Gujarat High Court
C Doctor & Company Private Limited vs Tata Projects Limited & on 23 December, 2016
Author: A.G.Uraizee
Bench: A.G.Uraizee
C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 365 of 2016
With
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9769 of 2016
In
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 365 of 2016
With
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 366 of 2016
With
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9770 of 2016
In
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 366 of 2016
================================================================
C DOCTOR & COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED....Appellant(s) Versus TATA PROJECTS LIMITED & 1....Respondent(s) ================================================================ Appearance:
ARJUN R SHETH, ADVOCATE for the Appellant(s) No. 1 MR RA MISHRA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2 NANAVATI ASSOCIATES, CAVEATOR for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.G.URAIZEE Date : 23/12/2016 COMMON CAV ORDER
1. This appeal under Order 43 Rule (1)(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code for the sake of brevity) questions order dated 29.09.2016 passed by the learned Chamber Judge, City Civil Court, Court No.4, Ahmedabad below Exhibit23 in Civil Suit No.1675 of 2016 whereby an application under Page 1 of 19 HC-NIC Page 1 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER Order VII Rule (10) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 preferred by the respondent No.1 is allowed and the plaint of Civil Suit No.1675 of 2016 instituted by the appellant is ordered to be returned for presenting the same in a competent Court at Hyderabad.
2. The brief facts which are necessary to be considered to resolve the issue involved in this appeal can be summed up as under:
2.1. The appellant was awarded a contract by the respondent No.1 to set up ventilation system for two units of 800 M.W. each at Sri Damodaran Sanjeevaiah Thermal Power Plant of APPDCL at Krishnapatnam, DistrictNellore, Andhra Pradesh. Thereupon, the appellant and the respondent No.1 entered into (supply contract) dated 31.03.2011 bearing purchase order No.SBUPG/2x800MW SDSTPS K'patnam/1438 for supply of material for installation of the ventilation system for the value of Rs.7,53,71,000/.
2.2 The appellant and the respondent No.1 also entered into another (Erection Contract) on the same date i.e. on 31.03.2011 bearing work order No.SBUPG/2x800MW SDSTPSK'patnam/1440 for erection of the ventilation system for the total value of Rs.58,15,000/.
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3. Pursuant to clause No.12 of the said contract, the appellant furnished performance bank guarantee, Ahmedabad. Later on, the appellant changed its bankers from HDFC Bank Limited to Oriental Bank of Commerce, Ahmedabad (respondent No.2) and replaced the performance bank guarantee.
4. Pursuant to the contracts, the ventilation system were installed and the performance bank guarantee test was successfully conducted by the appellant for the two units on 20.03.2015 and 24.06.2015 respectively. Thereafter, it appears that the correspondence and joint inspection took place between the appellant and the respondent No.2 with regard to the account statement, and, ultimately, by letter dated 26.08.2016, the respondent No.1 demanded a sum of Rs.2,23,81,310/ in relation to the contracts within seven days failing which it threatened to encash the performance bank guarantee (hereinafter referred to PBG). The appellant, therefore, approached the City Civil Court, Ahmedbad by instituting Civil Suit No.1675 of 2016 for restraining the defendant No.1 from encashing the PBG along with Notice of Motion Exhibit6/7 to restrain the defendant No.1 from encashing the PBG.
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5. The respondent No.1 entered its appearance and submitted an application Exhibit23 under Order VII Rule (10) of the Code for return of the plaint for being presented to Court of competent jurisdiction at Hyderabad on the ground that in view of clause 5.1 of the work order and purchase order the courts at Hyderabad have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters arising under the contract. The learned trial Judge by the impugned order has allowed the application and has ordered to return the plaint to the appellant for being presented to the Court having jurisdiction at Hyderabad. The learned trial Judge, in view of this order did not decide the Notice of Motion and left it to be decided by the competent Court at Hyderabad. The appellant being aggrieved by this impugned order has preferred this appeal.
6. I have heard Mr. Mihir Thakore, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Arjun R. Sheth, learned advocate for the appellant, Mr. K.S. Nanavati, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Rahil Patel and Mr. Pratik Balia, learned advocates for Nanavati Associates for respondent No.1 and Mr.R.A. Mishra, learned advocate for respondent No.2Bank.
7. With the consent of learned counsels for the parties the appeal was heard on merits and is Page 4 of 19 HC-NIC Page 4 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER being finally disposed of by this judgment.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Bank Guarantee is a separate and independent contract as held by the Supreme Court in the case of H. Construction Company Limited v. State of Bihar and others reported in (1999) 8 SCC 436 and Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coaltar Refinery Co., reported in (2007) 8 SCC 110. and the bank is not party to the contract dated 31.03.2011 entered into between the appellant and the respondent No.1. According to his further contention the bank guarantee does not contain a clause similar to clause 5.1 of the erection contract between the appellant and respondent No.2. He, therefore, submits that the jurisdiction of Court at Ahmedabad cannot be ousted on the basis of clause 5.1 to maintain the suit against the respondent No.2Bank. It is his further submissions that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and others reported in (1966) 3 SCC 443 is not applicable to the facts of the present case as it pertains to the invoking bank guarantee and does not reflect upon suit to restrain the bank from disbursing funds under the bank guarantee. It is his further contention that in view of provisions of Section 20(B), the City Civil Page 5 of 19 HC-NIC Page 5 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER Court, Ahmedabad has jurisdiction as the respondent No.2Bank has a plant in Ahmedabad, the PBG is issued at Ahmedabad, the appellant intimated the bank about the fraud committed by the respondent No.1 at Ahmedabad and the respondent No.1 has in fact invoked the bank guarantee at Ahmedabad, and therefore the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad has got the jurisdiction. He would also further contend that the Supreme Court has not considered Section 20(B) of the CPC in the case of South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. (supra). It is his further contention that since the knowledge of fraud was brought to the notice of respondent No.2Bank at Ahmedabad, being a relevant factor, in view of decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. State Sugar Corporation v. SUMAC International Ltd. reported in 1997 (1) SCC 568, the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad has got jurisdiction. He, therefore, submits that the learned trial Judge has committed an error in returning the plaint to the appellant for presenting the same in the competent Court at Hyderabad and urges that the appeal may be allowed.
9. Mr. K.S. Nanavati, learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 submits that for deciding the question of jurisdiction, the Court is required to consider the averments made in the plaint and Page 6 of 19 HC-NIC Page 6 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER the facts of the lis between the parties are to be considered. He further submits that the execution of bank guarantee of the defendant No.2 in Ahmedabad and its invocation at Ahmedabad would not confer jurisdiction at Ahmedabad. He has relied upon the various decisions as under: "(a) South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and others reported in 1996 (3) SCC 443.
(b) DLF Industries Ltd. v. ABN Amro Bank and others reported in 2000 (55) DRJ 470 (DB).
(c) Engineering Projects (India) Limited v. Greater Noida Industrial Development and Another reported in 113(2004)DLT465:
MANU/DE/0555/2004.
(d) McNally Bharat Engineering Company Limited v. Maharashtra State Power Generation Company Ltd. reported in AIR 2015 Cal 207 :
MANU/WB/0447/2015."
10. He further submits that cause of action is a bundle of facts and only such facts which are essential and material need to be proved to give right to the appellant to get relief would for integral part of cause of action to confer jurisdiction of a particular Court. In support of his submission, he has relied upon various decision as under: "(a) Union of India and others v. Adani Exports Ltd. and another reported in (2002) 1 SCC 567.
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(b) Alchemist Ltd. and anothers v. State Bank of Sikkim and others reported in (2007) 11 SCC
335.
(c) State of Rajasthan and others v. Swaika Properties and another reported in (1985) 3 SCC 217."
11. He would also submit that receipt of letter dated 30.08.2016 by respondent No.2Bank does not form part of cause of action to institute a suit within the territorial limits of City Civil Court at Ahmedabad. It is his further submission that so called fraudulent invocation of the PBG by the respondent No.1 occurred prior to issue of notice dated 30.08.2016 to the respondent No.1 by the appellant. He, therefore, submits that such a notice by the appellant does not furnish cause of action to institute a suit for injunction. He relies upon the following decision in support of this contention: "(a) Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1954 Bom. 129:
MANU/MH/0033/1954
(b) Jaharlal Pagalia v. Union of India reported in AIR 1959 Cal 273:
MANU/WB/0069/1954."
12. It is his further contention that the allegation of fraud being committed by the respondent No.1 is the dispute between the appellant and respondent No.1 which cannot form Page 8 of 19 HC-NIC Page 8 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER part of cause of action against the respondent No.2Bank. He relied upon the following decisions in support of this contention: "(a) General Electric Technical Services Company Inc. v. Punj Sons (P) Ltd. and Another reported in 1991 (4) SCC 230.
(b) Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. reported in 1997 (6) SCC 450.
(c) Reliance Salt Ltd. v. Cosmos Enterprises and Another reported in 2006 (13) SCC 599.
(d) State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. Jaisons Clothing Corporation and another reported in 1994 (6) SCC 597."
13. Mr. Nanavati, learned senior counsel, therefore, urges that the impugned order of the learned trial Judge does not warrant interference in this appeal.
14. The fulcrum of the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant is that the PBG is an independent contract, and since, this contract does not contain any clause as regards the exclusion of jurisdiction of the Court at Ahmedabad, and that the Branch Office of respondent No.2 is situated at Ahmedabad, and that the notice of fraud having been committed by the respondent No.1 is served on the Bank at Ahmedabad, and that the PBG is invoked at Page 9 of 19 HC-NIC Page 9 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER Ahmedabad. The Court at Ahmedabad has got jurisdiction and the learned trial Judge has fallen in error in recording the findings to the contrary and has directed to return the plaint to the appellant for being presented to the Court of competent jurisdiction at Hyderabad.
15. The learned counsels of either side are not at conflict on the proposition of law that the bank guarantee is an independent and separate contract and the same is absolute in nature, and therefore, it is not necessary to delve deep into the examination of this proposition of law.
16. This Court in the case of Nizar Sadaruddin Khoja v. Vaibhav Construction (supra) has held that jurisdiction of the Court has to be decided on the basis of the averments as originally made in the plaint and subsequent amendment in the plaint would not confer jurisdiction to a Court which has no jurisdiction on the basis of the averments made in the original plaint, the relevant observations are recorded in paragraph No.13 as under: "13. As per well settled principle of law, suit is to be instituted in a proper Court having jurisdiction, may be pecuniary, territorial or statutory. Institution of a suit in a Court with inherent lack of jurisdiction, the institution itself will be bad and the Court cannot entertain. Since this is the legal position the Court cannot deal with any application under Order 6 Rule 17 of Page 10 of 19 HC-NIC Page 10 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER the Code with a view to invest or divest with jurisdiction which otherwise the Court did not have initially at the time of institution. Any such order would be without jurisdiction. Once the suit is filed, in a Court having proper jurisdiction, it is always open to the plaintiff, at any stage of the suit, to relinquish or abandon a part of claim under Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code. This can be done by mere declaration which Court may record. Such abandonment/relinquishment shall not have any effect upon jurisdiction because on the date of institution the Court enjoyed jurisdiction and still enjoys but the plaintiff does not want the Court to exercise jurisdiction qua that claim. Hence, the Court has to proceed with the remaining claim for which the plaintiff requires to adjudicate. The Simple analogy is that if on the date of institution of the suit the Court was invested with jurisdiction by subsequent abandonment the jurisdiction is not usurped or taken away but simpliciter the Court is required not to apply mind to that part of the claim. Thus, when suit is instituted in a Court with jurisdiction by subsequent abandonment of a part of the claim even if such an abandonment has effect of divesting with pecuniary jurisdiction then also the institution of suit does not get affected and the Court shall decide the matter in accordance with law."
17. A similar view is taken by Delhi High Court in the case of Archie Comic Publication v. Purple Creations Pvt. Ltd. and others (supra).
18. The hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. (supra) has laid down a proposition of law that mere execution of the bank guarantee at a particular place would not confer jurisdiction and give cause of action to a place at which such a bank Page 11 of 19 HC-NIC Page 11 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER guarantee executed. The paragraph Nos.2 and 3 of this judgment lays down a proposition as under: "2. The only controversy is whether the Delhi High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is an admitted position that the contract was executed in Bombay. It is also an admitted position that the performance of obligations and liabilities under the contract was required to be done in Bombay inasmuch as cargo of livestock was to be transported in the ship from Kandla to Damman or Jeddah. It is also an admited position that in furtherance of the execution of the contract at Bombay, the respondents had executed the bank guarantee at Delhi and had transmitted it to Bombay for performance of the contract. The question, therefore, is whether any part of the cause of action had arisen in Delhi. The learned counsel for the respondents had relied upon a judgment of this Court in A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies to contend that since part of the cause of action had arisen in Delhi, the High Court on the original side has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. We are unable to accept the contention.
3. It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts which give cause to enforce the legal injury for redress in a court of law. The cause of action means, therefore, every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possible accrue or would arise. In view of the admitted position that contract was executed in Bombay, i.e., within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay, performance of the contract was also to be done within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court; merely because bank guarantee was Page 12 of 19 HC-NIC Page 12 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER executed at Delhi and transmitted for performance to Bombay, it does not constitute a cause of action to give rise to the respondent to lay the suit on the original side of the Delhi High Court. The contention that the Division Bench was right in its finding and that since the bank guarantee was executed and liability was enforced from the bank at Delhi, the Court got jurisdiction, cannot be sustained."
19. Delhi High Court in the case of DLF Industries Ltd. v. ABN Amro Bank and others (supra), Engineering Projects (India) Limited v. Greater Noida Industrial Development and Another (supra) and the Colkata High Court in the case of McNally Bharat Engineering Company Limited v. Maharashtra State Power Generation Company Limited (supra) has taken similar view on the basis of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. (supra).
20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and others v. M/s. Swaika Properties and another (supra) while explaining the meaning of cause of action has held in paragraph No.8 that the mere service of notice at a particular place would not confer jurisdiction to the Court of that particular place. Paragraph No.8 of the judgment reads as under: "8. The expression 'cause of action' is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure:
Page 13 of 19HC-NIC Page 13 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER The 'cause of action' means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court.
In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause ODF action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the respondent felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued dby the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of Page 14 of 19 HC-NIC Page 14 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER action wholly or in part arose."
21. Similar view is expressed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) and the Colkata High Court in the case of Jaharlal Pagalia v. Union of India (supra).
22. As per the settled proposition of law has laid down by this Court in the case of Nizar Sadaruddin Khoja (supra) the question of cause of action and jurisdiction has to be considered and decided on the basis of averments made in the plaint as originally instituted.
23. The suit as originally filed contain following substantive prayers: "a. this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue injunction restraining the Defendant no.1 from encashing any sum of money under the Performance Bank Guarantee No.10510005114 dt.
21.03.2014 for Rs. 5,81,500/;
b. this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue injunction restraining the Defendant no.2 from disbursing amounts under the Performance Bank Guarantee No.10510005014 dt. 21.03.2014 for Rs.72,07,100/, and the Performance Bank Guarantee No.10510005114 dt. 21.03.2014 for Rs.5,81,500/;
c. exparte adinterim and / or interim reliefs in terms of prayer clause 40 (a) and / or (b);
24. During the pendency of Notice of Motion Exhibit6/7, the respondent No.1 invoked the bank Page 15 of 19 HC-NIC Page 15 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER guarantee. Therefore, the appellant by endorsement dated 26.07.2008 did not press prayer 40 (a) since the same had become infructuous.
25. In view of the deletion of prayer 40 (a) the suit survives for prayer 40 (b) for injunction restraining respondent No.2Bank from disbursing the amounts under the PBG.
26. It would be apposite to examine averments made in the suit by the appellant as originally instituted. The paragraph No.34 of the Suit as originally instituted reads as under: "34. That the defendant No.2 carries on business within the territorial limits of this Hon'ble Court, and that the PBGs in question have been executed with the office of the defendant No.2 within the territorial limits of this Hon'ble Court, hence part cause of action has taken place within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and hence this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the present matter."
27. From the bare reading of the aforesaid paragraph makes it manifestly clear that the appellant has tried to invoke the jurisdiction of City Civil Court, Ahmedabad on the ground that the respondent No.2Bank is doing business within a territorial jurisdiction of Ahmedabad and that the PBG's have been issued by the respondent No.2 at Ahmedabad, and therefore, part of cause of action has arisen at Ahmedabad. Mr. Thakore, Page 16 of 19 HC-NIC Page 16 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER learned senior counsel for the appellant relying upon clause(b) and (c) of Section 20 of the Code has tried to submit that the defendant No.2 carries on business at Ahmedabad and the PBG's have been issued from Ahmedabad and during the pendency of the notice of motion they are being invoked at Ahmedabad. The Court at Ahmedabad has got jurisdiction to try the suit. It is settled proposition of law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts which give rise to institute a suit within the jurisdiction of particular Court for redressal of the legal injury. It is therefore necessary to consider the plaint as a whole to ascertain whether the facts as pleaded in the plaint give rise to cause of action to file suit within the jurisdiction of the particular Court. In the case on hand, therefore, only on the basis of averments made in paragraph No.34 of the plaint, it cannot be said that the cause of action has arisen within the local jurisdiction of Court at Ahmedabad. The averments made in the plaint makes it manifestly clear that there is an agreement dated 31.03.2011 between the appellant and respondent No.1 for erection of ventilation system. It is also not in dispute between the parties that the said contract was entered into between the parties at Hydrabad. It further appears from the averments in the plaint that dispute as regards settlement of accounts Page 17 of 19 HC-NIC Page 17 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER arose between the parties for which joint inspection of the site was made an Email communication has been exchanged. It, therefore, appears that dispute between the parties is regarding the settlement of accounts. Hence, only on the basis of paragraph No.34 of the plaint only because respondent No.2Bank carries on business within the territorial jurisdiction of Court at Ahmedabad to part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of Court at Ahmedabad. Therefore, contention of Mr. Thakkar, learned advocate for the appellant cannot countenanced. Admittedly, the appellant has furnished PBGs issued by respondent No.2Bank in terms of contract between the appellant and respondent No.1. This contention cannot countenance the hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. (supra) has now settled the controversy as held that the issue or invocation of bank guarantee at a particular place would not give rise or confer jurisdiction within the local limits of the Court where the bank guarantee is issued or invoked. Therefore, by invoking provisions of section 20
(b) and/or (c) merely because defendant No.2Bank who has issued the bank guarantee at Ahmedabad and the bank was intimated about the fact at Ahmedabad and that the bank guarantee is invoked at Ahmedabad would not confer jurisdiction on the Page 18 of 19 HC-NIC Page 18 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016 C/AO/365/2016 CAV ORDER Court at Ahmedabad by passing clause 5.1 of the contract.
28. In view of the above, I am of the view that the learned trial Judge has not committed any error in recording the conclusion that the Court at Ahmedabad has no jurisdiction and the impugned order of the learned trial Judge does not suffer from any perversity or irregularity warranting interference in this appeal.
29. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
30. In view of the above order, the Appeal from Order No.366 of 2016 as well as Civil Application No.9769 of 2016 and Civil Application No.9770 of 2016 do not survive and stands disposed of accordingly.
(A.G.URAIZEE,J) Manoj Page 19 of 19 HC-NIC Page 19 of 19 Created On Sat Dec 24 00:49:53 IST 2016