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[Cites 42, Cited by 0]

Jharkhand High Court

Manju Devi vs The State Of Jharkhand on 22 March, 2018

Equivalent citations: AIR 2018 JHARKHAND 173, AIR 2018 JHA 173, 2018 (3) AJR 845, (2018) 4 JCR 80 (JHA), (2018) 3 JLJR 554

Author: Rajesh Shankar

Bench: Rajesh Shankar

                                                        1

                       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                                       W.P.(C) No. 122 of 2018
                1. Manju Devi
                2. Rinki Devi
                3. Munni Devi
                4. Subhadra Devi                                       ..... Petitioner
                                               Versus
                1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Chief Secretary, Ranchi
                2. Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of
                Jharkhand, Ranchi
                3. Additional Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department,
                Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
                4. State Election Commission, through its Secretary, Ranchi
                5. Deputy Commissioner, Koderma                        ..... Respondents
                                               -----

CORAM HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR

-----

                For the Petitioner:                M/s Rajiv Ranjan (Sr. Adv.), Shresth
                                                   Gautam, Shray Mishra
                For the Respondent No.4:           M/s Sumeet Gadodia, Ritesh Kumar
                                                   Gupta, Vivek Raj
                For the State:                     M/s Srijit Choudhary (Sr. S.C-III),
                                                   Kaustav Roy [A.C to Sr. S.C-III]
                                                 -----

07/22.03.2018         The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the notification

issued under Sections 4, 5 & 6 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 2011') dated 01.09.2017 as contained in Gazette Notification No. 643 published on 31.08.2017 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) whereby different Panchayats have been reconstituted to form a Nagar Panchayat, namely, Domchanch Nagar Panchayat. An alternative prayer has been made that the said notification dated 01.09.2017 should be applicable prospectively i.e. after the end of the elected tenure of the petitioners. Further prayer has been made for holding that in terms of Article 243E (2) of the Constitution of India, the elected period of the petitioners (which is still subsisting) cannot be curtailed by way of reconstitution of Panchayat.

2. The factual background of the case, as stated in the writ petition, is that the petitioners are the elected Mukhias of various Panchayats and in terms of Section 25 of the Panchayati Raj Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 2001'). The tenure of the elected body is five years from the date of the first sitting. Since the first sitting of the petitioners was held on 07.12.2015, their tenure will end on 06.12.2020. In the meantime, a notification dated 23.01.2017 2 as contained in memo No. 666 was published by the respondent-authorities under Section 4 of the Act, 2011 declaring an intention to create a Nagar Panchayat [including the Panchayat(s) from which the petitioners were elected as Mukhias] under Section 3(2)(b) of the Act, 2011 on the recommendation of the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma-respondent No.5 as contained in letter No. 07 dated 04.01.2017. In terms of Section 5 of the Act, 2011, the objection to the said notification was to be filed within 30 days from the date of notification. Since the said notification was issued on 23.01.2017, the petitioners and other villagers made an objection through letter addressed to the President of India with copy to all the different authorities including the respondent No.5 by Registered Post on 14.02.2017 i.e. within 22 days of the notification. On receipt of the objection, a letter dated 06.03.2017 was issued by the Deputy Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Jharkhand asking an opinion from the respondent No.5 with regard to the said objection. The petitioners have claimed that the respondent-authorities without considering the objection of the petitioners, have issued the notification dated 01.09.2017 (published on 31.08.2017) declaring a new Nagar Panchayat, namely, Domchanch Nagar Panchayat, which includes total seven Panchayats including the Panchayats of the petitioners i.e. Domchanch East-Manju Devi, Mahathadih- Rinki Devi, Domchanch North-Munni Devi, Tetaryadih (part of the said Panchayat)-Subhadra Devi.

3. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners, submits that Chapter IX of the Constitution of India deals with the constitution of Panchayat, duration of the elected tenure and the manner in which the same can be dissolved. Article 243E of the Constitution of India provides for duration of the Panchayat and under no circumstance any constituted Panchayat can be dissolved before the expiry of the period of five years from the date appointed for its first meeting. Clause (2) of Article 243E specifically provides that no amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Panchayat at any level. Since the impugned notification 3 dated 01.09.2017 also comes within the definition of "law" under Article 13(2) of the Constitution of India, the same would have no effect. The petitioners are the elected Mukhiyas for a tenure of 5 years according to the provisions laid down in Section 25 of the Act, 2001 as well as Article 243E of the Constitution of India and as such it is the statutory right of the petitioners to serve as Mukhiya till completion of their tenure which cannot be curtailed by any amendment of law. The first sitting of the petitioners was held on 07.12.2015 and as such their tenure will end on 06.12.2020. The petitioners and other villagers had filed objection under Section 5 of the Act, 2011 against the declaration for constitution of Domchanch Nagar Panchayat and thus the respondent- authorities were duty bound to consider the said representation, but the same was not even objectively considered. Even though the notification was issued whereby a new Nagar Panchayat was formed, it should have been given a prospective effect, meaning thereby, the election for the newly constituted Nagar Panchayat could have been effected only after the completion of the elected tenure of the petitioners. The provisions of Article 243E of the Constitution of India as well as Section 24(3) and Section 25 of the Act, 2001 clearly mandate that a Gram Panchayat shall continue for a term of five years from the date appointed for its first meetings. Even in case of dissolution of the Gram Panchayat before the expiry of the tenure, the elected member shall continue to hold the office till the expiry of the tenure. Sub-section (2) of Section 615 of the Act, 2011 will not apply to the fact situation of the present case, rather sub-section (7) of Section 615 of the Act, 2011, which saves any council constituted under the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2000 and Ranchi Municipal Corporation Act, 2001, also supports the case of the petitioners.

4. The learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners put reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Sant Ram & Ors. Vs. Labh Singh & Anr. reported in AIR 1965 SC 314 and also a judgment of the Gujarat High Court rendered in the case of Khorijiya Dawoodbhai Sulaiman & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in AIR 2003 Gujarat 1. 4

5. Per-contra, Mr. Sumeet Gododia, learned counsel for the State Election Commission, Jharkhand, submits that Article 243E of the Constitution of India provides power to the State Government to dissolve a Panchayat before completion of its term of five years. No harm will cause to the public or voter of the particular area by forming the Nagar Panchayat dissolving the contiguous area of the existing Panchayats, as they will have every right to elect their representative in the ensuing election.

6. Mr. Srijit Choudhury, learned Sr. S.C-III appearing on behalf of the State, submits that a draft notification was published under Section 3 of the Act, 2011 vide memo No. 666 dated 23.01.2017 inviting objections within one month from affected people for the proposed constitution of Domchanch Nagar Panchayat. The petitioners themselves have admitted that the objections were raised by them requesting not to include the areas under Ward Nos. 1 to 6 of Domchanch Panchayat in the proposed Domchanch Nagar Panchayat. The said objection was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma for reconsideration vide letter bearing Memo No. 2505 dated 07.04.2017. Notification No. 5655 dated 31.08.2017 has been issued only after receiving the clear recommendation of the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma, sent vide Memo No. 163 dated 04.04.2017 and after the approval of the State Cabinet on 29.08.2017. The constitution of Domchanch Nagar Panchayat has been made as per the provision laid down in Article 243Q of the Constitution of India, which provides for constitution of Municipalities in transitional, smaller or larger urban area. Provisions of Sections 3(2)(c), 4, 5, 6 & 8(3) of the Act, 2011 empower the Government of Jharkhand to constitute Municipal Panchayat, Municipal Councils and Municipal Corporations. Further, Section 615(2) of the Act, 2011 under the head "Repeal and Savings" prohibits the Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parisads constituted under the Act, 2001 to exercise their power and functions, as has been entrusted to the Municipality under the Act, 2011.

7. The learned counsel for the respondents puts reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Maharashtra & 5 Anr. Vs. Deep Narayan Chavan & Ors. reported in (2002) 10 SCC 565.

8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant documents placed on record. The petitioners have challenged the notification dated 31.08.2017 whereby Domchanch Nagar Panchayat has been constituted including the Panchayats of the petitioners. The petitioners have contended that the respondent-authorities are taking steps for conducting the election for the newly formed Domchanch Nagar Panchayat, which is not legally permissible as the petitioners are the elected Mukhias and their tenure are still subsisting.

9. The learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners has assiduously argued that once the petitioners are elected with due process of law, they must continue for five years in view of the clear provisions of Article 243E of the Constitution of India and no law can curtail the tenure of the Panchayat. To appreciate the said argument, the provisions of Article 243E of the Constitution of India is to be considered, which reads as under:

"Art. 243(E): Duration of Panchayats, etc (1) Every Panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer.
(2) No amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Panchayat at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in clause (1). (3) An election to constitute a Panchayat shall be completed'
(a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1);
(b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution:
Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Panchayat would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for constituting the Panchayat for such period. (4) A Panchayat constituted upon the dissolution of a Panchayat before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Panchayat would have continued under clause (1) had it not been so dissolved."

10. Though Clause (1) of Article 243(E) provides that the term of a Panchayat shall be for five years from its first meeting, yet it also contains a 6 rider 'unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force'. Clause (2) further provides that no amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Panchayat at any level which is functioning immediately before such amendment, moreover, it also saves the expiration of duration of Panchayat specified in clause (1). On conjoint reading of both the clauses, it would emerge that a Panchayat may be dissolved before the expiry of the term of five years under any existing law in force. The only restriction is that by way of amendment in any law, the Panchayat which is functioning immediately before the said amendment, shall not be dissolved.

11. I have also perused Section 24(3) and Section 25 of the Act, 2001 which has been referred by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the contention that even after constitution of the Nagar Panchayat, the said notification will apply prospectively after the completion of the tenure of the petitioners as Mukhia. Section 24(3) provides that the term of the office-bearer of the Gram Panchayats will be five years from the date of the first meeting. Section 25 further provides that every Gram Panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for a term of five years from the date appointed from its first meeting and not exceeding this. It is also provided that if the Gram Panchayat is dissolved, the newly constituted Gram Panchayat shall continue only for the remaining period.

12. The learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners has tried to convince the Court by submitting that since the impugned notification is a "law" by reasons of which the right conferred upon the petitioners has been taken away, the same will have no effect being dehors the Constitutional mandate. The said argument of the learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners is not tenable in view of the fact that by way of the impugned notification no amendment has been carried out in any law, rather merely the existing power conferred by virtue of Article 243Q and Sections 3 to 6 of the Act, 2011 has been exercised which is well within the domain of the State Government.

13. In the case of Sant Ram (Supra) cited by the learned Sr. counsel for the 7 petitioners, the Hon'ble Apex Court interpreting the terms 'law' and 'law in force' provided in Article 13(3) of the Constitution of India has held that the custom and usage which are inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution of India shall to the extent of such inconsistency be void. The said judgment has been rendered under different fact situation. In the present case, no law has been made so as to take away or to abridge the right conferred by Part III, rather the right conferred to the petitioners by the provisions of Chapter IX of the Constitution of India, has extinguished automatically by the operation of law in view of the clear provisions delineated under Article 243Q as well as Sections 3 to 6 of the Act, 2011.

14. Further, proviso to Article 243N of the Constitution of India provides that all the Panchayats existing immediately before the commencement of 73rd Constitutional Amendment shall continue till its expiration or unless sooner dissolved by a resolution passed to that effect by the Legislative Assembly of that State or in the case of the State having a Legislative Council, by each House of a Legislature of that State. Though the said proviso has been put for dealing with different situation, yet it speaks about the intent of the legislature that the duration of any existing Panchayat may be put to an end by a law made by the legislature of the State.

15. In the case of Deep Narayan Chavan (Supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents relating to interpretation of Article 243U which is quite similar to the provisions of Article 243E, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the expression "unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force" would mean that the moment the Corporation is constituted in accordance with law, the elected Municipal Council would cease to function and the Councilors of the Council, though elected for a fixed tenure, will have to vacate the office.

16. The relevant part of the judgment rendered in the case of Deep Narain Chavan (Supra) is quoted hereunder:

"(2) Mr.Lalit, learned counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra, contends that once a Municipal 8 Council is constituted, then its duration should be five years in accordance with the constitutional provisions contained in Article 243-U and, therefore, in the event the writ application is dismissed and the State Government constitutes a Corporation, the Municipal council will continue to function. This apprehension, in our considered opinion, is misconceived, inasmuch as under Section 341 of the Maharashtra municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 when the whole of the local area comprising a municipal area ceases to be a municipal area, with effect from the date on which such local area ceases to be a municipal area, the Council constituted for such municipal area shall cease to exist or function and the Councillors of the Council shall vacate office. Article 243-U of the Constitution unequivocally indicates that every municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. The expression "unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being" would bring within its sweep the provisions of section 341 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and industrial Townships Act, 1965 and therefore the moment the Corporation is constituted in accordance with law, the elected Municipal Council would cease to function and so also the Councillors, though elected will have to vacate the office. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the interim order passed by the Bombay High Court directing holding of election to the Municipal Council."

17. Thus, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Deep Narain Chavan (Supra), it may be construed that the moment the Nagar Panchayat is constituted in accordance with law, the elected Mukhias i.e. the petitioners herein cease to function.

18. I have also perused the judgment of the Gujarat High Court rendered in the case of Khorijiya Dawoodbhai Sulaiman & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (Supra) relied upon by the learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners. In the said case, the fact was that by a notification dated 03.07.2001, the Government of Gujarat had included Vaghdod Taluka into Patan Taluka without any consequential notification under Section 264 (a)(i) & (ii) and Section 264 (2) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993. Having taken into consideration the provision of Section 264, a Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that after the reconstitution of the Panchayats, the State Government was required to issue 9 consequential notification for increasing the number of the members of the Patan Taluka Panchayat and appointing the members of the Vaghdod Taluka Panchayat as additional members of the Patantaluka Panchayat for the remainder of the term of the Patantaluka Panchayat which was till October, 2005.

19. The aforesaid judgment of the Gujarat High Court has been rendered entirely on different facts and circumstances wherein the issue was with regard to reconstitution of the Panchayats and there was a clear provision in the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 for increasing the number of seats for accommodating the elected members for the remaining period. However, in the present case, the term of the petitioners got dissolved by the operation of law in exercise of power conferred under Article 243Q of the Constitution of India as well as Sections 3, 4 & 5 of the Act, 2011, constituting Domchanch Nagar Panchayat by an order of the Governor having taken into consideration the population, the density thereof, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance and also other relevant factors.

20. Section 160 of the Act, 2001, as referred by the learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners, provides that if the limit of a Panchayat area is altered, the reconstituted Panchayat shall consist of the members nominated by the government and such members shall, as far as possible, would be the persons who were the members of the Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad which has been dissolved and the term of the Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad will not exceed six months and before the expiry of the said term, the Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad shall be constituted in the manner as provided under the Act.

21. The aforesaid provision deals with the situation where the boundary of a Gram Panchayat is altered/reconstituted. However, in the present case, Domchanch Nagar Panchayat has been constituted exercising the power conferred under Article 243Q of the Constitution of India as well as Sections 3, 10 4, 5 & 6 of the Act, 2011. Article 243Q enables the Governor to reconstitute any area as a Nagar Panchayat being transitional in nature considering the density of population, the revenue generated for the local administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors as seems appropriate, that is to say, an area in transition from a rural to an urban area, a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area; and a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area. The State legislature of Jharkhand by reasons of the Act, 2011 has provided the procedure for constitution of the Municipality in conformity with the provisions of Article 243Q of the Constitution of India.

22. Once the Governor takes a call for constitution of Municipality in exercise of the power conferred under the Constitution of India i.e. Article 243-Q, which specifically refers to three types of Municipalities i.e. Nagar Panchayat for transitional area, a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area and Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area and the moment the declaration is made under Article 243-Q read with Section 6 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 by the State Government, the said municipal body would be a sovereign body having both Constitutional and statutory status. The Constitutional Scheme as well as the statutory provisions pertaining to the 'Panchayats' would suggest that the object of Part IX of the Constitution is to introduce the Panchayat system at the grass root level and to strengthen the Panchayat system by providing uniform vibrant units of administration in the rural area so that there can be rapid improvement/development of the rural sector. However, if there appears a transformation from rural features to urban features having regard to the population of area, the density thereof, the revenue generated from the local administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance and other factors, the said area is to be denoted in the notification and the same would then be out from the purview of Part IX of the Constitution and the provisions of the Panchayati Raj Act and thereafter the affairs of the said area would be covered by the provisions of Part IX A of the 11 Constitution along with the provisions of the Act, 2011 treating the same to be urban area. If the argument of the learned Sr. counsel is accepted, the entire scheme of transformation would be unworkable.

23. Moreover, Section 615(2) of the Act, 2011 provides that the Gram Panchayats, Panchayat Samities and Zila Parishads constituted under the Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act, 2001 whose jurisdiction extends over the Municipal Area, shall not exercise powers and functions, as has been entrusted to the Municipality under the said Act. The aforesaid provision specifies that if any Municipality consisting of transitional area of Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti and Village Panchayat is constituted under the Act, 2011, the office of the said Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti and Village Panchayat will seize to function under the Act, 2001 in respect of that transitional area. Thus, the affairs of the same will have to be governed under the provisions of the Act, 2011 irrespective of the fact that the petitioners have been elected for a period of five years. Once the very identity of the Gram Panchayat in question ceases to exist on account of inclusion of such area, the provisions of the Act, 2001 will have no operation and the same will be governed by the provisions of the Act, 2011.

24. The learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners has also contended that the objection of the petitioners and other villagers of the concerned villages submitted under Section 5 of the Act, 2011 was not considered by the respondent-authorities before constitution of Domchanch Nagar Panchayat.

25. On conjoint reading of Sections 3, 4, 5 & 6 of the Act, 2011, it would appear that the State Government, after making the enquiry, is empowered to declare its intention to specify any area to be a larger urban area, a smaller urban area and a transitional area having regard to the population of any local area, the density thereof, the percentage of employment in non-agriculture activities in such area, the economic importance of such area and such other relevant factors. The said notification is to be published in the official gazette and also in two leading newspapers of that particular area inviting objections 12 from any person who has any grievance against that notification. Thereafter, the State Government is to consider the objections and issue the notification for constituting large urban area as Municipal Corporation, smaller urban urban area as Municipal Council and an area which is in transition from rural to urban as Nagar Panchayat.

26. In the case in hand, the specific stand of the respondents is that the impugned notification has been issued only after receiving recommendation of the Deputy Commissioner. The said averment of the respondents finds support from the contents of the impugned notification itself wherein it is mentioned that the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma (the respondent No.5), after disposing of all the objections, made recommendation for constitution of Domchanch Nagar Panchayat vide letter No. 163 dated 04.04.2017. The said fact has not been controverted by the petitioners by filing any rejoinder to the counter affidavit dated 08.03.2018 filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 & 3. Thus, I do not find any infirmity in the procedure adopted by the respondents while issuing the impugned notification.

27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sate of U.P Vs. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 305 has held as under:

"45. What is more objectionable in the approach of the High Court is that although clause (a) of Article 243-O of the Constitution enacts a bar on the interference by the Courts in electoral matters including the questioning of the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made or purported to be made under Article 243-K and the election to any panchayat, the High Court has gone into the question of the validity of the delimitation of the constituencies and also the allotment of seats to them. We may, in this connection, refer to a decision of this Court in Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission, (1967) 1 SCR 400. In that case, a notification of the Delimitation Commission whereby a city which had been a general constituency was notified as reserved for the Scheduled Castes. This was challenged on the ground that the petitioner had a right to be a candidate for Parliament from the said constituency which had been taken away. This Court held that the impugned notification was a law relating to the 13 delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made under Article 327 of the Constitution, and that an examination of Sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Commission Act showed that the matters therein dealt with were not subject to the scrutiny of any Court of law. There was a very good reason for such a provision because if the orders made under Sections 8 and 9 were not to be treated as final, the result would be that any voter, if he so wished, could hold up an election indefinitely by questioning the delimitation of the constituencies from Court to Court. Although an order under Section 8 or 9 of the Delimitation Commission Act and published under Section 10(1) of that Act is not part of an Act of Parliament, its effect is the same. Section 10(4), of that Act puts such an order in the same position as a law made by the Parliament itself which could only be made by the Parliament itself which could only be made by it under Article 327. If we read Articles 243-C, 243-K and 243-O in place of Article 327 and Section 2 (kk), of the Delimitation Act, 1950, it will be obvious that neither the delimitation of the panchayat area nor of the constituencies in the said areas and the allotments of seats to the constituencies could have been challenged or the Court could have entertained such challenge except on the ground that before the delimitation, no objections were invited and no hearing was given. Even this challenge could not have been entertained after the notification for holding the elections was issued. The High Court not only entertained the challenge but has also gone into the merits of the alleged grievances although the challenge was made after the notification for the election was issued on 31st August, 1994."

28. In the aforesaid case, their Lordships have clearly held that neither the delimitation of the Panchayat area nor of the constituencies in the said areas and the allotments of seats to the constituencies could have been challenged or the Court could have entertained such challenge, except on the ground that before the delimitation, no objections were invited and no hearing was given. Even this challenge could not have been entertained after the notification for holding the elections was issued.

29. Thus, even if the ground that the objection of the petitioners was not appropriately appreciated, would not be entertained by the Court after the notification for holding the elections was issued. In the present case also, the election notification for the Nagar Panchayat(s) has already been issued. Thus, the challenge to the impugned notification by the petitioners on this score is 14 also liable to be rejected.

30. In view of the discussions made herein above, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned notification as well as to entertain the other prayers of the petitioners. The writ petition being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed.

31. Consequently, I.A No. 565/2018 also stands dismissed.

(RAJESH SHANKAR, J) High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Dated 22.03.2018 Satish/A.F.R