased daughter, Jameela Ummal. The 13th defendant is the husband of the third defendant. On the eve of the marriage of the first defendant, the plaintiff's father late Mohamed Zackaria gave specific portions consisting of north eastern room and its adjacent verandah of the "A" schedule house with a right of common enjoyment of passage, and access to backyard to the first defendant and put her in possession of those portions. The property which was given to the first defendant by way of gift by the father Mohamed Zackaria was 1/4th of the whole of the "A" schedule house and the remaining portion in "A" schedule was enjoyed by the father along with his wife and other children. The father also owned lands in Vizhudhur Village in Neravy Commune, which is more fully described in "B" schedule property and the property of the father in Kothamangalam Village is shown as "C" schedule property. The properties owned by the mother is described in the "D" schedule. The parents were under care and custody of the plaintiff's family who were residing in the "A" schedule property. The plaintiff used to go abroad and parents were taken care of by his wife. The plaintiff's father was bed-ridden for about a year prior to his death and during his last days, he was not in full possession of his faculties and he was also very moody and remained indifferent to the surroundings and was also not responsive. He died on 6.4.1983 at Karaikal when the plaintiff was abroad. The plaintiff's mother also died on 19.11.1984 at Karaikal leaving behind "D" schedule property. The first defendant and her husband were residing in the portion gifted to the first defendant and they were very dominant. Therefore, after the death of the parents, the plaintiff was not willing to have enjoyment of "A" schedule property and wanted to have an amicable division of the property one year before filing of the suit. At that time, 9th defendant, the husband of the first defendant claimed larger share in the "A" schedule property stating that Mohamed Zackaria left a Will by which certain portions were allotted to the daughter, the first defendant.
(b) According to the plaintiff, his father died intestate and he did not leave any Will and he was not in a sound disposing state of mind during the alleged period of execution of the Will and he was not in a position to exercise his free Will. It is further stated that taking advantage of their proximity and the absence of the plaintiff, the first defendant in collusion with the 9th defendant must have fraudulently obtained the Will and therefore, the Will is void. Further, the father cannot dispose the entire properties under a Will and on that ground also, the Will is void. It is also stated that the alleged Will is also affected by the doctrine of "Marz-ul-maut" (death illness) and therefore, the Will projected by the defendants 1 to 9 is void and no one can claim any right under the Will. It is also stated that some transactions have also taken place under the Will in favour of the defendants 6 and 7 who were the children of the first and ninth defendants and also in favour of the fifth defendant, who is the daughter of the fourth defendant and therefore, they were impleaded as parties. The plaintiff is the only son and the defendants 1 to 3 and the deceased Jameela Ummal are the four daughters and the defendants 10 to 12 are cultivating tenants of "B" to "D" schedule property. Therefore, as per the Mahomedan law, the plaintiff is entitled to 2/6th share in the "A" to "D" schedule property and therefore, he file the suit for partition.
3. The first defendant filed a statement admitting the relationship between the parties and also the gift of a portion of the "A" schedule house by the father on the eve of her marriage. She denied the allegation that the father died intestate and according to her, their father executed last Will on 17.3.1983 which was also registered and in the said Will, he bequeathed 3/4th share in the "A" schedule property in favour of the plaintiff, defendants 1, 2, 9 and the wife of the fourth defendant, namely, the predeceased daughter, Jameela Ummal. Various portions were bequeathed for various defendants in the Will and the Will came into effect on the date of death of Mohamed Zackaria on 6.4.1983 and the Will also acted upon and mutation of name in favour of all the beneficiaries under the Will was effected after giving notice to all the parties concerned. The first defendant also gifted her property bequeathed to her under the Will dated 17.3.1983 in favour of her younger daughter, 7th defendant under a registered deed of gift dated 4.10.1989. The 9th defendant also gifted the property bequeathed to him in favour of the 7th defendant under a gift deed dated 4.10.1989. The second defendant gifted the property bequeathed to her in favour of the 8th defendant under a registered gift deed dated 21.10.1989. All these gifts were acted upon and donees were enjoying the property and the plaintiff was also aware of these gift deeds. Therefore, it is not open to the plaintiff to contend now that the Will was not valid. As the entire "A" schedule property was disposed of by the father, "A" schedule property is not available for partition. It is also stated that the father was taken care of by the defendants 1 and 9 and the plaintiff's wife never took care of the parents-in-law and she also denied the allegation that the father was not having his faculties immediately before his death and she also denied the allegation that the father was moody and not responsive and indifferent to the treatment given for ailment during his last days. She asserted that during the time of execution of the Will, the father was fully conscious and executed the Will knowing about the implications of the Will and he was in a sound disposing state of mind and he was suffering from paralysis on the right side and therefore, he was not able to put his signature and his thumb impression was obtained in the Will and the Will cannot be termed as marz-ul-maut as the father was not in contemplation of death and the Will was validly executed in the presence of the witnesses and the plaintiff cannot challenge the Will after 7 years of its execution. The plaintiff also accepted the Will and took possession of the portion given to him under the Will and other portions were taken by the other sharers. She also stated that in respect of "B" "C" and "D" schedule property, she has no objection for the decree being passed as prayed for by the plaintiff.
4. The 6th defendant filed a separate statement stating that a portion of the "A" schedule house was gifted by the first defendant mother at the time of the marriage of the 6th defendant and she also took possession of the same and therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim any partition in respect of that portion. The 11th and 12th defendants filed separate statements and they are the tenants and therefore, there is no need to elaborate the allegations in those statements and they are not relevant for this case.
5. On the basis of the above pleadings, the following issues were framed:-
(i) Whether the plaintiff's father Mohamed Zackaria executed a Will on 17.3.1983 pertaining to 3/4th share in "A" schedule property in favour of the plaintiff, defendants 1,2,9 and Jameela Ummal wife of the defendant No.4 and the same is valid in law?
(ii) Whether the gift by D1 and D9 in favour of D7 in respect of portion of suit "A" schedule property bequeathed to them under the Will dated 17.3.1983 is valid?
(iii) Whether the gift by D2 in favour of D8 in respect of portion of suit "A" schedule property to her under the Will dated 17.3.1983 is valid?
(iv)Whether the suit "A" schedule property has to be deleted from partition?
(v) Whether the plaintiff has 2/6th share in the suit properties and is entitled to partition and separate possession of the same?
(vi)Whether the defendants 1 and 2 each has 1/6th share in plaint B, C and D schedule properties and are entitled to partition and separate possession of the same?
(vii) Whether other defendants have any share in the suit properties and, if so, what is the share?
(viii)Whether the defendants 11 and 12 are in possession of suit B, C and D schedule properties as tenants and their possession be not disturbed by partition?
(ix) To what relief are the parties entitled?
6. The plaintiff examined 2 witnesses including himself as PW.1 and his wife as PW.2 and marked 5 documents. On the side of the defendants, DWs.1 and 2 were examined and 11 exhibits were marked. The trial Court tried issues 1 to 4 together and held that Mohamed Zackaria executed Ex.B.1 Will while he was in sound disposing state of mind and the disposition under Ex.B.1 was not in excess of 1/3rd share of Mohamed Zackaria's estate and the doctrine of marz-ul-maut will be applied only to the gift and not to the Will and there was no evidence adduced by the plaintiff that Mohamed Zackaria was labouring under pressure of imminent death and the fact that he was suffering from paralysis will not lead to the conclusion that he was contemplating death at the time of execution of the document and the execution of Ex.B.1 document was also proved by DW.2 one of the attesting witnesses to the Will and under Ex.B.1, properties were given to all the daughters, sons-in-law and to the plaintiff equally and the bequest was natural and the legatees got specific item of properties in "A" schedule property under the Will and the Will is a valid one and therefore, gift deed by D1 and D9 in favour of D7 and D2 in favour of D8 are valid in law.
7. Issues 5 to 8 were tried together and those issues were also answered holding that in the schedule of "B", "C" and "D", the plaintiff is entitled to 2/6th share and the defendants 1 to 3 and the deceased daughter Jameela Ummal are entitled to 1/6th share in "B" "C" and "D" schedule properties and the heirs of the deceased daughter, Jameela Ummal, namely, defendants 4 and 5 are entitled to 1/6th share in "B" "C" and "D" schedule properties and dismissed the suit in respect of "A" schedule properties. Aggrieved by the same, this appeal is filed by the plaintiff.
8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Trial Court has not properly appreciated the doctrine of marz-ul-maut and erred in holding that the alleged Will Ex.B.1 was not affected by the doctrine of marz-ul-maut and was executed by Mohamed Zackaria while in sound disposing state of mind bequeathing specific items of properties to various persons and therefore, Ex.B.1 is a valid document and declining the claim of the plaintiff in respect of "A" schedule property. The learned counsel submitted that admittedly, the father, Mohamed Zackaria was suffering from paralysis for 3 years and Ex.B.1 was dated 17.3.1983 and he died on 6.4.1983 i.e. within 20 days from the date of Ex.B.1 and the fact that he was not in a position to move about was also confirmed by the fact that the Registrar was invited to the house to register the Will and these facts would prove that the deceased Mohamed Zackaria was in his death bed and was under the apprehension of death and therefore, even assuming that he executed a Will, the same was affected by the doctrine of marz-ul-maut and relied upon the judgments reported in A.I.R. 1922 Privy Council 391 [A.E.Salayjee v. Fatima Bi Bi], AIR 1957 NAGPUR 84 [Izzul Jabbar Khan Azizul Jabbar and others v. Chairman District Council Kuchery Ward Seoni District Chhindwara and others] and (1991) 3 SCC 520 [Commissioner of Gift Tax, Ernakulam vs. Abdul Karim Mohd.(dead) by LRs], in support of her contention.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the facts of the case in the judgment reported in (1991) 3 SCC 520 cited supra is similar to the present case and in the reported judgment also, the testator was seriously ill when he executed his Will and he died within six weeks from the date of execution of the Will and the document was registered at the residence. In such circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Will was executed under the apprehension of death and therefore, hit by the "Marz-ul-maut" and therefore, it is not valid. He also submitted that inclusion of names of the defendants in the revenue records will not lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff was aware of the Will and consented for the mutation in the revenue records and he relied on the judgment reported in AIR 1957 NAGPUR 84 for that proposition.
10. On the other hand, Mr. R.Natarajan, learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that admittedly, 1/4th of "A" schedule property was gifted by the father to the first defendant on the eve of marriage and the remaining 3/4th share was in the possession of the father and under the Will Ex.B.1, he bequeathed specific portions to his daughters and sons-in-law and also to the plaintiff and the Will was also proved by examining DW.2 and no evidence was adduced by the plaintiff that on the date of execution of the Will, the father was in death bed. Therefore, the Trial Court rightly held that the Will was validly proved and the plaintiff cannot claim any right in the "A" schedule property and therefore, there is no need to interfere with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. He also submitted that the plaintiff also accepted the will and got possession of the portion bequeathed to him and therefore, it is not open to him to challenge the Will later and relied upon the judgment reported in A.I.R.1917 Oudh.326 [Wali Muhammad v. Daulat-Un-Nissa. He also submitted that when a bequest is made to heirs, the bequest is invalid unless the other heirs consented to it after the death of the testator. and even if there is bequest in favour of the 9th defendant, who is an outsider, he was not given any property more than the 1/3rd properties belonged to the testator and consent of the legal heirs can be inferred by their conduct and there was no necessity to have a written consent and relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1991 Patna 154 [Abdul Manan Khan v. Mirtuza Khan] and others. He also relied upon judgment reported in I (1994) DMC 502 [Abdul Kadar v. Pathumma] in support of his contention that the registration of the Will go a long way to dispel the doubt as to genuineness of the Will and the Will was proved by examining DW.2 and no question was put to impeach the credibility of DW.2 and that was also considered by the Trial Court. He also relied on the judgment of the Kerala High Court reported in I (1994) DMC 502 cited supra for the proposition that when other legal heirs acted as per the Will, the conduct of other legal heirs would amount to consent. He, therefore, submitted that there is no need to interfere with the findings of the Trial Court and the Appeal is liable to be dismissed.
11. On the basis of the above submissions, the following points for consideration arise in this Appeal.
Whether father, Mohamed Zackaria, executed the Will Ex.B.1 while he was in a sound disposing state of mind? If so, whether such Will is affected by the doctrine of marz-ul-maut?
12. It is the specific case of the appellant that he was not living along with his parents and he was spending most of his time abroad and his wife was taking care of the parents. Admittedly, the plaintiff/appellant was not in India when the father died. It is also submitted by the parties that the deceased was suffering from paralysis and his right hand was affected. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that his father was ill and bed ridden for about a year prior to his death and during his last days, he was not in full control of his faculties. Though burden is on the legatees to prove that the Will was executed by the testator while he was in a disposing state of mind, when a plea was raised that the Will was hit by the doctrine of marz-ul-maut, a duty is cast upon the plaintiff to prove that at the time of the execution of the Will, the father was in death bed and he was contemplating death and under the fear of the death, the document was executed. Further, the plea that the father was not in a sound disposing state of mind to execute the Will and the plea that the Will was affected by the doctrine of marz-ul-maut are mutually contradictory. When it is alleged that the Will was affected by the doctrine of marz-ul-maut, execution of the document was admitted and the mental capacity of the executor was also admitted and the only question to be considered was whether the executant was under the pressure of death or in contemplation of death. On the other hand, when it is alleged that the testator was not in a sound disposing state of mind, the legatees have to prove that the Will was executed by the testator while he was in a sound disposing state of mind. In this case, the plaintiff/appellant pleaded that the father was not in a sound disposing state of mind during his last days and also pleaded that taking advantage of the defendants' proximity and the absence of the plaintiff, the Will was obtained during the absence of the plaintiff's wife and the Will was also affected by the doctrine of "Marz-ul-maut" as he was facing death at the time of the execution of the Will. Therefore, the pleadings in the plaint would indirectly admit the execution of the Will by the father. The pleadings that taking advantage of the proximity and the absence of the plaintiff and his wife, the Will was fraudulently obtained as stated in paragraph No.6 of the plaint would lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff admitted the execution of the Will and also about the sound disposing state of mind of the father and his capability to execute the Will. Even assuming that the plaintiff did not admit that the father was in a sound disposing state of mind at the time of the execution of the Will, in this case, the defendants examined DW.2, one of the attesting witnesses of the Will to prove the Will and the reading of the evidence of DW.2 would make it clear that the Will was executed by Mohamed Zackaria while he was in a sound disposing state of mind. DW.2 is a family friend and he has no grudge against the plaintiff and no question was also put to that effect when he was examined, and he was also the friend of the plaintiff's father Mohamed Zackaria. He deposed that he was sent for by Mohamed Zackaria on that day for signing the document and he and his brother signed the document as witnesses and in their presence, Mohamed Zackaria, affixed his thumb impression and he was having mental awareness of understanding things and he was not unconscious and his right hand was affected by paralysis and he was not able to sign and therefore, he affixed his thumb impression. He also stated that he knew Mohamed Zackaria since his childhood and Mohamed Zackaria was a well educated man. His evidence was natural and there is no reason to disbelieve his evidence. He admitted that he was not aware of the contents of the Will and in his presence, the Will was not read over to Mohamed Zackaria. Reading the entire evidence of DW.2, in my opinion, his evidence was natural and no question was put to DW.2 that at the time of execution document, Mohamed Zackaria, was not in a sound disposing state of mind and he was in contemplation of death. Therefore, the evidence of DW.2 proved the due execution of the Will. Once the due execution of the Will was proved, it is for the plaintiff to prove that the Will was affected by the doctrine of marz-ul-maut and the deceased was in death bed and was in contemplation of death.
13. As stated supra, the plaintiff was not in India and his wife PW.2 was also living in the same house and according to her, no Government officials came to the residence to register any document and according to her, the deceased was not in a sound disposing state of mind and he was in death bed. She admitted in her cross-examination that 3 doctors treated the deceased and she was not maintaining those prescriptions and the medicines given to the deceased. According to her, for the 3 years, her father-in-law was suffering from paralysis and 2 months prior to his death, he was not in a sound state of mind and his right hand was affected by paralysis. She never deposed that her father-in-law was in ailment or under the apprehension of death or was contemplating death and she only stated that the father-in-law was not in a sound disposing state of mind.
14. According to me, it is one thing to allege that the testator was not in a sound disposing state of mind and another thing to allege that he was under the apprehension of death. To bring the document under the doctrine of marz-ul-maut, it is necessary to prove that the testator or the executant was under the apprehension of death and was in contemplation of death. The plaintiff/appellant could have proved about the health condition of the deceased Mohamed Zackaria by summoning doctors who treated Mohamed Zackaria during his last days or by examining any other witness to that effect. Except the husband and wife, no one was examined on the side of the plaintiff. Further, the person who was suffering from a disease for a long period cannot be under the contemplation of death or apprehending the death because of the disease, as the person was used to the disease and would have adjusted himself with the ailment.
15. Mulla, Principles of Mohamedan Law, 20th Edition 2013, in Paragraph 135 in Chapter - X deals with the death-bed gifts and acknowledgements, which reads as follows:-
"135. Gift made during marz-ul-maut. ...It is an essential condition of marz-ul-maut, that is, death-illness, that the person suffering from the marz (malady) must be under an apprehension of maut(death). "The most valid definition of death-illness is, that it is one which it is highly probable will issue fatally": Baillie, 552. Where the malady is of long continuance, as, for instance, consumption or albuminuria, and there is no immediate apprehension of death, the malady is not marz-ul-maut; but it may become marz-ul-maut if it subsequently reaches such a stage as to render death highly probable, and does in fact result in death. According to the Hedaya, a malady is said to be "long continuance," if it has lasted a year; a disease that has lasted a year does not constitute marz-ul-maut, for "the patient has become familiarized to his disease, which is not then accounted as sickness": Hedaya, 685 but "this limit of one year does not constitute a hard-and-fast rule, and it may mean a period of about one year". In short a gift must be deemed to be made during marz-ul-maut, if, as observed by the Privy Council, it was made "under pressure of the sense of the imminence of death".
To constitute a malady, marz-ul-maut, there must be (1) proximate danger of death, so that there is a preponderance of apprehension of death, (2) some degree of subjective apprehension of death in the mind of the sick person, and (3) some external indicia, chief among which would be inability to attend to ordinary avocations, although his attending his ordinary avocations does not conclusively prove that he was not suffering from marz-ul-maut. It is not necessary, however, to come to a definite finding that the disease which caused the apprehension of death was the immediate cause of death.
It has been pointed out by the same author that it is an essential conditon of marz-ul-maut, that is, death-illness that the person suffering from the marz (malady) must be made under an apprehension of maut (death) and that the most valid definition of death-illness, is, that it is one which it is highly probable will issue fatally. Where the malady is of long continuance and there is no immediate apprehension of death, the malady is not marz-ul-maut. To constitute a malady, marz-ul-maut, there must be :(1) proximate danger of death, so that there is a preponderance of apprehension of death; (2) some degree of subjective apprehension of death in the mind of the sick person, and (3) some external indicia, chief among which would be inability to attend to ordinary avocations. It is not necessary, however, to come to a definite finding that the disease which caused the apprehension of death was the immediate cause of death. The statement of the legal position of the above lines is not and cannot be in dispute."
16. It is also held by this Court in the Judgment reported in AIR 1973 Madras 154 [Bhooma Bi vs. Gujar Bi] that total evidence and all circumstances should be examined and a finding of gift being made in marz-ul-maut cannot be given when it is not alleged in the plaint or raised at the trial. It is not for the Court to raise the point suo motu. In the judgment reported in (1991) 3 SCC 520 cited supra, the very same principles were reiterated in the case of marz-ul-maut and having regard to the evidence in that particular case, it was held that the gift was a marz-ul-maut.
17. According to the facts of this case, as stated supra, it cannot be stated that the deceased was in contemplation of death or under the apprehension of death when he executed the document. Therefore, the Trial Court rightly held that the document cannot be brought under the doctrine of marz-ul-maut. I do not find any infirmity in that finding. Further, the conduct of the parties would also prove that all the legal heirs consented for the bequeath made by the deceased. Admittedly, the Will was dated 17.3.1983 and the testator died on 6.4.1983 and no steps were taken for nearly 9 years and the plaintiff also admitted in the plaint that he was aware of the Will executed by his father. In the evidence, he admitted that on his return to India in 1989, he came to know about the Will. He also admitted that he was often visiting India from 1983 to 1989 and specific portions were given to various persons and those persons were also dealt with those items of properties by executing the gift deeds and the donees took possession of those specific items and no objection was taken by the plaintiff. It is admitted that in "A" schedule properties, during the life time of Mohamed Zackaria, some portions of a house were bequeathed to D1 on the eve of her marriage and he was in possession of remaining portions and the plaintiff's wife was also residing in a portion and under the Will Ex.B.1, specific portions were bequeathed to D1, D2, D3, plaintiff, and D9 and those persons took possession of those items of properties and no objection was raised by the plaintiff or his wife till the suit was filed in 1992 and these factors would also lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff/appellant was aware of the Will and he also consented to the bequest made by his father.
18. Hence, the points for consideration are answered against the appellant and I hold that the Will was executed by Mohamed Zackaria while he was in sound disposing state of mind and that was proved by the examination of DW.2 and the Will was also not affected by marz-ul-maut as no evidence was let in by the plaintiff to prove that he was in contemplation of death or under the pressure of death at the time of execution of Ex.B.1 and the conduct of the plaintiff and his wife would also prove that they consented for the bequeath in favour of other heirs.
19. In the result, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
20.12.2013 Index: yes Internet : yes asvm To The Additional District Judge, Pondicherry at Karaikal.
R.S.RAMANATHAN, J (asvm) A.S.No.845 of 1994 20.12.2013